

AUSTIN
ON
JURISPRUDENCE.

VOL. I.

Lately published,

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LECTURES
ON
JURISPRUDENCE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW.

BY THE LATE JOHN AUSTIN,

OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

FOURTH EDITION, REVISED AND EDITED

BY ROBERT CAMPBELL,

ADVOCATE (SCOTCH BAR), AND OF LINCOLN'S INN, BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

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TO THIS EDITION. .

It must be gratifying to all who value and appreciate the work of the late JOHN AUSTIN to know that a new edition of these Lectures has been urgently called for. The circumstance is significant not only as a public recognition of the merit of the lectures themselves, but also as a proof of the growing interest which is becoming awakened in this country towards the philosophical study of jurisprudence.

The present edition has been prepared with the assistance of notes of the original lectures which have been preserved by Mr. J. S. Mill, and were kindly furnished by him to the late Mrs. Austin for the purpose of a new edition which she meditated, but did not live to complete. These notes have now been collated with the lectures as already published; and are found so accurate and full in the parts where the printed lectures are complete that they may be confidently relied on for supplying the lacunæ which, owing to the state of the author's MS., were in the former publication inevitable.

In revising the six lectures which formed the volume published in the author's lifetime, care has been taken to make no material alteration except in accordance with a clearly expressed intention of the author contained in

his memoranda preserved by the late editor, and published in the notes to the former edition. Where, however, such intention was clear upon the face of that text and notes, the present editor has chosen rather to venture on the attempt to embody it explicitly in the text, than to leave the task to each reader of collecting that intention from the scattered passages and fragments. In the instances, confined to the matter of a few pages, where any such alteration has been made, the nature and extent of the alteration is explicitly stated in the foot-notes by the present editor, distinguished by the initials 'R. C.'

With regard to the remaining Lectures, free use has been made of the notes above described (hereafter shortly referred to as 'J. S. M.'s notes'), both for purposes of arrangement and addition. For the purpose of arrangement, these notes have often furnished the clue where, for want of such a clue, inevitable misplacement of passages had taken place in the former edition. Of the additions the most important are in the 39th and 40th lectures. The latter part of the 39th lecture, on the important topic of 'Codification,' formed an entire lecture in the course preserved in J. S. M.'s notes. The 40th lecture, which is described in the former edition as missing, is now restored, and forms the leading chapter of one of the author's main divisions of his subject.

Neglect could not have effaced the impress, which John Austin and his work has stamped upon the thought of posterity. But that so much has been recorded in explicit and substantive form, is due to the ability and diligence of the lady whose preface heads the following pages. Mrs. Austin died at Weybridge on the 8th of August, 1867, and it may be interesting to the reader, and can scarcely be inappropriate here, to supplement the

ensuing preface with a short account of her own life. In doing so the editor takes the liberty of borrowing from the pen of one entitled to speak from long and intimate acquaintance. The *Times* of the 12th August, 1867, contains the following notice:—

It has already been announced, in another part of these columns, that Mrs. Austin, widow of the late John Austin, well known as one of the most eminent professors of the science of jurisprudence whom this country has produced, expired on the 8th inst. at her residence at Weybridge, after an acute attack of a malady of the heart, with which she had long been afflicted. Although the life of Mrs. Austin was spent in the active discharge of her private duties, and although no one was less disposed to court celebrity, which she might have enjoyed in a far larger degree had she cared to seek it, she undoubtedly filled so considerable a place in society and in literature that some record of so remarkable a woman may not unfitly appear in this place. To the attractions of great personal beauty in early life, and of a grace of manner undiminished by years, Mrs. Austin added a masculine intellect and a large heart. It was not by the play of a vivid imagination, or by an habitual display of what is termed wit, that she secured the affections and the friendship of so many of the wisest and noblest of her contemporaries. The power she exercised in society was due to the sterling qualities of her judgment, her knowledge, her literary style—which was one of great purity and excellence—and, above all, to her cordial readiness to promote all good objects, to maintain high principles of action, and to confer benefits on all who claimed her aid.

‘ Mrs. Austin was descended from the Taylors of Norwich, a family which has in several generations produced men and women distinguished by literary and scientific ability. She was born in 1793, and she received in her father’s house an education of more than common range. In 1820 she married Mr. John Austin, then a barrister on the Norfolk Circuit, and came to reside next door to Mr. Bentham and Mr. James Mill, in Queen Square, Westminster. Although that house could boast of none of the attractions of luxury, for the fortune of its owners was extremely small, it soon collected within its walls as remarkable an assemblage of persons as ever met in a London drawing-room. There might be seen—a dim

and fitting figure of the past—Mr. Bentham and his two disciples, James and John Stuart Mill, the Grotes, the rising lawyers of that day whose success has justified the promise of their dawn, Bickersteth, Erle, Romilly, and Senior, and all this wisdom and learning was enlivened in later years by the wit of Charles Buller, by the hearty sallies of Sydney Smith, by the polished eloquence of Jeffrey, by the courteous amenity of Lord Lansdowne, and by the varied resources of foreign visitors who found a home by Mrs. Austin's hearth.

‘Mrs. Austin never aspired to original literary composition. Except in some of the prefaces to her translations, she disclaimed all right to address the public in her own person. She, therefore, devoted the singular power of her pen to reproduce in English many of the best contemporary works of German and French literature. Her translations from the German, more especially, were of the highest excellence, and among these her version of Ranke's *Popes of Rome* has been commended by the best judges as deserving to retain a place in English historical literature.

‘Much of Mrs. Austin's life was spent abroad, and not a few of the most eminent persons in continental society enjoyed her friendship. She had inhabited two German Universities for the prosecution of her husband's studies; after he had quitted the bar for a chair of jurisprudence in the London University. She had accompanied him to Malta when he was sent as a commissioner to that island. She remained for some years in Paris, where her small *salon* had an intellectual stamp and charm not inferior to that of her London circle. The revolution of 1848 drove the Austins back to England; they established themselves in the village of Weybridge, and calmly anticipated the day when they should rest side by side in Weybridge churchyard. Mrs. Austin, however, survived her husband for several years, and that interval was employed by her in accomplishing a task which to most women would have seemed hopeless. The greater part of the Lectures delivered by Professor Austin on the principles of jurisprudence had remained in manuscript. His ill-health led him constantly to postpone the task of preparing them for the press. After his death his widow, assisted by one or two legal friends on whose judgment she could rely, succeeded in completing the imperfect edifice from the fragments of it that remained; and we owe to Mrs. Austin, already advanced in years, and struggling with a painful disease, the production of a work on jurisprudence, which is unquestionably the

noblest monument that could be raised to the memory of her husband.'

In pursuance of a bequest of Mrs. Austin's, the books on jurisprudence (chiefly of German authors), which had been preserved as those of her husband's ~~which~~ he had chiefly valued and studied, and many of which are filled with observations and analytical notes in his handwriting, are now placed in the library of the Inner Temple in a separate compartment. As these are the volumes which are chiefly denoted by the references in the ensuing Lectures, and as they are there sometimes referred to by their pages, it is important to state the particular editions. A list is accordingly here subjoined of the books forming the collection so placed in the Inner Temple Library.

	No. of Vols.
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter, Heidelberg, 1815-29	5
„ Das Recht des Besitzes, Giessen, 1827	1
„ System des heutigen römischen Rechts (first volume only) Berlin, 1840	1
„ Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, Heidelberg, 1814	1
„ Translation of the last, by Abraham Hayward. Printed by Littlewood & Co., Old Bailey, London (not for sale)	1
Karl Friedrich Eichhorn, Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht, Göttingen, 1825	1
„ Deutsche Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte, Göttingen, 1821-23	4
Gustavus Hugo, Jus Civile Ante-Justinianum, with preface, Berlin, 1815	2
„ Lehrbuch der Geschichte des römischen Rechts, Berlin, 1826	1
„ Lehrbuch eines civilistischen Coursus; 4 volumes of different editions, viz. 6 ^{ter} Band, 2 ^{ter} Versuch; Berlin, 1818; 2 ^{ter} Band, 4 ^{te} Ausgabe; Berlin, 1819; 5 ^{ter} (sonst) 7 ^{ter}) Band, 3 ^{tte} Ausgabe; Berlin, 1820; erster Band, 7 ^{te} Ausgabe; Berlin, 1821	4
Gaii Institutionum Commentarii IV., ed. J. F. L. Göschen, Berlin, 1823. (Full of analytical notes by Mr. Austin)	1
A. F. J. Thibaut, Theorie der logischen Auslegung des römischen Rechts, Altona, 1806	

A. F. J. Thibaut, Versuche über einzelne Theile der Theorie des Rechts, Jena, 1817	2
„ Civilistische Abhandlungen, Heidelberg, 1814	1
„ System des Pandekten-Rechts, Jena, 1828	2
Dr. Ferdinand Mackeldey, Lehrbuch des heutigen römischen Rechts, Giessen, 1827, two vols. (bound in one)	2
Christian Friedrich Mühlenthal, Doctrina Pandectarum, Halle, 1827	3
August Wilhelm Heffter Institutionem des römischen und deutschen Civil-Processus Bonn, 1825	3
D. Christ. Gottlieb Haubold, Institutionum Juris Romani Privati historico-dogmaticarum Lineamenta, Leipzig, 1826	1
„ Institutionum, &c., Epitome, Leipzig, 1821	1
Ernst Spangenberg, Einleitung in das Römisch-Justinianische Rechtsbuch, Hanover, 1817	1
And. W. Cramer, De Verborum significatione Tituli Pandectarum et Codicis cum variae lectionibus Apparatu, Kiliae, 1811	1
Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie, von Kant bis Hegel, Dresden and Leipzig, 1839	1
Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 7th. edition, Leipzig, 1828.	
„ Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, Riga, 1783	1
„ Zum ewigen Frieden, Königsberg, 1796	1
„ Kritik der practischen Vernunft, 6th edition, Leipzig, 1827	1
„ Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Königsberg, 1st part, 1798, 2nd part, 1803	2
F. Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre, Berlin, 1803	1
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, London, 1789	1
„ Constitutional Code for the use of all Nations and all Governments professing Liberal Opinions, vol. i., London, 1830	1
„ Fragment on Government, Dublin, 1776	1
„ Draught of a New Plan for the Organisation of the Judicial Establishment in France, March, 1790	1
„ Traités de Législation civile et pénale, publiés en Français par Ét. Dumont, de Genève, d'après les manuscrits confiés par l'auteur	3
John James Park, Con re-projet to the Humphreysian Code, London, 1828	1
Sir James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, chiefly during the 17th and 18th centuries, with Preface by Wm. Whewell, Edinburgh, 1836	1

James Mill, Essays on, 1. Government; 2. Jurisprudence; 3. Liberty of the Press; 4. Prisons and Prison Discipline; 5. Colonies; 6. Law of Nations; 7. Education; London, printed (not for sale) by J. Innes, 61, Wells Street, Oxford Street	1
Friedrich List, Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie, Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1841	1
Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten, Berlin, 1828	5
Allgemeines Criminal-Recht für die Preussischen Staaten, Berlin, 1827	1
Allgemeine Depositat-Ordnung für die Ober- und Unter-Gerichte der sämtlichen königlich-Preussischen Lande, 15th September, 1783, Berlin, 1783	1
Allgemeine Gerichts-Ordnung für die Preussischen Staaten, Berlin, 1822	2
Allgemeine Hypotheken-Ordnung für die gesammten königlichen Staaten, 20th December, 1783, Berlin, 1784	1
Instruction für die Ober- und Untergerichte zur Ausführung der königlichen Verordnung vom 16 ^{ten} Juni d. J. wegen Einrichtung des Hypotheken-Wesens in dem mit den Preussischen Staaten vereinigten Herzogthum Sachsen, Berlin, 1820	1
Strafgesetzbuch für die herzoglich Holstein-Oldenburgischen Lande, Oldenburg, 1814	1
J. and W. Beck, edition of Corpus Juris Civilis, Leipzig, 1825-6 (2nd vol. in two parts)	2
Joachim Hoppe, Commentarii succinta ad Institutiones Justinianeas, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1736	1
Ant. Matthaeus, De Criminibus ad xlvii. et xlviii. Dig. comment. Vesaliae, 1672	1
J. Gottl. Heineccius, Recitationes in elementa Juris Civilis secundum ordinem Institutionum, Vratislaviae, 1789	1
„ Antiquitatum Romanarum Jurisprudentiam illustrantium syntagma, ed. Haubold, Frankfort, 1822	1
John Reddie, Historical Notices of the Roman Law, Edinburgh, 1826	1
L. A. Warnkönig, Versuch einer Begründung des Rechts durch eine Vernunftidee, Bonn, 1819	1
Johann Wening, Ueber den Geist, des Studiums der Jurisprudenz, Landshut, 1814	1
Eduard Puggaeus, edition of Theodosiani Codicis Fragmenta, Bonn, 1825.	
Angelus Maius, Juris Romani Ante-Justiniani Fragmenta Vaticana (e codice palimpsesto eruta), Rome and Berlin, 1824	1

	No. of Vols.
D. Christoph Martin, Lehrbuch des Deutschen gemeinen Criminal-Processes, Göttingen, 1820	1
Corpus Juris Fridericianum, erstes Buch. 'Von der Prozessordnung, Berlin, 1781	1
B. G. Niebuhr and Eh. A. Brandis, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Geschichte und griechische Philosophie, Bonn, 1827-8	
F. C. von Savigny, C. F. Eichhorn, and T. F. L. Göschen, Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft, Berlin, 1815-23	5
Geo. Lud. Boehmer, Principia Juris Canonici speciatim Juris Ecclesiastici publici et privati quod per Germaniam obtinet, Gottingen, 1802	1
Paul J. Anselm Feuerbach, Betrachtungen über das Geschwornen-Gericht, Landsbut, 1813	1
„ Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gültigen peinlichen Rechts, Giessen, 1826	1
M. C. F. W. Gravell, Prüfung der Gutachten der königl. Preuss. Immediat-Justiz-Commission am Rhein über die dortigen Justiz-Einrichtungen, Leipzig, 1819	2
Ludwig Heinrich Jordan, Ueber die Billigkeit bey Entscheidung der Rechtsfälle, Göttingen, 1804	2
D. Vincenz August Wagner, Zeitschrift für österreichische Rechtsgelehrsamkeit und politische Gesetzkunde, Wien, 1830 (12th part)	1
C. F. Rosshirt, Lehrbuch des Criminalrechts, Heidelberg, 1821	1
C. J. A. Mittermaier, Ueber die Grundfehler der Behandlung des Criminalrechts in Lehr- und Strafgesetzbüchern, Bonn, 1819	1
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Cesare Beccaria (Marchese), Dei Delitti e delle Pene, London, 1801	1
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Isaac Watts, D.D., Logick, 9th edition, London, 1740	1
Arthur Schopenhauer, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, Frankfort, 1841	1
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 15th edition, by Edward Christian, London, 1809	4
Anonymous, Remarks on Criminal Law, with a plan for an improved system, and Observations on the Prevention of Crime, London, Hamilton, Adams & Co., 1834	1
A volume containing, 1. An article from the 'Edinburgh Review,' 1817, No. 57, entitled 'Bentham on Codification;' 2. An article from the same Review, 1843, entitled 'Centralisation,' by Mr. Austin; 3. The pamphlet 'A Plea for the Constitution,' mentioned in Mrs.	

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Austin's preface to these Lectures; 4. An article from the 'Edinburgh Review,' October 1863, 'Austin on Jurisprudence,' understood to be by Mr. J. S. Mill	1
A copy of the former edition (by Mrs. Austin) of these Lectures	3
Ranke's History of the Popes, translated from the German by Sarah Austin, London, 1866	3
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T. R. Malthus, Essay on Population, 4th edition, London, 1807.	2
Additions to the same, London 1817	1
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A volume without a title-page, containing articles from a French law review, the first (which has been carefully noted on the margin by Mr. Austin), being entitled 'Remarques sur la définition et sur la classification des choses,' and being a treatise suggested by a work of M. Poncet, dated about 1817	1
N. Falck, Juristische Encyklopädie, Kiel, 1825	1
Carl von Rotteck and Carl Welcker, Staats-Lexikon, oder Encyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften, Altona, 1842	1
Robert Eden, Jurisprudentia Philologica, Oxford, 1744	1
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M. Camus and M. Dupin, Lettres sur la profession d'Avocat et bibliothèque choisie, Paris, 1818	2
J. A. Rogron, Code de Procédure civile expliqué, Paris, 1826 (bound in 4 parts)	2
M. de Vattel, Droit des Gens, Lyon, 1802	3
George Frédéric von Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens moderne de l'Europe, fondé sur les traités et l'usage, Göttingen, 1821	1
Conrad J. Alex. Baumbach, Einleitung in das Naturrecht, Leipzig, 1823	1

In the following pages the notes which belonged to the Author's work published in his lifetime are distinguished by letters thus ^(u). The notes of the late editor are generally marked by the initials 'S. A.' Those of the present editor by the initials 'R. C.'

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PREFACE

(BY SARAH AUSTIN.)

IT SEEMS NECESSARY that I should endeavour to justify the step I have taken, in bringing before the public writings of such a nature and value as those of my deceased husband. I have also to explain why I have determined to publish them in the incomplete and unfinished state in which he left them. The latter decision was, indeed, a necessary consequence of the former; since I could hardly be guilty of the irreverence and presumption of attempting to correct or alter what he had written.

I respectfully offer these explanations to the few to whom it is fit that any mention of such a man should be made; and I beg them not to think me so careless of his fame, as to have lightly and unadvisedly undertaken to do what might lower the reputation which (almost in spite of himself) he has left among them. To their judgment and candour I commend these imperfect remains. Whatever defects *they* may find, let them be assured *he* would have found more and greater.

It is well known to all who are interested in the science of Jurisprudence, that the volume of which the present is a republication has for many years been out of print. From the time this was known, earnest and flattering entreaties that he would publish a second edition reached him from various quarters. They were sufficient to stimulate any vanity but his.

Unfortunately they came too late. The public, or that small portion of it which interests itself in such subjects, did not discover the deep and clear stream of legal science within

¹ This preface, ending with the division on p. 26, belonged to the edition or reprint published in 1861, of 'The Province of Jurisprudence, determined.'

What follows the division on p. 26 belonged to the edition of the remaining lectures, published in 1863, forming the sequel to the volume published in 1861.

its reach, till its waters had been diverted into other channels, or had disappeared altogether. In proportion as the demand for the book became urgent, (more years and more occupations were interposed between the state of mind in which it was written, and that in which this demand found him. Above all, the hope, the animation, the ardour with which he had entered upon his career as a teacher of Jurisprudence, had been blighted by indifference and neglect; and, in a temper so little sanguine as his, they could have no second spring.

It was not my intention to enter into the particulars of a life of which there is little but disappointment and suffering to relate, and which, from choice as much as from necessity, was passed in the shade. Nothing could be more repugnant to a man of his proud humility and fastidious reserve than the submitting his private life to the inspection of the public; nor would it consist with my reverence for him to ask for the admiration (even if I were sure of obtaining it) of a world with which he had so little in common.

But as, influenced by considerations which have appeared to me, and to those of his friends best qualified to advise, conclusive, I have determined to re-publish the following volume, and to publish the rest of the series of Lectures of which those herein contained form a part, it appears necessary to give some explanation of the state in which he left them; to tell why the work which the Author meditated was never completed; why the portion already in print was so long and so obstinately withheld from the public; and, lastly, what has determined me to take upon myself the arduous task of preparing these materials for the press. In order to do this, I must relate those passages of his life which are immediately connected with the course of his studies; and also, though with infinite pain, must touch upon the qualities, or the events, which paralysed his efforts for the advancement of legal science and the diffusion of important truths.

If I dwell longer upon his personal character than may be thought absolutely necessary to my purpose, my apology, or my justification, will be found in the words of a writer who understood and appreciated him:—

‘His personal character was, or ought to have been, more instructive in these days than his intellectual vigour. He lived and died a poor man. He was little known and little appreciated, nor did he seek for the rewards which society

had to give; but in all that he said and did there was a dignity and magnanimity which conveyed one of the most impressive lessons that can be conceived as to the true nature and true sources of greatness.' •

At a very early age Mr. Austin entered the army, in which he served for five years; a fact which would have no place here, but for the permanent traces it left in his character and sentiments. Though he quitted it for a profession for which his talents appeared more peculiarly to fit him, he retained to the end of his life a strong sympathy with, and respect for, the military character, as he conceived it. - The high and punctilious sense of honour, the chivalrous tenderness for the weak, the generous ardour mixed with reverence for authority and discipline, the frankness and loyalty, which were, he thought, the distinguishing characteristics of a true soldier, were also his own; perhaps even more pre-eminently, than the intellectual gifts for which he was so remarkable.

Mr. Austin was called to the Bar in 1818. If confidence in his powers and prospects could have been given to so sensitive and fastidious a mind by the testimony and the predictions of others, he would have entered on his career with an undoubting and buoyant spirit; for every one of the eminent lawyers in whose several chambers he studied, spoke of his talents and his application as unequalled, and confidently predicted for him the highest honours of his profession.

But he was never sanguine. Even in the days when hope is most flattering, he never took a bright view of the future; nor (let me here add) did he ever attempt to excite brilliant anticipations in the person whom he invited to share that future with him. With admirable sincerity, from the very first, he made her the confidante of his forebodings. Four years before his marriage, he concluded a letter thus:—
' . . . and may God, above all, strengthen us to bear up under those privations and disappointments with which it is but too probable we are destined to contend!' The person to whom such language as this was addressed has, therefore, as little right as she has inclination to complain of a destiny distinctly put before her and deliberately accepted. Nor has she ever been able to imagine one so consonant to her ambition, or so gratifying to her pride, as that which rendered her the sharer in his honourable poverty.

Preface.

I must be permitted to say^s this, that he may not be thought to have disappointed expectations he never raised; and that the effect of what I have to relate may not be enfeebled by the notion that it is the querulous expression of personal disappointment. Whatever there may be of complaint in this brief narrative, is excited by the recollection of great qualities unappreciated, great powers which found no congenial employment, great ardour for the good of mankind, chilled by indifference and neglect; by the recollection of the struggles and pangs of an over-scrupulous and over-sensitive spirit, vainly trying^s to establish, alone and unsustained, the claims of a science which he deemed so important to mankind. Nor is the sorrow of an immeasurable private loss so engrossing as not to be enhanced by regrets at the loss sustained by the world.

It became in no long time evident to one who watched him with the keenest anxiety, that he would not succeed at the Bar. His health was delicate: he was subject to feverish attacks which left him in a state of extreme debility and prostration; and as these attacks were brought on by either physical or moral causes, nothing could be worse for him than the hurry of practice, or the close air and continuous excitement of a court of law.

And if physically unfitted for the profession he had chosen, he was yet more disqualified by the constitution of his mind. Nervous and sensitive in the highest degree, he was totally deficient in readiness, in audacity, in self-complacency, and in reliance on the superiority of which he was conscious, but which oppressed rather than animated him. He felt that the weapons with which he was armed, though of the highest possible temper, were inapplicable to the warfare in which he was engaged; and he gradually grew more and more self-exacting and self-distrusting. He could do nothing rapidly or imperfectly; he could not prevail upon himself to regard any portion of his work as insignificant; he employed a degree of thought and care out of all proportion to the nature and importance of the occasion. These habits of mind were fatal to his success in business.

Indeed, even before his call to the Bar, he had detected in himself the germ of the peculiar disposition of mind which disqualified him for keeping pace with the current of human affairs. In a letter addressed to his future wife, dated 1817, when he was still in the chambers of an Equity Draftsman, he wrote, 'I almost apprehend, that the habit of drawing

will in no short time give me so exclusive and intolerant a taste (as far, I mean, as relate to my own productions) for perspicuity and precision, that I shall hardly venture on sending a letter of much purpose, even to you, unless it be laboured with the accuracy and circumspection which are requisite in a deed of conveyance.'

But 'the habit of drawing' did not create, though it might develope, this tendency to exact from himself a degree of perfection incompatible with promptitude and dispatch. He was, as he says, intolerant of any imperfection; and so long as he could descry the smallest error or ambiguity in a phrase, he recast it again and again till his accurate mind could no longer suggest an objection or a difficulty. This was not the temper which could accommodate itself to the imperious demands of business. After a vain struggle, in which his health and spirits suffered severely, he gave up practice in the year 1825.

In the year 1826, the University of London (now University College) was established. From the character and objects of this institution it appeared to hold out a hope, that not only classes of persons, but branches of science, excluded from the ancient universities, might find admittance and fostering in this. Among the sciences which it was proposed to teach, was Jurisprudence, and Mr. Austin was chosen to fill that Chair. As soon as he was appointed, he resolved to go to Germany, in order to study on the spot what had been done, and was doing, by the great jurists of that country, for whom he had already conceived a profound admiration. He immediately set about learning the language, and had already made some progress before he left England. In the autumn of 1827, after visiting Heidelberg, he established himself with his wife and child at Bonn, which was then the residence of Niebuhr, Brandis, Schlegel, Arndt, Welcker, Mackeldey, Heffter, and other eminent men, from whose society he received equal pleasure and instruction. Mr. Austin secured the assistance of a young jurist, who had just entered on that stage of the professional career in which men are permitted to teach, without holding any appointment. They are called *Privatdocenten*, and are a sort of tutors. By reading German law-books with this gentleman, Mr. Austin, while pursuing his main object, speedily acquired the language with that precision and completeness which he carried into everything he studied.

He also, as I find from some slight memoranda, took great

pains to inform himself thoroughly of the discipline and mode of teaching in the German Universities. He often expressed his earnest desire to carry home, for the use of England, whatever were most worthy of imitation in Germany. He left Bonn in the spring of 1828, master of the German language and of a number of the greatest works which it contains. He always looked back upon his residence there as one of the most agreeable portions of his life. He and those belonging to him, who were then the only English established at Bonn, were received with cordiality by this distinguished society, and found there the qualities most consonant to their tastes: respect for knowledge, love of art, freedom of thought, and simplicity of habits. Spite of the hopes, the projects, and the acquirements with which he entered upon his new functions, it was not without much regret and some forebodings that he quitted a life so full of interest and so free from care, for the restraints and privations which London imposes on poor people, and for the anxieties of a laborious and untried career.

Yet everything promised well, excepting always his health, which had suffered extremely from his anxiety before quitting the Bar, and was only partially restored by the comparative tranquillity of mind which followed his appointment, and by his salutary and agreeable residence on the Rhine.

His Lectures opened with a class which exceeded his expectations. It included several of the men who are now most eminent in law, politics, or philosophy. He was much impressed and excited by the spectacle of this noble band of young men, and he felt with a sort of awe the responsibility attaching to his office. He had the highest possible conception of the importance of clear notions on the foundations of Law and Morals to the welfare of the human race; the thought of being the medium through which these were to be conveyed into so many of the minds destined to exercise a powerful influence in England, filled him with ardour and enthusiasm. As might be expected from his susceptible nature and delicate conscience, these were not unmixed with anxiety too intense for his bodily health.

Some notes, which I find in a blank leaf of the First Lecture delivered at the London University, are so strongly imbued with his earnest and ardent devotion to his work, that, not without some hesitation, I resolve to give them exactly as they stand. Even the broken sentences are

characteristic, and, to those who knew him, inexpressibly touching. To such, they will vividly recall the man whose passionate love of truth and knowledge is apparent even in these hasty words.

‘Before we separate, I wish to say a few words.

It is my purpose to hold conversations at the end of every lecture.

[Advantages to myself and to the gentlemen of my class—Advantages of extempore lectures.

• Incompleteness of written lectures, in respect of the ideas. Waste of labour in writing; extempore lectures can be adapted at the moment to the hearer :

Dulness of written lectures :]

I therefore wish, of all things, to form a habit of lecturing extempore : To this, I am at present not competent, but by dint of giving explanations, &c., I hope I may acquire the requisite facility and composure.

Another advantage which will arise from these discussions : Errors in plan and in execution will be pointed out and corrected.

I beg of you not to be restrained by false delicacy : Frankness is the highest compliment.

I never myself acquiesce, &c. . . .

And this is perfectly consistent with admiration for genius—Monstrous, therefore, for a man, &c. . . .

I therefore entreat you, as the greatest favour you can do me, to demand explanations and ply me with objections—turn me inside out. I ought not to stand here, unless, &c.

Can bear castigation without flinching, coming from a friendly hand.

From this collision, advantages to both parties more advantageous than any written lecture.

Request them to ask questions relative to studies.

In short, my requests are, that you will ply me with questions, and that you will attend regularly.’

I find in the manuscript numerous passages marked *v. v.* which he evidently meant to expand or analyse extemporaneously.

He now appeared to have attained to a position above all others the best suited to him. His peculiar tastes and talents fitted him for the business of a teacher. His power of methodising and expounding was matchless; and he had a natural and powerful eloquence (when he allowed himself to give way to it), which was calculated to rivet the attention and fix itself on the memory. This was far more striking in conversation than in his written lectures. As soon as he reduced anything to writing, the severity of his taste and

his habitual resolution to sacrifice everything to clearness and precision, led him to re-examine every word or expression that did not, in his opinion, subserve these ends.

Perhaps no man was ever more eminently qualified to raise extemporaneous discourse to the highest excellence, had he but combined with his other singular qualifications that of easy confidence and self-satisfaction. His voice was clear and harmonious, and his elocution perfect. Nobody ever heard him talk without being powerfully struck with the vigour and originality of his discourse, the variety and extent of his knowledge, and the scholarlike accuracy and singular appositiveness of his language. Classical thoughts and turns of expression were so familiar to him that they seemed innate and spontaneous. 'I think,' writes a friend to whom I have shown this poor attempt to describe him, 'that you have hardly said enough about his eloquence in conversation. But the truth is, that it is impossible to describe the manner in which one was carried away and utterly absorbed by his talk. One had travelled in an hour over such vast regions, and at such an elevation! And then the extraordinary extent and exactness of his memory!' It is true that I shrink from the attempt to convey an idea of his eloquence in common discourse. It lives in the remembrance of a few. His memory was most extraordinary, and would have been a gift to dwell on with wonder, had it not been so subordinate to his higher faculties. He never made any display of it; and as it was always under the control of his severe love of truth, his hearers were certain that he hazarded nothing, and that his statements might be implicitly relied on.

But those qualities which, above all others, smooth the road to success, were not to be looked for in a character like his. Proud, sensitive, trying everything by the lofty standard he bore within him, it was only to a very peculiar sort of encouragement that he was accessible. The highest applause or admiration of ignorant millions would have failed to give him the smallest satisfaction. The approbation of the few whose judgment he respected, or the persuasion that his labours tended to general utility, were the only stimulants by which he could be enabled to rise above his constitutional shyness and reserve.

It soon became clear that he was as far as ever from having found the modest, but tranquil and secure position, in which he might continue to labour for the advancement of

the sublime science of which he knew himself to be so consummate a master.

It was not to be expected,—it is never found, even in the country where science is most ardently pursued for its own sake,—that studies which have no direct bearing upon what is called practical life, can, except under very peculiar circumstances, attract numerous audiences. Where, therefore, there is any serious intention that the few who addict themselves to such studies should find competent instructors, funds are provided for the maintenance of men who have obviously nothing to expect from popular resort. Their position is perhaps not brilliant, but it is secure and honourable, and affords them leisure for the prosecution of their science. No such provision was, however, made for the Chair to which Mr. Austin had been elected; and as jurisprudence formed no part of the necessary or ordinary studies of a barrister, his professorship became nearly an empty title.

‘In spite,’ says the illustrious writer of a notice of Mr. Austin’s death, in the ‘Law Magazine,’ ‘of the brilliant commencement of his career as a Professor, it soon became evident that this country would not afford such a succession of students of jurisprudence as would suffice to maintain a Chair; and as there was no other provision for the teachers than the students’ fees, it followed of necessity that no man could continue to hold that office unless he had a private fortune, or combined some gainful occupation with his professorship. Mr. Austin, who had no fortune, and who regarded the study and exposition of his science as more than sufficient to occupy his whole life, and who knew that it would never be in demand amongst that immense majority of law students who regard their profession only as a means of making money, found himself under the necessity of resigning his Chair.’²

Such was the end of his exertions in a cause to which he had devoted himself with an ardour and singleness of purpose of which few men are capable. This was the real and irremediable calamity of his life—the blow from which he never recovered. His failure at the Bar was nothing, and would never have been regretted by himself or those who cared for him. *That* was not his vocation, nor had he any peculiar aptitude for it; and there was no want of able and successful barristers. There was no one to do the work he could have done, as an expounder of the philosophy of Law.

² Law Magazine and Review, for May 1860.

At the time he wrote his Lectures, constructed the Tables (hereafter mentioned), and prepared this volume for the press, I can affirm that he had no other thought, intention, or desire, than to push his inquiries and discoveries in the science of law as far, and to diffuse them as widely, as possible. It was from no unsteadiness of purpose, no shrinking from labour, no distaste to a life of comparative poverty and obscurity that he abandoned the pursuit to which he had hoped to devote his life. If there had been found for him some quiet and humble nook in the wide and rich domains of learning, it is my firm conviction that he would have gone on, slowly indeed, as the nature of his study and his own nature rendered inevitable, and with occasional interruptions from illness, but with unbroken tenacity and zeal, to the end of his life.

In June, 1832, he gave his last lecture. In that year he published the volume, of which the present is a reprint. So far was he from anticipating for it any brilliant success, that he was astonished at the readiness and liberality with which the late Mr. Murray undertook the publication of it; and for years afterwards his anxiety was extreme, lest it should have entailed loss upon that gentleman. When at length, in answer to my inquiries, Mr. Murray presented to me the last remaining copy, as a proof that our fears were groundless, Mr. Austin expressed perfect satisfaction, and something like surprise, even at this very moderate success. He was fully aware of the unpopularity of the studies to which he had devoted himself.

‘So few,’ says he, ‘are the sincere inquirers who turn their attention to these sciences, and so difficult is it for the multitude to perceive the worth of their labours, that the advancement of the sciences themselves is comparatively slow; whilst the most perspicuous of the truths with which they are occasionally enriched, are either rejected by the many as worthless or pernicious paradoxes, or win their laborious way to general assent through a long and dubious struggle with established and obstinate errors.’

It must be admitted that the reception given to his book at first was not encouraging. Neither of the Reviews which profess to guide public opinion on serious subjects took the slightest notice of it. Some eulogistic articles appeared in journals of less general currency, but on the whole it may be said to have been left to make its way by its own merits. It was only at a later period, and by slow degrees, that they were appreciated.

In the year 1833 Mr. Austin was appointed by Lord Brougham, then Lord Chancellor, member of the Criminal Law Commission. Though this turned him from the pursuit to which he had hoped to dedicate his life, and confined his inquiries to a narrower and less inviting field than that he had marked out for himself, he entered upon it with the same conscientious devotion, and carried into it the same profound and comprehensive views. But he soon perceived that they would be of small avail to himself or to the public. The powers granted to the Commission did not authorise the fundamental reforms from which alone he believed any good could come; and his opinions as to the ground to be marked out, and the foundations to be laid, before any satisfactory structure of criminal law could be raised, differed widely from those of his colleagues. He had little confidence in the efficacy of Commissions for constructive purposes. He said to me, 'If they would give me two hundred a year for two years, I would shut myself up in a garret, and at the end of that time I would produce a complete map of the whole field of Crime, and a draft of a Criminal Code. *Then* let them appoint a Commission to pull it in pieces.' He used to come home from every meeting of the Commission disheartened and agitated, and to express his repugnance to receiving the public money for work from which he thought the public would derive little or no advantage. Some blurred and blotted sheets which I have found, bear painful and affecting marks of the struggle that was going on in his mind, between his own lofty sense of dignity and duty, and those more ordinary notions which subordinate public to private obligations. I have also found the commencement of a project of a Criminal Code drawn up at that time.

About the same time, he had arrived at the conviction that, as a teacher of Jurisprudence, he had nothing to hope. The insufficiency of the legal education of the country had for some time attracted the attention of the more enlightened part of the profession; and it was at length determined, by the Society of the Inner Temple, that some attempt should be made to teach the principles and history of jurisprudence. Among the most earnest promoters of this scheme was Mr. Austin's friend, Mr. Bickersteth, afterwards Lord Langdale. In the year 1834, Mr. Austin was accordingly engaged to deliver a course of lectures on jurisprudence at the Inner Temple. Had this appointment been made under different

conditions, it was one which he would have preferred to any other, however distinguished or however lucrative. Unfortunately, it was not of a kind to give him the security and confidence he wanted. He was invited to undertake the discouraging task of trying to establish a new order of things, without the certain, though distant, prospect which usually cheers the pioneer in such an enterprise. His appointment could only be regarded as an experiment. This uncertainty weighed upon him from the first. He was, as I have said, disqualified by nature from all work of a passing and temporary sort; and in order to labour with courage and animation, he needed to see before him a long period of persistent study, and security from harassing anxiety. His precarious health and depressed spirits required every possible support; and he was but too easily disheartened at what he thought the want of confidence in the scheme, or in him, evinced in a merely tentative appointment.

It was also clear that the same causes which rendered the appointment to a Chair of Jurisprudence abortive at the London University, were in operation (perhaps to a still greater extent) in the Inns of Court. The demand for anything like scientific legal education had to be created. The eminent lawyers who had adorned the English bar and bench (of whose great faculties no one had a higher admiration than Mr. Austin) had been formed by a totally different process; and the young men entering on the profession were, for the most part, profoundly indifferent to any studies but those which had enabled their predecessors to attain to places of honour and profit. Thus depressed by failure; unsustained by sympathy in his lofty and benevolent aspirations, or by recognition of his value as a teacher; agitated by conflicting duties, and harassed by anxiety about the means of subsistence, it is no wonder that his health became sensibly worse. The severe feverish attacks to which he had always been subject, became more and more frequent and violent; and often, after preparing a lecture with great care and intense application, he was compelled, on the day when it should have been delivered, to send messengers round to the gentlemen of his class, to announce his inability to attend. He soon saw the inutility of struggling against such obstacles. He resolved to abandon a conflict in which he had met with nothing but defeat, and to seek an obscure but tranquil retreat on the Continent, where he might live upon the very small means at his disposal.

He quitted England with a strong feeling of the disadvantage at which a man like himself, devoted exclusively to truth and to the permanent good of mankind, stood, in a country where worldly success is not only the reward, but the test of merit; and where, unless he advances in certain beaten tracks, he arrives at nothing, except neglect and a sort of contemptuous wonder. He felt this keenly, and said to the one person to whom he ever talked freely of himself, 'I was born out of time and place. I ought to have been a schoolman of the twelfth century—or a German professor.' The position of such illustrious and revered teachers as Hugo and Savigny seemed to him the most enviable in the world. The pecuniary inferiority of such a position, compared with the profits attending the practice of law in this country, was not a consideration to which his mind could easily descend.

He had been settled at Boulogne about a year and a half, when a proposal was made to him by the Colonial Office, through his much esteemed and faithful friend Sir James Stephen, to go to Malta as Royal Commissioner, to inquire into the nature and extent of the grievances of which the natives of that island complained. He accepted an appointment for which he was indeed peculiarly fitted. Justice and humanity were parts of his nature, and were fostered by reason and by study. He had no sympathy with the insolence of a dominant race, and he was not likely to view with indulgence, violations of the conditions under which England had accepted the voluntary cession of Malta by its inhabitants. On the other hand, his sagacity, knowledge, and strict sense of justice rendered him inaccessible to fantastic schemes or groundless complaints. Aided by his able and accomplished colleague Mr. (now Sir) George Cornwall Lewis, he rendered to the island services which attracted little attention in England, but are remembered with lively and affectionate gratitude in Malta.

He had the satisfaction of seeing every measure he recommended adopted by the Colonial Office; and he always looked back with great satisfaction to his connection with two men for whom he entertained so sincere a respect as Lord Glenelg and Sir James Stephen. But here another disappointment awaited him. After the reform of the tariff (which Sir James long after called, 'the most successful legislative experiment he had seen in his time'), and of various parts of the administration of the island, Mr. Lewis having been

recalled to England to preside over the Poor Law Board, Mr. Austin was preparing to enter upon his more peculiar province,—legal and judicial reform. Lord Glenelg, however, was no longer in office, and the Commission was suddenly brought to a close by his successor. No reason was assigned, nor was Mr. Austin's abrupt dismissal accompanied with a single word of recognition of his services. It remained for the Maltese to acknowledge them.³

It is indeed but too probable that the state of his health would have incapacitated him for the work he projected. But he frequently said to me; that if, as he presumed, the Colonial Office wished to put an end to the expense of the Commission, he would have continued to live in the island in a private and humble manner, till he had introduced something like order into the heterogeneous mass of laws bequeathed by the successive masters of Malta. It was, however, fortunate that he was not permitted to attempt a task to which his strength was so inadequate.

In giving this short account of his troubled life and baffled designs, my object has only been to show what were the circumstances by which he was forced out of the track on which he had entered, and in which his whole mind and soul were engaged; and why it was that he seemed to abandon the science to which he had devoted his singular powers with so much ardour and intensity.

It was this very ardour and intensity, this entire absorption in his subject, which rendered it impossible to him to resume, at any given moment, trains of thought from which his mind had been forcibly diverted. It belonged to the nature of his mind to grapple with a question with difficulty,—almost with reluctance. It seemed as if he had a sort of dread of the labour and tension to which, when it had once taken hold on him, it would inevitably subject him. He was frequently urged to write on matters which he had studied with an earnestness second only to that which he had devoted to his own peculiar science,—such as Philosophy, Political Economy, and Political Science generally. He usually

* 'Such was the man,' says a Malta journal, in an article announcing his death, 'to whom the Maltese must ever feel grateful for their improved condition as a people, and for the many privileges they now enjoy; and most of all for the liberty of the press under which we are now writing. It cannot be dis-

puted that the inhabitants of this island are greatly advanced in the scale of civilisation, both politically and socially, and rendered more essentially British in civil polity and institutions, by the measures adopted on the recommendation of the Commission presided over by Mr. Austin.'

Preface.

evaded these applications; but to the person with whom he had no reserves, he used to say, 'I cannot work so; I can do nothing in a perfunctory manner.' He knew perfectly his strength and his weakness. He could work out a subject requiring the utmost stretch of the human faculties, with a clearness and completeness that have rarely been equalled. But he had no mental agility. When he gave himself up to an inquiry, it mastered him like an overwhelming passion. Even as early as the year 1816, he spoke to me, in a letter, of 'the difficulty he found in turning his faculties from any object whereon they have been long and intently employed, to any other object.' And for the same reason, when his mind had once loosened its grasp of a subject, it could with difficulty recover its hold.

At the time when a second edition of his book was first demanded, he was, as I have said, occupied in the business of the public, to which it was with him a matter of conscience to consecrate his undivided attention. To this reason for delay was now added another. His health had gradually declined, under the pressure of labour and anxiety. After his return from Malta, in 1838, he was so much worse, that in 1840 his medical friends exhorted him to try the waters of Carlsbad,—with very small hope, as they afterwards confessed, of seeing him again. From those wonder-working waters however he received so much benefit that he determined to return to them, and the summers of 1841, 1842, and 1843 were spent there. In the varied and interesting society assembled in that place, he made the acquaintance of many eminent persons, from whom he eagerly sought for information on the condition of their several countries. The intervening winters were pleasantly and profitably passed at Dresden and Berlin. In the latter capital he found men eminent in every branch of science, to some of whom he had long looked up as the great masters of his own,—especially Herr von Savigny. Political questions were then agitated with great warmth and acrimony in Prussia. Mr. Austin studied them with his usual industry and impartiality; and several men who were themselves engaged in the discussions of the day, were so struck with the clearness and justness of his views, that they urged him to write on the affairs of their country. I have found memoranda which show that at one time he contemplated some work of the kind. It was at Dresden that he wrote, for the 'Edinburgh Review,' his answer to Dr. List's violent attack on the doctrine of Free Trade.

In 1844 he removed to Paris, attracted thither by the society and friendship of some of the distinguished men who were then the able expositors of science, or the eloquent advocates of free institutions. Shortly after, he was elected by the Institute a corresponding member of the Moral and Political Class; an honour for which he was wholly unprepared; unaccustomed as he was to any public recognition of his merits. I shall borrow the words of an illustrious friend, to describe the impression he left on some of the highest minds of France: I could add many such testimonies, but that of M. Guizot is sufficient. ‘C’était un des hommes les plus distingués, un des esprits les plus rares, et un des cœurs les plus nobles que j’ai connus. Quel dommage, qu’il n’ait pas su employer tout ce qu’il avait, et montrer tout ce qu’il valait!’

In that year another earnest appeal was made to him to publish a second edition of ‘The Province of Jurisprudence.’ Letters from friends, and even from strangers, arrived, lamenting the impossibility of getting a copy, and setting forth the constantly increasing reputation of the book. But these flattering representations, which perhaps at an earlier period would have spurred him on to fresh exertions, seemed to give him little pleasure, and he rarely alluded to them. They had now to encounter the reluctance I have spoken of, to resume long-disused labour,—a labour too with which a crowd of painful recollections were associated.

To give a mere reprint of the book would have been easy enough, and it is what any one else so encouraged would probably have done; but Mr. Austin had discovered defects in it which had escaped the criticism of others; and with that fastidious taste and scrupulous conscience which it was impossible to satisfy, he refused to republish what appeared to him imperfections.

That he had long meditated a book embracing a far wider field, I well knew; but I feared that this great work would never be accomplished, and would have gladly compounded for something far less perfect than his conceptions. But I saw that nothing could shake his resolution, and I never willingly adverted to the subject. Whenever it was mentioned, he said, that the book must be entirely recast and rewritten, and that there must be at least another volume. His opinion of the necessity of an entire *refonte* of his book arose, in great measure, from the conviction, which had continually been gaining strength in his mind, that until

the ethical notions of men, were more clear and consistent, no considerable improvement could be hoped for in legal or political science, nor, consequently, in legal or political institutions.

The subjoined prospectus, or advertisement sufficiently proves that he had seriously resolved to execute the great work he had planned. I have found but one copy of it, nor have I been able to hear of the existence of another. I cannot find that it attracted any attention.

The Principles and Relations of Jurisprudence and Ethics. By JOHN AUSTIN, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law.

An Outline of a Course of Lectures on General Jurisprudence, preceded by an attempt to determine the province of the science, was published by the author in 1832. By the sale of the entire edition, and by the continued demand for the book, he is encouraged to undertake a work concerning the same subject, but going more profoundly into the related subject of Ethics. The matter is so vast, and the task of digesting and condensing it so difficult, that a considerable time must necessarily elapse before the intended treatise will be ready for publication.

A concise and unequivocal title for the intended treatise is not afforded by established language. Positive law (or *jus*), positive morality (or *mos*), together with the principles which form the text of both, are the inseparably-connected parts of a vast organic whole. To explain their several natures, and present them with their common relations, is the purpose of the essay on which the author is employed. But positive morality (as conceived in the whole of its extent) has hardly acquired a distinguishing name; though one important branch of it has become the subject of a science, and been styled by recent writers the positive law of nations. For the variously conceived and much disputed principles which form the measure or test of positive law and morality, established language has no name which will mark them without ambiguity. As related to positive law (the appropriate subject of Jurisprudence), they are styled the principles of legislation. As related to positive morality, they are styled morals or ethics; but as either of these names will signify positive morality, as well as the standard to which it ought to conform, there is no current expression for the principles in question which will denote them adequately and distinctly. He (author) had thought of entitling the intended essay, the principles and relations of law, morals, and ethics: meaning by law, *positive* law; by morals, *positive* morals; and by ethics, the principles which are the test of both. But in consequence of the difficulties which he has just stated, he preferred the more concise and not more equivocal title which stands at the head of the present notice.

For reasons to appear hereafter, the work will be divided into two parts. The first will be given to General Jurisprudence; and in his exposition of that science the author will descend into the detail which was indicated by the above-mentioned outline, as deeply as may consist with the limits assigned to an institutional treatise. The second part will be given to Ethics. No separate department will be given to positive morals; but, so far as they are implicated with jurisprudence and ethics, they will be noticed in the departments allotted to those subjects.

He announced the same intention in a letter to the present Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, the companion of his early studies, the beloved and faithful friend of every period of his life. It was only the other day that Sir William Erle found the following fragment of this letter, which he has had the kindness to permit me to print. Unhappily, the part containing the date is lost. It begins with a broken sentence, which must relate to one of the many applications made to him for a second edition: probably they were preceded by some such words as—

[*What Mr. Murray suggests is*] ‘a mere reprint of it; but, if he would give me sufficient time (two years or so), I would do my best to produce something better.

‘I shall now set to work in good earnest; and if my unlucky stars will allow me a little peace, I hope I shall turn out something of considerable utility.

‘I intend to show the relations of positive morality and law (*mos* and *jus*), and of both, to their common standard or test; to show that there are principles and distinctions common to all systems of law (or that law is the subject of an abstract science); to show the possibility and conditions of codification; to exhibit a short scheme of a body of law arranged in a natural order; and to show that the English Law, in spite of its great peculiarities, might be made to conform to that order much more closely than is imagined.

‘The questions involved in this scheme are so numerous and difficult, that what I shall produce will be very imperfect. I think, however, that the subject is one which will necessarily attract attention before many years are over; and I believe that my suggestions will be of considerable use to those who, under happier auspices, will pursue the inquiry.

‘There are points upon which I shall ask your advice.

‘Yours most truly,

‘JOHN AUSTIN.’

He had finally established himself in Paris, when the Revolution of 1848 once more uprooted him. He had watched with intense interest and anxiety the approach of the storm which was to overthrow all regular government in France; and it was from earnest observation of what passed in that country, that he became confirmed in his opinion of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of reconstructing a society which has once been completely shattered. This opinion, together with his ardent and disinterested love of his country, found utterance in the pamphlet which he published in 1859.

He remained for some months in Paris after the Revolu-

tion, watching the course of things. As he became more and more convinced that permanent tranquillity was not to be looked for in France, and that life there would be incessantly troubled and embittered by uncertainty and alarm, he resigned himself to a serious pecuniary loss, and returned to England, determined to seek tranquillity in a small retreat in the country. He took a cottage at Weybridge, in Surrey, near enough to London for convenience, and for occasional visits from his only child, and far enough to enable him to enjoy the retirement he coveted.

Here he entered upon the last and happiest period of his life; the only portion during which he was free from carking cares and ever-recurring disappointments. The battle of life was not only over, but had hardly left a scar. He had neither vanity, nor ambition, nor any desires beyond what his small income sufficed to satisfy. He had no regrets or repinings at his own poverty and obscurity, contrasted with the successes of other men. He was insatiable in the pursuit of knowledge and truth for their own sake; and during the long daily walks, which were almost the sole recreation he coveted or enjoyed, his mind was constantly kept in a state of serene elevation and harmony by the aspects of nature,—which he contemplated with ever-increasing delight, and described in his own felicitous and picturesque language,—and by meditation on the sublimest themes that can occupy the mind of man. He wanted no excitement and no audience. Though he welcomed the occasional visits of his friends with affectionate cordiality, and delighted them by the vigour and charm of his conversation, he never expressed the smallest desire for society. He was content to pour out the treasures of his knowledge, wisdom, and genius, to the companion whose life was (to use the expression of one who knew him well) ‘enfolded in his.’

Thus passed twelve years of retirement, rarely interrupted, and never uninteresting or wearisome. His health was greatly improved. The place he had chosen, and his mode of life suited him. The simplicity of his tastes and habits would have rendered a more showy and luxurious way of living disagreeable and oppressive to him. Yet none of the small pleasures or humble comforts provided for him ever escaped his grateful notice. He loved to be surrounded by homely and familiar objects, and nothing pleased him so much in his garden as the flowers he had gathered in his childhood. Things new or rare were unattractive, if not

distasteful, to his constant and liberal nature. He had a disinterested hatred of expense, and of pretension, and, though very generous, and quite indifferent to gain, he was habitually frugal, and respected frugality in others, as the guardian of many virtues.

One regret mingled with the deep thankfulness with which this comparative freedom from pain and care was regarded by those who loved him:—he showed no inclination to devote these years of improved health and tranquil leisure to the work he had so long ago projected. But even this regret, poignant as it was, gradually subsided under the tranquillising influence of his serene contentment. It is no wonder that the person most sensible of the immense resources and powers of his mind, and most deeply interested in seeing them appreciated, could not resolve to urge him to return to long-disused labours. Suffering, from ill-health and from other causes, had pursued him, almost without intermission, throughout the early and middle part of his life; and now that he had found comparative ease of body and mind, fame, or even usefulness (so long and ardently coveted for him), faded into nothing, compared to these inestimable blessings. The calm evening that followed on so cloudy and stormy a day, was too precious to be risked for the reputation to which he was so indifferent, or for the advantage of a world to which he owed so little.

But his generous solicitude for his country did what nothing else could, and his last effort was prompted by benevolence and patriotism.

He was, in his solitude, a deeply interested observer of political events. He viewed with great anxiety and disapprobation the various schemes of parliamentary reform brought forward during the later years of his life, and felt deeply the severe blow they gave to the respect he wished to feel for eminent public men.

Profoundly convinced as he was of the scarcity of great ability, and of the still greater scarcity of a disinterested love of truth, it may easily be imagined that he regarded with a sort of horror all schemes for placing the business of legislation in the hands of large bodies of men. He had followed step by step the progress of the great minds by which systems of law had been, through ages, slowly and painfully elaborated; and the project of submitting these highest products of the human intellect, or the difficult problems they deal with, to the judgment and the handling of

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uneducated masses, seemed to him a return towards barbarism. He, least of all men, was likely to be dazzled or attracted by wealth or rank; but he valued them on public grounds, as providing for their possessors the highest sort of education, and the leisure and opportunity to apply that education to the general culture of the human mind,—especially to the difficult sciences of legislation and government. The idea of popular legislation was to him as alarming as it was absurd; and it was precisely on account of the disastrous consequences which he was certain must result from it to the people themselves, that he felt indignant at the uses made of their ignorance, and the unmanly affectation of deference to their wishes, by those whose duty it is to enlighten and guide them. Long and accurate observation of other countries, and intercourse with their public men, had taught him the full value of the institutions of this country, and the importance of the habit of obedience to law; and he was too ardent and sincere a patriot to see these imperilled without the deepest emotion. The work of Lord Grey, which appeared in the midst of the discussions on reform, excited his warm and respectful admiration; and when it was suggested to him that he should review it, he immediately consented. The pamphlet published under the title of ‘A Plea for the Constitution,’ was originally written for a quarterly journal; but being thought unsuitable, it was published separately. Its success far exceeded his very modest expectations, and gave him the satisfaction of thinking that he had contributed something to the defeat of pernicious projects. This was the only reward he desired.

From the time that he abandoned the struggle with the world to which he was at once so unequal and so superior, all the bitterness excited in him by the chilling indifference with which his noble and disinterested efforts had been received, subsided. His estimate of men was low, and his solicitude for their approbation was consequently small. But while he kept aloof from them, his sympathy with their sufferings, and his anxiety for their improvement, never abated. For himself, he coveted nothing they had to give; and he awaited the judgment of another tribunal with humility, but with a serenity which became more perfect in proportion as the time for his appearing before it drew nigh.

If elevation above all the low desires and poor ambitions which chain the soul to earth, if a life untainted by a single unjust or ungenerous action or thought, a single concession

to worldly or selfish objects, a single attempt to stifle or to disguise truth, could justify a strenuous anticipation of the world into which none of these things can enter, he might be permitted to feel

Having, as I hope, made intelligible to that portion of the public, capable of sympathy with a character like Mr. Austin's, what were the causes which disabled him—or disinclined him—from entering afresh on the labour of re-constructing and greatly enlarging his book, and of knitting up all the threads which years and events, care and sickness, had tangled or broken, it only remains for me to say what are the materials he has left; what the motives that have induced me to give them to the world; and how it is that I have found myself in a manner compelled to undertake the arrangement of them for the press.

I have sometimes doubted whether it was consistent with my obedience to him to publish what he had refused to publish. I have questioned myself strictly, whether, in devoting the rest of my life to an occupation which seems in some degree to continue my intercourse with him, I was not rather indulging myself than fulfilling my duty to him. There have been times, too, when, in the bitterness of my heart, I have determined that I would bury with me every vestige of his disinterested and unregarded labours for the good of mankind. But calmer thoughts have led me to the conclusion, that I ought not to suffer the fruit of so much toil and of so great a mind to perish; that what his own severe and fastidious judgment rejected as imperfect, has a substantial value which no defect of form or arrangement can destroy; and that the benefits which he would have conferred on his country and on mankind, may yet flow through devious and indirect channels. I persuade myself that if his noble and benevolent spirit can receive pleasure from anything done on earth, it is from the knowledge that his labours *are* 'of use to those who, under happier auspices, pursue the inquiry' into subjects of such paramount importance to human happiness.

Having thus come to the conclusion that some of the manuscripts he left ought to be given to the public, the next question was,—in what form, and by whom? My first thought was to look about for an editor, to whom I might confide the redaction of the whole; leaving to him entire

discretion as to the matter and form of the publication. But it did not appear that any such person could be found, or was likely to be found. A great portion of the manuscript was in so imperfect and fragmentary a state, that it was clear that the whole must be recast and rewritten by any editor who aspired to produce a readable book, from which he could derive reputation or profit. I was alarmed at the thought of the changes the work might undergo in this process. It was to be feared that any editor who had not the self-forgetting devotion of a Dumont, would be more sensible of his responsibility towards the public than of that towards his author. There are great peculiarities in Mr. Austin's style—not one of which was adopted without mature thought. He never had the slightest idea of rendering his subject popular or easy. He demanded from his hearers or readers the full force of their attention; and as he knew how lax and flitting the attention of most men is apt to be, he adopted every expedient for fixing or recalling it. He shrank from no repetitions that he thought necessary to keep a subject steadily and distinctly before the mind, and he availed himself of all typographical helps for the same purpose. Knowing this, I have disregarded the advice of some of those to whom I am most bound, and most disposed, to defer, in retaining the numerous italics with which his book is, in their opinion, deformed. Future editors may, if they will, remove this eyesore. They will not be bound by the deference which must govern me.

It will not be supposed that I think it necessary to call in any testimony to the value of the materials I have to produce. But those whose estimate of them is the highest, may very justly think they ought to have been put into more competent hands. This was my own opinion; and it was not without much anxious deliberation, or without consulting those of Mr. Austin's friends upon whose judgment and solicitude for his fame *he* would, I knew, have had the greatest reliance, that I determined on the course I have pursued. The opinion and the advice which I received from all was essentially the same;—that all the Lectures should be published, 'with only such revision as may remove needless repetitions;' and that, considering the confused and fragmentary state of much of the manuscript, the safest editor would be the person most deeply interested in the author's reputation, and most likely to bestow patient and reverential care on every relic left by him.

Preface.

I need not repeat the terms in which Mr. Austin's friends encouraged me to undertake the task of putting these precious materials in order, nor the offers of advice and assistance which determined me to venture upon it. One of them, who spoke with the authority of a lifelong friendship, said, after looking over a mass of detached and half-legible papers, 'It will be a great and difficult labour; but if you do not do it, it will never be done.' This decided me.

I have gathered some courage from the thought that forty years of the most intimate communion could not have left me entirely without the means of following trains of thought which constantly occupied the mind whence my own drew light and truth, as from a living fountain; of guessing at half-expressed meanings, or of deciphering words illegible to others. During all these years he had condescended to accept such small assistance as I could render; and even to read and talk to me on the subjects which engrossed his mind, and which were, for that reason, profoundly interesting to me.

Having determined on the course to be pursued, the first thing to be done was obviously to republish the volume already in print, which has been long and eagerly demanded. The Author's Preface explains the matter of which this volume consists, and his purpose in publishing it. I have altered nothing, except the position of the Outline, which is now placed at the beginning, instead of at the end of the book. I have inserted all the scattered memoranda I have been able to find, relating to alterations and additions which he meditated. Some of them are taken from a small paper marked 'Inserenda.' All these things are manifestly mere suggestions for his own use,—indications of matter which he intended to introduce or to work out. They are inserted, chiefly as proofs of the thought he had given to a more ample exposition of jurisprudence and the allied sciences; but also, not without a hope that some of them may serve as landmarks for the guidance of future explorers of the way he intended to follow.

The volume now republished includes the first ten of the Lectures read at the London University; which, though divided into that number for delivery, were (to use the author's expression), 'in obedience to the affinity of the topics,' reduced by him to six.

There remain, unprinted, all the rest of the Lectures

given at the London University. These I propose to print exactly as he left them. I shall alter nothing, and shall only make the omissions suggested above. This course is, I think, fully justified by the opinions already cited. There is also the short Course, delivered at the Inner Temple. But as this necessarily went in great measure over ground which had been traversed in the earlier Courses, it does not appear to the friends I have consulted that it will afford matter for a separate volume. It is thought that it will be expedient to collate these with the earlier and far more numerous Lectures, and to insert, as notes or appendix, any matter which is not found in those. The state of the manuscript seems to show that the author meant to incorporate them with the former; or rather, to employ both in the construction of the great work he meditated.

When Mr. Austin was preparing his lectures at the London University he drew out a set of Tables, which he had printed for distribution to the gentlemen of his class. They were never published nor sold, and were consequently unknown to the public. Nor were they ever completed. Between Tables I., II., and VIII., IX., there is a chasm,—never now to be filled. But lamentably incomplete as they are, they are pronounced by one eminent lawyer to be ‘perhaps the most extraordinary production of his mind;’ and, by all who have studied them, are thought to afford evidence of an astonishing originality of conception, extent of learning and force of reasoning. Each Table is accompanied by explanatory notes of great length. I am not without some faint hope that hints for the construction of some of the missing Tables may be found among the various scattered notes which exist.⁵

The nature and object of these Tables are described by the author in his opening Lecture, in the following words. After stating the causes which rendered an opening Lecture a useless ceremony in his case, he concludes thus:—

‘I find it utterly impossible to give you the faintest notion of my intended Course. Nor is it necessary that I should.

‘I have been busily employed in preparing a small work which will answer the purpose better. It consists of a Set of Tables, in which I have exhibited the Arrangement intended by the Roman Lawyers in their Institutes or Elementary Treatises. And this

⁵ These tables and notes were printed in the last of the volumes of these Lectures, published in 1863,⁶ and are now contained in the second volume of present edition.—R. C.

Arrangement is compared with various others, which have since been adopted in Codes, or proposed by Writers on Jurisprudence. To these Tables I have appended notes, in which I have endeavoured to show the *rationale* of that Arrangement, and to explain the import of the distinctions upon which it turns.

‘From these Tables and from the Notes which have been appended to them, those who may do me the honour of attending my Class, will collect a better idea of my general subject and design than from anything that I could utter here.

‘These Tables are nearly, though not completely, printed off. And I hope they will appear shortly. I have been working day and night in order that I might have them ready by the opening of my Lectures: but I have been obliged to struggle with so many intricate questions, and to make references to so great a number of books, that I found it impossible to complete them in time.

‘The pains which I have taken to get them ready must serve as my excuse for the present lame appearance.

‘With an object in view which I thought important I could not afford to expend my labour and time upon a mere formality.’

Lastly, I find a considerable mass of papers on Codification; an Essay on Interpretation; the ‘Excursus on Analogy,’ referred to at the beginning of Lecture V. in the present volume; and the commencement of a project of a Criminal Code, to which I have already referred.

Such are the materials laboriously brought together and marvellously wrought, which lie broken and scattered before me. The noblest designs, the highest faculties, the most unwearied industry, were employed upon them—in vain. What would have been the structure reared out of them, had the Master been enabled to execute the plan he had conceived, is now left to melancholy conjecture.

SARAH AUSTIN.

Weybridge, 1861.

In the preface to the Second Edition of the ‘Province of Jurisprudence determined,’ published two years ago, I stated what were the manuscripts remaining in my possession, in what condition they were left by Mr. Austin, and what were my intentions with regard to them. Since that time, I have been constantly occupied in preparing them for the press, and I now give them to the world under those conditions of incompleteness which I announced as inevitable.

It is unnecessary for me to repeat the reasons which determined me to undertake so arduous a work; or to apologise

for the imperfect manner in which it is accomplished. I am now more than ever convinced that (however obvious the objections to it) this was the only safe and practicable mode of preserving these unfinished but precious materials in perfect genuineness and integrity.

I have not attempted to alter the form of the Lectures, nor to disguise the breaks and chasms in them.

In the Preface to the first volume (p. 25), I spoke of my intention of 'collating the Course delivered at the Inner Temple with the earlier and more numerous lectures given at the London University, and inserting, as notes or appendix, any matter not found in these.' Fortunately, the task of selection and adaptation was not left to me. On a nearer examination, I found that the author had marked with his own hand the parts of the Inner Temple Course which were to be added to, or substituted for, passages in the earlier lectures. In several places he had even cut out considerable portions from the latter, leaving a reference to the passages in the former which he intended to put in their place. I had therefore only to conform to a plan which, in this case, and I believe in this alone, was clearly and precisely marked out. The Lectures, as now printed, are, in fact, the two Courses, consolidated by himself.

A few typographical details seem to require notice.

There are some passages in the manuscript through which the author had drawn a light pencil line; not, I am sure, signifying that they were to be entirely rejected, (for what he meant to be erasures are too complete to admit of a doubt,) but that they were reserved for further consideration, or were to be transferred to some other place. These passages I have generally inserted, distinguishing them by brackets.

The references to books, which are extremely numerous, I have verified in every case, with the rare exception of such as were not within my reach. In some cases, where I have seen that Mr. Austin had emphatically marked the passage referred to, or had commented upon it in the margin of the book, I have quoted it. Perhaps this has been done rather too freely; but the space so occupied is not great, the books are not in everybody's hands, and I thought it might be convenient to the reader to see the precise passage to which the author referred. Wherever any words in these quotations are printed in italics, those words are underlined in the book.

With regard to the use of italics, capital letters, and other typographical distinctions, I am fully aware that there is a want of uniformity and consistency; and if, with my present experience, I had to begin my work again, there are several things which I should do otherwise. But the mass of papers was so great, the subjects treated of so difficult, and the task of arranging them so formidable, that it seemed as if a thorough and minute examination of their contents, and a mature deliberation on the details of their arrangement, would defer their publication almost indefinitely. A still more urgent motive arose from the consciousness that my own time for work cannot be long, and is extremely precarious; and the thought that I should leave these remains to a very uncertain fate, made me determine to secure the most important part of them from the chance of destruction, with as little delay as possible; a determination in which I was strengthened by those of my husband's friends who take the warmest interest in the advancement of the science, and in the fame of the writer.

The duties imposed on the guardians of a great reputation have been the subject of much discussion, and, to myself, of much painful deliberation. The only conclusion I could arrive at is this:—Where a writer has attached great value to form, and has regarded his writings as works of art; where any considerable portion of his reputation rests upon his genius and skill as an artist, it seems an act of injustice to his memory to publish anything which had not undergone the last and highest polish of his own hand.

But where the great aim of a writer has been to correct pernicious errors, to throw light upon obscure truths, to disseminate new ideas which he believed to be of the highest concernment to mankind; where the labour he bestowed on style was bestowed solely with a view of expressing his thoughts with the greatest possible clearness and precision; where the depth, gravity, and originality of the matter have a value far beyond that of any conceivable perfection of form, the materials he had accumulated with purposes so far transcending any personal ones, ought not, however unfinished, to be consigned to oblivion.

In subjecting what is most dear and venerable to me in the world to so severe an ordeal, I would not be understood to be indifferent to form. But I have trusted confidently to qualities which no defects of form can destroy or greatly disguise. Moreover, these defects do not extend to what, in a

scientific work, is of supreme importance; namely, *ment*. It will be apparent to the reader that, upon whatever new inquiry he entered, Mr. Austin's invariable method of proceeding was, first to determine precisely its limits, and then to lay down in the most accurate manner the plan of arrangement to be pursued through the whole course of the investigation. And there are the clearest indications in the manuscripts themselves that this preliminary portion of his task was, in every case, most carefully and laboriously executed. Unfortunately, in many instances, the execution was carried no further; he never filled up the outline he had sketched with so masterly a hand. The notes on Criminal Law and those of Codification, for example, are in so rough and imperfect a state, that I should not have ventured to publish them, had I not been assured that they would, as models of arrangement, be of the utmost value to future inquirers.

It seems hardly necessary to repeat (yet perhaps I cannot repeat too often), that this book shows not what the author had done, but what he intended to do, and (in some degree) what he was capable of doing. I have therefore allowed various indications of his intentions to remain. I have also preserved the traces of the questionings which continually suggested themselves to his penetrating and sincere mind; and with which he was careful to qualify and limit his assertions, so long as the shadow of a doubt remained. All these are characteristic of the spirit in which he pursued science. To seem to know, or to leap to prompt and facile conclusions, was impossible to him. To arrive at knowledge by ways the most laborious, the most mortifying to vanity, and the most irritating to impatience, was the course which the rectitude of his nature irresistibly impelled him to follow.

I had also a double motive in showing how many passages were reserved for reconsideration. These very marks of doubt, while they prove the caution with which he worked, and the process of investigation which was for ever going on in his mind, may perhaps suggest similar caution, and excite to similar mental contention in those who are to follow him. Every one of these doubts, pointing to further research and further reflection, may lead to the discovery of new truths or to the solution of unsolved problems. Such results would have been far more precious to him than any conceivable addition to his fame as a writer.

In the Preface to the first volume, I ventured to print a few disjointed sentences which appeared to me to throw light on the character of the man, and on the nature and aims of his teaching. I have since found more notes of the same kind; and, broken as they are, I give them, as showing still more clearly in what spirit and with what views he entered upon the duties of an office so new to the country and to himself as that of Professor of Jurisprudence.

What Lectures of this kind ought to be.

Great defects of those which I shall actually deliver: particularly as to the method and style:—having thought it better to gain (as far as I could) an extensive and accurate knowledge of my subject than—&c.

The research, necessary for this, extremely extensive;—should have gone on for ever.—New language,—(Illness and debility).

In the course of a few years, shall be able to produce something more worth hearing.

Shall be obliged to omit much of what I had intended to embrace. There is none of the details which will not need as much illustration as the principal heads. (Lord Hale's illustration.) And if I descended far into the detail, the Lectures would be endless. I must therefore content myself with a general outline, descending here and there into the detail, so often as it is peculiarly interesting and important.

It is necessary to recollect that the terms, circumlocutions, &c., used in these Lectures (so far as new) are merely explanatory. In applying any actual system, the terms of that system must be observed. So of its arrangements, &c., which are connected with its terms.

The principles of General Jurisprudence will not coincide with any actual system, but are intended to facilitate the acquisition of any, and to show their defects.

In the ordinary business of life, these systems must, of course, be applied as they are.

Reconciliation of divorce between Philosophy and Practice.

Will thank my hearers to attend at the conclusion of every Lecture, and to ply me with questions and demands for explanation. This will not only enable me to clear up obscurities, but to produce much of which I have read, and upon which I have thought, but which in solitary composition escapes the recollection.

Also to criticise with unsparring severity; for it is only by this that I can ever learn to accommodate my future Lectures to the wants of students.

Uses of this friendly intercourse, or '*amica collatio*:' particularly to young men writing. No time, that I shall not be willing to give. My heart in the subject: nor will anything be disagreeable, but the chilling indifference which I cannot help anticipating.

It will easily be understood that I have never entertained the project of rendering such a book acceptable to any but men seriously interested in the great questions of Law and Morals which lie at the foundation of human society. To the discriminating, and therefore indulgent, judgment of that narrow public which is constantly tending towards the ends my husband pursued, and through whom his labours (which to him seemed barren) may hereafter be rendered fruitful, I humbly and earnestly commend it.

I must add, with gratitude, that my labour has been cheered by an ever-increasing expression of interest in it, from men eminent in Jurisprudence, and in the moral sciences generally, in this and other countries;—strangers to all but the mind and character of the author as displayed in his published book. They have exhorted me not to suffer myself to be deterred by want of completeness, or by defects of style, from giving to the world ‘any, the slightest, intimations of Mr. Austin’s opinions on the subjects to which he had devoted himself,’ or of his method of inquiry and arrangement. Such exhortations coming from men whose voice is authoritative, it seemed my duty to obey.

I am indebted to several gentlemen for encouragement, counsel, and assistance: especially, I have to acknowledge the invaluable and persevering aid I have received from friends of Mr. Austin, who found time, in the midst of their own pressing avocations, to attend to my doubts and difficulties. Their sanction was peculiarly important, since they had been among the most assiduous and attentive hearers of Mr. Austin’s Lectures, and were acquainted with his modes of thinking and expression. Without such a sanction, I should hardly have dared to publish matter in which, from the state of the manuscripts, some exercise of discretion was inevitable.

It would be impertinent to affect to regard the care they have bestowed on the work in its passage through the press, as an obligation conferred on me. What they have done has been done out of reverence for the memory of the author, and zeal for the advancement of his science. Nor should I venture to make any public acknowledgment of it, did it not appear to me necessary for my own justification, and for the satisfaction of the reader.

SARAH AUSTIN.

Weybridge, April, 1863.

OUTLINE OF THE COURSE OF LECTURES.

‘Dum potentes aliud agunt, jurisconsulti eruditi, prudentes, bene animati, conferant capita privatim, cogitentque de jure constituendo, ut reddant certius quam nunc: posset is labor præludere principum auctoritati.’—
LEIBNITZ.

[In the original edition of ‘The Province of Jurisprudence determined,’ published in 1832, the following passage is inserted in the Preface.

In 1831 I published an Outline of my Course: Which outline, carefully corrected and somewhat enlarged, I append to the following treatise. For the following treatise is a detached portion of the Course: And unless the disquisitions composing the treatise be viewed with their relations to the subject and scope of the Course, and the arrangement which I give to the subject, their pertinence and importance can hardly be seen completely. To lighten to the reader the labour of catching the arrangement, I have placed, at the end of the Outline, an Abstract of the Outline itself.

As the Outline relates not only to the matter of the original Volume, but to the entire Course, it has been thought advisable to prefix, instead of appending it.—S. A.]

PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS.

I. I shall determine the province of Jurisprudence.

II. Having determined the province of Jurisprudence, I shall distinguish general jurisprudence, or the philosophy of positive law, from what may be styled particular jurisprudence, or the science of particular law: that is to say, the science of any such system of positive law as now actually

Course of Lectures.

obtains, or once actually obtained, in a specifically determined nation, or specifically determined nations.

Note.—Of all the concise expressions which I have turned in my mind, ‘the philosophy of positive law’ indicates the most significantly the subject and scope of my Course. I have borrowed the expression from a treatise by Hugo, a celebrated professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Göttingen, and the author of an excellent history of the Roman Law. Although the treatise in question is entitled ‘the law of nature,’ it is not concerned with the law of nature in the usual meaning of the term. In the language of the author, it is concerned with ‘the law of nature as a *philosophy of positive law*.’ But though this last expression is happily chosen, the subject and scope of the treatise are conceived indistinctly. General jurisprudence, or the philosophy of positive law, is blended and confounded, from the beginning to the end of the book, with the portion of deontology or ethics, which is styled the science of legislation. Now general jurisprudence, or the philosophy of positive law, is not concerned directly with the science of legislation. It is concerned directly with principles and distinctions which are common to various systems of particular and positive law; and which each of those various systems inevitably involves, let it be worthy of praise or blame, or let it accord or not with an assumed measure or test. Or (changing the phrase) general jurisprudence, or the philosophy of positive law, is concerned with law as it necessarily is, rather than with law as it *ought* to be; with law as it must be, *be it good or bad*, rather than with law as it must be, *if it be good*.

The subject and scope of general jurisprudence, as contradistinguished to particular jurisprudence, are well expressed by Hobbes in that department of his *Leviathan* which is concerned with civil (or positive) laws. ‘By civil laws (says he). I understand the laws that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are members, not of this or that commonwealth in particular, but of a commonwealth. For the knowledge of particular laws belongeth to them that profess the study of the laws of their several countries: but the knowledge of civil laws in general, to any man. The ancient law of Rome was called their “civil law” from the word *civitas*, which signifies a commonwealth: And those countries which, having been under the Roman empire, and governed by that law, still retain such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the “civil law,” to distinguish it from the rest of their own civil laws. But that is not it I intend to speak of. My design is to show, *not what is law here or there, but what is law*: As Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the law.’

Having distinguished general from particular jurisprudence, I shall show that the study of the former is a necessary or useful preparative to the study of the science of legislation.* I shall also endeavour to show, that the study

* The matter contained in the above of the Outline does not appear to be further developed in the ensuing lectures. The distinction appears to be assumed, and the author, in the lecture marked XII., immediately proceeds to

address himself to the subject of *general* jurisprudence. The subject here referred to will, however, be found more upon in an essay entitled ‘On the Study of Jurisprudence,’ printed towards the end of the second volume.—R. C.

LECT. I-VI of general jurisprudence might precede or accompany with advantage the study of particular systems of positive law.

Note.—Expounding the principles and distinctions which are the appropriate matter of general jurisprudence, I shall present them abstracted or detached from every particular system. But when such a principle or distinction, as so abstracted or detached, may seem to need exemplification, I shall also endeavour to present it with one or both of the forms wherein it respectively appears in the two particular systems which I have studied with some accuracy: namely, the Roman Law and the Law of England.

LECT. XII-XXVII

Having determined the province of jurisprudence, and distinguished general from particular jurisprudence, I shall analyse certain notions which meet us at every step, as we travel through the science of law. Of these leading notions, or these leading expressions, the most important and remarkable are the following:—

Person and Thing. Fact or Event, and Incident. Act, Forbearance, and Omission.

Legal Duty, relative or absolute. Legal Right. Legal Rights *in rem*, with their corresponding *Offices*; and Legal Rights *in personam*, with their corresponding *Obligations*. Legal Privilege. Permission (by the Sovereign or State), and Political or Civil Liberty.

Delict or Injury, civil or criminal.

Culpa (in the largest sense of the term), or The Grounds or Causes of *Imputation*: a notion involving the notions of Wish or Desire, of Wish as Motive, and of Wish as Will; of Intention, of Negligence, of Heedlessness, and of Temerity or Rashness. The grounds or causes of *Non-Imputation*: e.g. Infancy, Insanity, *Ignorantia Facti*, *Ignorantia Juris*, *Casus* or Mishap, *Vis* or Compulsion.

Legal Sanction, civil or criminal.

Note.—Though every right implies a corresponding duty, every duty does not imply a corresponding right. I therefore distinguish duties into relative and absolute. A relative duty is implied by a right to which that duty answers. An absolute duty does not answer, or is not implied by, an answering right.

Persons are capable of taking rights, and are also capable of incurring duties. But a person, not unfrequently, is merely the *subject* of a right which resides in *another* person, and avails against *third* persons. And considered as the subject of a right, and of the corresponding duty, a person is neither invested *with* a right, nor subject *to* a duty. Considered as the subject of a right, and of the corresponding duty, a person occupies a position analogous to that of a thing. Such, for example, is the position of the servant or apprentice, in respect of the master's right to the servant or apprentice, against third persons or strangers.

Things are *subjects* of rights, and are also *subjects* of the duties to which those rights correspond. But, setting aside a fiction which I shall state and

explain in my lectures, things are incapable of taking rights, and are also incapable of incurring duties. LECT. XII-XXVII

Having determined the province of Jurisprudence, distinguished general from particular Jurisprudence, and analysed certain notions which pervade the science of law, I shall leave that merely prefatory, though necessary or inevitable matter, and shall proceed, in due order, to the various departments and sub-departments under which I arrange or distribute the body or bulk of my subject.

Now the principle of my main division, and the basis of the main departments which result from that main division, may be found in the following considerations.

First: Subject to slight correctives, the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be put in the following manner. Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign individual or a sovereign body of individuals, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. But some positive laws are set by the sovereign *immediately*: whilst others are set *immediately* by subordinate political superiors, or by private persons in pursuance of legal rights. In consequence of which differences between their *immediate* authors, laws are said to emanate from different *sources* or *fountains*.

Secondly: A law may begin or end in different *modes*, whether it be set immediately by the sovereign one or number, or by a party in a state of subjection to the sovereign.

Thirdly: Independently of the differences between their sources, and between the modes in which they begin and end, laws are calculated or intended to accomplish different *purposes*, and are also conversant about different *subjects*.

Being set or established by different *immediate authors*, beginning and ending in different *modes*, being calculated or intended to accomplish different *purposes*, and being conversant about different *subjects*, law may be viewed from two distinct aspects, and may also be aptly distributed under the two main departments which are sketched or indicated below.

In the first of those main departments, law will be considered with reference to its *sources*, and with reference to the *modes* in which it begins and ends. In the second of those main departments, law will be considered with reference to its *purposes*, and with reference to the *subjects* about which it is conversant.

LAW CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO ITS SOURCES,
AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE MODES IN WHICH IT
BEGINS AND ENDS.

LECT.
XXVIII-
XXXIX

I. A law or rule may be set *immediately* by the sovereign, or by a party in a state of subjection to the sovereign. Hence the distinction between *written* and *unwritten* law, as the terms are frequently used in treatises by modern civilians, or by writers of general jurisprudence. And hence the equivalent distinction between *promulged* and *unpromulged* law, as the terms are frequently used in the same treatises. As the terms are frequently used in those treatises, *written* law, or *promulged* law, is law of which the sovereign is the immediate author; whilst *unwritten* law, or *unpromulged* law, is law which flows immediately from some subordinate source.

The two distinctions, as taken in that sense, will be expounded in the lectures: wherein I shall explain the widely different senses which often are annexed to the terms.

II. Whether it be set *immediately* by the sovereign one or number, or by some political superior in a state of subjection to the sovereign, a law or rule may be set or established in either of two *modes*: namely, in the *properly* legislative mode (or in the way of *direct* legislation), or in the *improperly* legislative mode (or in the way of *judicial* legislation).

A law established in the properly legislative mode is set by its author or maker as a law. The direct or proper purpose of its author or maker is the establishment of the law which is made.—A rule established in the improperly legislative mode is assumed by its author or maker as the ground of a judicial decision. The direct or proper purpose is the decision of a case, and not the establishment of the rule which is assumed and applied to the case. The author or maker of the rule legislates as *properly judging*, and not as *properly legislating*.

As I have intimated above, the sovereign one or number, or any political superior in a state of subjection to the sovereign, may legislate in either of these modes. For example: The Roman Emperors or Princes, during the Lower Empire, were avowedly, as well as substantially, *sovereign* in the Roman World: and yet they established laws by the *decretes* which they gave judicially, as well as by the *edictal constitutions* which they made in their

legislative character. And, on the other hand, the Roman Prætors, who were properly *subject* judges, established laws in the way of direct legislation by the *edicts* which they published on their accession to office. The *rules of practice* made by the English Courts, are also examples of laws established in the legislative mode by *subordinate* political superiors.

Inasmuch as its true essentials are frequently misconceived, I shall endeavour to analyse accurately the distinction which I have now suggested: namely law made *directly*, or in the *properly* legislative manner; and law made *judicially*, or in the way of *improper* legislation.

Having stated the essential differences of the two kinds of law, I shall briefly compare their respective merits and defects, and then briefly consider the related question of *codification*.

III. Every positive law, or rule of positive law, exists *as such* by the pleasure of the sovereign. *As such*, it is made immediately by the sovereign, or by a party in a state of subjection to the sovereign, in one of the two modes which are indicated by the foregoing article. *As such*, it flows from one or another of those sources.

But by the classical Roman jurists, by Sir William Blackstone, and by numerous other writers on particular or general jurisprudence, the *occasions* of laws, or the *motives* to their establishment, are frequently confounded with their *sources* or *fountains*.

The following examples will show the nature of the error to which I have now adverted.

The prevalence of a custom amongst the governed, may determine the sovereign, or some political superior in a state of subjection to the sovereign, to transmute the custom into positive law. Respect for a law-writer whose works have gotten reputation, may determine the legislator or judge to adopt his opinions, or to turn the speculative conclusions of a private man into actually binding rules. The prevalence of a practice amongst private practitioners of the law, may determine the legislator or judge to impart the force of law to the practice which they observe spontaneously.—Now till the legislator or judge impress them with the character of law, the custom is nothing more than a rule of positive morality; the conclusions are the speculative conclusions of a private or unauthorised writer; and the practice is the spontaneous practice of private practitioners.

But the classical Roman jurists, Sir William Blackstone, and a host of other writers, fancy that a rule of law made by judicial decision on a pre-existing custom, exists *as positive law*, apart from the legislator or judge, by the institution of the private persons who observed it in its customary state. And the classical Roman jurists have the same or a like conceit with regard to the rules of law which are fashioned by judicial decision on the conclusions or practices of private writers or practitioners. They ascribe their existence *as law* to the authority of the writers or practitioners, and not to the sovereign, or the representatives of the sovereign, who clothed them with the legal sanction.

With a view to these conceits, and to others equally absurd, I shall examine the natures of the following kinds of law.

1. Law fashioned by judicial decision upon pre-existing custom: or (borrowing the language of the classical Roman jurists) *jus moribus constitutum*.

2. Law fashioned by judicial decision upon opinions and practices of private or unauthorised lawyers; or (borrowing the language of the classical Roman jurists) *jus prudentibus compositum*.

Examining customary law, or law *moribus constitutum*, I shall advert to the essential differences between general customary laws, and such customary laws as are local or particular: or (speaking more properly) between the customary laws which the tribunals know *judicially*, and the customary laws which the tribunals will not notice, unless their existence be *proved*.

IV. *Natural law*, as the term is commonly understood by modern writers upon jurisprudence, has two disparate meanings. It signifies the law of God, or a portion of positive law and positive morality.

The law natural, which is parcel of law positive, is analogous to law *moribus constitutum*, and to law *prudentibus compositum*. For natural law, considered as a portion of positive, is positive law fashioned by the legislator or judge on pre-existing law of another description: namely, on the law of God truly or erroneously apprehended; or on rules of positive morality which are not peculiar to any nation or age, but obtain, or are thought to obtain, in all nations and ages.

Accordingly, from law *moribus constitutum*, and law

dentibus compositum, I shall pass, by an obvious and easy transition, to the law natural which is parcel of law positive. Handling the topic, I shall show the analogy borne by that natural law to law *moribus constitutum* and law *prudentibus compositum*. Canvassing the same topic, I shall show that the supposition of a natural law (considered as a portion of positive law and morality) involves the intermediate hypothesis which is compounded of the theory of utility and the hypothesis of a moral sense: that, assuming the pure hypothesis of a moral sense, or assuming the pure theory of general utility, the distinction of human rules into natural and positive, were utterly senseless, or utterly purposeless.

With a view to my subsequent outline of the *jus prætorium*, I shall give an historical sketch of the *jus gentium*, as it was understood by the earlier Roman lawyers. The *jus gentium* of the earlier Roman lawyers, I shall distinguish from the *jus naturale*, or *jus gentium*, which makes so conspicuous a figure in the van of the Institutes and Pandects. I shall show that the *jus gentium* of the earlier Roman lawyers is peculiar to the Roman Law; whilst the latter is equivalent to natural law, as the term is commonly understood by modern writers upon jurisprudence. I shall show that the *jus gentium* of the earlier Roman lawyers was a purely practical notion: that it arose from the peculiar relations borne by the *Urbs Roma* to her dependent allies and subject provinces. I shall show that the latter is a purely speculative notion: that it was stolen by the jurists styled classical, and by them imported into the Roman Law, from certain muddy hypotheses of certain Greek philosophers, touching the measure or test of positive law and morality.

V. From the *jus moribus constitutum*, the *jus prudentibus compositum*, the natural law of modern writers upon jurisprudence, and the equivalent *jus gentium* of the jurists styled classical, I shall pass to the distinction between law of domestic growth and law of foreign original: the so called '*jus receptum*.' For here also, the sources or fountains of laws are commonly confounded with their occasions, or with the motives to their establishment. As obtaining in the nation wherein it is received, the so called *jus receptum* is not of foreign original, but is law of domestic manufacture or domestic growth. As obtaining in the nation wherein it is received, it is law fashioned by the tribunals of that nation on law of a foreign and independent community. For ex-

LECT. ample: The Roman Law, as it obtains in Germany, is not emanating from Roman lawgivers. It is law made by German lawgivers, but moulded by its German authors on a Roman original or model.

Passing from the *jus receptum*, I shall advert to the positive law, closely analogous to the *jus receptum*, which is fashioned by judicial decision on positive international morality.

VI. *Equity* sometimes signifies a species of law. But, as used in any of the significations which are oftener and more properly annexed to it, it is not the name of a species of law.

Of the latter significations, that which is most remarkable, and which I shall therefore explain with some particularity, may be stated briefly thus.—*Equity* often signifies the analogy, proportion, or equality, which is the basis of the spurious interpretation styled *extensive*.

As signifying a species of law, the term *equity* is confined exclusively to Roman and English jurisprudence. The law, moreover, of which it is the name in the language of English jurisprudence, widely differs from the law which it signifies in the language of the Roman. Consequently, its import is not involved by the principles of general jurisprudence, but lies in the particular histories of those particular systems. But since this talk of *equity* has obscured the *rationale* of law, and since an attempt should be made to dispel that thick obscurity, I shall here digress, for a time, from the region of philosophical or general, to the peculiar and narrower provinces of Roman and English jurisprudence. Having sketched an historical outline of the *jus prætorium* (which is intimately connected with the *jus gentium*, as this last was understood by the earlier Roman lawyers), I shall briefly compare the *equity* dispensed by the Roman Prætors with the *equity* administered by the English Chancellors. From which brief comparison it will amply appear, that the distinction of positive law into law and *equity* (or *jus civile* and *jus prætorium*) arose in the Roman, and also in the English nation, from circumstances purely anomalous, or peculiar to the particular community. And from which brief comparison it will also amply appear, that the distinction is utterly senseless, when tried by general principles; and is one prolific source of the needless and vicious complexness which disgraces the systems of jurisprudence wherein the distinction obtains.

VII. From the sources of law, and the modes wherein it begins, I shall turn to the modes wherein it is abrogated, or wherein it otherwise ends.

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LAW CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO ITS PURPOSES,
AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE SUBJECTS ABOUT WHICH
IT IS CONVERSANT.

I. There are certain *rights* and *duties*, with certain *capacities* and *incapacities* to take rights and incur duties, by which *persons*, as subjects of law, are variously determined to certain *classes*.

LECT. XL
&c.

The rights, duties, capacities, or incapacities, which determine a given person to any of these classes, constitute a *condition* or *status* which the person occupies, or with which the person is invested.

One and the same person may belong to *many* of these classes, or may occupy, or be invested with, *many* conditions or *status*. For example: One and the same person, at one and the same time, may be son, husband, father, guardian, advocate or trader, member of a sovereign number, and minister of that sovereign body. And various *status*, or various conditions, may thus meet or unite, in one and the same person, in infinitely various ways.

The rights, duties, capacities and incapacities, whereof conditions or *status* are respectively constituted or composed, are the appropriate matter of the department of law which commonly is named the *Law of Persons*: *Jus quod ad Personas pertinet*. Less ambiguously and more significantly, that department of law might be styled the 'Law of *Status*.' For though the term *persona* is properly synonymous with the term *status*, such is not its usual and more commodious signification. Taken with its usual and more commodious signification, it denotes *homo* or man (including woman and child), or it denotes an aggregate or collection of men. Taken with its usual and more commodious signification, it does not denote a *status* with which a man is invested.

The department, then, of law which is styled the Law of Persons, is conversant about *status* or conditions: or (expressing the same thing in another form) it is conversant about *persons* (meaning *men*) as bearing or invested with *persons* (meaning *status* or *conditions*).

LECT.
XXVIII-
XXXIX

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LECT.
XXVIII-
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AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE SUBJECTS ABOUT WHICH
IT IS CONVERSANT.

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LECT. XL
&c.

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The rights, duties, capacities and incapacities, whereof conditions or *status* are respectively constituted or composed, are the appropriate matter of the department of law which commonly is named the *Law of Persons*: *Jus quod ad Personas pertinet*. Less ambiguously and more significantly, that department of law might be styled the 'Law of *Status*.' For though the term *persona* is properly synonymous with the term *status*, such is not its usual and more commodious signification. Taken with its usual and more commodious signification, it denotes *homo* or man (including woman and child), or it denotes an aggregate or collection of men. Taken with its usual and more commodious signification, it does not denote a *status* with which a man is invested.

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LECT. XL
&c.

The department of law which is opposed to the Law of Persons, is commonly named the *Law of Things*: *Jus quod ad Res pertinet*. The explanation of which name needs a disquisition too long for the present outline.⁶

The Law of Things is conversant about matter which may be described briefly in the following manner:

It is conversant about rights and duties, capacities and incapacities, as *abstracted* from the rights and duties, capacities and incapacities, whereof conditions or *status* are respectively constituted or composed: or (changing the expression) it is conversant about rights and duties, capacities and incapacities, in so far as they are *not* constituent or component elements of *status* or conditions. It is also conversant about persons, in so far as they are invested with, or in so far as they are subject to, the rights and duties, capacities and incapacities, with which it is occupied or concerned.—It is conversant about acts, forbearances, and things, in so far as they are objects and subjects of rights and duties, and in so far as they are not considered in the Law of Persons: for acts, forbearances, and things, are so far considered in the Law of Persons, as they are objects and subjects of the rights and duties with which the Law of Persons is occupied or concerned. It is also conversant about persons as *subjects* of rights and duties, in so far as they are not considered from that aspect in the Law of Persons or *Status*.

II. Considered with reference to its different purposes, and with reference to the different subjects about which it is conversant, law may be divided in various ways. But of all the main divisions which it will admit, the least inconvenient is the ancient division, the import whereof I have now attempted to suggest. Considered with reference to its purposes and subjects, law will therefore be divided, in the Course which I intend, into *Law of Things* and *Law of Persons*. In the institutional or elementary writings of the classical Roman jurists, who were the authors or inventors of this celebrated division, the Law of Persons preceded the Law of Things. But for various reasons, to which I shall advert immediately,* I begin with the Law of Things, and conclude with the Law of Persons.

But before I consider the Law of Things, or the Law of

* 'The explanation to be inserted des Rechts, vol. ii. p. i. et seq.' (MS. from Lecture XL. See Thibaut, "Versuche über einzelne Theile der Theorie des Rechts," note by the Author.)

Persons, I shall state and illustrate the import and uses of this ancient and celebrated division. And in order to that end, I shall proceed in the following manner:—1. I shall try to define or determine the notion of *status* or condition: for that essential or necessary notion is the basis or principle of the division. 2. I shall show that the division is merely arbitrary, although it is more commodious than other divisions, and although the notion which is its basis or principle, is essential or necessary. 3. I shall show the uses of the division; and shall contrast it with other divisions which have been, or might be, adopted. 4.* I shall state the import of the division, as it was conceived by its authors, the classical Roman jurists, in their institutional or elementary writings. I shall show that their arrangement of the Roman Law often departs from the notion which is the basis of the division in question, and on which the whole of their arrangement ultimately rests. More especially, I shall show that the matter of *jus actionum*, which they placed on a line with *jus personarum et rerum*, should not be put into a department distinct from the two last, but ought to be distributed under both: that the main division of law ought to be twofold only, Law of Things and Law of Persons: and that the classical Roman jurists therefore fell into the error of *co-ordinating* certain *species* with the *genera* of which they are members. 5. The division of law into Law of Things and Persons, is obscured by the conciseness and ambiguity of the language wherein it is commonly expressed. Of that obscurity I shall endeavour to clear it. 6. I shall show that Blackstone and others, probably misled by that conciseness and ambiguity, have misapprehended grossly the true import of the division, and have turned that elliptical and dubious language into arrant jargon.

From the attempt which I have made above to suggest the import of the division, it may be inferred that the Law of Things is concerned with principles or rules which commonly are more general, or more abstract, than the principles or rules contained in the Law of Persons: that the principles or rules with which the former is concerned, commonly sin, by reason of that greater generality, through excess or defect: and that the narrower principles or rules contained in the latter, commonly modify the larger principles or rules about which the former is conversant. Now since a modification is not to be understood, if that which is modified be not foreknown, the Law of Things should not

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cisely at once, without a resort to terms which are unknown to the English Law, and which may appear uncouth and ridiculous to a merely English lawyer.

The distinction in question is a distinction which obtains between *rights*, and which therefore obtains, by necessary implication, between the *relative duties* answering to rights. It may be stated thus:

Every right, be it primary or sanctioning, resides in a person or persons determinate or certain: meaning by a person determinate, a person determined specifically. And it avails against a person or persons (or answers to a relative duty incumbent on a person or persons) other than the person or persons in whom it resides.

But though every right *resides* in a person or persons determinate, a right may *avail* against a person or persons determinate, or against the world at large. In other words, the duty implied by the right, or to which the right corresponds, may lie exclusively on a person or persons determinate, or it may lie upon persons generally and indeminately.

Duties answering to rights which avail against the world at large, are *negative*: that is to say, duties to *forbear*. Of duties answering to rights which avail against persons determinate, some are negative, but others, and most, are *positive*: that is to say, duties to *do* or *perform*.

A right availing against the world at large is defined by Grotius and others, thus; *facultas personae competens sine respectu ad certam personam*: a right availing exclusively against a person or persons determinate, thus; *facultas personae competens in certam personam*.

By most of the modern Civilians, though not by the Roman Lawyers, rights availing against the world at large are named *jura in rem*: rights availing against persons determinate, *jura in personam*, or *jura in personam certam*. And by these different names of rights *in rem* and rights *in personam*, I distinguish rights of the former from rights of the latter description.—My reasons for adopting them in preference to others, I shall assign in my lectures: wherein I shall endeavour to clear them of obscurity, and shall contrast them with the equivalent names of the Roman Lawyers.

The relative duties answering to rights *in rem*, might be distinguished conveniently from duties of the opposite class, by the appropriate name of *offices*: the relative duties answering to rights *in personam*, by the appropriate name of *obligations*.

Note.—In the writings of the Roman Lawyers, the term *obligatio* is never applied to a duty which answers to a right *in rem*. But, since they have no name appropriate to a right *in personam*, they use the term *obligatio* to denote a *right* of the class, as well as to denote the *duty* which the right implies. *Jus in rem* or *jura in rem*, they style *dominium* or *dominia* (with the larger meaning of the term); and to *dominia* (with that more extensive meaning), they oppose *jura in personam*, by the name of *obligationes*.

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XLV &c.

To exemplify the leading distinction which I have stated in general expressions, I advert (with the brevity which the limits of an outline command) to the right of property or ownership, and to rights arising from contracts.—The proprietor or owner of a given subject has a right *in rem*: since the relative duty answering to his right is a duty incumbent upon persons *generally and indeterminately*, to forbear from all such acts as would hinder his dealing with the subject agreeably to the lawful purposes for which his right exists. But if I singly, or I and you jointly, be obliged by bond or covenant to pay a sum of money, or not to exercise a calling within conventional limits, the right of the obligee or covenantee is a right *in personam*: the relative duty answering to his right being an obligation to do or to forbear, which lies exclusively on a person or persons *determinate*.

III. With the help of what I have premised, I can now indicate the method or order wherein I treat or consider the matter of the Law of Things. That method may be suggested thus:

The matter of the Law of Things, I arrange or distribute under two capital departments.

The subjects of the first of those capital departments are *primary* rights, with *primary* relative duties: which I arrange or distribute under four sub-departments.—1. Rights *in rem* as existing *per se*, or as not combined with rights *in personam*. 2. Rights *in personam* as existing *per se*, or as not combined with rights *in rem*. 3. Such of the *combinations* of rights *in rem* and rights *in personam* as are particular and comparatively simple. 4. Such *universities* of rights and duties (or such complex aggregates of rights and duties) as arise by universal succession.

Sanctioning rights (all of which are rights *in personam*), *sanctioning* duties (some of which are relative, but others of which are absolute), together with *delicts* or *injuries* (which are causes or antecedents of sanctioning rights and duties), are the subjects of the second of the capital departments under which I arrange or distribute the matter of the Law of Things.

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But before I proceed to those capital departments, I shall distribute *Things*, as subjects of rights and duties, under their various classes. And before I proceed to those capital departments, I shall remark generally upon *Persons*, as subjects of rights and duties; upon *Acts* and *Forbearances*, as objects of rights and duties; and upon *Facts* or *Events*, as causes of rights and duties, or as *extinguishing* rights and duties.

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XLVII
&c.

Primary Rights, with primary relative Duties.

Rights *in rem*, as existing *per se*, or as not combined with rights *in personam*.

The following is the matter of this sub-department, and the following is the order in which that matter will be treated.

I. As the reader may infer from a foregoing part of my outline, and as I shall show completely in my preliminary lectures, the expression *in rem*, when annexed to the term *right*, does not denote that the right in question is a right over a thing. Instead of indicating the nature of the subject, it points at the compass of the correlating duty. It denotes that the relative duty lies upon persons generally, and is not exclusively incumbent upon a person or persons determinate. In other words, it denotes that the right in question *avails against the world at large*.

Accordingly, some rights *in rem* are rights over things: others are rights over persons: whilst others have no subjects (persons or things) over or to which we can say they exist, or in which we can say they adhere.—For example: Property in a horse, property in a quantity of corn, or property in, or a right of way through a field, is a right *in rem* over or to a thing, a right *in rem* inhering in a thing, or a right *in rem* whereof the subject is a thing.—The right of the master, against third parties, to his slave, servant, or apprentice, is a right *in rem* over or to a person. It is a right residing in one person, and inhering in another person as its subject.—The right styled a monopoly, is a right *in rem* which has no subject. There is no specific subject (person or thing) over or to which the right exists, or in which the right inheres. The *officium* or common duty to which the right corresponds, is a duty lying on the world at large, to forbear from selling commodities of a given description or class: but it is not a duty lying on the world at large, to forbear

from acts regarding determinately a specifically determined subject. A man's right or interest in his reputation or good name, with a multitude of rights which I am compelled to pass in silence, would also be found, on analysis, to avail against the world at large, and yet to be wanting in persons and things which it were possible to style their subjects.

I shall therefore distinguish rights *in rem* (their answering relative duties being implied) with reference to differences between their *subjects*, or between the aspects of the forbearances which may be styled their *objects*. As distinguished with reference to those differences, they will fall (as I have intimated already) into three classes.—1. Rights *in rem* of which the subjects are things, or of which the objects are such forbearances as determinately regard specifically determined things. 2. Rights *in rem* of which the subjects are persons, or of which the objects are such forbearances as determinately regard specifically determined persons. 3. Rights *in rem* without specific subjects, or of which the objects are such forbearances as have no specific regard to specific things or persons.

II. By different rights *in rem* over things or persons, the different persons in whom they respectively reside are empowered to derive from their respective subjects different quantities of uses or services. Or (changing the expression) the different persons in whom they respectively reside, are empowered to use or deal with their respective subjects in different degrees or to different extents. Or (changing the expression again) the different persons in whom they respectively reside, are empowered to turn or apply their respective subjects to ends or purposes more or less numerous.—And such differences obtain between such rights, independently of differences between their respective durations, or the respective quantities of time during which they are calculated to last.

Of such differences between such rights, the principal or leading one is this.—1. By virtue of some of such rights, the entitled persons, or the persons in whom they reside, may use or deal with the subjects of the rights to an extent which is incapable of exact circumscription, although it is not unlimited. Or (changing the expression) the entitled persons may apply the subjects to purposes, the number and classes of which cannot be defined precisely, although such purposes are not unrestricted. For example: The proprietor or owner is empowered to turn or apply the subject of his

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XLVIII-I.

property or ownership, to uses or purposes which are not absolutely unlimited, but which are incapable of exact circumscription with regard to class or number. The right of the owner, in respect of the purposes to which he may turn the subject, is only limited, generally and vaguely, by all the rights of all other persons, and by all the duties (absolute as well as relative) incumbent on himself. He may not use his own so that he injure another, or so that he violate a duty (relative or absolute) to which he himself is subject. But he may turn or apply his own to every use or purpose which is not inconsistent with that general and vague restriction.—
2. By virtue of other of such rights, the entitled persons, or the persons in whom they reside, may merely use or deal with their subjects, to an extent exactly circumscribed (at least, in one direction). Or (changing the expression) they may merely turn them to purposes defined in respect of number, or, at least, in respect of class. For example: He who has a right of way through land owned by another, may merely turn the land to purposes of a certain class, or to purposes of determined classes. He may cross it in the fashions settled by the grant or præscription, but those are the only purposes to which he may turn it lawfully.

A right belonging to the first-mentioned kind, may be styled *dominion*, *property*, or *ownership*, with the sense wherein *dominion* is opposed to *servitus* or *easement*. As contradistinguished to a right belonging to the first-mentioned kind, a right belonging to the last-mentioned kind may be noted by one or another of the last-mentioned names.—*Dominion*, *property*, or *ownership*, is a name liable to objection. For, first, it may import that the right in question is a right of unmeasured duration, as well as indicate the indefinite extent of the purposes to which the entitled person may turn the subject. Secondly: It often signifies *property*, with the meaning wherein *property* is distinguished from the *right of possession* to which I shall advert below. Thirdly: *Dominion*, with one of its meanings, is exactly coextensive with *jus in rem*, and applies to every right which is not *jus in personam*.—For various reasons which I shall produce in my lectures, a right belonging to the last-mentioned kind, is not denoted adequately by the '*servitus*' of the Roman, or by the '*easement*' of the English Law.—But in spite of the numerous ambiguities which encumber these several terms, I think them less incommodious than the newly devised names by which it were possible to distinguish the rights of the two

kinds. For newly devised names, however significant and determinate, commonly need as frequent explanation as the ambiguous but established expressions which they were intended to supplant. And newly devised names are open to a great inconvenience from which established though ambiguous expressions are completely exempt. They are open to that undiscerning, yet overwhelming ridicule, which is poured upon innovations in speech by the formidable confederacy of fools: who being incapable of clear and discriminating apprehension, cannot perceive the difficulties which the names were devised to obviate, though they know that their ears are tingling with novel and grating sounds.

LECT.
XLVIII-L

With the help of what I have premised, I can now indicate the principal matters which I shall pass in review at this point of my Course.—1. I shall consider in a general manner such distinctions between rights *in rem* as are founded on differences between the degrees wherein the entitled persons may use or deal with the subjects. 2. I shall consider particularly that leading distinction of the kind, which may be marked with the opposed expressions *dominium et servitus*, or *ownership and easement*: understanding the expression *dominium*, or *ownership*, as indicating merely the indefinite extent of the purposes to which the entitled person may turn the subject of the right. 3. I shall consider the various *modes* of dominion or ownership, and shall advert to the various *classes* of servitude or easements. 4. Although they are incapable of exact circumscription, the purposes to which the owner may turn the subject of his ownership, are not exempt from restrictions. The oblique manner wherein the restrictions are set, I shall attempt to explain: an attempt which will lead me to consider generally, the actual and possible modes of *defining* rights and duties, with the approach to completeness and correctness whereof the process admits.

III. Whether they be rights to specific subjects, or rights without such subjects; and whatever be the purposes to which the entitled persons may turn their subjects; rights *in rem* are distinguishable by differences between the quantities of time during which they are calculated to last.

LECT. LI

As distinguishable by differences between their respective durations, rights *in rem* will be considered in the following order.—Rights *in rem* are rights of unlimited, or rights of limited duration. Every right of unlimited duration, is also a right of unmeasured duration: that is to say, a right of

. LI which the duration is not exactly defined. But of rights of limited duration, some are rights of unmeasured duration, whilst others are rights of a duration exactly defined or measured. For example: An estate in fee simple, or property in a personal chattel, is a right of unlimited, and therefore of unmeasured duration. An estate for life, is a right of unmeasured, but limited duration. The interest created by a lease for a given number of years, is a right of a duration limited and measured.—Accordingly, I shall distinguish rights of unlimited, from rights of limited duration: and I shall distinguish rights of limited, into rights of unmeasured, and rights of measured duration.

Differences between the degrees wherein the entitled persons may use or deal with the subjects, are related to differences between the durations of the rights. The several relations between those respective differences I shall endeavour to explain.

ECT. LIII IV. Whether they be rights to specific subjects, or rights without such subjects; whatever be the purposes to which the entitled persons may turn their subjects; and whatever be the quantities of time during which they are calculated to last; rights *in rem* are distinguishable by the following differences.

Of rights *in rem*, some are present or vested: others are future, contingent, or merely inchoate.—Vested rights essentially differ from one another, as well as from rights which are contingent. For in some cases of vested rights, the party entitled, or the party in whom it resides, may exercise the right presently. But in other cases of vested right, the exercise of the right is presently suspended by the presence of an anterior and preferable right.—And whether a right be vested or contingent, it may be liable to end, on the happening of a given event, before the lapse of its possible duration.

Upon these differences, and the distinctions resulting from these differences, I shall touch briefly in this sub-department: postponing a larger explanation to that subsequent point of my Course, at which I shall consider the trust-substitutions and entails of the Roman and English Law.

LECT. LIV. LVIII V.⁷ I shall consider the various events from which rights *in rem* arise, with the various events by which they are

⁷ It is in the course of the development of this fifth head of the sub-department here treated of, that the lectures break off. See Lecture LVIII, and the observations there placed.—R. C.

extinguished : reserving, however, an exact account of *scription*, until I shall have duly analysed the *right of possession*.

VI. If one person exercise a right residing in another person, but without authority from the latter, and without authority from those through whom the latter is entitled, the former acquires, by his unauthorised or *adverse* exercise, the anomalous right which is styled the *right of possession*.

This general description of the right of possession must, however, be taken with the following limitation.—The person who possesses adversely, or who exercises the right of another without the requisite authority, does not acquire thereby the right of possession, in case his adverse possession began *vi*, or arose through any of the means which fall within the name of *violence*.

The *right of possession* must be distinguished from the *right of possessing*, or (changing the phrase) from the *right to possess* : for the *right of possessing*, or the *right to possess*, is a property or integrant part of the *right of possession* itself, and also of numerous rights which widely differ from the latter. In other words, the right of possessing, considered generally, may arise from any of various titles or causes : but the peculiar right of possessing which is styled the right of possession, is a right of possessing that arises exclusively from the fact of an adverse possession.

Although it arises from actual possession, the right *in rem* which is styled the right of possession, must also be distinguished from the rights *in rem* which arise from occupation or occupancy. For the fact of possessing which is styled occupation or occupancy, consists in the possession of a something that is *res nullius*. But the fact of possessing which gives the right of possession, consists in the adverse exercise, by the person who acquires the right, of a right residing in another.

Consequently, the following description of the right of possession has all the exactness which accords with extreme brevity.—It is that right to possess (or to use or exercise a right) which springs from the fact of an adverse possession not beginning through violence.

As against all but the person whose right is exercised adversely, the person who acquires the right of possession is clothed with the very right which he affects to exercise. And as against the person whose right is exercised adversely,

II. Having defined the meanings of those leading expressions, I shall consider particularly the nature of *contracts*. I shall distinguish contracts properly so called, from certain facts or events which are styled contracts, but which virtually are alienations or conveyances. I shall distribute contracts under their various classes: expounding the distinctions (with many other distinctions) between unilateral and bilateral, principal and accessory, nominate and innominate contracts. Expounding this last distinction, I shall show what is meant by the *essence*, and what by the *accidents* of a contract. I shall notice the solemnities or formalities which are essential to the validity of certain contracts: and, thereupon, I shall analyse the *rationale* of the doctrine of *considerations*. Finally, I shall turn to the events whereon, or to the modes wherein, the rights and obligations arising from contracts, cease or are extinguished.

III. From contracts, I shall proceed to *quasi-contracts*: that is to say, facts or events which are neither contracts nor delicts; but which, inasmuch as they engender rights *in personam* and obligations, are, in that respect, *analogous* to contracts. I shall notice the frequent confusion of merely quasi-contracts with contracts which properly are such, although they are tacit or implied. I shall show that quasi-contracts are analogous to the fancied contracts from which speculators on government have derived the duties of the governed: and I shall show the causes of the tendency to imagine or feign contracts, for the purpose of explaining the origin of duties which emanate from other sources. I shall advert to the classes of quasi-contracts; and to the events whereon, or the modes wherein, the rights and obligations which they generate, cease or are extinguished.

Such of the *combinations* of rights *in rem* and rights *in personam* as are particular and comparatively simple.

Though *jus in rem*, or *jus in personam*, may exist separately, or uncombined with the other, both may vest *uno ictu* in one and the same party: or (changing the expression) an event which invests a party with a right *in rem* or *in personam*, may invest the same party with a right *in personam* or *in rem*. As examples of such events, I may mention the following: namely, a conveyance with a covenant for title: a *hypotheca* or mortgage, express or tacit: a sale completed by delivery, with a warranty, express or tacit, for title or soundness.

And, as I shall show in my lectures, many a fact or event which is styled simply a contract, is properly a complex event compounded of a conveyance and a contract, and imparting *uno flatu* a right *in rem* and *in personam*.

Such of the combinations of rights *in rem* and *in personam* as are particular and comparatively simple, are the matter of this sub-department. What I mean, by, their *particular*, or rather their *singular*, combinations, as distinguished from the *universal* aggregates which are the matter of the next sub-department, would scarcely admit of explanation within the limits of an outline. In order to an explanation of my meaning, I must explain the distinction between singular and universal successors, or succession *rei singulæ* and succession *per universitatem*: nearly the most perplexed of the many intricate knots with which the science of law tries the patience of its students.

Such *universities* of rights and duties (or such complex aggregates of rights and duties) as arise by universal succession.

The matter of this sub-department will be treated in the following order.

I. The complex aggregates of *rights* and *duties*, which commonly are named by modern Civilians, ‘*universitates juris*,’ will be distinguished from the aggregates or collections of *things*, which commonly are named by the same Civilians, ‘*universitates rerum sive facti*.’—They will also be distinguished from the complex and fictitious *persons* (or the collective bodies of individual or physical persons), which are named by the Roman Lawyers, *universitates* or *collegia*, and by the English Lawyers, *corporations aggregate*.—The universities of rights and duties, which are the matter of this sub-department, will also be distinguished from *status* or conditions. For the aggregates of rights and duties, capacities and incapacities, which are styled *status* or conditions, are, for the most part, *juris universitates*.

II. Since all the universities of rights and duties, which are the matter of this sub-department, arise by universal succession, the distinction between singular and universal successors, or succession *rei singulæ* and succession *per universitatem*, will be stated and explained. As I have already remarked, that knotty distinction would scarcely admit of explanation within the limits of an outline. But the following examples may suggest to the reflecting reader, the

character of successors *per universitatem*, with the nature of the *universitates* to which such successors succeed.—The executor or administrator of a testator or intestate, with the general assignee of a bankrupt or insolvent, are universal successors. And, in respect of specialty debts due from the ancestor or devisor, the heir or devisee, general or particular, succeeds *per universitatem*.—The aggregate of rights and obligations which devolves from the testator or intestate to the executor or administrator, with that which passes from the bankrupt or insolvent to the general assignee of his estate and effects, are universities of rights and duties. And since *all* the obligations of a given class, which were due from the ancestor or devisor, attach *at once* upon the heir or devisee, that mass of obligations falls within the notion of a *juris universitas*.

For every *juris universitas* bears one or both of the following characters. First: Where a *universitas juris* arises by universal succession, rights residing in, or obligations incumbent upon, a person or persons, pass *uno ictu* to another person or persons, and pass *in genere* and not *per speciem*. In other words, they pass or devolve *at once* or *together*, and they pass or devolve as belonging to their *kinds* or *sorts*, and not as determined by their *specific* or *individual* natures. Secondly: Whatever be its origin, a *universitas juris*, so far as it consists of rights, is of itself (or considered as abstracted from its component particulars), the subject of a right *in rem*. The party invested with a *universitas juris*, has a right in the aggregate availing against the world at large, even though all the rights which are constituent elements of the aggregate, be merely rights *in personam*, or availing against persons determinate.—I shall show in my lectures, that every *status* or condition which is not purely burthensome, bears the last of these marks, and therefore is *juris universitas*. I shall also explain in my lectures, why the right *in rem* over a *juris universitas* (considered as abstracted from its component particulars) stands out conspicuously in the Roman Law, and is far less obvious in the English.

The legatee of a specific thing, the alienee of a specific thing by transfer *inter vivos*, or the assignee of a given bond or other contract, are *singular* successors, or successors *rei singulæ*.

III. From the generic nature of *universitates juris*, and the peculiar nature of such of them as arise by universal succession, I shall proceed to such of these last as are the matter

of this sub-department. Now *universitates juris* which devolve to universal successors, and which are the matter of this sub-department, are of two kinds: 1. *Universitates juris* devolving from the *dead* as such: 2. *Universitates juris* devolving from the *living*, or devolving from the *dead*, but not from the *dead* as such. And those two kinds I shall consider in that order.

Universal successors succeeding to the *dead* as such, take *ab intestato* or *ex testamento*. Accordingly, I shall explain universal succession *ab intestato*, and universal succession *ex testamento*. And to exemplify my explanation of the distinction, I shall compare the characters of the Roman *hæres legitimus*, of the English *administrator* and *next of kin*, and of the English *heir*: of the Roman *hæres testamentarius*, of the English *executor* and *residuary legatee*, and of the English *devisee* general or particular.

Note.—By the English lawyers, *real* rights (property in things *real*, or *real* property) are distinguished from *personal* rights (property in things *personal*, or *personal* property). These two classes of rights blend at so many points, that the difference between them cannot be described correctly in generic and concise expressions. A correct description of the difference between the two classes of rights, would involve a complete description of the several or various rights which belong to those classes respectively. Of the generic and concise descriptions which the difference in question will take, the following, I incline to believe, is the least remote from the truth. Real rights (property in things *real*, or *real* property) are rights which are *inheritable*: which (where they are transmissible to representatives) devolve *ab intestato* to *heirs*. Personal rights (property in things *personal*, or *personal* property) are rights which are *not inheritable*: which (where they are transmissible to representatives) devolve *ab intestato* to *administrators* (or *next of kin*). The difference, therefore, between *real* and *personal* rights, mainly consists in this. According to the English law, succession *ab intestato* is of two descriptions: namely, succession by *heirs* (strictly and technically so called), and succession by *administrators* (or *next of kin*). Rights devolving *ab intestato* to successors of the former description, are *real*: rights devolving *ab intestato* to successors of the latter description, are *personal*.—It were easy to demonstrate, that the division of rights into *real* and *personal* (or the division of property into *real* and *personal*) does not quadrate with the division of things into things *immoveable* and things *moveable*: It were also easy to demonstrate, that it does not quadrate with the division of things into things *which are subjects of tenure* and things *which are not*. As I have remarked already, the division of property into *real* and *personal*, is not susceptible of a precise generic description. He who would know precisely the meaning of the division in question, must master all the details which each of its compartments embraces. Or (changing the expression) the various details which each of its compartments embraces, are not connected by a common character or property, but form a heap, inevitably incondite, of heterogeneous particulars.—This needless distinction between *real* and *personal* property, which is nearly the largest of the distinctions that the Law of England contains, is one prolific source of the unrivalled intricacy of the system,

and of its matchless confusion and obscurity. To the absence of this distinction (a cause of complexness, disorder, and darkness, which naught but the extirpation of the distinction can thoroughly cure), the greater compactness of the Roman system, with its greater symmetry and clearness, are mainly imputable. There is not, indeed, in the Roman jurisprudence, the brevity and harmony of parts, with the consequent lucidity and certainty, which are essential to a system of law that were worthy of the prostituted name; a system of law that were truly a guide of conduct, and not a snare in the way of the parties' bound to observe its provisions. But, this notwithstanding, the Roman Law (mainly through the absence of the distinction between real and personal property) is greatly and palpably superior, considered as a system or whole, to the Law of England. Turning from the study of the English to the study of the Roman Law, you escape from the empire of chaos and darkness, to a world which seems by comparison, the region of order and light.

The distinction of the English lawyers, between *real* and *personal* rights, is peculiar to the systems of positive law which are mainly bottomed in feudal institutions. As I have stated already, there is not in the Roman Law the faintest trace of it. According to the Roman Law, rights devolve *ab intestato* agreeably to a uniform and coherent scheme. It is true that rights are distinguished by most of the modern Civilians, into *jura realia* and *jura personalia*: and that this distinction of rights into *jura realia* and *jura personalia*, obtains in every system of particular and positive law, which is an offset or derivative of the Roman. But the distinction of the modern Civilians, between *jura realia* and *jura personalia*, is equivalent to the distinction, made by the same Civilians, between *jura in rem* and *jura in personam*: and it is also equivalent to the distinction, made by the Roman Lawyers, between *dominia* (with the larger meaning of the term) and *obligationes*. *Real* rights (in the sense of the English Lawyers) comprise rights which are *personal* as well as rights which are *real* (in the sense of the modern Civilians): and *personal* rights (in the sense of the former) comprise rights which are *real* as well as rights which are *personal* (in the sense of the latter). The difference between *real* and *personal* rights (as the terms are understood by the modern Civilians) is essential or necessary. It runs through the English Law, just as it pervades the Roman: although it is obscured in the English, by the multitude of wanton distinctions which darken and deform the system. But the difference between *real* and *personal* rights (as the terms are understood by the English Lawyers) is purely accidental.

And since this difference is purely accidental, it is not involved by general jurisprudence: for general jurisprudence, or the philosophy of positive law, is concerned with principles and distinctions which are essential or necessary. Accordingly, I shall touch upon the difference in a merely incidental manner, and merely to illustrate principles and distinctions which the scope of general jurisprudence properly embraces.

Succession to the subject of a *specific*, or other *particular* legacy, is succession *rei singulæ*: and it therefore belongs logically to one or another of the three foregoing sub-departments. But since such succession, although it be singular, is succession *ex testamento*, it could not be considered, under any of those sub-departments, without an inconvenient anti-

cipation of the doctrine of testaments. Accordingly, succession to the subject of a specific, or other particular legacy, will be considered at this point of this sub-department.—For a similar reason, the *entails* and *trust-substitutions* of the English and Roman Law, will be postponed to the same point. According to the Roman law, the person who takes virtually by a trust-substitution, is always, in effect, *successor singularis*: but the *subject* of a trust-substitution is either a *juris universitas* or a *res singula*. According to the same system, every trust-substitution is created by testamentary disposition. And, according to the Law of England, an entail is created by testament or will, as well as by act *inter vivos*. I therefore shall find it expedient to postpone substitutions and entails, until I shall have passed in review the nature of a *juris universitas*, and of succession, universal and singular, *ex testamento*.—In *liberâ republicâ*, and under the earlier Emperors, every disposition suspending the vesting of its subject, and almost every disposition restraining the power of alienation, was prohibited by the Roman Law; and such dispositions of the kind as it afterwards allowed, were created exclusively by testament or codicil, and in the circuitous and absurd manner of a *fidei-commisum*. Consequently, as succession *ex testamento* will lead me to entails, so will entails conduct me to the nature of *trusts*: that is to say, to the nature of trusts in general, as well as to the *fidei-commissa* which are peculiar to the Roman Law, and to the uses and trusts (an offset of those *fidei-commissa*) which are peculiar to the Law of England.

Having treated of universal successors succeeding to the *dead* as such, I shall treat of universal successors succeeding to the *living*, or succeeding to the dead, but not to the dead as such. And treating of universal successors of those generic characters, I shall consider particularly the succession *per universitatem* which obtains in cases of *insolvency* and of the consequent *cessio bonorum*.

Note.—In this sub-department of the Law of Things, I shall consider universal succession as it obtains *generally*. In other words, I shall consider universal succession abstracted from persons, in so far as persons are invested with *status* or conditions.

In some cases of universal succession, the succession is the consequence of certain *status* or conditions, or supposes the pre-existence of certain *status* or conditions: and in other cases of universal succession, certain parties are invested with conditions, in consequence of the succession itself. As examples of universal succession, the effect or cause of conditions, I adduce the following cases from the Roman and English Law: namely, universal

sion, *ab intestato* or *ex testamento*, to the rights and obligations of a *freedman* : universal succession, by the adopting father, to the rights and obligations of an *abrogated* son : universal succession, by the general assignees or trustees, to the rights and obligations of an insolvent *trader*. For through a distinction built on an essential difference, but carried to needless length and breeding needless complexness, the law of England, and of other modern nations, severs the insolvency of traders from other insolvency, and makes it the subject of a peculiar system of rules.

Now where universal succession is the effect or cause of conditions, it ought to be excluded from the Law of Things, and treated with the conditions from which it emanates, or of which it is the fountain or spring.

But in spite of that exclusion, the consideration of the universal succession which is matter for the Law of Things, involves large anticipations from the Law of Persons. For example : Succession *ab intestato* cannot be explained completely, without an explanation of consanguinity, or of cognation (*sensu latiore*) : whilst consanguinity cannot be explained completely, without a large anticipation from the law of marriage, or a long reference forward to the *status* of husband and wife. Wearing the peculiar form which it takes in the Roman Law, succession *ab intestato* cannot be explained completely, without an explanation of cognation (*sensu latiore*), of the relation styled agnation, and also of that cognation which is contradistinguished to agnation, and which therefore differs from cognation (in the larger meaning of the term). But since the relation styled agnation results from the *patria potestas*, the consideration of the Roman succession *ab intestato*, involves a double reference to the Law of Persons : namely, a reference to the *status* or conditions of *pater et filius familias*, as well as to the *status* or conditions of husband and wife.

As I shall show in my lectures, that portion of the Law of Things which is concerned with universal succession, is more implicated than any other with the Law of Persons or *Status*. If, indeed, it were closely analysed, the whole of that portion of the Law of Things might be found to consist of matter belonging logically to the Law of Persons, but interpolated in the Law of Things, for the sake of commodious exposition.

As I treat of universal succession to intestates, testators, and insolvents, another implication of the parts of my subject will compel me to draw upon the second of those two capital departments under which I arrange or distribute the matter of the Law of Things. For rights and obligations arising from *delicts* devolve or pass, in company with others, to the universal successors, or general representatives, of intestates, testators, and insolvents.

Sanctioning Rights, with sanctioning Duties (relative and absolute) : Delicts or Injuries (which are causes or antecedents of sanctioning rights and duties) included.

This is the second of the capital departments under which I arrange or distribute the matter of the Law of Things.

Before I proceed to the sub-departments under which I distribute the subjects of this second capital department, I shall distinguish delicts into *civil injuries* and *crimes* : or (what is the same process stated in different expressions) I

shall distinguish the rights and duties which are effects of *civil* delicts, from the duties, and other consequences, which are effects of *criminal*.

Having expounded the nature of the distinction between civil and criminal delicts, I shall distribute the subjects of this second capital department under two sub-departments.—1. Rights and duties arising from *civil injuries*. 2. Duties, and other consequences, arising from *crimes*.

Rights and duties arising from *civil injuries*.

The matter of this sub-department will be treated in the following order.

I. Civil injuries will be classed and described with reference to the rights and duties whereof they are respectively infringements.

II. Rights arising from civil delicts are generally rights *in personam*: that is to say, rights availing against persons certain, or rights answering to duties incumbent on determinate persons.

The rights arising from civil delicts, including the relative duties answering to those rights, I distribute under two departments: each of which two departments immediately severs into various sub-departments.

The division of those rights into those two departments, rests upon a principle of division which may be stated thus: namely, the difference between the natures of the rights and duties whereof civil delicts are respectively infringements. Accordingly, rights arising from civil delicts which are infringements of rights *in rem*, are the subjects of the first department. Rights arising from civil delicts which are infringements of rights *in personam*, are the subjects of the second department.

The various sub-departments into which those two departments immediately sever, rest upon a principle of division which may be stated thus: namely, the respective differences between the immediate purposes which the rights and duties arising from civil delicts are respectively calculated to accomplish.

Note.—In the language of the Roman Law, the term *delict*, as applied to civil injuries, is commonly limited to civil injuries which are infringements of rights *in rem*. Violations of rights *in personam*, or breaches of contracts and quasi-contracts, are not commonly styled *delicts* or *injuries*, and are not commonly considered in a peculiar or appropriate department. In the Insti-

tutes of Gaius, as well as in those of Justinian, they are considered with contracts and quasi-contracts, or with the primary rights *in personam* of which they are infringements.

In the language of the English Law (here manifestly borrowing the language of the Roman), the term *delict* (in so far as the term is employed by English Lawyers) is also limited to civil injuries which are infringements of rights *in rem*. Remedies by action are not unfrequently distinguished into actions *ex delicto* and actions *ex contractu*. The former are remedial of injuries which are infringements of rights *in rem*: the latter are remedial of breaches of contracts, and of breaches of quasi-contracts. Such, at least, is the nature of the distinction as conceived and stated generally. The various classes of actions having been much confounded, the foregoing general statement of the nature or *rationale* of the distinction, must be taken with numerous qualifications. For example: In *case*, strictly so called, the general issue is *not guilty*, and the ground of the action is properly a *tort*: that is to say, the ground of the action is properly a *delict* (in the narrower signification of the term to which I have now adverted). But, this notwithstanding, the action is frequently brought on breaches of contracts, and on breaches of quasi-contracts.—The department of the English Law which relates to rights of action, is signally impressed with the disgraceful character of the system: namely, a want of broad and precise principles; and of large, clear, and conspicuous distinctions.

In the language of the Roman Law, the term *delict* has another and a larger meaning; being co-extensive with the term *injury*, and signifying *any* violation of *any* right or duty. This is the meaning with which I employ the term, unless I employ it expressly with its narrower signification.

Agreeably to the principles of division which I have stated or suggested above, the rights arising from civil delicts, including the relative duties answering to those rights, will be distributed under the two departments, and the various sub-departments, which are sketched or indicated below.

1. Rights arising from civil delicts which are infringements of rights *in rem*, are the subjects of the first department: which first department immediately severs into the four following sub-departments.

If the user of a right *in rem* be prevented or hindered *presently*, and the preventive cause or hindrance can be removed or abated, the party injured by the prevention or hindrance, may be *restored* to the ability of exercising the right freely. Rights to such restoration are of two kinds. Some, and most, are rights of *action*: but others are exercised extra-judicially, and are matter for *justification*. A right of action to obtain possession of a house, or to procure the abatement of a nuisance which hinders the user of the house, is a right of the former kind. A right of recapturing without resorting to action, is a right of the latter kind.—Rights to such restoration, which might be

styled significantly and shortly, 'rights of *vindication*,' are the subjects of the first sub-department.

If a violated right *in rem* be virtually annihilated by the injury, the only remedy of which the case will admit is *satisfaction* to the injured party. Where a prevention or hindrance opposed to the user of a right, has been withdrawn, or has otherwise ceased, satisfaction to the injured party for the past prevention or hindrance is the apt or appropriate remedy. And, generally, the apt or appropriate remedy for a *past* delict is satisfaction or compensation to the injured party for the damage or inconvenience which the party has suffered through or in consequence of the offence.—Rights to *satisfaction*, pecuniary or other, are the subjects of the second sub-department.

If the user of a right *in rem* be prevented or hindered *presently*, the party injured by the prevention, or hindrance, has commonly a right to *satisfaction* for damage or inconvenience, as well as a right of *restoration* to the ability of free exercise.—Rights of *vindication* combined with rights to *satisfaction*, are the subjects of the third sub-department.

Where an offence is merely incipient or impending, the offence may be stayed or prevented. For example: Forcible dispossession is prevented, and waste is prevented or stayed, by an interdict or injunction: or if I be threatened with an instant assault, I may prevent the approaching injury by repelling the assailant.—Rights of preventing or staying, judicially or extra-judicially, impending or incipient offences against rights *in rem*, are the subjects of the fourth sub-department.

2. Rights arising from civil delicts which are infringements of rights *in personam*, are the subjects of the second department: which second department immediately severs into the three following sub-departments.—First: Rights of compelling, judicially or extra-judicially, the *specific performance* of such obligations as arise from contracts and quasi-contracts: e. g. A right of compelling performance by *action* or suit: A right to an *interdict* or *injunction*, for the purpose of preventing the obligor or debtor from evading the fulfilment of the obligation: A right of *retainer* or *detention*, by the creditor or obligee, of a thing or person which belongs to the obligor or debtor, but on which the obligee or creditor has expended money or labour.—Secondly: Rights of obtaining *satisfaction*, in lieu of specific performance, where obligees or creditors are content with compensation, or where

specific performance is not possible, or where specific performance would not be advantageous to creditors, or would be followed by preponderant inconvenience to obligors or debtors.—Thirdly: Rights of obtaining specific performance in part, with satisfaction or compensation for the residue.

Note.—I here shall analyse the principles whereon specific performance is rationally compelled. The caprices of the English Law with regard to specific performance, and with regard to the connected matter of recovery *in specie*, I shall try to explain historically.

Travelling through the rights which arise from civil injuries, I shall note the respective applicability of those various remedies to the various cases of injury previously classed and described.

III. Having classed and described civil injuries, and treated of the rights and duties which civil injuries engender, I shall consider the *modes* wherein those rights are exercised, and wherein those duties are enforced. In other words, I shall consider *civil procedure*.

Now the pursuit of rights of *action*, with the conduct of the incidental *defences*, are the principal matter of that department of jurisprudence. The consideration of which matter will involve a consideration of the following principal, and of many subordinate, topics:

The functions of judges and other ministers of justice.

The *rationale* of the process styled *pleading*, with the connected *rationale* of judicial *evidence*.

Judicial decisions, with their necessary or more usual concomitants: namely, The *interpretation* or *construction* of statute law, or law established in the properly legislative mode: The *peculiar process of induction* (not unfrequently confounded with the interpretation of statute law) through which a rule made by judicial legislation, is gathered from the decision or decisions whereby it was established: The *application* of the law, be it statute law or a rule made judicially, to the fact, case, or *species obveniens*, which awaits the solution of the tribunal.

The judgments, decrees, or judicial commands, which are consequent on judicial decisions. Appeals. Execution of judgments.

Judgments considered as *modes of acquisition*: that is to say, not merely as instruments by which rights of action are enforced, but as causes of ulterior rights: e. g. as causes of liens, or tacit mortgages, given to plaintiffs on lands or moveables of defendants.

indemnities or decrees as virtually are mere solemn-

ties adjoined to conveyances or contracts. The explanation of which solemnities will involve an explanation of the distinction between *voluntary* and *contentious* jurisdiction.

—A right which arises from a judgment is often distinct from the right of action which is pursued to judgment and execution. Arising directly from the *judgment*, it arises not from the *injury* which is the cause of the right of action, as from a *mode of acquisition*. Consequently, rights of the kind ought in strictness to be classed with rights which I style *primary*: that is to say, with rights which do *not* arise from delicts or offences. But the classing them with primary rights were followed by this inconvenience: that the writer were unable to explain them in a satisfactory manner, unless he anticipated the doctrine of injuries, of rights arising from injuries, and of civil procedure.

As certain rights arising from judgment should in strictness be placed under a foregoing head, so should 'the functions of judges and other ministers of justice' be placed under a following: namely, the Law of Persons. But if this matter, which logically belongs to that following head, were not anticipated under the present, the exposition of civil procedure would be incomplete.

Whoever reads and reflects on the arrangement of a *corpus juris*, must perceive that it cannot be constructed with logical rigour. The members or parts of the arrangement being extremely numerous, and their common matter being an organic whole, they can hardly be *opposed* completely. In other words, the arrangement of a *corpus juris* can hardly be so constructed, that none of its members shall contain matter which logically belongs to another. If the principles of the various divisions were conceived and expressed clearly, if the departments resulting from the divisions were distinguished broadly, and if the necessary departures from the principles were marked conspicuously, the arrangement would make the *approach* to logical completeness and correctness, which is all that its stubborn and reluctant matter will permit us to accomplish.

Duties, and other consequences, arising from crimes.

This is the second sub-department of the second of the capital departments under which I arrange or distribute the matter of the Law of Things.

The matter of this sub-department will be treated in the following order.

I. Duties are relative or absolute. A relative duty is implied by a right to which that duty answers. An absolute duty does not answer, or is not implied by, an answering right.

As an example of an absolute duty, I may mention a duty to forbear from cruelty to any of the lower animals. For a necessary element of a right (implying or answering the duty) is wanting. There is no *person*, individual or complex, towards or in respect of whom the duty is to be observed.

I have adduced the foregoing example of an absolute duty,

Outline of the

on account of its extreme simplicity, and of the brevity with which it may be suggested. But, as I shall show in my preliminary lectures, absolute duties are very numerous, and many of them are very important. As I shall also show in my preliminary lectures, there are three cases wherein a duty is absolute, or wherein it answereth not to an answering right; wherein it answers to nothing which we could call a *right*, unless we gave to the term so large and vague a meaning, that the term would denote, in effect, just nothing at all. The three cases may be stated briefly, in the following manner.—The duty is absolute, in case there be no *person*, individual or complex, towards or in respect of whom the duty is to be observed. The duty is absolute, in case the persons, towards or in respect of whom the duty is to be observed, be *uncertain* or *indeterminate*. The duty is absolute, in case the only person, towards or in respect of whom the duty is to be observed, be the *monarch*, or *sovereign number*, ruling the given community.

Now absolute duties, like relative duties, are primary or sanctioning: that is to say, *not* arising from injuries, or arising from injuries. Again: Primary rights, with the primary *relative* duties which respectively answer to those rights, are the only subjects of the capital department to which I have given the title of '*primary* rights and duties.' But primary *absolute* duties ought to be placed somewhere. And though the present sub-department be a member of the capital department to which I have given the title of '*sanctioning* rights and duties,' primary absolute duties may be placed commodiously here. For infringements of duties primary and absolute, belong to the class of delicts which are styled *crimes*.

Accordingly, I shall here interpolate a description of the primary absolute duties which are not appropriate subjects for the Law of Persons. As I have already remarked, such interpolations of foreign matter cannot be avoided always.

II. Having interpolated a brief description of primary absolute duties, I shall class and describe *crimes* (be they breaches of primary absolute, or of primary relative duties), with reference to the rights and duties whereof they are respectively infringements.

III. Having classed and described crimes, I shall briefly touch upon the duties (all such duties being absolute) which arise from crimes. I shall also notice briefly those consequences of crimes which are styled, strictly and properly,

IV. I shall advert to *criminal procedure*, with what may be called, by a strict application of the name, *police*. In other words, I shall advert to the modes wherein crimes are pursued to punishment, with the precautions which may be taken to prevent them.

LAW OF PERSONS.

Having made an attempt, at a previous point of my Course, to determine the notion of *status* or condition, I shall enter the department of law which is styled the Law of Persons, with an attempt to distribute *status* or conditions under certain principal and subordinate classes.

Accordingly, I shall divide conditions into *private* and *political*.—I shall divide private conditions into *domestic* (or *æconomical*) and *professional*.—Certain conditions nearly related to the domestic, I shall place with the latter: styling the former, by reason of the analogy through which they are so related, *quasi-domestic* conditions.—Certain conditions which will not bend to my arrangement, I shall place on a line with private and political conditions, and shall style *anomalous* or *miscellaneous*.

My arrangement, therefore, of *status* or conditions will stand thus :

I shall distribute conditions under three principal classes :
1. *Private* conditions : 2. *Political* conditions : 3. *Anomalous* or *miscellaneous* conditions. And I shall distribute private conditions under two subordinate classes : 1. *Domestic* (or *æconomical*) and *quasi-domestic* conditions : 2. *Professional* conditions.

—According to the jurists of ancient Rome, and to the jurists of the modern nations whose law is fashioned on the Roman, the capital or leading division of the entire *corpus juris* is the division of *jus* into *publicum* and *privatum*. In other words, positive law (considered with reference to its different purposes and subjects) is divided by those jurists, at the outset of the division, into *public* and *private*.

Now the name *public law* has two principal significations : one of which significations is large and vague ; the other, strict and definite.

Taken with its large and vague signification, the name will apply indifferently (as I shall show in my lectures) to law of every department. The various writers, therefore, who take it with that signification, determine the province of public law in various and inconsistent ways. According to some, the province of public law comprises political conditions, together with civil procedure, and the law which is styled criminal: that is to say, the department of law which is concerned with crimes; with the duties

Outline of the

arising from crimes; with the punishments annexed to crimes; and with criminal procedure and preventive police. According to others, the province of public law embraces criminal law, but excludes civil procedure. According to others, its province rejects both. Whilst others (confounding positive law and positive morality) extend its province to the so-called law of nations, as well as to civil procedure and to the law which is styled criminal. But in one thing all of them agree. All of them distribute the entire *corpus juris* under two principal and contradistinguished departments: namely, *jus publicum* and *jus privatum*. And, consequently, all of them contradistinguish their so-called *public law* to the two principal and opposed departments of their so-called *private law*: namely, The Law of Persons and The Law of Things. Now, as I shall show in my lectures, this notable division and arrangement of the *corpus juris* is erroneous and pregnant with error: springing from a perplexed apprehension of the ends or purposes of law, and tending to generate a like apprehension in the helpless and bewildered student. As I shall show also, every department of law, viewed from a certain aspect, may be styled private; whilst every department of law, viewed from another aspect, may be styled public. As I shall show further, *public law* and *private law* are names which should be banished the science; for since each will apply indifferently to every department of law, neither can be used conveniently to the purpose of signifying any. As I shall show, moreover, the entire *corpus juris* ought to be divided, at the outset, into Law of Things and Law of Persons; whilst the only portion of law that can be styled *public law* with a certain or determinate meaning, ought not to be contradistinguished to the Law of Things and Persons, but ought to be inserted in the Law of Persons, as one of its limbs or members.

Taken with its strict and definite signification, the name *public law* is confined to that portion of law which is concerned with political conditions. Accordingly, I take the name with that its determinate meaning, and I deem that portion of law, a member of the Law of Persons. But, to obviate a cause of misconception, I style that portion of law, The Law of Political Status, or the Law of Political Conditions: suppressing the ambiguous names of *public* and *private* law, along with that groundless division of the *corpus juris* which those opposed names are commonly employed to signify. For, as I have intimated above, the Law of Political Status, like every other portion of the entire *corpus juris*, might be styled with perfect propriety, public or private: public, when viewed from a certain aspect; private, when viewed from another.

In rejecting the division of law into public and private, in rejecting the names by which the division is signified, and in classing political conditions with conditions of other natures, I am justified by the great authority of our own admirable Hale, as well as by the cogent reasons whereon I shall insist in my lectures. In his Analysis of the Law of England (or rather of the Law of England, excepting the criminal part of it), he classes political conditions (or 'political relations') with the private conditions (or 'relations') which he styles oeconomic. Nor can I discover in any nook of his treatise the slightest trace of the perplexed apprehension which is the source of the division of law into public and private. Even in adverting to criminal delicts, where it was most likely that he would fall into the error, he avoids it. Unlike his imitator, Blackstone, who calls them *public* wrongs, he styles them *criminal* wrongs, or *matter for Pleas of the Crown*: hitting precisely by the last expression the basis of the division of wrongs into civil injuries and crimes. We scarcely

can estimate completely the originality and depth of his Analysis, unless we compare it closely with the institutes of Gaius or Justinian, and unless we look vigilantly for the instructive but brief hints which abound in every part of it. The only gross mistakes that I have found in his masterly outline are his glaring and strange mistranslation of '*jus personarum et rerum*,' and his placing under the department assigned to the *status* of persons, certain rights of persons which he styles their *absolute* rights. Seeing that *all* rights are rights of persons, and seeing that things are merely *subjects* of rights, it is clear that the genuine meaning of '*jus personarum et rerum*' is not very happily rendered by '*rights of persons and things*.' And as to *absolute* (commonly denominated *natural* or *innate*) rights, they are not matter for the Law of *Status*, but belong pre-eminently and conspicuously to the contradistinguished department. But, in justice to this great and excellent person, I must add that the former mistake is verbal rather than substantial. Unlike the imitator Blackstone, with his '*rights of persons and things*,' Hale seizes, for the most part, the genuine meaning of the distinction, though he thickens the obscurity of the obscure phrases by which the modern Civilians usually express it.—In rejecting the division of law into public and private, and in classing political with other conditions, Hale, I believe, is original, and nearly singular. In an *encyclopædia* by Falck, a professor of law at Kiel, it is said that the authors of the Danish Code, with those of the Danish writers who treat law systematically, observe, in this respect, the arrangement observed by Hale. But in all the treatises by Continental Jurists which have fallen under my inspection, law is divided into public and private, though the province of public law is variously determined and described.

It is true that Sir William Blackstone also rejects that division, and also considers the law which is concerned with political conditions a member of the Law of Persons. But the method observed by Blackstone in his far too celebrated Commentaries, is a slavish and blundering copy of the very imperfect method which Hale delineates roughly in his short and unfinished Analysis. From the outset to the end of his Commentaries, he blindly adopts the mistakes of his rude and compendious model, missing invariably, with a nice and surprising infelicity, the pregnant but obscure suggestions which it proffered to his attention, and which would have guided a discerning and inventive writer to an arrangement comparatively just. Neither in the general conception, nor in the detail of his book, is there a single particle of original and discriminating thought. He had read somewhat (though far less than is commonly believed); but he had swallowed the matter of his reading, without choice and without rumination. He owed the popularity of his book to a paltry but effectual artifice, and to a poor, superficial merit. He truckled to the sinister interests and to the mischievous prejudices of power: and he flattered the overweening conceit of their national or peculiar institutions, which then was devoutly entertained by the body of the English people, though now it is happily vanishing before the advancement of reason. And to this paltry but effectual artifice he added the allurements of a style which is fitted to tickle the ear, though it never or rarely satisfies a severe and masculine taste. For that rhetorical and prattling manner of his is not the manner which suited the matter in hand. It is not the manner of those classical Roman jurists who are always models of expression, though their meaning be never so faulty. It differs from their unaffected, yet apt and nervous style, as the tawdry and flimsy dress of a milliner's doll, from the graceful and imposing nakedness of a Grecian statue.

Having distributed *status* or conditions under the principal and subordinate classes mentioned above, I shall consider them particularly in the following order and manner.

I. I shall review domestic and quasi-domestic conditions: describing the rights and duties, capacities and incapacities, of which they are constituted or composed: and also describing the events by which persons are invested with them, or are divested of them.—Of these conditions the following are the principal: namely, The conditions of Husband and Wife: of Parent and Child: of Master and Slave: of Master and Servant: of Persons who by reason of their age, or by reason of their sex, or by reason of infirmity arising from disease, require, or are thought to require, an extraordinary measure of protection and restraint.

Having reviewed domestic and quasi-domestic conditions, in the manner which I have now suggested, I shall review professional conditions (the other leading class of private conditions), in a similar manner.

II. Having reviewed private conditions, in the manner suggested above, I shall review, in a similar manner, political conditions: that is to say, the *status* or conditions of subordinate political superiors. Of the classes of persons bearing political conditions, the following are the most remarkable. 1. Judges and other ministers of justice. 2. Persons whose principal and appropriate duty is the defence of the community against foreign enemies. 3. Persons invested with rights to collect and distribute the revenue of the state. 4. Persons commissioned by the state to instruct its subjects in religion, science, or art. 5. Persons commissioned by the state to minister to the relief of calamity: e. g. overseers of the poor. 6. Persons commissioned by the state to construct or uphold works which require, or are thought to require, its special attention and interference: e. g. roads, canals, aqueducts, sewers, embankments.

Note.—Before I dismiss the matter of the present article, I will request the attention of the reader to the following explanatory suggestions.

1. The monarch properly so called, or the sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, is not invested with a *status* (in the proper acceptation of the term). A *status* is composed or constituted of *legal* rights and duties, and of capacities and incapacities to take and incur them. Now, since they are merely creatures of the positive law of the community, and since that positive law is merely a creature of the sovereign, we cannot ascribe such rights and duties to the monarch or sovereign body. We may say that the sovereign has *powers*. We may say that the sovereign has rights conferred by the Law of God; that the sovereign has rights conferred by positive morality; that the sovereign is subject to duties set by

the Law of God; that the sovereign is subject to duties which positive morality imposes. Nay, a sovereign government may have a legal right against a subject or subjects of another sovereign government. But it cannot be bound by legal duties, and cannot have legal rights against its own subjects. Consequently, a sovereign government of one, or a sovereign government of a number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, is not invested with a *status* (in the proper acceptation of the term); or it is not invested with a *status* (in the proper acceptation of the term) derived from the positive law of its own political community.

For the sake, however, of shortness, but not without impropriety, we may say that the sovereign bears a *status* composed or constituted of *powers*. And, by reason of the intimate connexion of that improper *status* with the *status* (properly so called) of subordinate political superiors, I shall consider the powers of the monarch, or the powers of the sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, with the rights and duties of the subordinate political superiors to whom portions of those powers are delegated or committed in trust. Or, rather, I shall consider the powers of the sovereign, at the present point of my Course, in so far as the essentials of the matter may not have been treated adequately in my preliminary lecture on sovereignty and independent political society.

2. The law of political conditions, or public law (with the strict and definite meaning), is frequently divided into *constitutional* and *administrative*.

In a country governed by a monarch, constitutional law is extremely simple: for it merely determines the person who shall bear the sovereignty. In a country governed by a number, constitutional law is more complex: for it determines the persons, or the classes of the persons who shall bear the sovereign powers; and it determines, moreover, the mode wherein those persons shall share those powers.—In a country governed by a monarch, constitutional law is positive morality merely: In a country governed by a number, it may consist of positive morality, or of a compound of positive morality and positive law.

Administrative law determines the ends and modes to and in which the sovereign powers shall be exercised: shall be exercised directly by the monarch or sovereign number, or shall be exercised directly by the subordinate political superiors to whom portions of those powers are delegated or committed in trust.

The two departments, therefore, of constitutional and administrative law, do not quadrate exactly with the two departments of law which regard respectively the *status* of the sovereign, and the various *status* of subordinate political superiors. Though the rights and duties of the latter are comprised by administrative law, and are not comprised by constitutional law, administrative law comprises the powers of the sovereign, in so far as they are exercised directly by the monarch or sovereign number.

In so far as the powers of the sovereign are delegated to political subordinates, administrative law is positive law, whether the country be governed by a monarch, or by a sovereign number. In so far as the sovereign powers are exercised by the sovereign directly, administrative law, in a country governed by a monarch, is positive morality merely: In a country governed by a number, it may consist of positive morality, or of a compound of positive morality and positive law.

3. It is somewhat difficult to describe the boundary by which the conditions of political subordinates are severed from the conditions of private persons. The rights and duties of political subordinates, and the rights and duties of private persons, are creatures of a common author: namely, the

sovereign or state. And if we examine the purposes to which their rights and duties are conferred and imposed by the sovereign, we shall find that the purposes of the rights and duties which the sovereign confers and imposes on private persons, often coincide with the purposes of those which the sovereign confers and imposes on subordinate political superiors. Accordingly, the conditions of parent and guardian (with the answering conditions of child and ward) are not unfrequently treated by writers on jurisprudence, as portions of *public law*. For example: The *patria potestas* and the *tutela* of the Roman Law are treated thus, in his masterly *System des Pandekten-Rechts*, by Thibaut of Heidelberg: who, for penetrating acuteness, rectitude of judgment, depth of learning, and vigour and elegance of exposition, may be placed, by the side of Von Savigny, at the head of all living Civilians.

At the earliest part of my Course that will admit the subject conveniently, I shall try to distinguish political from private conditions, or to determine the province of *public law* (with the strict and definite meaning): an attempt which will lead me to examine the current division of law into *jus publicum* and *jus privatum*; and which will lead me to explain the numerous and disparate senses attached to the two expressions. I would briefly remark at present, that I merely mean by *private* persons, persons *not* political: that is to say, persons not invested with political conditions; or persons bearing political conditions, but not considered in those characters, or not viewed from that aspect. I intend not to intimate by the term *private*, that private or not political, and public or political persons, are distinguishable by differences between the ultimate *purposes* for which their rights and duties are respectively conferred and imposed.

III. Having reviewed private and political conditions, in the manner suggested above, I shall review anomalous or miscellaneous conditions in a similar manner.—As examples of such conditions, I adduce the following: namely, the conditions of Aliens: the conditions of Persons incapable of rights by reason of their religious opinions: the conditions of Persons incapable of rights by reason of their crimes.

Note.—In any department of the Law of Persons assigned to a given condition, the rights and duties composing the given condition, would naturally be arranged (in a *corpus juris*) agreeably to the order or method observed in the Law of Things. For example: Agreeably to the order or method which I have delineated above, the rights and duties composing the given condition, would naturally be divided at the outset, into primary and sanctioning: those primary rights and duties being divided again, into rights *in rem*, rights *in personam*, combinations of rights *in rem* and rights *in personam*, and so on. And in any department of the Law of Persons assigned to a given condition, the constituent elements of the given condition would naturally be treated with perpetual reference to the principles and rules expounded in the Law of Things.

To the series of lectures briefly delineated above, I shall add a concise summary of the positive moral rules which are styled by recent writers, the positive law of nations, or posi-

tive international law: concluding therewith my review of *positive law*, as conceived with its relations to *positive morality*, and to that *divine law* which is the ultimate test of both.

I have drawn and published the foregoing explanatory Outline with two purposes: with the purpose of suggesting to strangers the subject and scope of my Course, and with the purpose of enabling my Class to follow my Course easily.

To the members of my Class the outline, I think, will be useful. Many of the numerous topics upon which it touches will be treated in the Course slightly and defectively. But, having those topics before them in a connected and orderly series, they may easily fill the chasms which I shall inevitably leave, with apt conclusions of their own. And every demand for explanation that the outline may suggest to any of them, I shall gladly answer and satisfy to the best of my knowledge and ability.

For the numerous faults of my intended Course, I shall not apologise.

Such an exposition of my subject as would satisfy my own wishes, would fill, at the least, a hundred and twenty lectures. It would fill, at the least, a hundred and twenty lectures, though every lecture of the series occupied an hour in the delivery, and were packed as closely as possible with strictly pertinent matter.

And, as competent and candid judges will readily perceive and admit, a good exposition of the subject which I have undertaken to treat, were scarcely the forced product of a violent and short effort. It were rather the tardy fruit of large and careful research, and of obstinate and sustained meditation. After a few repetitions, my Course may satisfy my hearers, and may almost satisfy myself. But, until I shall have traversed my ground again and again, it will abound with faults which I fairly style inevitable, and for which I confidently claim a large and liberal construction.

JOHN AUSTIN.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE FOREGOING OUTLINE.

PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS.

- LECT. I-VI The province of Jurisprudence determined.
 General jurisprudence distinguished from particular.
- LECT. XII-XXVII Analyses of certain notions which pervade the science of law.

- LECT. XXVIII-XXXIX LAW CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO ITS *SOURCES*,
 AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE *MODES* IN WHICH IT
 BEGINS AND ENDS.

Written, or promulged law; and *unwritten*, or unpro-
 mulged law.

Law made directly, or in the properly legislative manner;
 and law made judicially, or in the way of improper legisla-
 tion.—Codification.

Law, the occasions of which, or the motives to the esta-
 blishment of which, are frequently mistaken or confounded
 for or with its sources: viz.

Jus moribus constitutum; or law fashioned by judicial
 decision upon pre-existing custom:

Jus prudentibus compositum; or law fashioned by judi-
 cial decision upon opinions and practices of private
 or unauthorised lawyers:

The *natural law* of modern writers upon jurisprudence,
 with the equivalent *jus naturale*, *jus gentium*, or *jus*
naturale et gentium, of the classical Roman jurists:

Jus receptum; or law fashioned by judicial decision upon
 law of a foreign and independent nation:

Law fashioned by judicial decision upon positive inter-
 national morality.

Distinction of positive law into *law* and *equity*, or *jus civile*
 and *jus prætorium*.

Modes in which law is abrogated, or in which it otherwise
 ends.

LAW CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO ITS *PURPOSES*,
AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE *SUBJECTS* ABOUT
WHICH IT IS CONVERSANT. LECT. XL
&c.

Division of Law into Law of Things and Law of Persons.
Principle or basis of that Division, and of the two departments which result from it.

LAW OF THINGS.

LECT. XLV
&c.

Division of rights, and of duties (relative and absolute), into primary and sanctioning.

Principle or basis of that division, and of the two departments which result from it.

Principle or basis of many of the sub-departments into which those two departments immediately sever: namely, The distinction of rights and of relative duties, into rights *in rem* with their answering *offices*, and rights *in personam* with their answering *obligations*.

Method or order wherein the matter of the Law of Things will be treated in the intended lectures.

Preliminary remarks on things and persons, as subjects of rights and duties: on acts and forbearances, as objects of rights and duties: and on facts and events, as causes of rights and duties, or as extinguishing rights and duties.

Primary Rights, with primary relative Duties.

LECT.

Rights *in rem* as existing *per se*, or as not combined with rights *in personam*. Only a part

Rights *in personam* as existing *per se*, or as not combined with rights *in rem*.

ment is filled up. The remainder of this outline not filled up.

Such of the *combinations* of rights *in rem* and rights *in personam* as are particular and comparatively simple.

Such *universities* of rights and duties (or such complex aggregates of rights and duties) as arise by universal succession.

Sanctioning Rights, with sanctioning Duties (relative and absolute).

Delicts distinguished into civil injuries and crimes: or rights and duties which are effects of civil delicts, dis-

LECT. XLVII, &c. distinguished from duties, and other consequences, which are effects of criminal.

Rights and duties arising from civil injuries.

Duties, and other consequences, arising from crimes.

[*Interpolated description of primary absolute duties.*]

LAW OF PERSONS.

Distribution of *status* or conditions under certain principal and subordinate classes.

Division of law into *public* and *private*.

Review of private conditions.

Review of political conditions.

The *status* or condition (improperly so called) of the monarch or sovereign number.

Division of the law which regards political conditions, into *constitutional* and *administrative*.

Boundary which severs political from private conditions.

Review of anomalous or miscellaneous conditions.

The respective arrangements of those sets of rights and duties which respectively compose or constitute the several status or conditions.


THE FOREGOING ABSTRACT RESUMED BRIEFLY IN A TABULAR FORM.

PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS.

(Lect. I.—XXVII.)

Law considered with reference to its sources, and with reference to the modes in which it begins and ends.
(Lect. XXVIII.—XXXIX.)

Law considered with reference to its purposes, and with reference to the subjects about which it is conversant.
(Lect. XL. &c.)



LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE.

THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED.*

LAWS PROPER, or properly so called, are commands; laws which are not commands, are laws improper or improperly so called. Laws properly so called, with laws improperly so called, may be aptly divided into the four following kinds.

ANALYSIS
LECT. I-V

Purpose or
scope and
order of the
topics pre-
sented by
the six en-
suing lec-
tures.

1. The divine laws, or the laws of God: that is to say, the laws which are set by God to his human creatures.

2. Positive laws: that is to say, laws which are simply and strictly so called, and which form the appropriate matter of general and particular jurisprudence.

3. Positive morality, rules of positive morality, or positive moral rules.

4. Laws metaphorical or figurative, or merely metaphorical or figurative.

The divine laws and positive laws are laws properly so called.—Of positive moral rules, some are laws properly so called, but others are laws improper. The positive moral rules which are laws improperly so called, may be styled laws or rules set or imposed by opinion: for they are merely opinions or sentiments held or felt by men in regard to human conduct. A law set by opinion and a law imperative

* The author's preface to the original edition of the work under this title states that out of the lectures originally delivered by Mr. Austin, at the University of London, the first ten were directed towards distinguishing positive law (the appropriate matter of jurisprudence), from various objects with which it is connected by resemblance, and from various other objects to which it is allied by analogy. These ten lectures were

afterwards published by him in a treatise under the title of 'The Province of Jurisprudence determined;' and the treatise so published being divided according to topics, and not by the hours of reading, was comprised in six lectures. These published lectures, with alterations confined to a few pages, chiefly made in accordance with later memoranda of the author, are the six lectures which immediately here follow.—R.C.

ANALYSIS
I-VI

and proper are allied by analogy merely; although the analogy by which they are allied is strong or close.—Laws metaphorical or figurative, or merely metaphorical or figurative, are laws improperly so called. A law metaphorical or figurative and a law imperative and proper are allied by analogy merely; and the analogy by which they are allied is slender or remote,

Consequently, positive laws (the appropriate matter of jurisprudence) are related in the way of resemblance, or by close or remote analogies, to the following objects. 1. In the way of resemblance, they are related to the laws of God. 2. In the way of resemblance, they are related to those rules of positive morality which are laws properly so called: And by a close or strong analogy, they are related to those rules of positive morality which are laws set by opinion. 3. By a remote or slender analogy, they are related to laws metaphorical, or laws merely metaphorical.

The principal purpose or scope of the six ensuing lectures, is to distinguish positive laws (the appropriate matter of jurisprudence) from the objects now enumerated: objects with which they are connected by ties of resemblance and analogy; with which they are further connected by the common name of 'laws;' and with which, therefore, they often are blended and confounded. And, since such is the principal purpose of the six ensuing lectures, I style them, considered as a whole, 'the province of jurisprudence determined.' For, since such is their principal purpose, they affect to describe the boundary which severs the province of jurisprudence from the regions lying on its confines.

The way which I take in order to the accomplishment of that purpose, may be stated shortly thus.

I. I determine the essence or nature which is common to all laws that are laws properly so called: In other words, I determine the essence or nature of a law imperative and proper.

II. I determine the respective characters of the four several kinds into which laws may be aptly divided: Or (changing the phrase) I determine the appropriate marks by which laws of each kind are distinguished from laws of the others.

And here I remark, by the by, that, examining the respective characters of those four several kinds, I found the following the order wherein I could explain them best: First, the characters or distinguishing marks of the laws of God;

secondly, the characters or distinguishing marks of positive moral rules; thirdly, the characters or distinguishing marks of laws metaphorical or figurative; fourthly and lastly, the characters or distinguishing marks of positive law, or laws simply and strictly so called.

By determining the essence or nature of a law imperative and proper, and by determining the respective characters of those four several kinds, I determine positively and negatively the appropriate matter of jurisprudence. I determine positively what that matter is; and I distinguish it from various objects which are variously related to it, and with which it not unfrequently is blended and confounded. I show moreover its affinities with those various related objects: affinities that ought to be conceived as precisely and clearly as may be, inasmuch as there are numerous portions of the *rationale* of positive law to which they are the only or principal key.

Having suggested the principal purpose of the following treatise, I now will indicate the topics with which it is chiefly concerned, and also the order wherein it presents them to the reader.

I. In the *first* of the six lectures which immediately follow, I state the essentials of a law or rule (taken with the largest signification that can be given to the term properly). In other words, I determine the essence or nature which is common to all laws that are laws properly so called.

Determining the essence or nature of a law imperative and proper, I determine implicitly the essence or nature of a command; and I distinguish such commands as are laws or rules from such commands as are merely occasional or particular. Determining the nature of a command, I fix the meanings of the terms which the term 'command' implies: namely, 'sanction' or 'enforcement of obedience;' 'duty' or 'obligation;' 'superior and inferior.'

II. (a) In the beginning of the *second* lecture, I briefly determine the characters or marks by which the laws of God are distinguished from other laws.

In the beginning of the same lecture, I briefly divide the laws, and the other commands of the Deity, into two kinds: the revealed or express, and the unrevealed or tacit.

Having briefly distinguished his revealed from his unrevealed commands, I pass to the nature of the signs or index through which the latter are manifested to Man. Now, con-

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cerning the nature of the index to the tacit commands of the Deity, there are three theories or three hypotheses: First, the pure hypothesis or theory of general utility; secondly, the pure hypothesis or theory of a moral sense; thirdly, a hypothesis or theory mixed or compounded of the others. And with a statement and explanation of the three hypotheses or theories, the greater portion of the *second* lecture, and the whole of the *third* and *fourth* lectures, are exclusively or chiefly occupied.

That exposition of the three hypotheses or theories, may seem somewhat impertinent to the subject and scope of my Course. But in a chain of systematical lectures concerned with the *rationale* of jurisprudence, such an exposition is a necessary link.

Of the principles and distinctions involved by the *rationale* of jurisprudence, or of the principles and distinctions occurring in the writings of jurists, there are many which could not be expounded correctly and clearly, if the three hypotheses or theories had not been expounded previously. For example: Positive law and morality are distinguished by modern jurists into law natural and law positive: that is to say, into positive law and morality fashioned on the law of God, and positive law and morality of purely human origin. And this distinction of law and morality into law natural and law positive, nearly tallies with a distinction which runs through the Pandects and Institutes, and which was taken by the compilers from the jurists who are styled 'classical.' By the jurists who are styled 'classical' (and of excerpts from whose writings the Pandects are mainly composed), *jus civile* is distinguished from *jus gentium*, or *jus omnium gentium*. For (say they) a portion of the positive law which obtains in a particular nation, is peculiar to that community: And, being peculiar to that community, it may be styled *jus civile*, or *jus proprium ipsius civitatis*. But, besides such portions of positive law as are respectively peculiar to particular nations or states, there are rules of positive law which obtain in all nations, and rules of positive morality which all mankind observe: And since these legal rules obtain in all nations, and since these moral rules are observed by all mankind, they may be styled the *jus omnium gentium*, or the *commune omnium hominum jus*. Now these universal rules, being universal rules, cannot be purely or simply of human invention and position. They rather are made by men on laws coming from God, or from the intelligent and rational Nature which

is the soul and the guide of the universe. They are not so properly laws of human device and institution, as divine or natural laws clothed with human sanctions. But the legal and moral rules which are peculiar to particular nations, are purely or simply of human invention and position. Inasmuch as they are partial and transient, and not universal and enduring, they hardly are fashioned by their human authors on divine or natural models.—Now, without a previous knowledge of the three hypotheses in question, the worth of the two distinctions to which I have briefly alluded, cannot be known correctly, and cannot be estimated truly. Assuming the pure hypothesis of a moral sense, or assuming the pure hypothesis of general utility, those distinctions are absurd, or are purposeless and idle subtleties. But, assuming the hypothesis compounded of the others, those distinctions are significant, and are also of considerable moment.

Besides, the divine law is the measure or test of positive law and morality: or (changing the phrase) law and morality, in so far as they *are* what they *ought* to be, conform, or are not repugnant, to the law of God. Consequently, an all-important object of the science of ethics (or, borrowing the language of Bentham, ‘the science of deontology’) is to determine the nature of the index to the tacit commands of the Deity, or the nature of the signs or proofs through which those commands may be known.—I mean by ‘the science of ethics’ (or by ‘the science of deontology’), the science of law and morality as they respectively *ought* to be: or (changing the phrase), the science of law and morality as they respectively *must* be if they conform to their measure or test. That department of the science of ethics, which is concerned especially with positive law as it ought to be, is styled the science of legislation: that department of the science of ethics, which is concerned especially with positive morality as it ought to be, has hardly gotten a name perfectly appropriate and distinctive.—Now, though the science of legislation (or of positive law as it *ought* to be) is not the science of jurisprudence (or of positive law as it *is*), still the sciences are connected by numerous and indissoluble ties. Since, then, the nature of the index to the tacit command of the Deity is an all-important object of the science of legislation, it is a fit and important object of the kindred science of jurisprudence.

There are certain current and important misconceptions of the theory of general utility: There are certain objections

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resting on those misconceptions, which frequently are urged against it: There are also considerable difficulties with which it really is embarrassed. Labouring to rectify those misconceptions, to answer those objections, and to solve or extenuate those difficulties, I probably dwell upon the theory somewhat longer than I ought. Deeply convinced of its truth and importance, and therefore earnestly intent on commending it to the minds of others, I probably wander into ethical disquisitions which are not precisely in keeping with the subject and scope of my Course. If I am guilty of this departure from the subject and scope of my Course, the absorbing interest of the purpose which leads me from my proper path, will excuse, to indulgent readers, my offence against rigorous logic.

II. (b) At the beginning of the *fifth* lecture, I distribute laws or rules under two classes: First, laws properly so called, with such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper; secondly, those improper laws which are remotely analogous to the proper, and which I style, therefore, laws metaphorical or figurative.—I also distribute laws proper, with such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper, under three classes: namely, the laws properly so called which I style the laws of God; the laws properly so called which I style positive laws; and the laws properly so called, with the laws improperly so called, which I style positive morality or positive moral rules.—I assign moreover my reasons for marking those several classes with those respective names.

Having determined, in preceding lectures, the characters or distinguishing marks of the divine laws, I determine, in the fifth lecture, the characters or distinguishing marks of positive moral rules: that is to say, such of the laws or rules set by men to men as are not armed with legal sanctions; or such of those laws or rules as are not positive laws, or are not appropriate matter for general or particular jurisprudence.—Having determined the distinguishing marks of positive moral rules, I determine the respective characters of their two dissimilar kinds: namely, the positive moral rules which are laws imperative and proper, and the positive moral rules which are laws set by opinion.

The divine law, positive law, and positive morality, are mutually related in various ways. To illustrate their mutual relations, I advert, in the fifth lecture, to the cases wherein they agree, wherein they disagree without conflicting, and wherein they disagree and conflict.

I show, in the same lecture, that my distribution of laws proper, and of such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper, tallies, in the main, with a division of laws which is given incidentally by Locke in his Essay on Human Understanding.

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II. (c) At the end of the same lecture, I determine the characters or distinguishing marks of laws metaphorical or figurative. And I show that laws which are merely laws through metaphors, are blended and confounded, by writers of celebrity, with laws imperative and proper.

II. (d) In the *sixth* and *last* lecture, I determine the characters of laws positive: that is to say, laws which are simply and strictly so called, and which form the appropriate matter of general and particular jurisprudence.

Determining the characters of positive laws, I determine implicitly the notion of sovereignty, with the implied or correlative notion of independent political society. For the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated generally in the following manner. Every positive law or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the phrase) it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.

To elucidate the nature of sovereignty, and of the independent political society that sovereignty implies, I examine various topics which I arrange under the following heads. First, the possible forms or shapes of supreme political government; secondly, the limits, real or imaginary, of supreme political power; thirdly, the origin or causes of political government and society. Examining those various topics, I complete my description of the limit or boundary by which positive law is severed from positive morality. For I distinguish them at certain points whereat they seemingly blend, or whereat the line which divides them is not easily perceptible.

The essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated generally as I have stated it above. But the foregoing general statement of that essential difference is open to certain correctives. And with a brief allusion to those correctives, I close the *sixth* and *last* lecture.

LECTURE I.

LECT. I

The purpose of the following attempt to determine

stated or suggested.

Law: what, in most comprehensive literal sense.

Law of God.

Human laws. Two classes.

1st class.

THE matter of jurisprudence is positive law: law, simply and strictly so called: or law set by political superiors to political inferiors. But positive law (or law, simply and strictly so called) is often confounded with objects to which it is related by *resemblance*, and with objects to which it is related in the way of *analogy*: with objects which are *also* signified, *properly* and *improperly*, by the large and vague expression *law*. To obviate the difficulties springing from that confusion, I begin my projected Course with determining the province of jurisprudence, or with distinguishing the matter of jurisprudence from those various related objects: trying to define the subject of which I intend to treat, before I endeavour to analyse its numerous and complicated parts.

A law, in the most general and comprehensive acceptation in which the term, in its literal meaning, is employed, may be said to be a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him. Under this definition are included, and without impropriety, several species. It is necessary to define accurately the line of demarcation which separates these species from one another, as much mistiness and intricacy has been infused into the science of jurisprudence by their being confounded or not clearly distinguished. In the comprehensive sense above indicated, or in the largest meaning which it has, without extension by metaphor or analogy, the term *law* embraces the following objects:—Laws set by God to his human creatures, and laws set by men to men.

The whole or a portion of the laws set by God to men is frequently styled the law of nature, or natural law: being, in truth, the only natural law of which it is possible to speak without a metaphor, or without a blending of objects which ought to be distinguished broadly. But, rejecting the appellation Law of Nature as ambiguous and misleading, I name those laws or rules, as considered collectively or in a mass, the *Divine law*, or the *law of God*.

Laws set by men to men are of two leading or principal classes: classes which are often blended, although they differ extremely; and which, for that reason, should be severed precisely, and opposed distinctly and conspicuously.

Of the laws or rules set by men to men, some are established by *political* superiors, sovereign and subject: by

persons exercising supreme and subordinate government, in independent nations, or independent political societies. The aggregate of the rules thus established, or some aggregate forming a portion of that aggregate, is the appropriate matter of jurisprudence, general or particular. To the aggregate of the rules thus established, or to some aggregate forming a portion of that aggregate, the term *law*, as used simply and strictly, is exclusively applied. But, as contradistinguished to *natural law*, or to the law of *nature* (meaning, by those expressions, the law of God), the aggregate of the rules, established by political superiors, is frequently styled *positive law*, or law existing *by position*. As contradistinguished to the rules which I style *positive morality*, and on which I shall touch immediately, the aggregate of the rules, established by political superiors, may also be marked commodiously with the name of *positive law*. For the sake, then, of getting a name brief and distinctive at once, and agreeably to frequent usage, I style that aggregate of rules, or any portion of that aggregate, *positive law*: though rules, which are *not* established by political superiors, are also *positive*, or exist *by position*, if they be rules or laws, in the proper signification of the term.

Though *some* of the laws or rules, which are set by men to men, are established by political superiors, *others* are *not* established by political superiors, or are *not* established by political superiors, in that capacity or character.

2nd class.
Laws set by
men not
political
superiors.

Closely analogous to human laws of this second class, are a set of objects frequently but *improperly* termed *laws*, being rules set and enforced by *mere opinion*, that is, by the opinions or sentiments held or felt by an indeterminate body of men in regard to human conduct. Instances of such a use of the term *law* are the expressions—‘The law of honour;’ ‘The law set by fashion;’ and rules of this species constitute much of what is usually termed ‘International law.’

(Objects im-
properly
but by close
analogy
termed
laws.

The aggregate of human laws properly so called belonging to the second of the classes above mentioned, with the aggregate of objects *improperly* but by *close analogy* termed laws, I place together in a common class, and denote them by the term *positive morality*. The name *morality* severs them from *positive law*, while the epithet *positive* disjoins them from the *law of God*. And to the end of obviating confusion, it is necessary or expedient that they *should* be disjoined from the latter by that distinguishing epithet. For the name *morality* (or *morals*), when standing unqualified or alone, denotes in-

The two
last placed
in one class
under
name

ity.

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differently either of the following objects : namely, positive morality *as it is*, or without regard to its merits ; and positive morality *as it would be*, if it conformed to the law of God, and were, therefore, deserving of *approbation*.

Objects
metapho-
rically
termed
laws.

Besides the various sorts of rules which are included in the literal acceptation of the term law, and those which are by a close and striking analogy, though improperly, termed laws, there are numerous applications of the term law, which rest upon a slender analogy and are merely metaphorical or figurative. Such is the case when we talk of *laws* observed by the lower animals ; of *laws* regulating the growth or decay of vegetables ; of *laws* determining the movements of inanimate bodies or masses. For where *intelligence* is not, or where it is too bounded to take the name of *reason*, and, therefore, is too bounded to conceive the purpose of a law, there is not the *will* which law can work on, or which duty can incite or restrain. Yet through these misapplications of a *name*, flagrant as the metaphor is, has the field of jurisprudence and morals been deluged with muddy speculation.

Having suggested the *purpose* of my attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence : to distinguish positive law, the appropriate matter of jurisprudence, from the various objects to which it is related by resemblance, and to which it is related, nearly or remotely, by a strong or slender analogy : I shall now state the essentials of a *law* or *rule* (taken with the largest signification which can be given to the term *properly*).

Laws or
rules *pro-*
perly so
called, are
a species of
commands.

Every *law* or *rule* (taken with the largest signification which can be given to the term *properly*) is a *command*. Or, rather, laws or rules, properly so called, are a *species* of commands.

Now, since the term *command* comprises the term *law*, the first is the simpler as well as the larger of the two. But, simple as it is, it admits of explanation. And, since it is the *key* to the sciences of jurisprudence and morals, its meaning should be analysed with precision.

Accordingly, I shall endeavour, in the first instance, to analyse the meaning of '*command*:' an analysis which, I fear, will task the patience of my hearers, but which they will bear with cheerfulness, or, at least, with resignation, if they consider the difficulty of performing it. The elements of a science are precisely the parts of it which are explained least easily. Terms that are the largest, and, therefore, the simplest of a series, are without equivalent expressions into

which we can resolve them *concisely*. And when we endeavour to *define* them, or to translate them into terms which we suppose are better understood, we are forced upon awkward and tedious circumlocutions.

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If you express or intimate a wish that I shall do or forbear from some act, and if you will visit me with an evil in case I comply not with your wish, the *expression* or *intimation* of your wish is a *command*. A command is distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the style in which the desire is signified, but by the power and the purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be disregarded. If you cannot or will not harm me in case I comply not with your wish, the expression of your wish is not a command, although you utter your wish in imperative phrase. If you are able and willing to harm me in case I comply not with your wish, the expression of your wish amounts to a command, although you are prompted by a spirit of courtesy to utter it in the shape of a request. '*Preces erant, sed quibus contradici non posset.*' Such is the language of Tacitus, when speaking of a petition by the soldiery to a son and lieutenant of Vespasian.

The meaning of the term *command*.

A command, then, is a signification of desire. But a command is distinguished from other significations of desire by this peculiarity: that the party to whom it is directed is liable to evil from the other, in case he comply not with the desire.

Being liable to evil from you if I comply not with a wish which you signify, I am *bound* or *obliged* by your command, or I lie under a *duty* to obey it. If, in spite of that evil in prospect, I comply not with the wish which you signify, I am said to disobey your command, or to violate the duty which it imposes.

The meaning of the term *duty*.

Command and duty are, therefore, correlative terms: the meaning denoted by each being implied or supposed by the other. Or (changing the expression) wherever a duty lies, a command has been signified; and whenever a command is signified, a duty is imposed.

The terms *command* and *duty* are correlative.

Concisely expressed, the meaning of the correlative expressions is this. He who will inflict an evil in case his desire be disregarded, utters a command by expressing or intimating his desire: He who is liable to the evil in case he disregard the desire, is bound or obliged by the command.

The evil which will probably be incurred in case a com-

The mean-

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ing of the
term sanc-
tion.

mand be disobeyed or (to use an equivalent expression) in case a duty be broken, is frequently called a *sanction*, or an *enforcement of obedience*. Or (varying the phrase) the command or the duty is said to be *sanctioned* or *enforced* by the chance of incurring the evil.

Considered as thus abstracted from the command and the duty which it enforces, the evil to be incurred by disobedience is frequently styled a *punishment*. But, as punishments, strictly so called, are only a *class* of sanctions, the term is too narrow to express the meaning adequately.

To the ex-
istence of a
command,
a duty, and
a sanction,
a *violent*
motive to
compliance
is not re-
quisite.

I observe that Dr. Paley, in his analysis of the term *obligation*, lays much stress upon the *violence* of the motive to compliance. In so far as I can gather a meaning from his loose and inconsistent statement, his meaning appears to be this: that, unless the motive to compliance be *violent* or *intense*, the expression or intimation of a wish is not a *command*, nor does the party to whom it is directed lie under a *duty* to regard it.

If he means, by a *violent* motive, a motive operating with certainty, his proposition is manifestly false. The greater the evil to be incurred in case the wish be disregarded, and the greater the chance of incurring it on that same event, the greater, no doubt, is the *chance* that the wish will *not* be disregarded. But no conceivable motive will *certainly* determine to compliance, or no conceivable motive will render obedience inevitable. If Paley's proposition be true, in the sense which I have now ascribed to it, commands and duties are simply impossible. Or, reducing his proposition to absurdity by a consequence as manifestly false, commands and duties are possible, but are never disobeyed or broken.

If he means by a *violent* motive, an evil which inspires fear, his meaning is simply this: that the party bound by a command is bound by the prospect of an evil. For that which is not feared is not apprehended as an evil; or (changing the shape of the expression) is not an evil in prospect.

The truth is, that the magnitude of the eventual evil, and the magnitude of the chance of incurring it, are foreign to the matter in question. The greater the eventual evil, and the greater the chance of incurring it, the greater is the efficacy of the command, and the greater is the strength of the obligation: Or, (substituting expressions exactly equivalent) the greater is the *chance* that the command will

be obeyed, and that the duty will not be broken. But where there is the smallest chance of incurring the smallest evil, the expression of a wish amounts to a command, and, therefore, imposes a duty. The sanction, if you will, is feeble or insufficient; but still there is a sanction, and, therefore, a duty and a command.

By some celebrated writers (by Locke, Bentham, and, I think, Paley), the term *sanction*, or *enforcement of obedience*, is applied to conditional good as well as to conditional evil: to reward as well as to punishment. But, with all my habitual veneration for the names of Locke and Bentham, I think that this extension of the term is pregnant with confusion and perplexity.

Rewards
are not
sanctions.

Rewards are, indisputably, *motives* to comply with the wishes of others. But to talk of commands and duties as *sanctioned* or *enforced* by rewards, or to talk of rewards as *obliging* or *constraining* to obedience, is surely a wide departure from the established meaning of the terms.

If *you* expressed a desire that *I* should render a service, and if you proffered a reward as the motive or inducement to render it, *you* would scarcely be said to *command* the service, nor should *I*, in ordinary language, be *obliged* to render it. In ordinary language, *you* would *promise* me a reward, on condition of my rendering the service, whilst *I* might be *incited* or *persuaded* to render it by the hope of obtaining the reward.

Again: If a law hold out a *reward* as an inducement to do some act, an eventual *right* is conferred, and not an *obligation* imposed, upon those who shall act accordingly: The *imperative* part of the law being addressed or directed to the party whom it requires to *render* the reward.

In short, I am determined or inclined to comply with the wish of another, by the fear of disadvantage or evil. I am also determined or inclined to comply with the wish of another, by the hope of advantage or good. But it is only by the chance of incurring *evil*, that I am *bound* or *obliged* to compliance. It is only by conditional *evil*, that duties are *sanctioned* or *enforced*. It is the power and the purpose of inflicting eventual *evil*, and not the power and the purpose of imparting eventual *good*, which gives to the expression of a wish the name of a *command*.

If we put *reward* into the import of the term *sanction*, we must engage in a toilsome struggle with the current of ordinary speech; and shall often slide unconsciously, not-

LECT. I

The meaning of the term *command*, briefly restated.

The inseparable connexion of the three terms, *command*, *duty*, and *sanction*.

The manner of that connexion.

Laws or rules distinguished from commands

withstanding our efforts to the contrary, into the narrower and customary meaning.

It appears, then, from what has been premised, that the ideas or notions comprehended by the term *command* are the following. 1. A wish or desire conceived by a rational being, that another rational being shall do or forbear. 2. An evil to proceed from the former, and to be incurred by the latter, in case the latter comply not with the wish. 3. An expression or intimation of the wish by words or other signs.

It also appears from what has been premised, that *command*, *duty*, and *sanction* are inseparably connected terms: that each embraces the same ideas as the others, though each denotes those ideas in a peculiar order or series.

'A wish conceived by one, and expressed or intimated to another, with an evil to be inflicted and incurred in case the wish be disregarded,' are signified directly and indirectly by each of the three expressions. Each is the name of the same complex notion.

But when I am talking *directly* of the expression or intimation of the wish, I employ the term *command*: The expression or intimation of the wish being presented *prominently* to my hearer; whilst the evil to be incurred, with the chance of incurring it, are kept (if I may so express myself) in the background of my picture.

When I am talking *directly* of the chance of incurring the evil, or (changing the expression) of the liability or obnoxiousness to the evil, I employ the term *duty*, or the term *obligation*: The liability or obnoxiousness to the evil being put foremost, and the rest of the complex notion being signified implicitly.

When I am talking *immediately* of the evil itself, I employ the term *sanction*, or a term of the like import: The evil to be incurred being signified directly; whilst the obnoxiousness to that evil, with the expression or intimation of the wish, are indicated indirectly or obliquely.

To those who are familiar with the language of logicians (language unrivalled for brevity, distinctness, and precision), I can express my meaning accurately in a breath.—Each of the three terms *signifies* the same notion; but each *denotes* a different part of that notion, and *connotes* the residue.

Commands are of two species. Some are *laws* or *rules*. The others have not acquired an appropriate name, nor does language afford an expression which will mark them briefly

and precisely. I must, therefore, note them as well as I can by the ambiguous and inexpressive name of '*occasional or particular* commands.'

LECT. I

which are
occasional
or *particu-*
lar.

The term *laws* or *rules* being not unfrequently applied to occasional or particular commands, it is hardly possible to describe a line of separation which shall consist in every respect with established forms of speech. But the distinction between laws and particular commands may, I think, be stated in the following manner.

By every command, the party to whom it is directed is obliged to do or to forbear.

Now where it obliges *generally* to acts or forbearances of a *class*, a command is a law or rule. But where it obliges to a *specific* act or forbearance, or to acts or forbearances which it determines *specifically* or *individually*, a command is occasional or particular. In other words, a class or description of acts is determined by a law or rule, and acts of that class or description are enjoined or forbidden generally. But where a command is occasional or particular, the act or acts, which the command enjoins or forbids, are assigned or determined by their specific or individual natures as well as by the class or description to which they belong.

The statement which I have given in abstract expressions I will now endeavour to illustrate by apt examples.

If you command your servant to go on a given errand, or *not* to leave your house on a given evening, or to rise at such an hour on such a morning, or to rise at that hour during the next week or month, the command is occasional or particular. For the act or acts enjoined or forbidden are specially determined or assigned.

But if you command him *simply* to rise at that hour, or to rise at that hour *always*, or to rise at that hour *till further orders*, it may be said, with propriety, that you lay down a *rule* for the guidance of your servant's conduct. For no specific act is assigned by the command, but the command obliges him generally to acts of a determined class.

If a regiment be ordered to attack or defend a post, or to quell a riot, or to march from their present quarters, the command is occasional or particular. But an order to exercise daily till further orders shall be given would be called a *general* order, and *might* be called a *rule*.

If Parliament prohibited simply the exportation of corn, either for a given period or indefinitely, it would establish a law or rule: a *kind* or *sort* of acts being determined by the

LECT. I command, and acts of that kind or sort being *generally* forbidden. But an order issued by Parliament to meet an impending scarcity, and stopping the exportation of corn *then shipped and in port*, would not be a law or rule, though issued by the sovereign legislature. The order regarding exclusively a specified quantity of corn, the negative acts or forbearances, enjoined by the command, would be determined specifically or individually by the determinate nature of their subject.

As issued by a sovereign legislature, and as wearing the form of a law, the order which I have now imagined would probably be *called* a law. And hence the difficulty of drawing a distinct boundary between laws and occasional commands.

Again: An act which is not an offence, according to the existing law, moves the sovereign to displeasure: and, though the authors of the act are legally innocent or unoffending, the sovereign commands that they shall be punished. As enjoining a specific punishment in that specific case, and as not enjoining generally acts or forbearances of a class, the order uttered by the sovereign is not a law or rule.

Whether such an order would be *called* a law, seems to depend upon circumstances which are purely immaterial: immaterial, that is, with reference to the present purpose, though material with reference to others. If made by a sovereign assembly, deliberately, and with the forms of legislation, it would probably be called a law. If uttered by an absolute monarch, without deliberation or ceremony, it would scarcely be confounded with acts of legislation, and would be styled an arbitrary command. Yet, on either of these suppositions, its nature would be the same. It would not be a law or rule, but an occasional or particular command of the sovereign One or Number.

To conclude with an example which best illustrates the distinction, and which shows the importance of the distinction most conspicuously, *judicial commands* are commonly occasional or particular, although the commands which they are calculated to enforce are commonly laws or rules.

For instance, the lawgiver commands that thieves shall be hanged. A specific theft and a specified thief being given, the judge commands that the thief shall be hanged, agreeably to the command of the lawgiver.

Now the lawgiver determines a class or description of acts; prohibits acts of the class generally and indefinitely; and commands, with the like generality, that punishment

shall follow transgression. The command of the lawgiver is, therefore, a law or rule. But the command of the judge is occasional or particular. For he orders a specific punishment, as the consequence of a specific offence.

According to the line of separation which I have now attempted to describe, a law and a particular command are distinguished thus.—Acts or forbearances of a *class* are enjoined *generally* by the former. Acts *determined specifically*, are enjoined or forbidden by the latter.

A different line of separation has been drawn by Blackstone and others. According to Blackstone and others, a law and a particular command are distinguished in the following manner.—A law obliges *generally* the members of the given community, or a law obliges *generally* persons of a given class. A particular command obliges a *single* person, or persons whom it determines *individually*.

That laws and particular commands are not to be distinguished thus, will appear on a moment's reflection.

For, *first*, commands which oblige generally the members of the given community, or commands which oblige generally persons of given classes, are not always laws or rules.

Thus, in the case already supposed; that in which the sovereign commands that all corn actually shipped for exportation be stopped and detained; the command is obligatory upon the whole community, but as it obliges them only to a set of acts individually assigned, it is not a law. Again, suppose the sovereign to issue an order enforced by penalties, for a general mourning, on occasion of a public calamity. Now, though it is addressed to the community at large, the order is scarcely a rule, in the usual acceptation of the term. For, though it obliges generally the members of the entire community, it obliges to acts which it assigns specifically, instead of obliging generally to acts or forbearances of a class. If the sovereign commanded that *black* should be the dress of his subjects, his command would amount to a law. But if he commanded them to wear it on a specified occasion, his command would be merely particular.

And, *secondly*, a command which obliges exclusively persons individually determined, may amount, notwithstanding, to a law or rule.

For example, A father may set a *rule* to his child or children: a guardian, to his ward: a master, to his slave

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or servant. And certain of God's *laws* were as binding on the first man, as they are binding at this hour on the millions who have sprung from his loins.

Most, indeed, of the laws which are established by political superiors, or most of the laws which are simply and strictly so called, oblige generally the members of the political community, or oblige generally persons of a class. To frame a system of duties for every individual of the community, were simply impossible: and if it were possible, it were utterly useless. Most of the laws established by political superiors are, therefore, *general* in a twofold manner: as enjoining or forbidding generally acts of kinds or sorts; and as binding the whole community, or, at least, whole classes of its members.

But if we suppose that Parliament creates and grants an office, and that Parliament binds the grantee to services of a given description, we suppose a law established by political superiors, and yet exclusively binding a specified or determinate person.

Laws established by political superiors, and exclusively binding specified or determinate persons, are styled, in the language of the Roman jurists, *privilegia*. Though that, indeed, is a name which will hardly denote them distinctly: for, like most of the leading terms in actual systems of law, it is not the name of a definite class of objects, but of a heap of heterogeneous objects.^(a)

The defini-
of a
or rule,

It appears from what has been premised, that a law, properly so called, may be defined in the following manner.

A law is a command which obliges a person or persons.

But, as contradistinguished or opposed to an occasional or particular command, a law is a command which obliges a person or persons, and obliges *generally* to acts or forbearances of a *class*.

In language more popular but less distinct and precise, a law is a command which obliges a person or persons to a *course* of conduct. •

(*) Where a *privilegium* merely imposes a duty, it exclusively obliges a determinate person or persons. But where a *privilegium* confers a right, and the right conferred *avails against the world at large*, the law is *privilegium* as viewed from a certain aspect, but is also a *general law* as viewed from another aspect. • In respect of the right conferred, the law exclusively regards a deter-

minate person, and, therefore, is *legium*. In respect of the duty imposed, and corresponding to the right conferred, the law regards generally the members of the entire community.

This I shall explain particularly at a subsequent point of my Course, when I consider the peculiar nature of so called *privilegia*, or of so called *private laws*.

Laws and other commands are said to proceed from *superiors*, and to bind or oblige *inferiors*. I will, therefore, analyze the meaning of those correlative expressions; and will try to strip them of a certain mystery, by which that simple meaning appears to be obscured.

The meaning of the correlative terms *superior* and *inferior*.

Superiority is often synonymous with *precedence* or *excellence*. We talk of superiors in rank; of superiors in wealth; of superiors in virtue: comparing certain persons with certain other persons; and meaning that the former precede or excel the latter in rank, in wealth, or in virtue.

But, taken with the meaning wherein I here understand it, the term *superiority* signifies *might*: the power of affecting others with evil or pain, and of forcing them, through fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to one's wishes.

For example, God is emphatically the *superior* of Man. For his power of affecting us with pain, and of forcing us to comply with his will, is unbounded and resistless.

To a limited extent, the sovereign One or Number is the superior of the subject or citizen: the master, of the slave or servant: the father, of the child.

In short, whoever can *oblige* another to comply with his wishes, is the *superior* of that other, so far as the ability reaches: The party who is obnoxious to the impending evil, being, to that same extent, the *inferior*.

The might or superiority of God, is simple or absolute. But in all or most cases of human superiority, the relation of superior and inferior, and the relation of inferior and superior, are reciprocal. Or (changing the expression) the party who is the superior as viewed from one aspect, is the inferior as viewed from another.

For example, To an indefinite, though limited extent, the monarch is the superior of the governed: his power being commonly sufficient to enforce compliance with his will. But the governed, collectively or in mass, are also the superior of the monarch: who is checked in the abuse of his might by his fear of exciting their anger; and of rousing to active resistance the might which slumbers in the multitude.

A member of a sovereign assembly is the superior of the judge: the judge being bound by the law which proceeds from that sovereign body. But, in his character of citizen or subject, he is the inferior of the judge: the judge being the minister of the law, and armed with the power of enforcing it.

It appears, then, that the term *superiority* (like the terms

1 *duty* and *sanction*) is implied by the term *command*. For superiority is the power of enforcing compliance with a wish: and the expression or intimation of a wish, with the power and the purpose of enforcing it, are the constituent elements of a command.

‘That *laws* emanate from *superiors*’ is, therefore, an identical proposition. For the meaning which it affects to impart is contained in its subject.

If I mark the peculiar source of a given law, or if I mark the peculiar source of laws of a given class, it is possible that I am saying something which may instruct the hearer. But to affirm of laws universally ‘that they flow from *superiors*,’ or to affirm of laws universally ‘that *inferiors* are bound to obey them,’ is the merest tautology and trifling.

Laws (improperly so called) which are not commands.

Like most of the leading terms in the sciences of jurisprudence and morals, the term *laws* is extremely ambiguous. Taken with the largest signification which can be given to the term properly, *laws* are a species of *commands*. But the term is improperly applied to various objects which have nothing of the imperative character: to objects which are *not* commands; and which, therefore, are *not* laws, properly so called.

Accordingly, the proposition ‘that laws are commands’ must be taken with limitations. Or, rather, we must distinguish the various meanings of the term *laws*; and must restrict the proposition to that class of objects which is embraced by the largest signification that can be given to the term properly.

I have already indicated, and shall hereafter more fully describe, the objects improperly termed laws, which are *not* within the province of jurisprudence (being either rules enforced by opinion and closely analogous to laws properly so called, or being laws so called by a metaphorical application of the term merely). There are other objects improperly termed laws (not being commands) which yet may properly be included within the province of jurisprudence. These I shall endeavour to particularise:—

1. Acts on the part of legislatures to *explain* positive law, can scarcely be called laws, in the proper signification of the term. Working no change in the actual duties of the governed, but simply declaring what those duties *are*, they properly are acts of *interpretation* by legislative authority. Or, to borrow an expression from the writers on the Roman Law, they are acts of *authentic* interpretation.

But, this notwithstanding, they are frequently styled laws; *declaratory* laws, or declaratory statutes. They must, therefore, be noted as forming an exception to the proposition 'that laws are a species of commands.'

It often, indeed, happens (as I shall show in the proper place), that laws declaratory in name are imperative in effect: Legislative, like judicial interpretation, being frequently deceptive; and establishing new law, under guise of expounding the old.

2. Laws to repeal laws, and to release from existing duties, must also be excepted from the proposition 'that laws are a species of commands.' In so far as they release from duties imposed by existing laws, they are not commands, but revocations of commands. They authorize or permit the parties, to whom the repeal extends, to do or to forbear from acts which they were commanded to forbear from or to do. And, considered with regard to *this*, their immediate or direct purpose, they are often named *permissive laws*, or, more briefly and more properly, *permissions*.

Remotely and indirectly, indeed, permissive laws are often or always imperative. For the parties released from duties are restored to liberties or rights: and duties answering those rights are, therefore, created or revived.

But this is a matter which I shall examine with exactness, when I analyze the expressions 'legal right,' 'permission by the sovereign or state,' and 'civil or political liberty.'

3. Imperfect laws, or laws of imperfect obligation, must also be excepted from the proposition 'that laws are a species of commands.'

An imperfect law (with the sense wherein the term is used by the Roman jurists) is a law which wants a sanction, and which, therefore, is not binding. A law declaring that certain acts are crimes, but annexing no punishment to the commission of acts of the class, is the simplest and most obvious example.

Though the author of an imperfect law signifies a desire, he manifests no purpose of enforcing compliance with the desire. But where there is not a purpose of enforcing compliance with the desire, the expression of a desire is not a command. Consequently, an imperfect law is not so properly a law, as counsel, or exhortation, addressed by a superior to inferiors.

Examples of imperfect laws are cited by the Roman jurists. But with us in England, laws professedly imperative are

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always (I believe) perfect or obligatory. Where the English legislature affects to command, the English tribunals not unreasonably presume that the legislature exacts obedience. And, if no specific sanction be annexed to a given law, a sanction is supplied by the courts of justice, agreeably to a general maxim which obtains in cases of the kind.

The imperfect laws, of which I am now speaking, are laws which are imperfect, in the sense of *the Roman jurists*: that is to say, laws which speak the desires of political superiors, but which their authors (by oversight or design) have not provided with sanctions. Many of the writers on *morals*, and on the so called *law of nature*, have annexed a different meaning to the term *imperfect*. Speaking of imperfect obligations, they commonly mean duties which are *not legal*: duties imposed by commands of God, or duties imposed by positive morality, as contradistinguished to duties imposed by positive law. An imperfect obligation, in the sense of the Roman jurists, is exactly equivalent to no obligation at all. For the term *imperfect* denotes simply, that the law wants the sanction appropriate to laws of the kind. An imperfect obligation, in the other meaning of the expression, is a religious or a moral obligation. The term *imperfect* does not denote that the law imposing the duty wants the appropriate sanction. It denotes that the law imposing the duty is *not* a law established by a political superior: that it wants that *perfect*, or that surer or more cogent sanction, which is imparted by the sovereign or state.

Laws (*properly so called*) which may *seem* not imperative.

I believe that I have now reviewed all the classes of objects, to which the term *laws* is improperly applied. The laws (improperly so called) which I have here lastly enumerated, are (I think) the only laws which are not commands, and which yet may be properly included within the province of jurisprudence. But though these, with the so called laws set by opinion and the objects metaphorically termed laws, are the only laws which *really* are not commands, there are certain laws (*properly so called*) which may *seem* not imperative. Accordingly, I will subjoin a few remarks upon laws of this dubious character.

1. There are laws, it may be said, which *merely* create *rights*: And, seeing that every command imposes a *duty*, laws of this nature are not imperative.

But, as I have intimated already, and shall show completely hereafter, there are no laws *merely* creating *rights*. There ~~are~~ laws, it is true, which *merely* create *duties*: duties

not correlating with correlating rights, and which, therefore may be styled *absolute*. But every law, really conferring a right, imposes expressly or tacitly a *relative* duty, or a duty correlating with the right. If it specify the remedy to be given, in case the right shall be infringed, it imposes the relative duty expressly. If the remedy to be given be not specified, it refers tacitly to pre-existing law, and clothes the right which it purports to create with a remedy provided by that law. Every law, really conferring a right, is, therefore, imperative: as imperative, as if its only purpose were the creation of a duty, or as if the relative duty, which it inevitably imposes, were merely absolute.

The meanings of the term *right*, are various and perplexed; taken with its proper meaning, it comprises ideas which are numerous and complicated; and the searching and extensive analysis, which the term, therefore, requires, would occupy more room than could be given to it in the present lecture. It is not, however, necessary, that the analysis should be performed here. I purpose, in my earlier lectures, to determine the province of jurisprudence; or to distinguish the laws established by political superiors, from the various laws, proper and improper, with which they are frequently confounded. And this I may accomplish exactly enough, without a nice inquiry into the import of the term *right*.

2. According to an opinion which I must notice *incidentally* here, though the subject to which it relates will be treated *directly* hereafter, *customary laws* must be excepted from the proposition 'that laws are a species of commands.'

By many of the admirers of customary laws (and, especially, of their German admirers), they are thought to oblige legally (independently of the sovereign or state), *because* the citizens or subjects have observed or kept them. Agreeably to this opinion, they are not the *creatures* of the sovereign or state, although the sovereign or state may abolish them at pleasure. Agreeably to this opinion, they are positive law (or law, strictly so called), inasmuch as they are enforced by the courts of justice: But, that notwithstanding, they exist *as positive law* by the spontaneous adoption of the governed, and not by position or establishment on the part of political superiors. Consequently, customary laws, considered as positive law, are not commands. And, consequently, customary laws, considered as positive law, are not laws or rules properly so called.

An opinion less mysterious, but somewhat allied to this,

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is not uncommonly held by the adverse party: by the party which is strongly opposed to customary law; and to all law made judicially, or in the way of judicial legislation. According to the latter opinion, all judge-made law, or all judge-made law established by *subject* judges, is purely the creature of the judges by whom it is established immediately. To impute it to the sovereign legislature, or to suppose that it speaks the will of the sovereign legislature, is one of the foolish or knavish *fictions* with which lawyers, in every age and nation, have perplexed and darkened the simplest and clearest truths.

I think it will appear, on a moment's reflection, that each of these opinions is groundless: that customary law is *imperative*, in the proper signification of the term; and that all judge-made law is the creature of the sovereign or state.

At its origin, a custom is a rule of conduct which the governed observe spontaneously, or not in pursuance of a law set by a political superior. The custom is transmuted into positive law, when it is adopted as such by the courts of justice, and when the judicial decisions fashioned upon it are enforced by the power of the state. But before it is adopted by the courts, and clothed with the legal sanction, it is merely a rule of positive morality: a rule generally observed by the citizens or subjects; but deriving the only force, which it can be said to possess, from the general disapprobation falling on those who transgress it.

Now when judges transmute a custom into a legal rule (or make a legal rule not suggested by a custom), the legal rule which they establish is established by the sovereign legislature. A subordinate or subject judge is merely a minister. The portion of the sovereign power which lies at his disposition is merely delegated. The rules which he makes derive their legal force from authority given by the state: an authority which the state may confer expressly, but which it commonly imparts in the way of acquiescence. For, since the state may reverse the rules which he makes, and yet permits him to enforce them by the power of the political community, its sovereign will 'that his rules shall obtain as law' is clearly evinced by its conduct, though not by its express declaration.

The admirers of customary law love to trick out their idol with mysterious and imposing attributes. But to those who can see the difference between positive law and morality, there is nothing of mystery about it. Considered as rules of

positive morality, customary laws arise from the consent of the governed, and not from the position or establishment of political superiors. But, considered as moral rules turned into positive laws, customary laws are established by the state: established by the state directly, when the customs are promulged in its statutes; established by the state circuitously, when the customs are adopted by its tribunals.

The opinion of the party which abhors judge-made laws, springs from their inadequate conception of the nature of commands.

Like other significations of desire, a command is express or tacit. If the desire be signified by *words* (written or spoken), the command is express. If the desire be signified by conduct (or by any signs of desire which are *not* words), the command is tacit.

Now when customs are turned into legal rules by decisions of subject judges, the legal rules which emerge from the customs are *tacit* commands of the sovereign legislature. The state, which is able to abolish, permits its ministers to enforce them: and it, therefore, signifies its pleasure, by that its voluntary acquiescence, 'that they shall serve as a law to the governed.'

My present purpose is merely this: to prove that the positive law styled *customary* (and all positive law made judicially) is established by the state directly or circuitously, and, therefore, is *imperative*. I am far from disputing, that law made judicially (or in the way of improper legislation) and law made by statute (or in the properly legislative manner) are distinguished by weighty differences. I shall inquire, in future lectures, what those differences are; and why subject judges, who are properly ministers of the law, have commonly shared with the sovereign in the business of making it.

I assume, then, that the only laws which are not imperative, and which belong to the subject-matter of jurisprudence, are the following:—1. Declaratory laws, or laws explaining the import of existing positive law. 2. Laws abrogating or repealing existing positive law. 3. Imperfect laws, or laws of imperfect obligation (with the sense wherein the expression is used by the Roman jurists).

Laws which are not commands, enumerated.

But the space occupied in the science by these improper laws is comparatively narrow and insignificant. Accordingly, although I shall take them into account so often as I refer to them directly, I shall throw them out of account on

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other occasions. Or (changing the expression) I shall limit the term *law* to laws which are imperative, unless I extend it expressly to laws which are not.

LECTURE II.

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The connection of the second with the first lecture.

IN my first lecture, I stated or suggested the purpose and the manner of my attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence: to distinguish positive law, the appropriate matter of jurisprudence, from the various objects to which it is related by resemblance, and to which it is related, nearly or remotely, by a strong or slender analogy.

In pursuance of that purpose, and agreeably to that manner, I stated the essentials of a law or rule (taken with the largest signification which can be given to the term *properly*).

In pursuance of that purpose, and agreeably to that manner, I proceed to distinguish laws set by men to men from those Divine laws which are the ultimate test of human.

The Divine laws or the laws of God.

The Divine laws, or the laws of God, are laws set by God to his human creatures. As I have intimated already, and shall show more fully hereafter, they are laws or rules, *properly* so called.

As distinguished from duties imposed by human laws, duties imposed by the Divine laws may be called *religious duties*.

As distinguished from violations of duties imposed by human laws, violations of religious duties are styled *sins*.

As distinguished from sanctions annexed to human laws, the sanctions annexed to the Divine laws may be called *religious sanctions*. They consist of the evils, or pains, which we may suffer here or hereafter, by the immediate appointment of God, and as *consequences* of breaking his commandments.

Of the Divine laws, some are revealed, and others are un-revealed.

Of the Divine laws, or the laws of God, some are *revealed* or promulged, and others are *unrevealed*. Such of the laws of God as are unrevealed are not unfrequently denoted by the following names or phrases: 'the law of nature;' 'natural law;' 'the law manifested to man by the light of nature or reason;' 'the laws, precepts, or dictates of natural religion.'

The *revealed* law of God, and the portion of the law of

God which is *unrevealed*, are manifested to men in different ways, or by different sets of signs.

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With regard to the laws which God is pleased to *reveal*, the way wherein they are manifested is easily conceived. They are *express* commands: portions of the *word* of God: commands signified to men through the medium of human language; and uttered by God directly, or by servants whom he sends to announce them.

Such of the Divine laws as are revealed.

Such of the Divine laws as are *unrevealed* are laws set by God to his human creatures, but not through the medium of human language, or not expressly.

Such of the Divine laws as are unrevealed.

These are the only laws which he has set to that portion of mankind who are excluded from the light of Revelation.

These laws are binding upon us (who have access to the truths of Revelation), in so far as the revealed law has left our duties undetermined. For, though his express declarations are the clearest evidence of his will, we must look for many of the duties, which God has imposed upon us, to the marks or signs of his pleasure which are styled the *light of nature*. Paley and other divines have proved beyond a doubt, that it was not the purpose of Revelation to disclose the *whole* of those duties. Some we could not know, without the help of Revelation; and these the revealed law has stated distinctly and precisely. The rest we may know, if we will, by the light of nature or reason; and these the revealed law supposes or assumes. It passes them over in silence, or with a brief and incidental notice.

But if God has given us laws which he has not revealed or promulged, how shall we know them? What are those signs of his pleasure, which we style the *light of nature*; and oppose, by that figurative phrase, to express declarations of his will?

What is the index to such of the Divine laws as are unrevealed?

The hypotheses or theories which attempt to resolve this question, may be reduced, I think, to two.

According to one of them, there are human actions which all mankind approve, human actions which all men disapprove; and these universal sentiments arise at the thought of those actions, spontaneously, instantly, and inevitably. Being common to all mankind, and inseparable from the thoughts of those actions, these sentiments are marks or signs of the Divine pleasure. They are proofs that the actions which excite them are enjoined or forbidden by the Deity.

The hypotheses or theories which regard the nature of that index. The hypothesis or theory of a moral sense: of innate practical principles; of a practical reason; of

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a common
sense, &c.
&c.

The rectitude or pravity of human conduct, or its agreement or disagreement with the laws of God, is instantly inferred from these sentiments, without the possibility of mistake. He has resolved that our happiness shall depend on our keeping his commandments: and it manifestly consists with his manifest wisdom and goodness, that we should know them promptly and certainly. Accordingly, he has not committed us to the guidance of our slow and fallible *reason*. He has wisely endowed us with *feelings*, which warn us at every step; and pursue us, with their importunate reproaches, when we wander from the path of our duties.

These simple or inscrutable feelings have been compared to those which we derive from the outward senses, and have been referred to a peculiar faculty called the *moral sense*: though, admitting that the feelings exist, and are proofs of the Divine pleasure, I am unable to discover the analogy which suggested the comparison and the name. The objects or appearances which properly are perceived through the senses, are perceived immediately, or without an inference of the understanding. According to the hypothesis which I have briefly stated or suggested, there is always an inference of the understanding, though the inference is short and inevitable. From feelings which arise within us when we think of certain actions, we infer that those actions are enjoined or forbidden by the Deity.

The hypothesis, however, of a *moral sense*, is expressed in other ways.

The laws of God, to which these feelings are the index, are not unfrequently named *innate practical principles*, or *postulates of practical reason*: or they are said to be written on our hearts, by the finger of their great Author, in broad and indelible characters.

Common sense (the most yielding and accommodating of phrases) has been moulded and fitted to the purpose of expressing the hypothesis in question. In all their decisions on the rectitude or pravity of conduct (its agreement or disagreement with the unrevealed law), mankind are said to be determined by *common sense*: this same *common sense* meaning, in this instance, the simple or inscrutable sentiments which I have endeavoured to describe.

Considered as affecting the soul, when the man thinks especially of *his own* conduct, these sentiments, feelings, or emotions, are frequently styled *his conscience*.

According to the other of the adverse theories or hypotheses, the laws of God, which are not revealed or promulged, must be gathered by man from the goodness of God, and from the tendencies of human actions. In other words, the benevolence of God, with the principle of general utility, is our only index or guide to his unrevealed law.

The theory or hypothesis of utility.

God designs the happiness of all his sentient creatures. Some human actions forward that benevolent purpose, or their tendencies are beneficent or useful. Other human actions are adverse to that purpose, or their tendencies are mischievous or pernicious. The former, as promoting his purpose, God has enjoined. The latter, as opposed to his purpose, God has forbidden. He has given us the faculty of observing; of remembering; of reasoning: and, by duly applying those faculties, we may collect the tendencies of our actions. Knowing the tendencies of our actions, and knowing his benevolent purpose, we know his tacit commands.

A brief summary of the theory of utility.

Such is a brief summary of this celebrated theory. I should wander to a measureless distance from the main purpose of my lectures, if I stated all the explanations with which that summary must be received. But, to obviate the principal misconceptions to which the theory is obnoxious, I will subjoin as many of those explanations as my purpose and limits will admit.

The following explanations of that summary briefly introduced.

The theory is this.—Inasmuch as the goodness of God is boundless and impartial, he designs the greatest happiness of all his sentient creatures: he wills that the aggregate of their enjoyments shall find no nearer limit than that which is inevitably set to it by their finite and imperfect nature. From the probable effects of our actions on the greatest happiness of all, or from the tendencies of human actions to increase or diminish that aggregate, we may infer the laws which he has given, but has not expressed or revealed.

Now the *tendency* of a human action (as its tendency is thus understood) is the whole of its tendency: the sum of its probable consequences, in so far as they are important or material: the sum of its remote and collateral, as well as of its direct consequences, in so far as any of its consequences may influence the general happiness.

The true tendency of a human action, and the true test of that tendency.

Trying to collect its tendency (as its tendency is thus understood), we must not consider the action as if it were

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single and insulated, but must look at the *class* of actions to which it belongs. The probable *specific* consequences of doing that single act, of forbearing from that single act, or of omitting that single act, are not the objects of the inquiry. The question to be solved is this:—If acts of the *class* were *generally* done, or *generally* forborne or omitted, what would be the probable effect on the general happiness or good?

Considered by itself, a mischievous act may seem to be useful or harmless. Considered by itself, a useful act may seem to be pernicious.

For example, If a poor man steal a handful from the heap of his rich neighbour, the act, considered by itself, is harmless or positively good. One man's property is assuaged with the superfluous wealth of another.

But suppose that thefts were general (or that the useful right of property were open to frequent invasions), and mark the result.

Without security for property, there were no inducement to save. Without habitual saving on the part of proprietors, there were no accumulation of capital. Without accumulation of capital, there were no fund for the payment of wages, no division of labour, no elaborate and costly machines: there were none of those helps to labour which augment its productive power, and, therefore, multiply the enjoyments of every individual in the community. Frequent invasions of property would bring the rich to poverty; and, what were a greater evil, would aggravate the poverty of the poor.

If a single and insulated theft seem to be harmless or good, the fallacious appearance merely arises from this: that the vast majority of those who are tempted to steal abstain from invasions of property; and the detriment to security, which is the end produced by a single theft, is overbalanced and concealed by the mass of wealth, the accumulation of which is produced by general security.

Again: If I evade the payment of a tax imposed by a good government, the *specific* effects of the mischievous forbearance are indisputably useful. For the money which I unduly withhold is convenient to myself; and, compared with the bulk of the public revenue, is a quantity too small to be missed. But the regular payment of taxes is necessary to the existence of the government. And I, and the rest of the community, enjoy the security which it gives, because the payment of taxes is rarely evaded.

In the cases now supposed, the act or omission is good, considered as single or insulated; but, considered with the rest of its class, is evil. In other cases, an act or omission is evil, considered as single or insulated; but, considered with the rest of its class, is good.

For example, A punishment, as a solitary fact, is an evil: the pain inflicted on the criminal being added to the mischief of the crime. But, considered as part of a system, a punishment is useful or beneficent. By a dozen or score of punishments, thousands of crimes are prevented. With the sufferings of the guilty few, the security of the many is purchased. By the lopping of a peccant member, the body is saved from decay.

It, therefore, is true generally (for the proposition admits of exceptions), that, to determine the true tendency of an act, forbearance, or omission, we must resolve the following question.—What would be the probable effect on the general happiness or good, if *similar* acts, forbearances, or omissions were general or frequent?

Such is the *test* to which we must usually resort, if we would try the true *tendency* of an act, forbearance, or omission: Meaning, by the true *tendency* of an act, forbearance, or omission, the sum of its probable effects on the general happiness or good, or its agreement or disagreement with the principle of general utility.

But, if this be the ordinary test for trying the tendencies of actions, and if the tendencies of actions be the index to the will of God, it follows that most of his commands are general or universal. The useful acts which he enjoins, and the pernicious acts which he prohibits, he enjoins or prohibits, for the most part, not singly, but by classes: not by commands which are particular, or directed to insulated cases; but by laws or rules which are general, and commonly inflexible.

According to the theory of utility, God's commands are mostly rules.

For example, Certain acts are pernicious, considered as a class: or (in other words) the frequent repetition of the act were adverse to the general happiness, though, in this or that instance, the act might be useful or harmless. Further: Such are the motives or inducements to the commission of acts of the class, that, unless we were determined to forbearance by the fear of punishment, they *would* be frequently committed. Now, if we combine these *data* with the wisdom and goodness of God, we must infer that he forbids such acts, and forbids them *without exception*. In the tenth, or

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the hundredth case, the act might be useful: in the nine, or the ninety and nine, the act would be pernicious. If the act were permitted or tolerated in the rare and anomalous case, the motives to forbear in the others would be weakened or destroyed. In the hurry and tumult of action, it is hard to distinguish justly. To grasp at present enjoyment, and to turn from present uneasiness, is the habitual inclination of us all. And thus, through the weakness of our judgments, and the more dangerous infirmity of our wills, we should frequently *stretch* the exception to cases embraced by the rule.

Consequently, where acts, considered as a class, are useful or pernicious, we must conclude that he enjoins or forbids them, and by a *rule* which probably is inflexible.

Such, I say, is the conclusion at which we must arrive, supposing that the fear of punishment be necessary to incite or restrain.

It does not follow from the theory of utility, that every useful action is the object of a Divine injunction; and every pernicious action, the object of a Divine prohibition.

For the tendency of an act is one thing: the utility of enjoining or forbidding it is another thing. There are classes of useful acts, which it were useless to enjoin; classes of mischievous acts, which it were useless to prohibit. Sanctions were superfluous. We are sufficiently prone to the useful, and sufficiently averse from the mischievous acts, without the motives which are presented to the will by a lawgiver. Motives *natural* or spontaneous (or motives *other* than those which are created by injunctions and prohibitions) impel us to action in the one case, and hold us to forbearance in the other. In the language of Mr. Locke, 'The mischievous omission or action would bring down evils upon us, which are its *natural* products or consequences; and which, as *natural* inconveniences, operate *without a law*.'

A current and specious objection to the theory of utility, introduced and stated.

Now, if the measure or test which I have endeavoured to explain be the ordinary measure or test for trying the tendencies of our actions, the most current and specious of the objections, which are made to the theory of utility, is founded in gross mistake, and is open to triumphant refutation.

The theory, be it always remembered, is this:

Our motives to obey the laws which God has given us, are paramount to all others. For the transient pleasures which we may snatch, or the transient pains which we may shun, by violating the duties which they impose, are nothing in comparison with the pains by which those duties are sanctioned.

The greatest possible happiness of all his sentient crea-

tures, is the purpose and effect of those laws. For the benevolence by which they were prompted, and the wisdom with which they were planned, equal the might which enforces them.

But, seeing that such is their purpose, they embrace the *whole* of our conduct: so far, that is, as our conduct may promote or obstruct that purpose; and so far as injunctions and prohibitions are necessary to correct our desires.

In so far as the laws of God are clearly and indisputably revealed, we are bound to guide our conduct by the plain meaning of their terms. In so far as they are not revealed, we must resort to another guide: namely, the probable effect of our conduct on that *general happiness* or *good* which is the object of the Divine Lawgiver in all his laws and commandments.

In each of these cases, the *source* of our duties is the same; though the *proofs* by which we know them are different. The principle of general utility is the *index* to many of these duties; but the principle of general utility is not their *fountain* or *source*. For duties or obligations arise from commands and sanctions. And commands, it is manifest, proceed not from abstractions, but from living and rational beings.

Admit these premises, and the following conclusion is inevitable.—The *whole* of our conduct should be guided by the principle of utility, in so far as the conduct to be pursued has not been determined by Revelation. For, to conform to the principle or maxim with which a law coincides, is equivalent to obeying that law.

Such is the theory: which I have repeated in various forms, and, I fear, at tedious length, in order that my younger hearers might conceive it with due distinctness.

The current and specious objection to which I have adverted, may be stated thus:

‘Pleasure and pain (or good and evil) are inseparably connected. Every positive act, and every forbearance or omission, is followed by *both*: immediately or remotely, directly or collaterally, to ourselves or to our fellow-creatures.

‘Consequently, if we shape our conduct justly to the principle of general utility, every election which we make between doing or forbearing from an act will be preceded by the following process. *First*: We shall conjecture the consequences of the act, and also the consequences of the forbearance. For these are the competing elements of

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‘ that *calculation*, which, according to our guiding principle, we are bound to make. *Secondly* : We shall compare the consequences of the act with the consequences of the forbearance, and determine the set of consequences which gives the *balance* of advantage : which yields the larger residue of probable good, or (adopting a different, though exactly equivalent expression) which leaves the smaller residue of probable evil.

‘ Now let us suppose that we actually tried this process, before we arrived at our resolves. And then let us mark the absurd and mischievous effects which would inevitably follow our attempts.

‘ Generally speaking, the period allowed for deliberation is brief : and to lengthen deliberation beyond that limited period, is equivalent to forbearance or omission. Consequently, if we performed this elaborate process completely and correctly, we should often defeat its purpose. We should abstain from action altogether, though utility required us to act ; or the occasion for acting *usefully* would slip through our fingers, whilst we weighed, with anxious scrupulosity, the merits of the act and the forbearance.

‘ But feeling the necessity of resolving promptly, we should *not* perform the process completely and correctly. We should guess or conjecture hastily the effects of the act and the forbearance, and compare their respective effects with equal precipitancy. Our premises would be false or imperfect ; our conclusions, badly deduced. Labouring to adjust our conduct to the principle of general utility, we should work inevitable mischief.

‘ And such were the consequences of following the principle of utility, though we sought the true and the useful with simplicity and in earnest. But, as we commonly prefer our own to the interests of our fellow-creatures, and our own immediate to our own remote interests, it is clear that we should warp the principle to selfish and sinister ends.

‘ The final cause or purpose of the Divine laws is the general happiness or good. But to trace the effect of our conduct on the general happiness or good is not the way to know them. By consulting and obeying the laws of God we promote our own happiness and the happiness of our fellow-creatures. But we should *not* consult his laws, we should *not* obey his laws, and, so far as in us lay, we should thwart their benevolent design, if we made the general happiness our object or end. In a breath, we should widely deviate

‘in effect from the principle of general utility by taking it as ‘the guide of our conduct.’

Such, I believe, is the meaning of those—if they have a meaning—who object to the principle of utility ‘that it were a *dangerous* principle of conduct.’

The two apt answers to the foregoing objection briefly introduced.

As the objectors are generally persons little accustomed to clear and determinate thinking, I am not quite certain that I have conceived the objection exactly. But I have endeavoured with perfectly good faith to understand their meaning, and as forcibly as I can to state it, or to state the most rational meaning which their words can be supposed to import.

It has been said, in answer to this objection, that it involves a contradiction in terms. *Danger* is another name for *probable mischief*: And, surely, we best avert the probable mischiefs of our conduct, by conjecturing and estimating its probable consequences. To say ‘that the principle of utility were a *dangerous* principle of conduct,’ is to say ‘that it were contrary to utility to consult utility.’

Now, though this is so brief and pithy that I heartily wish it were conclusive, I must needs admit that it scarcely touches the objection, and falls far short of a crushing reduction to absurdity. For the objection obviously assumes that we *cannot* foresee and estimate the probable effects of our conduct: that if we attempted to calculate its good and its evil consequences, our presumptuous attempt at calculation would lead us to error and sin. What is contended is, that by the attempt to act according to utility, an attempt which would not be successful, we should deviate from utility. A proposition involving when fairly stated nothing like a contradiction.

But, though this is not the refutation, there is a refutation.

And first, If utility be our only index to the tacit commands of the Deity, it is idle to object its imperfections. We must even make the most of it.

The first answer to the foregoing objection stated.

If we were endowed with a *moral sense*, or with a *common sense*, or with a *practical reason*, we scarcely should construe his commands by the principle of general utility. If our souls were furnished out with *innate practical principles*, we scarcely should read his commands in the tendencies of human actions. For, by the supposition, man would be gifted with a peculiar organ for acquiring a knowledge of his duties. The duties imposed by the Deity would be subjects of immediate consciousness, and completely exempted from the jurisdiction

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of observation and induction. An attempt to displace that invincible consciousness, and to thrust the principle of utility into the vacant seat, would be simply impossible and manifestly absurd. An attempt to taste or smell by force of syllogism, were not less hopeful or judicious.

But, if we are not gifted with that peculiar organ, we must take to the principle of utility, let it be never so defective. We must gather our duties, as we can, from the tendencies of human actions; or remain, at our own peril, in ignorance of our duties. We must pick our scabrous way with the help of a glimmering light, or wander in profound darkness.

The second answer to the foregoing objection briefly introduced.

Whether there be any ground for the hypothesis of a *moral sense*, is a question which I shall duly examine in a future lecture, but which I shall not pursue in the present place. For the present is a convenient place for the introduction of another topic: namely, that they who advance the objection in question misunderstand the theory which they presume to impugn.

Their objection is founded on the following assumption. — That, if we adjusted our conduct to the principle of general utility, every election which we made between doing and forbearing from an act would be preceded by a *calculation*: by an attempt to conjecture and compare the respective probable consequences of action and forbearance.

Or (changing the expression) their assumption is this. — That, if we adjusted our conduct to the principle of general utility, our conduct would always be determined by an immediate or direct resort to it.

And, granting their assumption, I grant their inference. I grant that the principle of utility were a halting and purblind guide.

But their assumption is groundless. They are battering (and most effectually) a misconception of their own, whilst they fancy they are hard at work demolishing the theory which they hate.

For, according to that theory, our conduct would conform to *rules* inferred from the tendencies of actions, but would not be determined by a direct resort to the principle of general utility. Utility would be the test of our conduct, ultimately, but not immediately: the immediate test of the rules to which our conduct would conform, but not the immediate test of specific or individual actions. Our rules would be fashioned on utility; our conduct, on our rules.

Recall the true test for trying the tendency of an action,

and, by a short and easy deduction, you will see that their assumption is groundless.

If we would try the tendency of a specific or individual act, we must not contemplate the act as if it were single and insulated, but must look at the class of acts to which it belongs. We must suppose that acts of the class were generally done or omitted, and consider the probable effect upon the general happiness or good.

We must guess the consequences which would follow, if acts of the class were general; and also the consequences which would follow, if they were generally omitted. We must then compare the consequences on the positive and negative sides, and determine on which of the two the balance of advantage lies.

If it lie on the positive side, the tendency of the act is good: or (adopting a wider, yet exactly equivalent expression) the general happiness requires that *acts of the class* shall be done. If it lie on the negative side, the tendency of the act is bad: or (again adopting a wider, yet exactly equivalent expression) the general happiness requires that *acts of the class* shall be forborne.

In a breath, if we truly try the tendency of a specific or individual act, we try the tendency of the class to which that act belongs. The *particular* conclusion which we draw, with regard to the single act, implies a *general* conclusion embracing all similar acts.

But, concluding that acts of the class are useful or pernicious, we are forced upon a further inference. Adverting to the known wisdom and the known benevolence of the Deity, we infer that he enjoins or forbids them by a general and inflexible *rule*.

Such is the inference at which we inevitably arrive, supposing that the acts be *such* as to call for the intervention of a lawgiver.

To *rules* thus inferred, and lodged in the memory, our conduct would conform *immediately*, if it were truly adjusted to utility. To consider the specific consequences of single or individual acts, would seldom consist with that ultimate principle. And our conduct would, therefore, be guided by *general* conclusions, or (to speak more accurately) by *rules* inferred from those conclusions.

But, this being admitted, the necessity of pausing and calculating, which the objection in question supposes, is an imaginary necessity.* To preface each act or forbearance by

If our conduct were truly adjusted to the principle of general utility, our conduct would conform, for the most part, to *rules*: rules which emanate from the Deity, and to which the tendencies of human actions are the guide or index.

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a conjecture and comparison of consequences, were clearly superfluous and mischievous. It were clearly superfluous, inasmuch as the result of that process would be embodied in a known *rule*. It were clearly mischievous, inasmuch as the *true* result would be expressed by that rule, whilst the process would probably be faulty, if it were done on the spur of the occasion.

Theory and
practice are
inseparable.

Speaking generally, human conduct, including the human conduct which is subject to the Divine commands, is inevitably guided by *rules*, or by *principles* or *maxims*.

If our experience and observation of particulars were not *generalized*, our experience and observation of particulars would seldom avail us in *practice*. To review on the spur of the occasion a host of particulars, and to obtain from those particulars a conclusion applicable to the case, were a process too slow and uncertain to meet the exigencies of our lives. The inferences suggested to our minds by repeated experience and observation are, therefore, drawn into *principles*, or compressed into *maxims*. These we carry about us ready for use, and apply to individual cases promptly or without hesitation: without reverting to the process by which they were obtained; or without recalling, and arraying before our minds, the numerous and intricate considerations of which they are handy abridgments.

This is the main, though not the only use of *theory*: which ignorant and weak people are in a habit of *opposing* to practice, but which is essential to practice guided by experience and observation.

'Tis true in *theory*; but, then, 'tis false in *practice*.' Such is a common talk. This says Noodle; propounding it with a look of the most ludicrous profundity.

But, with due and discreet deference to this worshipful and weighty personage, *that* which is true in *theory* is *also* true in *practice*.

Seeing that a true theory is a *compendium* of particular truths, it is necessarily true as applied to particular cases. The terms of the theory are general and abstract, or the particular truths which the theory implies would not be abbreviated or condensed. But, unless it be true of particulars, and, therefore, true in practice, it has no *truth* at all. *Truth* is always particular, though *language* is commonly general. Unless the terms of a theory can be resolved into particular truths, the theory is mere jargon: a coil of those senseless abstractions which often ensnare the *instructed*; and in which

the wits of the ignorant are certainly caught and entangled, when they stir from the track of authority, and venture to think for themselves.

They who talk of theory as if it were the antagonist of practice, or of a thing being true in *theory* but not true in *practice*, mean (if they have a meaning) that the theory in question is false: that the particular truths which it concerns are treated imperfectly or incorrectly; and that, if it were applied in practice, it might, therefore, mislead. They say that truth in theory is not truth in practice. They mean that a false theory is not a true one, and might lead us to practical errors.

Speaking then, generally, human conduct is inevitably guided by *rules*, or by *principles* or *maxims*.

The human conduct which is subject to the Divine commands, is not only guided by *rules*, but also by *moral sentiments* associated with those rules.

If I believe (no matter why) that acts of a class or description are enjoined or forbidden by the Deity, a moral sentiment or feeling (or a sentiment or feeling of approbation or disapprobation) is inseparably connected in my mind with the thought or conception of such acts. And by this I am urged to do, or restrained from doing such acts, although I advert not to the reason in which my belief originated, nor recall the Divine rule which I have inferred from that reason.

Now, if the reason in which my belief originated be the useful or pernicious tendency of acts of the class, my conduct is truly adjusted to the principle of general utility, but my conduct is not determined by a direct resort to it. It is directly determined by a *sentiment* associated with acts of the class, and with the rule which I have inferred from their tendency.

If my conduct be truly adjusted to the principle of general utility, my conduct is guided remotely by *calculation*. But, immediately, or at the moment of action, my conduct is determined by *sentiment*. I am swayed by *sentiment* as imperiously as I *should* be swayed by it, supposing I were utterly unable to produce a reason for my conduct, and were ruled by the capricious feelings which are styled the moral sense.

For example, Reasons which are quite satisfactory, but somewhat numerous and intricate, convince me that the institution of property is necessary to the general good. Convinced of this, I am convinced that thefts are pernicious.

If our conduct were truly adjusted to the principle of general utility, our conduct would be guided, for the most part, by *sentiments* associated with *rules*: rules which emanate from the Deity, and to which the tendencies of human actions are the guide or index.

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Convinced that thefts are pernicious, I infer that the Deity forbids them by a general and inflexible rule.

Now the train of induction and reasoning by which I arrive at this rule, is somewhat long and elaborate. But I am not compelled to repeat the process, before I can know with certainty that I should forbear from taking your purse. Through my previous habits of thought and by my education, a *sentiment of aversion* has become associated in my mind with the thought or conception of a *theft*: And, without adverting to the reasons which have convinced me that thefts are pernicious, or without adverting to the rule which I have inferred from their pernicious tendency, I am determined by that ready emotion to keep my fingers from your purse.

To think that the theory of utility would *substitute* calculation for sentiment, is a gross and flagrant error: the error of a shallow, precipitate understanding. He who *opposes* calculation and sentiment, opposes the rudder to the sail, or to the breeze which swells the sail. Calculation is the guide, and not the antagonist of sentiment. Sentiment without calculation were blind and capricious; but calculation without sentiment were inert.

To crush the moral sentiments, is not the scope or purpose of the true theory of utility. It seeks to impress those sentiments with a just or beneficent direction: to free us of *groundless* likings, and from the tyranny of senseless antipathies; to fix our love upon the useful, our hate upon the pernicious.

If, then, the principle of utility were the presiding principle of our conduct, our conduct would be determined immediately by Divine *rules*, or rather by moral *sentiments* associated with those rules. And, consequently, the application of the principle of utility to particular or individual cases, would neither be attended by the errors, nor followed by the mischiefs, which the current objection in question supposes.

But these conclusions (like most conclusions) must be taken with limitations.

There certainly are cases (of comparatively rare occurrence) wherein the specific considerations balance or outweigh the general: cases which (in the language of Bacon) are 'immersed in matter:' cases perplexed with peculiarities from which it were dangerous to abstract them; and to which our attention would be directed, if we were true to our presiding principle. It were mischievous to depart from a rule which

If our conduct were truly adjusted to the principle of general utility, our conduct would conform, for the most part, to Divine rules, and would also be guided, for the most part, by sentiments associated with those rules. But, in anomalous and excepted cases (of

regarded any of these cases; since every departure from a rule tends to weaken its authority. But so important were the *specific* consequences which would follow our resolves, that the evil of observing the rule might surpass the evil of breaking it. Looking at the reasons from which we had inferred the rule, it were absurd to think it inflexible. We should, therefore, dismiss the *rule*; resort directly to the *principle* upon which our rules were fashioned; and calculate *specific* consequences to the best of our knowledge and ability.

comparatively rare occurrence) our conduct would be fashioned directly on the principle of general utility, or guided by a conjecture and comparison of *specific* or *particular* consequences.

For example, If we take the principle of utility as our index to the Divine commands, we must infer that obedience to established government is enjoined generally by the Deity. For, without obedience to 'the powers which be,' there were little security and little enjoyment. The ground, however, of the inference, is the *utility* of government: And if the protection which it yields be *too costly*, or if it vex us with *needless* restraints and load us with *needless* exactions, the principle which points at submission as our general duty may counsel and justify resistance. Disobedience to an established government, let it be never so bad, is an evil: For the mischiefs inflicted by a bad government are less than the mischiefs of anarchy. So momentous, however, is the difference between a bad and a good government, that, *if it would lead to a good one*, resistance to a bad one would be useful. The anarchy attending the transition were an extensive, but a passing evil: The good which would follow the transition were extensive and lasting. The peculiar good would outweigh the generic evil: The good which would crown the change in the insulated and eccentric case, would more than compensate the evil which is inseparable from rebellion.

Whether resistance to government be useful or pernicious, be consistent or inconsistent with the Divine pleasure, is, therefore, an *anomalous* question. We must try it by a direct resort to the ultimate or presiding *principle*, and not by the Divine *rule* which the principle clearly indicates. To consult the rule, were absurd. For, the rule being general and applicable to ordinary cases, it ordains obedience to government, and excludes the question.

The members of a political society who revolve this momentous question must, therefore, dismiss the rule, and calculate specific consequences. They must measure the mischief wrought by the actual government; the chance of getting a better, by resorting to resistance; the evil which must attend resistance, whether it prosper or fail; and the good

which may follow resistance, in case it be crowned with success. And, then, by comparing these, the elements of their moral calculation, they must solve the question before them to the best of their knowledge and ability.

And in this eccentric or anomalous case, the application of the principle of utility would probably be beset with the difficulties which the current objection in question imputes to it generally. To measure and compare the evils of submission and disobedience, and to determine which of the two would give the balance of advantage, would probably be a difficult and uncertain process. The numerous and competing considerations by which the question must be solved, might well perplex and divide the wise, and the good, and the brave. A Milton or a Hampden might animate their countrymen to resistance, but a Hobbes or a Falkland would counsel obedience and peace.

But, though the principle of utility would afford no certain solution, the community would be fortunate, if their opinions and sentiments were formed upon it. The pretensions of the opposite parties being tried by an intelligible test, a peaceable compromise of their difference would, at least, be possible. The adherents of the established government, might think it the most *expedient*: but, as their liking would depend upon reasons, and not upon names and phrases, they might possibly prefer innovations, of which they would otherwise disapprove, to the mischiefs of a violent contest. They might chance to see the absurdity of upholding the existing order, with a stiffness which must end in anarchy. The party affecting reform, being also intent upon *utility*, would probably accept concessions short of their notions and wishes, rather than persist in the chase of a greater possible good through the evils and the hazards of a war. In short, if the object of each party were measured by the standard of utility, each might compare the worth of its object with the cost of a violent pursuit.

But, if the parties were led by their ears, and not by the principle of utility; if they appealed to unmeaning abstractions, or to senseless fictions; if they mouthed of 'the rights of man,' or 'the sacred rights of sovereigns,' of 'unalienable liberties,' or 'eternal and immutable justice;' of an 'original contract or covenant,' or 'the principles of an inviolable constitution;' neither could compare its object with the cost of a violent pursuit, nor would the difference between them admit of a peaceable compromise. A sacred or unalienable

right is truly and indeed *invaluable*: For, seeing that it means nothing, there is nothing with which it can be measured. Parties who rest their pretensions on the jargon to which I have adverted, must inevitably push to their objects through thick and thin, though their objects be straws or feathers as weighed in the balance of utility. Having banded their fustian phrases, and ‘bawled’ till their lungs be spent,’ they must even take to their weapons, and fight their difference out.

It really *is* important (though I feel the audacity of the paradox), that men should think distinctly, and speak with a meaning.

In most of the domestic broils which have agitated civilized communities, the result has been determined or seriously affected, by the nature of the prevalent *talk*: by the nature of the topics or phrases which have figured in the war of words. These topics or phrases have been more than pretexts: more than varnish: more than distinguishing cockades mounted by the opposite parties.

For example, If the bulk of the people of England had thought and reasoned with Mr. Burke, had been imbued with the spirit and had seized the scope of his arguments, her needless and disastrous war with her American colonies would have been stifled at the birth. The stupid and infuriate majority who rushed into that odious war, could perceive and discourse of nothing but the *sovereignty* of the mother country, and her so called *right* to tax her colonial subjects.

But, granting that the mother country was properly the sovereign of the colonies, granting that the fact of her sovereignty was proved by invariable practice, and granting her so called *right* to tax her colonial subjects, this was hardly a topic to move an enlightened people.

Is it the interest of England to insist upon her sovereignty? Is it her interest to exercise her right without the approbation of the colonists? For the chance of a slight revenue to be wrung from her American subjects, and of a trifling relief from the taxation which now oppresses herself, shall she drive those reluctant subjects to assert their alleged independence, visit her own children with the evil of war, squander her treasures and soldiers in trying to keep them down, and desolate the very region from which the revenue must be drawn?—These and the like considerations would have determined the people of England, if their dominant

opinions and sentiments had been fashioned on the principle of utility.

And, if these and the like considerations had determined the public mind, the public would have damned the project of taxing and coercing the colonies, and the government would have abandoned the project. For, it is only in the ignorance of the people, and in their consequent mental imbecility, that governments or demagogues can find the means of mischief.

If these and the like considerations had determined the public mind, the expenses and miseries of the war would have been avoided; the connection of England with America would not have been torn asunder; and, in case their common interests had led them to dissolve it quietly, the relation of sovereign and subject, or of parent and child, would have been followed by an equal, but intimate and lasting alliance. For the interests of the two nations perfectly coincide; and the open, and the covert hostilities, with which they plague one another, are the offspring of a bestial antipathy begotten by their original quarrel.

But arguments drawn from utility were not to the dull taste of the stupid and infuriate majority. The rabble, great and small, would hear of nothing but their *right*. 'They'd a *right* to tax the colonists, and tax 'em they would: Ay, *that* they would.' Just as if a *right* were worth a rush of itself, or a something to be cherished and asserted independently of the good that it may bring.

Mr. Burke would have taught them better: would have purged their muddled brains, and 'laid the fever in their souls,' with the healing principle of utility. He asked them what they would get, if the project of coercion should succeed; and implored them to compare the advantage with the hazard and the cost. But the sound practical men still insisted on the *right*; and sagaciously shook their heads at him, as a refiner and a theorist.

If a serious difference shall arise between ourselves and Canada, or if a serious difference shall arise between ourselves and Ireland, an attempt will probably be made to cram us with the same stuff. But, such are the mighty strides which reason has taken in the interval, that I hope we shall not swallow it with the relish of our good ancestors. It will probably occur to us to ask, whether she be worth keeping, and whether she be worth keeping at the cost of a war?—I think there is nothing romantic in the hope which I now express;

since an admirable speech of Mr. Baring, advising the relinquishment of Canada, was seemingly received, a few years ago, with general assent and approbation.*

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There are, then, cases, which are anomalous or eccentric; and to which the man, whose conduct was fashioned on utility, would apply that ultimate principle immediately or directly. And, in these anomalous or eccentric cases, the application of the principle would probably be beset with the difficulties which the current objection in question imputes to it generally.

The *second* answer to the foregoing objection briefly resumed.

But, even in these cases, the principle would afford an intelligible test, and a likelihood of a just solution: a probability of discovering the conduct required by the general good, and, therefore, required by the commands of a wise and benevolent Deity.

And the anomalies, after all, are comparatively few. In the great majority of cases, the general happiness requires that *rules* shall be observed, and that *sentiments* associated with rules shall be promptly obeyed. If our conduct were truly adjusted to the principle of general utility, our conduct would seldom be determined by an immediate or direct resort to it.

LECTURE III.

ALTHOUGH it is not the object of this course of lectures to treat of the science of legislation, but to evolve and expound the principles and distinctions involved in the idea of law, it was not a deviation from my subject to introduce the principle of utility. For I shall often have occasion to refer to that principle in my course, as that which not only ought to guide, but has commonly in fact guided the legislator. The principle of utility, well or ill understood, has usually been the principle consulted in making laws; and I therefore should often be unable to explain distinctly and precisely the scope and purport of a law, without having brought the principle of utility directly before you. I have therefore done so, not pretending to expound the principle in its various applications, which would be a subject of sufficient extent for many courses of lectures; but attempting to give

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Apology for introducing the principle of utility.

* The rationale of the so-called *rights of sovereign governments* is *post*.

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you a general notion of the principle, and to obviate the most specious of the objections which are commonly made to it.

The connection of the third with the second lecture.

In my second lecture, I examined a current and specious objection to the theory of general utility.

The drift of the objection, you undoubtedly remember; and you probably remember the arguments by which I attempted to refute it.

Accordingly, I merely resume that general conclusion which I endeavoured to establish by the second of my two answers.

The conclusion may be stated briefly, in the following manner.—If our conduct were truly adjusted to the principle of general utility, our conduct would conform, for the most part, to *laws* or *rules*: laws or rules which are set by the Deity, and to which the tendencies of *classes* of actions are the guide or index.

A second objection to the theory of utility, stated.

But here arises a difficulty which certainly is most perplexing, and which scarcely admits of a solution that will perfectly satisfy the mind.

If the Divine laws must be gathered from the tendencies of action, how can they, who are bound to keep them, know them fully and correctly?

So numerous are the classes of actions to which those laws relate, that no single mind can mark the whole of those classes, and examine completely their respective tendencies. If every single man must learn their respective tendencies, and thence infer the rules which God has set to mankind, every man's scheme of ethics will embrace but a *part* of those rules, and, on many or most of the occasions which require him to act or forbear, he will be forced on the dangerous process of calculating specific consequences.

Besides, ethical, like other wisdom, 'cometh by opportunity of leisure:' And, since they are busied with earning the means of living, the many are unable to explore the field of ethics, and to learn their numerous duties by learning the tendencies of actions.

If the Divine laws must be gathered from the tendencies of actions, the inevitable conclusion is absurd and monstrous.——God has given us laws which no man can know completely, and to which the great bulk of mankind has scarcely the slightest access.

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The considerations suggested by this and the next dis-

course, may solve or extenuate the perplexing difficulty to which I have now adverted.

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In so far as law and morality are what they *ought* to be (or in so far as law and morality accord with their ultimate test, or in so far as law and morality accord with the Divine commands), legal and moral rules have been fashioned on the principle of utility, or obtained by observation and induction from the tendencies of human actions. But, though they have been fashioned on the principle of utility, or obtained by observation and induction from the tendencies of human actions, it is not necessary that all whom they bind should know or advert to the process through which they have been gotten. If all whom they bind keep or observe them, the ends to which they exist are sufficiently accomplished. The ends to which they exist are sufficiently accomplished, though most of those who observe them be unable to perceive their ends, and be ignorant of the reasons on which they were founded, or of the proofs from which they were inferred.

An answer to that second objection introduced.

According to the theory of utility, the science of Ethics or Deontology (or the science of Law and Morality, as they *should* be, or *ought* to be) is one of the sciences which rest upon observation and induction. The science has been formed, through a long succession of ages, by many and separate contributions from many and separate discoverers. No single mind could explore the whole of the field, though each of its numerous departments has been explored by numerous inquirers.

If positive law and morality were exactly what they *ought* to be (or if positive law and morality were exactly fashioned to utility), sufficient reasons might be given for each of their constituent rules, and each of their constituent rules would *in fact* have been founded on those reasons. But no single mind could have found the whole of those rules, nor could any single mind compass the whole of their proofs. Though all the evidence would be known, the several parts of the evidence would be known by different men. Every single man might master a *portion* of the evidence: a portion commensurate with the attention which he gave to the science of ethics, and with the mental perspicacity and vigour which he brought to the study. But no single man could master *more* than a portion: And many of the rules of conduct, which were actually observed or admitted, would be taken, by the most instructed, on *authority, testimony, or trust*.

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In short, if a system of law and morality were exactly fashioned to utility, all its constituent *rules* might be known by all or most. But all the numerous *reasons*, upon which the system would rest, could scarcely be compassed by any: while most must limit their inquiries to a few of those numerous reasons; or, without an attempt to examine the reasons, must receive the whole of the rules from the teaching and example of others.

But this inconvenience is not peculiar to law and morality. It extends to all the sciences, and to all the arts.

Many mathematical truths are probably taken upon trust by deep and searching mathematicians:⁹ And of the thousands who apply arithmetic to daily and hourly use, not one in a hundred knows or surmises the reasons upon which its rules are founded. Of the millions who till the earth and ply the various handicrafts, few are acquainted with the grounds of their homely but important arts, though these arts are generally practised with passable expertness and success.

The powers of single individuals are feeble and poor, though the powers of conspiring numbers are gigantic and admirable. Little of any man's knowledge is gotten by original research. It mostly consists of *results* gotten by the researches of others, and taken by himself upon *testimony*.

⁹ In J. S. M.'s notes I find this passage in the following form:—'There are doubtless many mathematical truths which are believed on authority or testimony by the greatest mathematicians.'

By 'mathematical truths' the author cannot have intended those hypothetical conclusions or deductions which pertain to the branch of science sometimes called *pure mathematics*. As the meaning and purport of such conclusions is seldom correctly apprehended without pursuing the steps of reasoning upon which they rest, it would be merely idle for a mathematician to take them upon trust, or to believe them upon testimony.

The author's remark is however undoubtedly just, with regard to all scientific conclusions relating to actual phenomena, and based upon observations and experiment. I will take as an instance one of the best known and most widely accepted of them. The ultimate demonstration of the (so called) *law of gravitation* (or rather the demonstration of its *extreme approximation* to an ac-

curate expression of the physical conditions which regulate the motions of the heavenly bodies) rests upon a combination of *data* reduced from an enormous number of observations, and a variety of mathematical calculations which alternately assume approximate results, and by the use of these assumptions, make new and closer approximations. All these calculations implicitly involve or assume the law of gravitation, and the evidence of that law depends on the accuracy of the entire calculations, combined with the final agreement of calculation with observation. Now no single individual has ever verified more than a fractional part of this evidence. Or to take a connected and more homely illustration. No single individual has examined more than a fraction of the evidence on which depends the accuracy of a single statement in the Nautical Almanac for the current year. Yet the *data* of that publication will be implicitly relied on by astronomers no less than by navigators.—R. C.

And in many departments of science we may safely rely upon testimony: though the knowledge which we thus obtain is less satisfactory and useful than that which we win for ourselves by direct examination of the proofs.

In the mathematical and physical sciences, and in the arts which are founded upon them, we may commonly trust the conclusions which we take upon authority. For the adepts in these sciences and arts mostly agree in their results, and lie under no temptation to cheat the ignorant with error. I firmly believe (for example) that the earth moves round the sun; though I know not a tittle of the evidence from which the conclusion is inferred. And my belief is perfectly rational, though it rests upon mere authority. For there is nothing in the alleged fact, contrary to my experience of nature: whilst all who have scrutinized the evidence concur in affirming the fact; and have no conceivable motive to assert and diffuse the conclusion, but the liberal and beneficent desire of maintaining and propagating truth.

But the case is unhappily different with the important science of ethics, and also with the various sciences—such as legislation, politics, and political economy—which are nearly related to ethics. Those who have inquired, or affected to inquire into ethics, have rarely been impartial, and, therefore, have differed in their results. Sinister interests, or prejudices begotten by such interests, have mostly determined them to embrace the opinions which they have laboured to impress upon others. Most of them have been advocates rather than inquirers. Instead of examining the evidence and honestly pursuing its consequences, most of them have hunted for arguments in favour of *given* conclusions, and have neglected or purposely suppressed the unbending and incommensurable considerations which pointed at opposite inferences.

An objection fore-answered, stated.

Now how can the bulk of mankind, who have little opportunity for research, compare the respective merits of these varying and hostile opinions, and hit upon those of the throng which accord with utility and truth? Here, testimony is not to be trusted. There is not *that concurrence or agreement of numerous and impartial inquirers*, to which the most cautious and erect understanding readily and wisely defers. With regard to the science of ethics, and to all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, invincible doubt, or blind and prostrate belief, would seem to be the doom of the multi-

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tude. Anxiously busied with the means of earning a precarious livelihood, they are debarred from every opportunity of carefully surveying the *evidence*: whilst every *authority*, whereon they may hang their faith, wants that mark of trustworthiness which justifies reliance on authority.

Accordingly, the science of ethics, with all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, lag behind the others. So few are the sincere inquirers who turn their attention to these sciences, and so difficult is it for the multitude to perceive the worth of their labours, that the advancement of the sciences themselves is comparatively slow; whilst the most perspicuous of the truths, with which they are occasionally enriched, are either rejected by the many as worthless or pernicious paradoxes, or win their laborious way to general assent through a long and dubious struggle with established and obstinate errors.

Many of the legal and moral rules which obtain in the most civilised communities, rest upon brute custom, and not upon manly reason. They have been taken from preceding generations without examination, and are deeply tinged with barbarity. They arose in early ages, and in the infancy of the human mind, partly from caprices of the fancy (which are nearly omnipotent with barbarians), and partly from the imperfect apprehension of general utility which is the consequence of narrow experience. And so great and numerous are the obstacles to the diffusion of ethical truth, that these monstrous or crude productions of childish and imbecile intellect have been cherished and perpetuated, through ages of advancing knowledge, to the comparatively enlightened period in which it is our happiness to live.

The foregoing objection to the foregoing answer, solved or

It were idle to deny the difficulty. The *diffusion* and the *advancement* of ethical truth are certainly prevented or obstructed by great and peculiar obstacles.

But these obstacles, I am firmly convinced, will gradually disappear. In two causes of slow but sure operation, we may clearly perceive a cure, or, at least, a palliative of the evil. — In every civilized community of the Old and New World, the *leading principles* of the science of ethics, and also of the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, are gradually finding their way, in company with other knowledge, amongst the great mass of the people: whilst those who accurately study, and who labour to advance these sciences, are proportionally increasing in number, and waxing in zeal and

activity. From the combination of these two causes we may hope for a more rapid progress both in the discovery and in the diffusion of moral truth. LECT. III

Profound knowledge of these, as of the other sciences, will always be confined to the comparatively few who study them long and assiduously. But the multitude are fully competent to conceive the *leading principles*, and to apply those leading principles to particular cases. And, if they were imbued with those principles, and were practised in the art of applying them, they would be docile to the voice of reason, and armed against sophistry and error. There is a wide and important difference between ignorance of principles and ignorance of particulars or details. The man who is ignorant of principles, and unpractised in right reasoning, is imbecile as well as ignorant. The man who is simply ignorant of particulars or details, can reason correctly from premises which are *suggested* to his understanding, and can justly estimate the consequences which are drawn from those premises by others. If the minds of the many were informed and invigorated, so far as their position will permit, they could distinguish the statements and reasonings of their instructed and judicious friends, from the lies and fallacies of those who would use them to sinister purposes, and from the equally pernicious nonsense of their weak and ignorant well-wishers. Possessed of directing principles, able to reason rightly, helped to the requisite premises by accurate and comprehensive inquirers, they could examine and fathom the questions which it most behoves them to understand: Though the leisure which they can snatch from their callings is necessarily so limited, that their opinions upon numerous questions of subordinate importance would continue to be taken from the mere *authority* of others.

The shortest and clearest illustrations of this most cheering truth, are furnished by the inestimable science of political economy, which is so interwoven with every consideration belonging to morals, politics, and legislation, that it is impossible to treat any one of these sciences without a continual reference to it.

The broad or leading principles of the science of political economy, may be mastered, with moderate attention, in a short period. With these simple, but commanding prin-

ciples, a number of important questions are easily resolved. And if the multitude (as they can and will) shall ever understand these principles, many pernicious prejudices will be extirpated from the popular mind, and truths of ineffable moment planted in their stead.

For example, In many or all countries (the least uncivilized not excepted), the prevalent opinions and sentiments of the working people are certainly not consistent with the complete security of property. To the *ignorant* poor, the inequality which inevitably follows the beneficent institution of property is necessarily invidious. That they who toil and produce should fare scantily, whilst others, who 'delve not nor spin,' batten on the fruits of labour, seems, to the jaundiced eyes of the poor and the ignorant, a monstrous state of things: an arrangement upheld by the few at the *cost* of the many, and flatly inconsistent with the benevolent purposes of Providence.

A statement of the numerous evils which flow from this single prejudice, would occupy a volume. But they cast so clear a light on the mischiefs of popular ignorance, and show so distinctly the advantages of popular instruction, that I will briefly touch upon a few of them, though at the risk of tiring your patience.

In the first place, this prejudice blinds the people to the cause of their sufferings, and to the only remedy or palliative which the case will admit.

Want and labour spring from the niggardliness of nature, and not from the inequality which is consequent on the institution of property. These evils are inseparable from the condition of man upon earth; and are lightened, not aggravated, by this useful, though invidious institution. Without *capital*, and the arts which depend upon capital, the reward of labour would be far scantier than it is; and capital, with the arts which depend upon it, are creatures of the institution of property. The institution is good for the many, as well as for the few. The poor are not stripped by it of the produce of their labour; but it gives them a part in the enjoyment of wealth which it calls into being. In effect, though not in law, the labourers are co-proprietors with the capitalists who hire their labour. The reward which they get for their labour is principally drawn from *capital*; and they are not less interested than the legal owners in protecting the fund from invasion.

It is certainly to be wished, that their reward were

greater; and that they were relieved from the incessant drudgery to which they are now condemned. But the condition of the working people (whether their wages shall be high or low; their labour, moderate or extreme) depends upon their own will, and not upon the will of the rich. In the *true principle of population*, detected by the sagacity of Mr. Malthus, they must look for the cause and the remedy of their penury and excessive toil. There they may find the means which would give them comparative affluence; which would give them the degree of leisure necessary to knowledge and refinement; which would raise them to personal dignity and political influence, from grovelling and sordid subjection to the arbitrary rule of a few.

And these momentous truths are deducible from plain principles, by short and obvious inferences. Here, there is no need of large and careful research, or of subtle and sustained thinking. If the people understood distinctly a few indisputable propositions, and were capable of going correctly through an easy process of reasoning, their minds would be purged of the prejudice which binds them to the cause of their sufferings, and they would see and apply the remedy which is suggested by the principle of population. Their repinings at the affluence of the rich, would be appeased. Their murmurs at the injustice of the rich, would be silenced. They would scarcely break machinery, or fire barns and corn ricks, to the end of raising wages, or the rate of parish relief. They would see that violations of property are mischievous to *themselves*: that such violations weaken the motives to accumulation, and, therefore, diminish the fund which yields the labourer his subsistence. They would see that they are deeply interested in the *security* of property: that, if they adjusted their numbers to the demand for their labour, they would share abundantly, with their employers, in the blessings of that useful institution.

Another of the numerous evils which flow from the prejudice in question, is the frequency of crimes.

Nineteen offences out of twenty, are offences against property. And most offences against property may be imputed to the prejudice in question.

The authors of such offences are commonly of the poorer sort. For the most part, poverty is the incentive. And this prejudice perpetuates poverty amongst the great body of the people, by blinding them to the cause and the remedy.

And whilst it perpetuates the ordinary incentive to crime, it weakens the restraints.

As a check or deterring motive, as an inducement to abstain from crime, the fear of public disapprobation, with its countless train of evils, is scarcely less effectual than the fear of legal punishment. To the purpose of forming the moral character, of rooting in the soul a prompt aversion from crime, it is infinitely more effectual.

The help of the hangman and the gaoler would seldom be called for, if the *opinion* of the great body of the people were cleared of the prejudice in question, and, therefore, fell heavily upon all offenders against property. If the *general opinion* were thoroughly cleared of that prejudice, it would greatly weaken the temptations to crime, by its salutary influence on the moral character of the multitude: The motives which it would oppose to those temptations, would be scarcely less effectual than the motives which are presented by the law: And it would heighten the terrors, and strengthen the restraints of the law, by engaging a countless host of eager and active volunteers in the service of criminal justice. If the people saw distinctly the tendencies of offences against property; if the people saw distinctly the tendencies and the grounds of the punishments; and if they were, therefore, bent upon pursuing the criminals to justice; the laws which prohibit these offences would seldom be broken with impunity, and, by consequence, would seldom be broken. An enlightened people were a better auxiliary to the judge than an army of policemen.

But, in consequence of the prejudice in question, the fear of public disapprobation scarcely operates upon the poor to the end of restraining them from offences against the property of the wealthier classes. For every man's public is formed of his own class: of those with whom he associates: of those whose favourable or unfavourable opinion sweetens or embitters his life. The poor man's public is formed of the poor. And the crimes, which affect merely the property of the wealthier classes, are certainly regarded with little, or rather with no abhorrence, by the indigent and ignorant portion of the working people. Not perceiving that such crimes are pernicious to *all* classes, but considering property to be a benefit in which they have no share and which is enjoyed by others at their expense, the indigent and ignorant portion of the working people are prone to consider such crimes as *reprisals* made upon usurpers and enemies. They

regard the criminal with sympathy rather than with indignation. They rather incline to favour, or, at least, to wink at his escape, than to lend their hearty aid towards bringing him to justice.

Those who have inquired into the causes of crimes, and into the means of lessening their number, have commonly expected magnificent results from an improved system of *punishments*. And I admit that something might be done by a judicious mitigation of punishments, and by removing that frequent inclination to, abet the escape of a criminal which springs from their repulsive severity. Something might also be accomplished by improvements in prison-discipline, and by providing a refuge for criminals who have *suffered* their punishments. For the stigma of legal punishment is commonly indelible; and, by debarring the unhappy criminal from the means of living honestly, forces him on further crimes.

But nothing but *the diffusion of knowledge through the great mass of the people* will go to the root of the evil. Nothing but this will cure or alleviate the poverty which is the ordinary incentive to crime. Nothing but this will extirpate their prejudices, and correct their moral sentiments: will lay them under the restraints which are imposed by enlightened opinion, and which operate so potently on the higher and more cultivated classes.

The evils which I have now mentioned, with many which I pass in silence, flow from *one* of the prejudices which enslave the popular mind. The advantages at which I have pointed, with many which I leave unnoticed, would follow the emancipation of the multitude from that *single* error.

And this, with other prejudices, might be expelled from their understandings and affections, if they had mastered the broad principles of the science of political economy, and could make the easiest applications of those simple, though commanding truths.

The functions of paper-money, the incidence of taxes, with other of the *nicer* points which are presented by this science, the multitude, it is probable, will never understand distinctly: and their opinions on such points (if ever they shall think of them at all) will, it is most likely, be always taken from *authority*. But the importance of those nicer points dwindles to nothing, when they are compared with the true reasons which call for the institution of property, and with the effect of the principle of population on the price of labour.

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For if these (which are *not* difficult) were clearly apprehended by the many, they would be raised from penury to comfort: from the necessity of toiling like cattle, to the enjoyment of sufficient leisure: from ignorance and brutishness, to knowledge and refinement: from abject subjection, to the independence which *commands* respect.

If my limits would permit me to dwell upon the topic at length, I could show, by many additional and pregnant examples, that the multitude might clearly apprehend the *leading principles* of ethics, and also of the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics: and that, if they had seized these principles, and could reason distinctly and justly, all the more momentous of the derivative practical truths would find access to their understandings and expel the antagonist errors.

And the multitude (in civilized communities) would soon apprehend these principles, and would soon acquire the talent of reasoning distinctly and justly, if one of the weightiest of the duties, which God has laid upon governments, were performed with fidelity and zeal. For, if we must construe those duties by the principles of general utility, it is not less incumbent on governments to forward the diffusion of knowledge, than to protect their subjects from one another by a due administration of justice, or to defend them by a military force from the attacks of external enemies. A small fraction of the sums which are squandered in needless war, would provide complete instruction for the working people: would give this important class that portion in the knowledge of the age, which consists with the nature of their callings, and with the necessity of toiling for a livelihood.

It appears, then, that the ignorance of the multitude is not altogether invincible, though the principle of general utility be the index to God's commands, and, therefore, the proximate test of positive law and morality.

If ethical science must be gotten by consulting the principle of utility, if it rest upon observation and induction applied to the tendencies of actions, if it be matter of acquired knowledge and not of immediate consciousness, much of it (I admit) will ever be hidden from the multitude, or will ever be taken by the multitude on authority, testimony, or trust. For an inquiry into the tendencies of actions encompasses so spacious a field, that none but the comparatively

few, who study the science assiduously, can apply the principle extensively to received or positive rules, and determine how far they accord with its genuine suggestions or dictates.

But the multitude might clearly understand the elements or groundwork of the science, together with the more momentous of the derivative practical truths. To that extent, they might be freed from the dominion of authority: from the necessity of blindly persisting in hereditary opinions and practices; or of turning and veering, for want of directing principles, with every wind of doctrine.

Nor is this the only advantage which would follow the spread of those elements amongst the great body of the people.

If the elements of ethical science were widely *diffused*, the science would *advance* with proportionate rapidity.

If the minds of the many were informed and invigorated, their coarse and sordid pleasures, and their stupid indifference about knowledge, would be supplanted by refined amusements, and by liberal curiosity. A numerous body of recruits from the lower of the middle classes, and even from the higher classes of the working people would thicken the slender ranks of the reading and reflecting public: the public which occupies its leisure with letters, science, and philosophy; whose opinion determines the success or failure of books; and whose notice and favour are naturally courted by the writers.

And until that public shall be much extended, shall embrace a considerable portion of the middle and working people, the science of ethics, with all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, will advance slowly.

It was the opinion of Mr. Locke, and I fully concur in the opinion, that there is no peculiar uncertainty in the *subject* or *matter* of these sciences: that the great and extraordinary difficulties, by which their advancement is impeded, are *extrinsick*; are opposed by sinister interests, or by prejudices which are the offspring of such interests: that, if they who seek, or affect to seek the truth, would pursue it with obstinate application and with due '*indifferency*,' they might frequently hit upon the object which they profess to look for.

Now few of them *will* pursue it with this requisite '*indifferency*' or impartiality, so long as the bulk of the public, which determines the fate of their labours, shall continue to

LECT. III be formed from the classes which are elevated by rank or opulence, and from the peculiar professions or callings which are distinguished by the name of 'liberal.'

In the science of ethics, and in all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, your only sure guide is *general* utility. If thinkers and writers would stick to it honestly and closely, they would frequently enrich these sciences with additional truths, or would do them good service by weeding them of nonsense and error. But, since the *peculiar* interests of particular and narrow classes are always somewhat adverse to the interests of the great majority, it is hardly to be expected of writers, whose reputation depends upon such classes, that they should fearlessly tread the path which is indicated by the general well-being. The *indifferency* in the pursuit of truth which is so earnestly inculcated by Mr. Locke, is hardly to be expected of writers who occupy so base a position. Knowing that a fraction of the community can make or mar their reputation, they unconsciously or purposely accommodate their conclusions to the prejudices of that narrower public. Or, to borrow the expressive language of this greatest and best of philosophers, 'they begin with espousing the *well-endowed* opinions in fashion; and, then, seek arguments to show their beauty, or to varnish and disguise their deformity.'

The treatise by Dr. Paley on Moral and Political Philosophy exemplifies the natural tendency of narrow and domineering interests to pervert the course of inquiry from its legitimate purpose.

As men go, this celebrated and influential writer was a wise and a virtuous man. By the qualities of his head and heart, by the cast of his talents and affections, he was fitted, in a high degree, to seek for ethical truth, and to expound it successfully to others. He had a clear and just understanding; a hearty contempt of paradox, and of ingenious, but useless refinements; no fastidious disdain of the working people, but a warm sympathy with their homely enjoyments and sufferings. He knew that they are more numerous than all the rest of the community, and he felt that they are more important than all the rest of the community to the eye of unclouded reason and impartial benevolence.

But the sinister influence of the position which he unluckily occupied, cramped his generous affections, and warped the rectitude of his understanding.

A steady pursuit of the consequences indicated by *general* utility, was not the most obvious way to professional advancement, nor even the short cut to extensive reputation. For there was no impartial public, formed from the community at large, to reward and encourage, with its approbation, an inflexible adherence to truth.

If the bulk of the community had been instructed, so far as their position will permit, he might have looked for a host of readers from the middle classes. He might have looked for a host of readers from those classes of the working people, whose wages are commonly high, whose leisure is not inconsiderable, and whose mental powers are called into frequent exercise by the natures of their occupations or callings. To readers of the middle classes, and of all the higher classes of the working people, a well made and honest treatise on Moral and Political Philosophy, in his clear, vivid, downright, *English* style, would have been the most easy and attractive, as well as instructive and useful, of abstract or scientific books.

But those numerous classes of the community were commonly too coarse and ignorant to care for books of the sort. The great majority of the readers who were likely to look into his book, belonged to the classes which are elevated by rank or opulence, and to the peculiar professions or callings which are distinguished by the name of 'liberal.' And the character of the book which he wrote betrays the position of the writer. In almost every chapter, and in almost every page, his fear of offending the prejudices, commonly entertained by such readers, palpably suppresses the suggestions of his clear and vigorous reason, and masters the better affections which inclined him to the *general* good.

He was one of the greatest and best of the great and excellent writers, who, by the strength of their philosophical genius, or by their large and tolerant spirit, have given imperishable lustre to the Church of England, and extinguished or softened the hostility of many who reject her creed. He may rank with the Berkeleys and Butlers, with the Burnets, Tillotsons and Hoadlys.

But, in spite of the esteem with which I regard his memory, truth compels me to add that the book is unworthy of the man. For there is much ignoble truckling to the dominant and influential few. There is a deal of shabby sophistry in defence or extenuation of abuses which the few are interested in upholding.

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If there were a reading public numerous, discerning, and *impartial*, the science of ethics, and all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, would advance with unexampled rapidity.

By the hope of obtaining the approbation which it would bestow upon genuine merit, writers would be incited to the patient research and reflection, which are not less requisite to the improvement of ethical, than to the advancement of mathematical science.

Slight and incoherent thinking would be received with general contempt, though it were cased in polished periods studded with brilliant metaphors. Ethics would be considered by readers, and, therefore, treated by writers, as the matter or subject of a *science*: as a subject for persevering and accurate investigation, and not as a theme for childish and babbling rhetoric.

This general demand for truth (though it were clothed in homely guise), and this general contempt of falsehood and nonsense (though they were decked with rhetorical graces), would improve the method and the style of inquiries into ethics, and into the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics. The writers would attend to the suggestions of Hobbes and of Locke, and would imitate the method so successfully pursued by geometers: Though such is the variety of the premises which some of their inquiries involve, and such are the complexity and ambiguity of some of the terms, that they would often fall short of the perfect exactness and coherency, which the fewness of his premises, and the simplicity and definiteness of his expressions, enable the geometer to reach. But, though they would often fall short of geometrical exactness and coherency, they might always approach, and would often attain to them. They would acquire the art and the habit of defining their leading terms; of steadily adhering to the meanings announced by the definitions; of carefully examining and distinctly stating their premises; and of deducing the consequences of their premises with logical rigour. Without rejecting embellishments which might happen to fall in their way, the only excellencies of style for which they would seek, are precision, clearness, and conciseness: the first being absolutely requisite to the successful prosecution of inquiry; whilst the others enable the reader to seize the meaning with certainty, and spare him unnecessary fatigue.

And, what is equally important, the protection afforded

by this public to diligent and honest writers, would inspire into writers upon ethics, and upon the nearly related sciences, the spirit of dispassionate inquiry: the 'indifferency' or impartiality in the pursuit of truth, which is just as requisite to the detection of truth as continued and close attention, or sincerity and simplicity of purpose. Relying on the discernment and the justice of a numerous and powerful public, shielded by its countenance from the shafts of the hypocrite and the bigot, indifferent to the idle whistling of that harmless storm, they would scrutinize established institutions, and current or received opinions, fearlessly, but coolly; with the freedom which is imperiously demanded by general utility, but without the antipathy which is begotten by the dread of persecution, and which is scarcely less adverse than 'the love of things ancient' to the rapid advancement of science.

This patience in investigation, this distinctness and accuracy of method, this freedom and 'indifferency' in the pursuit of the useful and the true, would thoroughly dispel the obscurity by which the science is clouded, and would clear it from most of its uncertainties. The wish, the hope, the prediction of Mr. Locke would, in time, be accomplished: and 'ethics would rank with the sciences which are *capable of demonstration*.' The adepts in ethical, as well as in mathematical science, would commonly agree in their results: And, as the jar of *their* conclusions gradually subsided, a body of doctrine and authority to which the *multitude* might trust would emerge from the existing chaos. The direct examination of the multitude would only extend to the elements, and to the easier, though more momentous, of the derivative practical truths. But none of their opinions would be adopted blindly, nor would any of their opinions be obnoxious to groundless and capricious change. Though most or many of their opinions would still be taken from *authority*, the authority to which they would trust might satisfy the most scrupulous reason. In the *unanimous or general consent of numerous and impartial inquirers*, they would find that mark of trustworthiness which justifies reliance on authority, wherever we are debarred from the opportunity of examining the evidence for ourselves.

With regard, then, to the perplexing difficulty which I am trying to solve or extenuate, the case stands thus:

If utility be the proximate test of positive law and morality, it is simply impossible that positive law and morality

The second objection to the theory of utility, together with the

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foregoing
answer to
that second
objection,
briefly re-
stated.

should be free from defects and errors. Or (adopting a different, though exactly equivalent expression) if the principle of general utility be our guide to the Divine commands, it is impossible that the rules of conduct *actually obtaining amongst mankind* should accord completely and correctly with the laws *established by the Deity*. The index to his will is imperfect and uncertain. His laws are signified obscurely to those upon whom they are binding, and are subject to inevitable and involuntary misconstruction.

For, *first*, positive law and morality, fashioned on the principle of utility, are gotten by observation and induction from the tendencies of human actions: from what can be known or conjectured, by means of observation and induction, of their uniform or customary effects on the general happiness or good. Consequently, till these actions shall be marked and classed with perfect completeness, and their effects observed and ascertained with similar completeness, positive law and morality, fashioned on the principle of utility, must be more or less defective, and more or less erroneous. And these actions being infinitely various, and their effects being infinitely diversified, the work of classing them completely, and of collecting their effects completely, transcends the limited faculties of created and finite beings. As the experience of mankind enlarges, as they observe more extensively and accurately and reason more closely and precisely, they may gradually mend the defects of their legal and moral rules, and may gradually clear their rules from the errors and nonsense of their predecessors. But, though they may constantly approach, they certainly will never attain to a faultless system of ethics: to a system perfectly in unison with the dictates of general utility, and, therefore, perfectly in unison with the benevolent wishes of the Deity.

And, *secondly*, if utility be the proximate test of positive law and morality, the defects and errors of *popular or vulgar* ethics will scarcely admit of a remedy. For, if ethical truth be matter of science, and not of immediate consciousness, most of the ethical maxims, which govern the sentiments of the multitude, must be taken, without examination, from human authority. And where is the *human* authority upon which they can safely rely? Where is the *human* authority bearing such marks of trustworthiness, that the ignorant may hang their faith upon it with reasonable assurance? Reviewing the various ages and the various nations of the world, reviewing the various sects which have divided the

opinions of mankind, we find conflicting maxims taught with equal confidence, and received with equal docility. We find the guides of the multitude moved by sinister interests, or by prejudices which are the offspring of such interests. We find them stifling inquiry, according to the measure of their means: upholding with fire and sword, or with sophistry, declamation and calumny, the theological and ethical dogmas which they impose upon their prostrate disciples.

Such is the difficulty.—The only solution of which this difficulty seems to admit, is suggested by the remarks which I have already submitted to your attention, and which I will now repeat in an inverted and compendious form.

In the *first* place, the *diffusion* of ethical science amongst the great bulk of mankind will gradually remove the obstacles which prevent or retard its *advancement*. The field of human conduct being infinite or immense, it is impossible that human understanding should embrace and explore it completely. But, by the general diffusion of knowledge amongst the great bulk of mankind, by the impulse and the direction which the diffusion will give to inquiry, many of the defects and errors in existing law and morality will in time be supplied and corrected.

Secondly: Though the many must trust to authority for a number of subordinate truths, they are competent to examine the elements which are the groundwork of the science of ethics, and to infer the more momentous of the derivative practical consequences.

And, *thirdly*, as the science of ethics advances, and is cleared of obscurity and uncertainties, they who are debarred from opportunities of examining the science extensively, will find an authority, whereon they may rationally rely, in the unanimous or general agreement of searching and impartial inquirers.¹

¹ The experience of the thirty years which have elapsed since the foregoing lecture was written does not seem to justify the author's sanguine anticipations of the effects of the spread of education among the people. But it must be observed that, as little or no attempt has been made to give the sort of instruction which he contemplated (and upon which alone his expectations rested), nothing at variance with these consolatory views can be inferred.—S. A. (*Ed.* 1861.)

The history of even the few years which have elapsed since the date of the above note, inspires a more hopeful

view. And if sound conceptions of ethics and political economy have in our own country penetrated more widely and deeply than a few years ago was apparent, I believe it possible to discern, in the writings of those who have been most successful in diffusing this knowledge among the populace, a trace at least of Mr. Austin's influence; an influence far more powerful, as I am assured by those conversant with his living discourse, than can be estimated by those conversant only with the remains of his writings.—R. C.

LECTURE IV.

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 The connection of the fourth with the third lecture.

IN my last lecture, I endeavoured to answer an objection which may be urged against the theory of utility. And to the purpose of linking my present with my last lecture, I will now restate, in a somewhat abridged shape, that summary of the objection and the answer with which I concluded my discourse.

The objection may be put briefly, in the following manner.

If utility be the proximate test of positive law and morality, it is impossible that the rules of conduct *actually obtaining amongst mankind* should accord completely and correctly with the laws *established by the Deity*. The index to his will is imperfect and uncertain. His laws are signified obscurely to those upon whom they are binding, and are subject to inevitable and involuntary misconstruction.

For, *first*, positive law and morality, fashioned on the principle of utility, are gotten by observation and induction from the tendencies of human actions. Consequently, till these actions shall be marked and classed with perfect completeness, and their effects observed and ascertained with similar completeness, positive law and morality, fashioned on the principle of utility, must be more or less defective, and more or less erroneous. And, these actions being infinitely various, and their effects being infinitely diversified, the work of classing them completely, and of collecting their effects completely, transcends the limited faculties of created and finite beings.

And, *secondly*, if utility be the proximate test of positive law and morality, the defects and errors of *popular or vulgar* ethics will scarcely admit of a remedy. For if ethical truth be matter of science, and not of immediate consciousness, most of the ethical maxims, which govern the sentiments of the multitude, must be taken without examination, from human authority.

Such is the objection.—The only answer of which the objection will admit, is suggested by the remarks which I offered in my last lecture, and which I repeated at its close, and here repeat in an inverted and compendious form.

In the *first* place, the *diffusion* of ethical science amongst the great bulk of mankind will gradually remove the obstacles which prevent or retard its *advancement*. The field of human conduct being infinite or immense, it is impossible that human understanding should embrace and explore it completely.

But, by the general diffusion of knowledge amongst the great bulk of mankind, by the impulse and the direction which the diffusion will give to inquiry, many of the defects and errors in existing law and morality will in time be supplied and corrected.

Secondly : Though the many must trust to authority for a number of subordinate truths, they are competent to examine the elements which are the ground-work of the science of ethics, and to infer the more momentous of the derivative practical consequences.

And, *thirdly*, as the science of ethics advances, and is cleared of obscurity and uncertainties, they, who are debarred from opportunities of examining the science extensively, will find an authority whereon they may rationally rely, in the unanimous or general agreement of searching and impartial inquirers.

But this answer, it must be admitted, merely *extenuates* the objection. It shows that law and morality fashioned on the principle of utility might approach continually and indefinitely to absolute perfection. But it grants that law and morality fashioned on the principle of utility is inevitably defective and erroneous : that, if the laws established by the Deity must be construed by the principle of utility, the most perfect system of ethics which the wit of man could conceive, were a partial and inaccurate copy of the Divine original or pattern.

The second objection to the theory of utility, resumed.

And this (it may be urged) disproves the theory which makes the principle of utility the index to the Divine pleasure. For it consists not with the known wisdom and the known benevolence of the Deity, that he should signify his commands defectively and obscurely to those upon whom they are binding.

But admitting the imperfection of utility as the index to the Divine pleasure, it is impossible to argue, from this its admitted imperfection, 'that utility is *not* the index.'

A further answer to that second objection.

Owing to causes which are hidden from human understanding, all the works of the Deity which are open to human observation are alloyed with imperfection or evil. That the Deity should signify his commands defectively and obscurely, is strictly in keeping or unison with the rest of his inscrutable ways. The objection now in question proves too much, and, therefore, is untenable. If you argue 'that the principle of utility is *not* the index to his laws, *because* the principle of utility were an *imperfect* index to his laws,' you argue 'that

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all his works are *in fact* exempt from evil, *because* imperfection or evil is inconsistent with his wisdom and goodness.' The former of these arguments *implies* the latter, or is merely an application of the sweeping position to *one* of innumerable cases.

Accordingly, if the objection now in question will lie to the theory of utility, a similar objection will lie to *every* theory of ethics which supposes that any of our duties are set or imposed by the Deity.

The objection is founded on the alleged inconsistency of evil with his perfect wisdom and goodness. But the notion or idea of evil or imperfection is involved in the connected notions of law, duty, and sanction. For, seeing that every law imposes a restraint, every law is an evil of itself: and, unless it be the work of malignity, or proceed from consummate folly, it also supposes an evil which it is designed to prevent or remedy. Law, like medicine, is a preventive or remedy of *evil*: and, if the world were free from evil, the notion and the name would be unknown.

'That his laws are signified obscurely, if utility be the index to his laws,' is rather a presumption in favour of the theory which makes utility our guide. Analogy might lead us to expect that they would be signified obscurely. For laws or commands suppose the existence of evils which they are designed to remedy: let them be signified as they may, they remedy those evils imperfectly: and the imperfection which they are designed to remedy, and of which the remedy partakes, might naturally be expected to show itself in the mode by which they are manifested.

My answer to the objection is the very argument which the excellent Butler, in his admirable 'Analogy,' has wielded in defence of Christianity with the vigour and the skill of a master.

Considered as a system of rules for the guidance of human conduct, the Christian religion is defective. There are also circumstances, regarding the manner of its promulgation, which human reason vainly labours to reconcile with the wisdom and goodness of God. Still it were absurd to argue 'that the religion is not of God, *because* the religion is defective, and is imperfectly revealed to mankind.' For the objection is founded on the alleged inconsistency of evil with his perfect wisdom and goodness. And, since evil pervades the universe, in so far as it is open to our inspection, a similar objection will lie to *every* system of religion which ascribes

the existence of the universe to a wise and benevolent Author. Whoever believes that the universe is the work of benevolence and wisdom, is concluded, or *estopped*, by his own religious creed, from taking an objection of the kind to the creed or system of another.

Analogy (as Butler has shown) would lead us to expect the imperfection upon which the objection is founded. Something of the imperfection which runs through the frame of the universe, would probably be found in a revelation emanating from the Author of the universe.

And here my solution of the difficulty necessarily stops. A complete solution is manifestly impossible. To reconcile the existence of evil with the wisdom and goodness of God is a task which surpasses the powers of our narrow and feeble understandings. This is a deep which our reason is too short to fathom. From the decided predominance of good which is observable in the order of the world, and from the manifold marks of wisdom which the order of the world exhibits, we may draw the cheering inference 'that its Author is good and wise.' Why the world which he has made is not altogether perfect, or why a benevolent Deity tolerates the existence of evil, or what (if I may so express myself) are the obstacles in the way of his benevolence, are clearly questions which it were impossible to solve, and which it were idle to agitate although they admitted a solution. It is enough for us to know, that the Deity is perfectly good; and that, since he is perfectly good, he wills the happiness of his creatures. *This* is a truth of the greatest *practical* moment. For the cast of the affections, which we attribute to the Deity, determines, for the most part, the cast of our moral sentiments.

I admit, then, that God's commands are imperfectly signified to man, supposing we must gather his commands from the tendencies of human actions. But I deny that this imperfection is a conclusive objection to the theory which makes the principle of utility our guide or index to his will. Whoever would disprove the theory which makes utility our guide, must produce another principle that were a surer and a better guide.

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Now, if we reject *utility* as the index to God's commands, we must assent to the theory or hypothesis which supposes a *moral sense*. One of the adverse theories, which regard the nature of that index, is certainly true. He has left us to *presume* his commands from the tendencies of human actions,

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or he has given us a peculiar *sense* of which his commands are the objects.

'A moral sense,' 'a common sense,' 'a moral instinct,' 'a principle of reflection or conscience,' 'a practical reason,' 'innate practical principles,' 'connate practical principles,' &c. &c. are various expressions for one and the same hypothesis.

All the hypotheses, regarding the nature of that index, which discard the principle of utility, are built upon the supposition of a peculiar or appropriate *sense*. The language of each of these hypotheses differs from the language of the others, but^e the import of each resembles the import of the rest.

By '*a moral sense*,' with which my understanding is furnished, I discern the human actions which the Deity enjoins and forbids: And, since you and the rest of the species are provided with a like organ, it is clear that this sense of mine is '*the common sense of mankind*.' By '*a moral instinct*,' with which the Deity has endowed me, I am urged to some of these actions, and am warned to forbear from others. '*A principle of reflection or conscience*,' which Butler assures me I possess, informs me of their rectitude or pravity. Or '*the innate practical principles*,' which Locke has presumed to question, define the duties, which God has imposed upon me, with infallible clearness and certainty.

These and other phrases are various but equivalent expressions for one and the same hypothesis. The only observable difference between these various expressions consists in this: that some denote *sentiments* which are excited by human actions, whilst others denote the *commands* to which those sentiments are the index.

The hypothesis in question involves two assumptions.

The first of the two assumptions involved by the hypothesis in question, stated in general expressions.

The hypothesis of a moral sense, or the hypothesis which is variously signified by these various but equivalent expressions, involves two assumptions.

The first of the two assumptions involved by the hypothesis in question, may be stated, in general expressions, thus:

Certain sentiments or feelings of approbation or disapprobation accompany our conceptions of certain human actions. They are neither effects of reflection upon the tendencies of the actions which excite them, nor are they effects of education. A conception of any of these actions would be accompanied by certain of these sentiments, although we had not adverted to its good or evil tendency, nor knew the opinions of others with regard to actions of the class.

In a word, that portion of the hypothesis in question which I am now stating is purely *negative*. We are gifted with moral sentiments which are *ultimate or inscrutable facts*: which are *not* the consequences of reflection upon the tendencies of human actions, which are *not* the consequences of the educa-

tion that we receive from our fellow-men, which are *not* the consequences or effects of any antecedents or causes placed within the reach of our inspection. Our conceptions of certain actions are accompanied by certain sentiments, and *there* is an end of our knowledge.

For the sake of brevity, we may say that these sentiments are 'instinctive,' or we may call them 'moral instincts.'

For the terms 'instinctive' and 'instinct' are merely *negative* expressions. They merely denote our own ignorance. They mean that the phenomena of which we happen to be talking are *not* preceded by causes which man is able to perceive. For example, The bird, it is commonly said, builds her nest by 'instinct:' or the skill which the bird evinces in the building of her nest, is commonly styled 'instinctive.' That is to say, It is not the product of experiments made by the bird herself; it has not been imparted to the bird by the teaching or example of others; nor is it the consequence or effect of any antecedent or cause open to our observation.

The remark which I have now made upon the terms 'instinctive' and 'instinct,' is not interposed needlessly. For, though their true import is extremely simple and trivial, they are apt to dazzle and confound us (unless we advert to it steadily) with the false and cheating appearance of a mysterious and magnificent meaning.

In order that we may clearly apprehend the nature of these 'moral instincts,' I will descend from general expressions to an imaginary case.

I will not imagine the case which is fancied by Dr. Paley: for I think it ill fitted to bring out the meaning sharply. I will merely take the liberty of borrowing his solitary savage: a child abandoned in the wilderness immediately after its birth, and growing to the age of manhood in estrangement from human society.

Having gotten my subject, I proceed to deal with him after my own fashion.

I imagine that the savage, as he wanders in search of prey, meets, for the first time in his life, with a man. This man is a hunter, and is carrying a deer which he has killed. The savage pounces upon it. The hunter holds it fast. And, in order that he may remove this obstacle to the satisfaction of his gnawing hunger, the savage seizes a stone, and knocks the hunter on the head.—Now, according to the hypothesis in question, the savage is affected with *remorse* at the thought of the deed which he has done. He is affected with more

The foregoing statement of the first assumption, exemplified and explained by an imaginary case.

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than the *compassion* which is excited by the sufferings of another, and which, considered by itself, amounts not to a moral sentiment. He is affected with the more complex emotion of *self-condemnation* or *remorse*: with a consciousness of *guilt*: with the feeling that haunts and tortures civilized or cultivated men, whenever they violate rules which accord with their notions of utility, or which they have learned from others to regard with habitual veneration. He feels as you would feel, in case you had committed a murder: in case you had killed another, in an attempt to rob him of his goods: or in case you had killed another under *any* combination of circumstances, which, agreeably to your notions of utility, would make the act a pernicious one, or, agreeably to the moral impressions which you have passively received from others, would give to the act of killing the quality and the name of an *injury*.

Again: Shortly after the incident which I have now imagined, he meets with a second hunter whom he also knocks on the head. But, in this instance, he is not the aggressor. He is attacked, beaten, wounded, without the shadow of a provocation: and to prevent a deadly blow which is aimed at his own head, he kills the wanton assailant.—Now here, according to the hypothesis, he is *not* affected with remorse. The sufferings of the dying man move him, perhaps, to *compassion*: but his *conscience* (as the phrase goes) is tranquil. He feels as you would feel, after a justifiable homicide: after you had shot a highwayman in defence of your goods and your life: or after you had killed another under *any* combination of circumstances, which, agreeably to your notions of utility, would render killing innocuous, or, agreeably to the current morality of your age and country, would render the killing of another a just or lawful action.

That *you* should feel remorse if you kill in an attempt to rob, and should not be affected with remorse if you kill a murderous robber, is a difference which I readily account for without the supposition of an instinct. The law of your country distinguishes the cases: and the current morality of your country accords with the law.

Supposing that you have never adverted to the reasons of that distinction, the difference between your feelings is easily explained by imputing it to *education*: Meaning, by the term *education*, the influence of authority and example on opinions, sentiments, and habits.

Supposing that you have ever adverted to the reasons of

that distinction, you, of course, have been struck with its obvious utility.—Generally speaking, the intentional killing of another is an act of pernicious tendency. If the act were frequent, it would annihilate that general security, and that general feeling of security, which are, or should be, the principal ends of political society and law. • But to this there are exceptions: and the intentional killing of a robber who aims at your property and life, is amongst those exceptions. Instead of being adverse to the principal ends of law, it rather promotes those ends. It answers the purpose of the punishment which the law inflicts upon murderers: and it also accomplishes a purpose which punishment is too tardy to reach. The death inflicted on the aggressor tends, as his punishment would tend, to deter from the crime of murder: and it also prevents, what his punishment would not prevent, the completion of the murderous design in the specific or particular instance.—Supposing that you have ever adverted to these and similar reasons, the difference between your feelings is easily explained by imputing it to a *perception of utility*. You see that the tendencies of the act vary with the circumstances of the act, and your sentiments in regard to the act vary with those varying tendencies.

But the difference, supposed by the hypothesis, between the feelings of the *savage*, cannot be imputed to *education*. For the savage has lived in estrangement from human society.

Nor can the supposed difference be imputed to a *perception of utility*.—He knocks a man on the head, that he may satisfy his gnawing hunger. He knocks another on the head, that he may escape from wounds and death. So far, then, as these different actions exclusively regard himself, they are equally good: and so far as these different actions regard the men whom he kills, they are equally bad. As tried by the test of utility, and with the lights which the savage possesses, the moral qualities of the two actions are precisely the same. If we suppose it possible that he adverts to considerations of utility, and that his sentiments in respect to these actions are determined by considerations of utility, we must infer that he remembers both of them with similar feelings: with similar feelings of complacency, as the actions regard himself; with similar feelings of regret, as they regard the sufferings of the slain.

To the social man the difference between these actions, as tried by the test of utility, were immense.—The general happiness or good demands the institution of property: that the exclusive enjoyment conferred by the law upon the owner

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shall not be disturbed by private and unauthorised persons : that no man shall take from another the product of his labour or saving, without the permission of the owner previously signified, or without the authority of the sovereign acting for the common weal. Were want, however intense, an excuse for violations of property ; could every man who hungers take from another with impunity, and slay the owner with impunity if the owner stood on his possession ; that beneficent institution would become nugatory, and the ends of government and law would be defeated.—And, on the other hand, the very principle of utility which demands the institution of property requires that an attack upon the body shall be repelled at the instant : that, if the impending evil cannot be averted otherwise, the aggressor shall be slain on the spot by the party whose life is in jeopardy.

But these are considerations which would not present themselves to the solitary savage. They involve a number of notions with which his mind would be unfurnished. They involve the notions of political society ; of supreme government ; of positive law ; of legal right ; of legal duty ; of legal injury. The good and the evil of the two actions, in so far as the two actions would affect the immediate parties, is all that the savage could perceive.

The difference, supposed by the hypothesis, between the feelings of the savage, must, therefore, be ascribed to a *moral sense*, or to *innate practical principles*. Or (speaking in homelier but plainer language) he would regard the two actions with different sentiments, *we know not why*.

The first of the two assumptions involved by the hypothesis in question, briefly restated in general expressions.

The first of the two assumptions involved by the hypothesis in question is, therefore, this.—Certain inscrutable sentiments of approbation or disapprobation accompany our conceptions of certain human actions. They are not begotten by reflection upon the tendencies of the actions which excite them, nor are they instilled into our minds by our intercourse with our fellow-men. They are simple elements of our nature. They are ultimate facts. They are not the effects of causes, or are not the consequents of antecedents, which are open to human observation.

And, thus far, the hypothesis in question has been embraced by sceptics as well as by religionists. For example, It is supposed by David Hume, in his *Essay on the Principles of Morals*, that *some* of our moral sentiments spring from a *perception of utility* : but he also appears to imagine that *others* are not to be analyzed, or belong exclusively to the

province of *taste*. Such, I say, *appears* to be his meaning. For, in this essay, as in all his writings, he is rather acute and ingenious than coherent and profound: handling detached topics with signal dexterity, but evincing an utter inability to grasp his subject as a whole. When he speaks of *moral sentiments* belonging to the province of *taste*, he may, perhaps, be adverting to the origin of *benevolence*, or to the origin of our *sympathy* with the pleasures and pains of others: a feeling that differs as broadly as the appetite of hunger or thirst from the sentiments of approbation or disapprobation which accompany our judgments upon actions.

That these inscrutable sentiments are signs of the Divine will, or the proofs that the actions which excite them are enjoined or forbidden by God, is the second of the two assumptions involved by the hypothesis in question.

The second of the two assumptions involved by the hypothesis in question, briefly stated.

In the language of the admirable Butler (who is the ablest advocate of the hypothesis), the human actions by which these feelings are excited are their direct and appropriate objects: just as things visible are the direct and appropriate objects of the sense of seeing.

In homelier but plainer language, I may put his meaning thus.—As God has given us eyes, in order that we may see therewith; so has he gifted or endowed us with the feelings or sentiments in question, in order that we may distinguish directly, by means of these feelings or sentiments, the actions which he enjoins or permits, from the actions which he prohibits.

Or, if you like it better, I may put the meaning thus.—That these inscrutable sentiments are signs of the Divine will, is an inference which we necessarily deduce from our consideration of *final causes*. Like the rest of our appetites or aversions, these sentiments were designed by the Author of our being to answer an appropriate end. And the only pertinent end which we can possibly ascribe to them, is the end or final cause at which I have now pointed.

Now, supposing that the Deity has endowed us with a moral sense or instinct, we are free of the difficulty to which we are subject, if we must construe his laws by the principle of general utility. According to the hypothesis in question, the inscrutable feelings which are styled the moral sense arise directly and inevitably with the thoughts of their appropriate objects. We cannot mistake the laws which God has prescribed to mankind, although we may often be seduced by the blandishments of present advantage from the plain

As an index to God's commands, a moral sense were less fallible than the principle of general utility.

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But is there any evidence to sustain the hypothesis in question?

The hypothesis in question is disproved by the negative state of our consciousness.

The two current arguments in favour of the hypothesis in question, briefly stated.

The first argument in favour of the hypothesis in question, examined.

path of our duties. The understanding is never at a fault, although the will may be frail.

But here arises a small question.—Is there any *evidence* that we are gifted with feelings of the sort?

That this question is possible, or is seriously asked and agitated, would seem of itself a sufficient proof that we are *not* endowed with such feelings.—According to the hypothesis of a moral sense, we are conscious of the feelings which indicate God's commands, as we are conscious of hunger or thirst. In other words, the feelings which indicate God's commands are ultimate facts. But, since they are ultimate facts, these feelings or sentiments must be indisputable, and must also differ obviously from the other elements of our nature. If I were really gifted with feelings or sentiments of the sort, I could no more seriously question whether I had them or not, and could no more blend and confound them with my other feelings or sentiments, than I can seriously question the existence of hunger or thirst, or can mistake the feeling which affects me when I am hungry for the different feeling which affects me when I am thirsty. All the parts of our nature which are ultimate, or incapable of analysis, are certain and distinct as well as inscrutable. We know and discern them with unhesitating and invincible assurance.

The two current arguments in favour of the hypothesis in question are raised on the following assertions. 1. The judgments which we pass internally upon the rectitude or pravity of actions are immediate and involuntary. In other words, our moral sentiments or feelings arise directly and inevitably with our conceptions of the actions which excite them. 2. The moral sentiments of all men are precisely alike.

Now the first of these venturous assertions is not universally true. In numberless cases, the judgments which we pass internally upon the rectitude or pravity of actions are hesitating and slow. And it not unfrequently happens that we cannot arrive at a conclusion, or are utterly at a loss to determine whether we shall praise or blame.

And, granting that our moral sentiments are always instantaneous and inevitable, this will not demonstrate that our moral sentiments are instinctive. Sentiments which are factitious, or begotten in the way of association, are not less prompt and involuntary than feelings which are instinctive or inscrutable. For example, We begin by loving money

for the sake of the enjoyment which it purchases : and, that enjoyment apart, we care not a straw for money. But, in time, our love of enjoyment is extended to money itself, or our love of enjoyment becomes inseparably associated with the thought of the money which procures it. The conception of money suggests a wish for money, although we think not of the uses to which we should apply it. Again : We begin by loving knowledge as a mean to ends. But, in time, the love of the ends becomes inseparably associated with the thought or conception of the instrument. Curiosity is instantly roused by every unusual appearance, although there is no purpose which the solution of the appearance would answer, or although we advert not to the purpose which the solution of the appearance might subserve.

The promptitude and decision with which we judge of actions are impertinent to the matter in question : for our moral sentiments would be prompt and inevitable, although they arose from a perception of utility, or although they were impressed upon our minds by the authority of our fellow-men. Supposing that a moral sentiment sprang from a perception of utility, or supposing that a moral sentiment were impressed upon our minds by authority, it would hardly recur spontaneously until it had recurred frequently. Unless we recalled the *reasons* which had led us to our opinion, or unless we adverted to the *authority* which had determined our opinion, the sentiment, at the outset, would hardly be excited by the thought of the corresponding action. But, in time, the sentiment would adhere inseparably to the thought of the corresponding action. Although we recalled not the ground of our moral approbation or aversion, the sentiment would recur directly and inevitably with the conception of its appropriate object.

But, to prove that moral sentiments are instinctive or inscrutable, it is bodily asserted, by the advocates of the hypothesis in question, that the moral sentiments of all men are precisely alike.

The second argument in favour of the hypothesis in question, examined.

The argument, in favour of the hypothesis, which is raised on this hardy assertion, may be stated briefly in the following manner.—No opinion or sentiment which is a result of observation and induction is held or felt by all mankind. Observation and induction, as applied to the same subject, lead different men to different conclusions. But the judgments which are passed internally upon the rectitude or pravity of actions, or the moral sentiments or feelings which

LECT. IV

actions excite, are precisely alike with all men. Consequently, our moral sentiments or feelings were not gotten by our inductions from the tendencies of the actions which excite them: nor were these sentiments or feelings gotten by inductions of others, and then impressed upon our minds by human authority and example. Consequently, our moral sentiments are instinctive or are ultimate or inscrutable facts.

Now, though the assertion were granted, the argument raised on the assertion would hardly endure examination. Though the moral sentiments of all men were precisely alike, it would hardly follow that moral sentiments are instinctive.

But an attempt to confute the argument were superfluous labour: for the assertion whereon it is raised is groundless. The respective moral sentiments of different ages and nations, and of different men in the same age and nation, have differed to infinity. This proposition is so notoriously true, and to every instructed mind the facts upon which it rests are so familiar, that I should hardly treat my hearers with due respect if I attempted to establish it by proof. I therefore assume it without an attempt at proof; and I oppose it to the assertion which I am now considering, and to the argument which is raised on that assertion.

But, before I dismiss the assertion which I am now considering, I will briefly advert to a difficulty attending the hypothesis in question which that unfounded assertion naturally suggests.—Assuming that moral sentiments are instinctive or inscrutable, they are either different with different men, or they are alike with all men. To affirm ‘that they are alike with all men,’ is merely to hazard a bold assertion contradicted by notorious facts. If they are different with different men, it follows that God has not set to men a *common* rule. If they are different with different men, there is no *common* test of human conduct: there is no test by which one man may try the conduct of another. It were folly and presumption in *me* to sit in judgment upon *you*. That which were pravity in *me* may, for aught I can know, be rectitude in *you*. The moral sense which *you* allege, may be just as good and genuine as that of which *I* am conscious. Though *my* instinct points one way, *yours* may point another. There is no broad sun destined to illumine the world, but every single man must walk by his own candle.

A brief
statement
of the fact
whereon

Now what is the fact whereon the second argument in favour of the hypothesis in question is founded? The plain and glaring fact is this.—With regard to actions of a few

classes, the moral sentiments of most, though not of all men, have been alike. But, with regard to actions of other classes, their moral sentiments have differed, through every shade or degree, from slight diversity to direct opposition.

And this is what might be expected, supposing that the principle of general utility is our only guide or index to the tacit commands of the Deity. The fact accords exactly with that hypothesis or theory. For, first, the positions wherein men are, in different ages and nations, are, in many respects, widely different: whence it inevitably follows, that much which was useful there and then were useless or pernicious here and now. And, secondly, since human tastes are various, and since human reason is fallible, men's moral sentiments must often widely differ even in respect of the circumstances wherein their positions are alike. But, with regard to actions of a few classes, the dictates of utility are the same at all times and places, and are also so obvious that they hardly admit of mistake or doubt. And hence would naturally ensue what observation shows us is the fact: namely, a general resemblance, with infinite variety, in the systems of law and morality which have actually obtained in the world.

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the second argument in favour of the hypothesis in question is founded. The fact accords exactly with the hypothesis or theory of utility.

According to the hypothesis which I have now stated and examined, the moral sense is our *only* index to the tacit commands of the Deity. According to an intermediate hypothesis, compounded of the hypothesis of utility and the hypothesis of a moral sense, the moral sense is our index to *some* of his tacit commands, but the principle of general utility is our index to *others*.

A brief statement of the intermediate hypothesis which is compounded of the hypothesis of utility and the hypothesis of a moral sense.

In so far as I can gather his opinion from his admirable sermons, it would seem that the compound hypothesis was embraced by Bishop Butler. But of this I am not certain: for, from many passages in those sermons, we may perhaps infer that he thought the moral sense our only index or guide.

The compound hypothesis now in question naturally arose from the fact to which I have already adverted.—With regard to actions of a few classes, the moral sentiments of most, though not of all men, have been alike. With regard to actions of other classes, their moral sentiments have differed, through every shade or degree, from slight diversity to direct opposition.—In respect to the classes of actions, with regard to which their moral sentiments have agreed, there was some show of reason for the supposition of a moral sense. In respect to the classes of actions, with regard to which their

LECT. IV moral sentiments have differed, the supposition of a moral sense seemed to be excluded.

But the modified or mixed hypothesis now in question is not less halting than the pure hypothesis of a moral sense or instinct.—With regard to actions of a few classes, the moral sentiments of *most* men have concurred or agreed. But it were hardly possible to indicate a single class of actions, with regard to which *all* men have thought and felt alike. And it is clear that every objection to the simple or pure hypothesis may be urged, with slight adaptations, against the modified or mixed.

The division of positive law into *law natural* and *law positive*, and the division of *jus civile* into *jus gentium* and *jus civile*, suppose or involve the intermediate hypothesis which is compounded of the hypothesis of utility and the hypothesis of a moral sense.

By modern writers on jurisprudence, positive law (or law, simply and strictly so called) is divided into *law natural* and *law positive*. By the classical Roman jurists, borrowing from the Greek philosophers, *jus civile* (or positive law) is divided into *jus gentium* and *jus civile*. Which two divisions of positive law are exactly equivalent.

By modern writers on jurisprudence, and by the classical Roman jurists, positive morality is also divided into *natural* and *positive*. For, through the frequent confusion (to which I shall advert hereafter) of positive law and positive morality, a portion of positive morality, as well as of positive law, is embraced by the *law natural* of modern writers on jurisprudence, and by the equivalent *jus gentium* of the classical Roman jurists.

By reason of the division of positive law into *law natural* and *law positive*, crimes are divided, by modern writers on jurisprudence, into crimes which are ‘*mala in se*’ and crimes which are ‘*mala quia prohibita*.’ By reason of the division of positive law into *jus gentium* and *jus civile*, crimes are divided, by the classical Roman jurists, into such as are crimes *juris gentium* and such as are crimes *jure civili*. Which divisions of crimes, like the divisions of law wherefrom they are respectively derived, are exactly equivalent.

Now without a clear apprehension of the hypothesis of utility, of the pure hypothesis of a moral sense, and of the modified or mixed hypothesis which is compounded of the others, the distinction of positive law into *natural* and *positive*, with the various derivative distinctions which rest upon that main one, are utterly unintelligible. Assuming the hypothesis of utility, or assuming the pure hypothesis of a moral sense, the distinction of positive law into *natural* and *positive* is senseless. But, assuming the intermediate hypothesis which is compounded of the others, positive law, and

also positive morality, is inevitably distinguished into *natural* and *positive*. In other words, if the modified or mixed hypothesis be founded in truth, positive human rules fall into two parcels:—1. Positive human rules which obtain with all mankind; and the conformity of which to Divine commands is, therefore, indicated by the moral sense: 2. Positive human rules which do not obtain universally; and the conformity of which to Divine commands is, therefore, not indicated by that infallible guide.

When I treat of positive law as considered with reference to its *sources*, I shall show completely that the modified or mixed hypothesis is involved by the distinction of positive law into law natural and law positive. I touch upon the topic, at the present point of my Course, to the following purpose: namely, to show that my disquisitions on the hypothesis of utility, on the hypothesis of a moral sense, and on that intermediate hypothesis which is compounded of the others, are necessary steps in a series of discourses occupied with the *rationale* of jurisprudence. It will, indeed, appear, as I advance in my projected Course, that *many* of the distinctions, which the science of jurisprudence presents, cannot be expounded, in a complete and satisfactory manner, without a previous exposition of those seemingly irrelative hypotheses. But the topic upon which I have touched at the present point of my Course shows most succinctly the pertinence of the disquisitions in question.

Having stated the hypothesis of utility, the hypothesis of a moral sense, and the modified or mixed hypothesis which is compounded of the others, I will close my disquisitions on the index to God's commands with an endeavour to clear the hypothesis of utility from two current though gross misconceptions.

The foregoing disquisitions on the index to God's commands closed with an endeavour to clear the theory of utility from two current though gross misconceptions. The two misconceptions stated.

Of the writers who maintain and impugn the theory of utility, three out of four fall into one or the other of the following errors.—1. Some of them confound the *motives* which ought to determine our conduct with the proximate *measure* or *test* to which our conduct should conform and by which our conduct should be tried.—2. Others confound the *theory of general utility* with that *theory or hypothesis concerning the origin of benevolence* which is branded by its ignorant or disingenuous adversaries with the misleading and invicious name of the *selfish system*.

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Now these errors are so palpable, that, perhaps, I ought to conclude with the bare statement, and leave my hearers to supply the corrective. But, let them be never so palpable, they have imposed upon persons of unquestionable penetration, and therefore may impose upon all who will not pause to examine them. Accordingly, I will clear the theory of utility from these gross but current misconceptions as completely as my limits will permit.

I will first examine the error of confounding *motives* to conduct with the proximate *measure* or *test* to which our conduct should conform and by which our conduct should be tried. I will then examine the error of confounding the *theory of utility* with that *theory or hypothesis concerning the origin of benevolence* which is styled the *selfish system*.

The first
misconcep-
tion ex-
amined.

According to the theory of utility, the measure or test of human conduct is the law set by God to his human creatures. Now some of his commands are revealed, whilst others are unrevealed. Or (changing the phrase) some of his commands are express, whilst others are tacit. The commands which God has revealed, we must gather from the terms wherein they are promulged. The commands which he has not revealed, we must construe by the principle of utility: by the probable effects of our conduct on that general happiness or good which is the final cause or purpose of the good and wise lawgiver in all his laws and commandments.

Strictly speaking, therefore, utility is not the *measure* to which our conduct should conform, nor is utility the *test* by which our conduct should be tried. It is not in itself the source or spring of our highest or paramount obligations, but it guides us to the source whence these obligations flow. It is merely the *index* to the measure, the *index* to the test. But, since we conform to the measure by following the suggestions of the index, I may say with sufficient, though not with strict propriety, that utility is the measure or test *proximately* or *immediately*. Accordingly, I style the Divine commands the *ultimate* measure or test: but I style the principle of utility, or the general happiness or good, the *proximate* measure to which our conduct should conform, or the *proximate* test by which our conduct should be tried.

Now, though the general good is that proximate *measure*, or though the general good is that proximate *test*, it is not in all, or even in most cases, the *motive* or *inducement* which ought to determine our conduct. If our conduct were always determined by it considered as a *motive* or *inducement*,

our conduct would often disagree with it considered as the *standard* or *measure*. If our conduct were always determined by it considered as a *motive* or *inducement*, our conduct would often be blameable, rather than deserving of praise, when tried by it as the *test*. LECT. IV

Though these propositions may sound like paradoxes, they are perfectly just. I should occupy more time than I can give to the disquisition, if I went through the whole of the proofs which would establish them beyond contradiction. But the few hints which I shall now throw out will sufficiently suggest the evidence to those of my hearers who may not have reflected on the subject.

When I speak of the public good, or of the general good, I mean the aggregate enjoyments of the single or individual persons who compose that public or general to which my attention is directed. The good of mankind, is the aggregate of the pleasures which are respectively enjoyed by the individuals who constitute the human race. The good of England, is the aggregate of the pleasures which fall to the lot of Englishmen considered individually or singly. The good of the public in the town to which I belong, is the aggregate of the pleasures which the inhabitants severally enjoy.

‘Mankind,’ ‘country,’ ‘public,’ are concise expressions for a number of individual persons considered collectively or as a whole. In case the good of those persons considered singly or individually were sacrificed to the good of those persons considered collectively or as a whole, the general good would be destroyed by the sacrifice. The sum of the particular enjoyments which constitutes the general good, would be sacrificed to the mere name by which that good is denoted.

When it is stated strictly and nakedly, this truth is so plain and palpable that the statement is almost laughable. But experience sufficiently evinces, that plain and palpable truths are prone to slip from the memory: that the neglect of plain and palpable truths is the source of most of the errors with which the world is infested. For example, That notion of the public good which was current in the ancient republics supposes a neglect of the truism to which I have called your attention. Agreeably to that notion of the public good, the happiness of the individual citizens is sacrificed without scruple in order that the common weal may wax and prosper. The only substantial interests are the victims of a barren abstraction, of a sounding but empty phrase.

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Now (speaking generally) every individual person is the best possible judge of his own interests: of what will affect himself with the greatest pleasures and pains. Compared with his intimate consciousness of his own peculiar interests, his knowledge of the interests of others is vague conjecture.

Consequently, the principle of general utility imperiously demands that he commonly shall attend to his own rather than to the interests of others: that he shall not habitually neglect that which he knows accurately in order that he may habitually pursue that which he knows imperfectly.

This is the arrangement which the principle of general utility manifestly requires. It is also the arrangement which the Author of man's nature manifestly intended. For our self-regarding affections are steadier and stronger than our social: the motives by which we are urged to pursue our peculiar good operate with more constancy, and commonly with more energy, than the motives by which we are solicited to pursue the good of our fellows.

If every individual neglected his own to the end of pursuing and promoting the interests of others, every individual would neglect the objects with which he is intimately acquainted to the end of forwarding objects of which he is comparatively ignorant. Consequently, the interests of every individual would be managed unskilfully. And, since the general good is an aggregate of individual enjoyments, the good of the general or public would diminish with the good of the individuals of whom that general or public is constituted or composed.

The principle of general utility does not demand of us, that we shall always or habitually intend the general good: though the principle of general utility does demand of us, that we shall never pursue our own peculiar good by means which are inconsistent with that paramount object.

For example: The man who delves or spins, delves or spins to put money in his purse, and not with the purpose or thought of promoting the general well-being. But by delving or spinning, he adds to the sum of commodities: and he therefore promotes that general well-being, which is not, and ought not to be, his practical end. General utility is not his motive to action. But his action conforms to utility considered as the standard of conduct: and when tried by utility considered as the test of conduct, his action deserves approbation.

Again: Of all pleasures bodily or mental, the pleasures of mutual love, cemented by mutual esteem, are the most enduring and varied. They therefore contribute largely to swell the sum of well-being, or they form an important item in the account of human happiness. And, for that reason, the well-wisher of the general good, or the adherent of the principle of utility, must, in that character, consider them with much complacency. But, though he approves of love because it accords with his principle, he is far from maintaining that the general good ought to be the motive of the lover. It was never contended or conceived by a sound, orthodox utilitarian, that the lover should kiss his mistress with an eye to the common weal.

And by this last example, I am naturally conducted to this further consideration.

Even where utility requires that benevolence shall be our motive, it commonly requires that we shall be determined by partial, rather than by general benevolence: by the love of the narrower circle which is formed of family or relations, rather than by sympathy with the wider circle which is formed of friends or acquaintance: by sympathy with friends or acquaintance, rather than by patriotism: by patriotism, or love of country, rather than by the larger humanity which embraces mankind.

In short, the principle of utility requires that we shall act with the utmost effect, or that we shall so act as to produce the utmost good. And (speaking generally) we act with the utmost effect, or we so act as to produce the utmost good, when our motive or inducement to conduct is the most urgent and steady, when the sphere wherein we act is the most restricted and the most familiar to us, and when the purpose which we directly pursue is the most determinate or precise.

The foregoing general statement must, indeed, be received with numerous limitations. The principle of utility not unfrequently requires that the order at which I have pointed shall be inverted or reversed: that the self-regarding affections shall yield to the love of family, or to sympathy with friends or acquaintance: that the love of family, or sympathy with friends or acquaintance, shall yield to the love of country: that the love of country shall yield to the love of mankind: that the general happiness or good, which is always the test of our conduct, shall also be the motive determining our conduct, or shall also be the practical end to which our conduct is directed.

IV

Goodness
and bad-
ness of
motives.

In order further to dissipate the confusion of ideas giving rise to the misconception last examined, I shall here pause to analyze the expression 'good and bad motives,' and to show in what sense it represents a sound distinction.

We often say of a man on any given occasion that his motive was good or bad, and in a certain sense we may truly say that some motives are better than others; inasmuch as some motives are more likely than others to lead to beneficial conduct.

But, in another and more extended sense, no motive is good or bad: since there is no motive which may not by possibility, and which does not occasionally in fact, lead both to beneficial and to mischievous conduct.

Thus in the case which I have already used as an illustration, that of the man who digs or weaves for his own subsistence; the motive is self-regarding, but the action is beneficial. The same motive, the desire of subsistence, may lead to pernicious acts, such as stealing. [Love of reputation, though a self-regarding motive, is a motive generally productive of beneficial acts; and there are persons with whom it is one of the most powerful incentives to acts for the public good. That form of love of reputation called vanity, on the other hand, implying, as it does, that the aim of its possessor is set upon worthless objects, commonly leads to evil, since it leads to a waste of energy, which might otherwise have been turned to useful ends. Yet if, as a motive, it be subordinate in the individual to other springs of action, and exist merely as a latent feeling of self-complacency arising out of considerations however foolish or unsubstantial, it may be harmless, or even useful as tending to promote energy.] Benevolence, on the other hand, and even religion, though certainly unselfish, and generally esteemed good motives, may, when narrowed in their aims, or directed by a perverted understanding, lead to actions most pernicious. For instance, the affection for children, and the consequent desire of pushing or advancing them in the world (a species of narrow benevolence), is with many persons more apt to lead to acts contrary to the public good than any purely selfish motive; and the palliation, which the supposed goodness of the motive constitutes in the eyes of the public for the pernicious act, encourages men to do for the sake of their children, actions which they would be ashamed to do for their own direct interest. Even that enlarged benevolence which embraces humanity, may lead to actions extremely mischievous, unless

guided by a perfectly sound judgment. Few will doubt, for example, that Sand and those other enthusiasts in Germany, who have at different times thought it right to assassinate those persons whom they believed to be tyrants, have acted in a manner highly pernicious as regards the general good. Of the purity (as it is commonly termed) of their motives, I have not the least doubt; that is to say, I am convinced that they acted under the impulse of a most enlarged benevolence; but I have as little doubt that, by this benevolence, they were led to the commission of acts utterly inconsistent with that general good at which they aimed.

But, although every motive may lead to good or bad, some are pre-eminently likely to lead to good; *e.g.* benevolence, love of reputation, religion. Others pre-eminently likely to lead to bad, and little likely to lead to good; *e.g.* the anti-social;—antipathy—particular or general. Others, again, are as likely to lead to good as to bad; *e.g.* the self-regarding. They are the origin of most of the steady industry, but also of most of the offences of men.

In this qualified sense, therefore, motives may be divided into such as are good, such as are bad, and such as are neither good nor bad.

If an action is good; that is, conforming to general utility; the motive makes it more laudable. If not, not. But it is only secondarily that the nature of the motive affects the quality of the action.

[That the nature of the motive does affect the quality of the action is evident from this consideration. Acts are never insulated. And as their moral complexion is ultimately tested by their conformity to the law having utility for its index, so is that moral complexion immediately tested by the nature and tendency of the course of conduct of which the acts are samples. Now, the conduct of an individual is (speaking generally) determined partly by the *motives* which are his springs of action, and partly by the *intention*, or the state of his understanding at the instant of action, regarding the effects or tendency of his acts; both being antecedent to the *volition* by which these immediately emerge into act. Human conduct is, in short, determined by the motives which urge, as well as by the intentions which direct. The intention is the aim of the act, of which the motive is the spring.]

It is, therefore, wrong to maintain that the complexion of the action mainly depends on the complexion of the motive.

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It is equally wrong to maintain that the nature of the motive does not, to a certain degree, determine its complexion.

In this limited sense, therefore, the moral complexion of the action is determined by the motive. If the intention be good, the action is the better for being prompted by a social motive. If the action be bad, it is less bad if prompted by a social one.*

It is important that good dispositions should be recognised and approved. But the goodness of the action depends upon its conformity to utility; [and even if judged from the narrow point of view commanded by the individual whose acts are in question, depends upon the state of his understanding as to the effects of the action; that is, upon the intention, no less than upon the motive.]¹¹

But to adjust the respective claims of the selfish and social motives, of partial sympathy and general benevolence, is a task which belongs to the detail, rather than to the principles of ethics: a task which I could hardly accomplish in a clear and satisfactory manner, unless I visited my hearers with a complete *dissertation* upon ethics, and wandered at unconscionable length from the appropriate purpose of my Course. What I have suggested will suffice to conduct the reflecting to the following conclusions. 1. General utility considered as the measure or test, differs from general utility considered as a motive or inducement. 2. If our conduct were truly adjusted to the principle of utility, our conduct would conform to rules fashioned on the principle of utility, or our conduct would be guided by sentiments associated with such rules. But, this notwithstanding, general utility, or the general happiness or good, would not be in all, or even in most cases, our motive to action or forbearance.

The second misconception examined.

Having touched generally and briefly on the first of the two misconceptions, I will now advert to the second with the same generality and brevity.

They who fall into this misconception are guilty of two errors. 1. They mistake and distort the hypothesis concern-

¹¹ The foregoing passage, commencing at the head of p. 164, is not contained in the text of either of the previous editions of these lectures. The purport of it is however contained partly in J. S. M.'s notes of the lectures as originally delivered; and partly in the fragments from the author's MS. printed in the notes to the last edition. As it may be inferred from these fragments that the author contemplated incorporating their

substance in the more ample edition of the work which he meditated; I have ventured to construct the above passage partly from the fragmentary notes last mentioned, and partly from J. S. M.'s notes. Some of the fragmentary notes I have ventured to expand, endeavouring to do so consistently with the purport of the rest of these lectures. The passages so expanded I have marked by the use of brackets. - R.C.

ing the origin of benevolence which is styled the *selfish system*.

2. They imagine that that hypothesis, as thus mistaken and distorted, is an essential or necessary ingredient in the *theory of utility*.^(b)

I will examine the two errors into which the misconception may be resolved, in the order wherein I have stated them.

1. According to an hypothesis of Hartley and of various other writers, benevolence or sympathy is not an ultimate fact, or is not unsusceptible of analysis or resolution, or is not a simple or inscrutable element of man's being or nature. According to their hypothesis, it emanates from self-love, or from the self-regarding affections, through that familiar process styled 'the association of ideas,' to which I have briefly adverted in a preceding portion of my discourse.

Now it follows palpably from the foregoing concise statement, that these writers dispute not the *existence* of disinterested benevolence or sympathy: that, assuming the existence of disinterested benevolence or sympathy, they endeavour to trace the feeling, through its supposed generation, to the simpler and ulterior feeling of which they believe it the offspring.

But, palpable as this consequence is, it is fancied by many opponents of the theory of utility, and (what is more remarkable) by some of its adherents also, that these writers dispute the *existence* of disinterested benevolence or sympathy.

According to the hypothesis in question, *as thus mistaken and distorted*, we have no sympathy, properly so called, with the pleasures and pains of others. That which is styled sympathy, or that which is styled benevolence, is provident regard to self. Every good office done by man to man springs from a *calculation* of which self is the object. We perceive that we depend on others for much of our own happiness: and, per-

^(b) The first of these mistakes is made by Godwin.¹² The second by Paley.

¹² From Epicurus and Lucretius down to Paley and Godwin, Mr. Bentham is the only writer who has explained this subject with clearness and accuracy. He is not, indeed, the inventor of the theory of utility (for that is as old as the human race), but he is the first of all philosophers who has viewed it from

every aspect, and has fitted it for practice.

'Many of the writers who appear to reject utility do, in fact, embrace it; (e.g. Cicero, Seneca, Johnson, etc.) (Eudæmonismus). The *honestum* is the *generally* useful. The *utile* is the *generally* pernicious; but which would answer some selfish and sinister purpose.'—MS. Fragment.

¹² Enquiry concerning Political Justice. By William Godwin. January, 1793, book iv. ch. viii. I presume the author classes Godwin amongst the adherents of the theory of utility. This writer

certainly anticipates, under the name of the *principle of justice*, some of the arguments most effectively urged in favour of the theory of utility by its more modern adherents.—R. C.

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ceiving that we depend on others for much of our own happiness, we do good unto others that others may do it unto us. The seemingly disinterested services that are rendered by men to men, are the offspring of the very motives, and are governed by the very principles, which engender and regulate *trade*.^(c)

2. Having thus mistaken and distorted the so-called *selfish system*, many opponents of the *theory of utility*, together with some adherents of the same theory, imagine that the former, as thus mistaken and distorted, is a necessary portion of the latter. And hence it naturally follows, that the adherents of the theory of utility are styled by many of its opponents 'selfish, sordid, and cold-blooded calculators.'

(c) The selfish system, in this its literal import, is flatly inconsistent with obvious facts, and therefore is hardly deserving of serious refutation. We are daily and hourly *conscious* of disinterested benevolence or sympathy, or of wishing the good of others without regard to our own. In the present wretched condition of human society, so unfavourable are the outward circumstances wherein most men are placed, and so bad is the education or training received by most men in their youth, that the benevolence of most men wants the intensity and endurance which are requisite to their own happiness and to the happiness of their fellow-creatures. With most men, benevolence or sympathy is rather a barren emotion than a strong and steady incentive to vigorous and efficient action. Although the feeling or sentiment affects them often enough, it is commonly stifled at the birth by antagonist feelings or sentiments. But to deny, with Rochefoucauld or Mandeville, the *existence* of benevolence or sympathy, is rather a wild paradox, hazarded in the wantonness of satire, than the deliberate position of a philosopher examining the springs of conduct.

And here I may briefly remark, that the expression *selfish*, as applied to motives, has a large and a narrower meaning.—Taking the expression *selfish* with its larger meaning, *all* motives are *selfish*. For every motive is a wish: and every wish is a pain which affects a man's *self*, and which urges him to seek relief, by attaining the object wished.—Taking the expression *selfish* with its narrower meaning, motives which are *selfish* must be distinguished from motives which are *benevolent*: our wishes for our own good, from our wishes for the good of our neighbour: the desires which impel us to pursue our own advantage or benefit, from the desires which solicit

us to pursue the advantage or benefit of others.

To obviate this ambiguity, with the wretched quibbling which it begets, Mr. Bentham has judiciously discarded the dubious expression *selfish*. The motives which solicit us to pursue the advantage or good of others, he styles *social*. The motives which impel us to pursue our own advantage or good, he styles *self regarding*.

But, besides the social and self-regarding motives, there are disinterested motives, or disinterested wishes, by which we are impelled or solicited to visit others with evil. These disinterested but malevolent motives, he styles *anti-social*.—When I style a motive of the sort a *disinterested* motive, I apply the epithet with the meaning wherein I apply it to a benevolent motive. Speaking with absolute precision, the motive is not disinterested in either case: for, in each of the two cases, the man desires relief from a wish importuning himself. But, excepting the desire of relief which the wish necessarily implies, the wish, in each of the cases, is purely disinterested. The end or object to which it urges the man is the good or evil of another, and not his own advantage.—By imputing to human nature disinterested malevolence, Mr. Bentham has drawn upon himself the reproaches of certain critics. But in imputing disinterested malevolence to human nature, he is far from being singular. The fact is admitted or assumed by Aristotle and Butler, and by all who have closely examined the springs or motives of conduct. And the fact is easily explained by the all-pervading principle which is styled 'the association of ideas.' Disinterested malevolence or antipathy, like disinterested benevolence or sympathy, is begotten by that principle on the self-

Now the *theory of ethics* which I style the *theory of utility* has no necessary connection with any *theory of motives*. It has no necessary connection with any theory or hypothesis which concerns the nature or origin of benevolence or sympathy. The theory of utility will hold good, whether benevolence or sympathy be truly a portion of our nature, or be nothing but a mere name for provident regard to self. The theory of utility will hold good, whether benevolence or sympathy be a simple or ultimate fact, or be engendered by the principle of association on the self-regarding affections.

According to the theory of utility, the principle of *general utility* is the index to God's commands, and is therefore the proximate measure of all human conduct. We are bound by the awful sanctions with which his commands are armed, to adjust our conduct to rules formed on that proximate measure. Though benevolence be nothing but a name for provident regard to self, we are moved by regard to self, when we think of those awful sanctions, to pursue the generally useful, and to forbear from the generally pernicious. Accordingly, that is the version of the theory of utility which is rendered by Dr. Paley. He supposes that *general utility* is the proximate *test* of conduct: but he supposes that all the *motives* by which our conduct is determined are purely *self-regarding*. And his version of the *theory of utility* is, nevertheless, coherent: though I think that his *theory of motives* is miserably partial and shallow, and that mere regard to self, although it were never so provident, would hardly perform the office of genuine benevolence or sympathy. For if genuine benevolence or sympathy be not a portion of our nature, we have only one inducement to consult the general good: namely, a provident regard to our own welfare or happiness. But if genuine benevolence or sympathy be a portion of our nature, we have two distinct inducements to consult the general good: namely, the same provident regard to our own welfare or happiness, and also a disinterested regard to the welfare or happiness of others. If genuine benevolence or sympathy were not a portion of our nature, our motives to consult the general good would be more defective than they are.^(d)

^{d)} *Confusion of Sympathy with Moral Sense.*

Sympathy is the pleasure or pain which we feel when another enjoys or suffers. In common language it is fellow-feeling. This is totally different from moral approbation or disapprobation, and instead of always coinciding

with moral sentiments (let their origin be what it may), often runs counter to them. As (e.g.) that large sympathy with every sentient being, or at least with every human being, which is called humanity or benevolence, inclines us to sympathize with the sufferings of the culprit whose punishment we approve.

LECT. IV

Again: Assuming that benevolence or sympathy is truly a portion of our nature, the theory of utility has no connection whatever with any hypothesis or theory which concerns the origin of the motive. Whether benevolence or sympathy be a simple or ultimate fact, or be engendered by the principle of association on the self-regarding affections, it is one of the motives by which our conduct is determined. And, on either of the conflicting suppositions, the principle of utility, and not benevolence or sympathy, is the *measure* or *test* of conduct: For as conduct may be generally useful, though the motive is self-regarding; so may conduct be generally pernicious, though the motive is purely benevolent. Accordingly, in all his expositions of the theory of utility, Mr. Bentham assumes or supposes the existence of disinterested sympathy, and scarcely adverts to the hypotheses which regard the origin of the feeling.^(e)

Like the pains and pleasures which purely regard ourselves, the pains and pleasures of sympathy are not moral sentiments, but feelings or motives which, according to the justness of our moral sentiments, may lead us wrong or right.

This sympathy may be an original instinct, like our appetites, or begotten by association, like diseased curiosity, love of money, etc. (Bishop Butler).

But on neither of these hypotheses is the theory which derives our moral sentiments from utility at all affected.

The theory of utility assumes sympathy, but maintains that our judgments of actions ought to be, and in a great measure are, derived from our perception of the *general* consequences of actions; i.e. not their immediate, but their remote consequences, supposing them unregulated by Morals and Law; and not only their consequences upon ourselves, but also upon our relations, our friends, our country, our fellow-men; with whom, according to the theory, as I understand it, we are held by bonds of sympathy; which, though not so strong nor so constant as our mere regard to ourselves, is just as necessary to our own well-being. Sympathy, as well as pure self-love, is not a moral sentiment, but a principle or motive to action: either being liable to disturb our moral judgment. Indeed a narrow sympathy is, in some minds, as tyrannous as the self-love of the most narrow and contracted being that crawls

the earth. Maternal love, the passion between the sexes when exalted into Love, the spirit of sect and party, a narrow patriotism—all these are as likely to mislead the judgment or the moral sense as the purely self-regarding affections, which, on the other hand, though often misleading, are, to a great extent, the causes of good, prompting men to all long and obscure effort.—*MS. Fragment.*

(^e) But here I would briefly remark, that, though the hypothesis of Hartley is no necessary ingredient in the theory of general utility, it is a necessary ingredient (if it be not unfounded) in every sound system of education or training. For the sake of our own happiness, and the happiness of our fellow-creatures, the affection of benevolence or sympathy should be strong and steady as possible: for though, like other motives, it may lead us to pernicious conduct, it is less likely than most of the others to seduce us from the right road. Now if benevolence or sympathy be engendered by the principle of association, the affection may be planted and nurtured by education or training. The truth or falsehood of the hypothesis, together with the process by which the affection is generated, are therefore objects of great practical moment, and well deserving of close and minute examination.

LECTURE V.

THE term *law*, or the term *laws*, is applied to the following objects:—to laws proper or properly so called, and to laws improper or improperly so called: to objects which have all the essentials of an imperative law or rule, and to objects which are wanting in some of those essentials, but to which the term is unduly extended either by reason of *analogy* or in the way of *metaphor*.

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Laws proper or properly so called, and laws improper or improperly so called.

Strictly speaking, *all* improper laws are *analogous* to laws proper: and the term *law*, as applied to *any* of them, is a *metaphorical* or *figurative* expression.

For every metaphor springs from an analogy: and every analogical extension given to a term is a metaphor or figure of speech. The term is extended from the objects which it properly signifies to objects of another nature; to objects not of the class wherein the former are contained, although they are allied to the former by that more distant resemblance which is usually styled *analogy*. But, taking the expressions with the meanings which custom or usage has established, there is a difference between an employment of a term analogically and a metaphor.

Analogy is a species of *resemblance*. The word *resemblance* is here taken in that large sense, in which all subjects which have any property in common, are said to resemble. But besides this more extended acceptation according to which *resemblance* is a genus, and *analogy* one of the species included therein, there is another and a narrower sense, in which *resemblance* is opposed to *analogy*. Two resembling subjects are said to *resemble* in the narrower meaning of the term, when they both belong to some determinate genus or species expressly or tacitly referred to; when they both have every property, which belongs to all the subjects included in the class. Two resembling subjects are said on the contrary to be *analogous*, when *one* of them belongs to some class expressly or tacitly referred to, and the *other* does *not*: when one possesses all the properties common to the class and the other only some of them. I choose, for instance, on account of a particular convenience, to range together in one class all animals having feet. When I am speaking with reference to this class, the foot of a lion and the foot of a man would be said to resemble in the narrower as well as in the wider sense of the word. But the foot of a table, though it resem-

Analogy and metaphor as used in common parlance, defined.

bles the foot of a lion and of a man in the more enlarged sense, does not resemble these in the narrower sense, but is only analogous to them. For *these* possess the whole of the qualities belonging universally to the class, while *it* possesses only a part of the same qualities. If I were not tacitly referring to a genus, I might say that all the three objects resemble, but if the genus be referred to, the foot of the lion and the foot of the man resemble, the foot of the table is only analogous to them.

Resemblance is hence an ambiguous term. When two things resemble in the narrow sense, that is, when they both possess all the properties which belong universally to the class, the common name (such as *foot* in the instance above given), is applied to both of them strictly and properly. When they are analogous, that is when the one possesses all, the other only some of the properties which belong universally to the class, the name denotes the one properly, the other improperly or analogically.

It is extremely important to fix our conception with respect to this ambiguity, as the words analogy and analogous often recur in the science of jurisprudence, and by the laxity with which they are employed involve it in a scarcely penetrable mist. The nature of unwritten law, and the principles of interpretation or construction, are among the most obscure of all the questions which arise in jurisprudence. This obscurity springs, as is usually the case, from nonsense or jargon; which jargon, on these questions, arises from hence, that men talk profusely of analogy and things analogous, without ascertaining the precise meaning of those terms, or taking pains to employ them with any precise meaning. Professor Thibaut of Berlin, in his treatise on the Interpretation of the Roman Law, is, as far as I know, the only writer who has seen this perplexity; and notwithstanding my warm respect for that learned and discerning jurist, it seems to me that even he has scarcely solved the difficulty, though he has pointed out the path by which we may arrive at a solution.

A metaphor is the transference of a term from its primitive signification to subjects to which it is applied not in that, but in a secondary sense. An analogy real or supposed, is always the ground of the transference; hence every metaphor is an analogical application of a term, and every analogical application of a term is a metaphor. But a metaphorical or figurative application is scarcely, in common parlance, synonymous with an analogical application. By a metaphorical

or figurative application, we usually mean one in which the analogy is faint, the alliance between the primitive and the derivative signification remote. When the analogy is clear, strong, and close; when the subjects to which the term is deflected lie on the confines of the class properly denoted by it, and have many of the properties common to the class, we hardly say that the name is employed figuratively or metaphorically.

In the language of logic, objects which have all the qualities composing the essence of the class, and all the qualities which are the necessary consequences of those composing the essence, *resemble*. When an object does not possess all the essence of the class, but possesses many of the qualities which compose the essence, or many of those which necessarily result from the essence, the application of the name to that object will be said to be analogical and not a metaphor. The difference between metaphor and analogy is hence a difference of degree, and not to be settled precisely by drawing a strict line between them.¹³

Now a broad distinction obtains between laws improperly so called. Some are *closely*, others are *remotely* analogous to laws proper. The term *law* is extended to some by a decision of the reason or understanding. The term *law* is extended to others by a turn or caprice of the fancy.

Laws in proper of two kinds.—
1. Laws closely analogous to laws proper.
2. Laws metaphorical or figurative.

In order that I may mark this distinction briefly and commodiously, I avail myself of the difference, established by custom or usage, between the meanings of the expressions *analogical* and *figurative*.—I style laws of the first kind *laws closely analogous to laws proper*. I say that they are called *laws* by an *analogical* extension of the term.—I style laws of the second kind *laws metaphorical or figurative*. I say that they are called *laws* by a *metaphor* or *figure of speech*.

Now laws proper, with such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper, are divisible thus.

Of laws properly so called, some are set by God to his human creatures, others are set by men to men.

Division of laws proper, and of such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper.

¹³ The subject of analogy will be found more fully treated in a separate essay or *excursus* printed in the second volume, being one of the MSS. collected by the late Mrs. Austin after the author's death. It appears from a note to the edition of 1861, that the author had some intention of inserting the essay in the body of the more extended work which he meditated. To insert it entire in the body

of these lectures was impracticable; but in order to carry out to some extent the intention indicated by the note now referred to, I have ventured to restore the above passage (upon analogy and metaphor, commencing on p. 171) from Mr. J. S. Mill's notes of the oral lectures, where it is much less condensed than the corresponding passage of the lectures as formerly published.—R. C.

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Of the laws properly so called which are set by men to men, some are set by men as political superiors, or by men as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights. Others may be described in the following negative manner: They are not set by men as political superiors, nor are they set by men, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights.

The laws improperly so called which are closely analogous to the proper, are merely opinions or sentiments held or felt by men in regard to human conduct. As I shall show hereafter, these opinions and sentiments are styled *laws*, because they are *analogous* to laws properly so called: because they resemble laws properly so called in *some* of their properties or *some* of their effects or consequences.

Accordingly, I distribute laws proper, with such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper, under three capital classes.

The first comprises the laws (properly so called) which are set by God to his human creatures.

The second comprises the laws (properly so called) which are set by men as political superiors, or by men, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights.

The third comprises laws of the two following species: 1. The laws (properly so called) which are set by men to men, but not by men as political superiors, nor by men, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights: 2. The laws which are closely analogous to laws proper, but are merely opinions or sentiments held or felt by men in regard to human conduct. —I put laws of these species into a common class, and I mark them with the common name to which I shall advert immediately, for the following reason. No law of either species is a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number in the character of political superior. In other words, no law of either species is a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. Consequently, laws of both species may be aptly opposed to laws of the second capital class. For every law of that second capital class is a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number in the character of political superior: that is to say, a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.

Laws comprised by these three capital classes I mark with the following names.

Distribu-
tion of laws
proper, and
of such im-
proper
laws as are
closely ana-
logous to
the proper,
under three
capital
classes.—
1. The law
of God, or
the laws of
God.
2. Positive
law, or
positive
laws.
3. Positive
morality,
rules of
positive
morality,
or positive
moral rules.

I name laws of the first class *the law or laws of God*, or *the Divine law or laws*.

For various reasons which I shall produce immediately, I name laws of the second class *positive law*, or *positive laws*.

For the same reasons, I name laws of the third class *positive morality*, *rules of positive morality*, or *positive moral rules*.

My reasons for using the two expressions '*positive law*' and '*positive morality*,' are the following.

There are two capital classes of human laws. The first comprises the laws (properly so called) which are set by men as political superiors, or by men, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights. The second comprises the laws (proper and improper) which belong to the two species mentioned on the preceding page.

Digression to explain the expressions *positive law* and *positive morality*.

As merely distinguished from the second, the first of those capital classes might be named simply *law*. As merely distinguished from the first, the second of those capital classes might be named simply *morality*. But both must be distinguished from the law of God: and, for the purpose of distinguishing both from the law of God, we must qualify the names *law* and *morality*. Accordingly, I style the first of those capital classes '*positive law*:' and I style the second of those capital classes '*positive morality*.' By the common epithet *positive*, I denote that both classes flow from human sources. By the distinctive names *law* and *morality*, I denote the difference between the human sources from which the two classes respectively emanate.

Strictly speaking, every law properly so called is a *positive law*. For it is *put* or set by its individual or collective author, or it exists by the *position* or institution of its individual or collective author.

But, as opposed to the law of nature (meaning the law of God), human law of the first of those capital classes is styled by writers on jurisprudence '*positive law*.' This application of the expression '*positive law*' was manifestly made for the purpose of obviating confusion; confusion of human law of the first of those capital classes with that Divine law which is the measure or test of human.

And, in order to obviate similar confusion, I apply the expression '*positive morality*' to human law of the second capital class. For the name *morality*, when standing unqualified or alone, may signify the law set by God, or human law of that second capital class. If you say that an act or omission violates *morality*, you speak ambiguously. You

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may mean that it violates the law which I style '*positive morality*,' or that it violates the Divine law which is the measure or test of the former.

Again: The human laws or rules which I style '*positive morality*,' I mark with that expression for the following additional reason.

I have said that the name *morality*, when standing unqualified or alone, may signify positive morality, or may signify the law of God. But the name *morality*, when standing unqualified or alone, is perplexed with a further ambiguity. It may import indifferently either of the two following senses.—1. The name *morality*, when standing unqualified or alone, may signify positive morality which is good or worthy of approbation, or positive morality as it would be if it were good or worthy of approbation. In other words, the name *morality*, when standing unqualified or alone, may signify positive morality which agrees with its measure or test, or positive morality as it would be if it agreed with its measure or test. 2. The name *morality*, when standing unqualified or alone, may signify the human laws, which I style positive morality, as considered without regard to their goodness or badness. For example, Such laws of the class as are peculiar to a given age, or such laws of the class as are peculiar to a given nation, we style the *morality* of that given age or nation, whether we think them good or deem them bad. Or, in case we mean to intimate that we approve or disapprove of them, we name them the *morality* of that given age or nation, and we qualify that name with the epithet *good* or *bad*.

Now, by the name '*positive morality*,' I mean the human laws which I mark with that expression, as considered without regard to their goodness or badness. Whether human laws be worthy of praise or blame, or whether they accord or not with their measure or test, they are '*rules of positive morality*,' in the sense which I give to the expression, if they belong to either of the two species lastly mentioned on p. 174. But, in consequence of that ambiguity which I have now attempted to explain, I could hardly express my meaning with passable distinctness by the unqualified name *morality*.

Explanation of the following expressions: viz.

From the expression *positive law* and the expression *positive morality*, I pass to certain expressions with which they are closely connected.

The *science of jurisprudence* (or, simply and briefly, *juris-*

jurisprudence) is concerned with positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, as considered without regard to their goodness or badness.

Positive morality, as considered without regard to its goodness or badness, *might* be the subject of a science closely analogous to jurisprudence. I say '*might* be:' since it is only in one of its branches (namely, the law of nations or international law), that positive morality, as considered without regard to its goodness or badness, has been treated by writers in a scientific or systematic manner.—For the science of positive morality, as considered without regard to its goodness or badness, current or established language will hardly afford us a name. The name *morals*, or *science of morals*, would denote it ambiguously: the name *morals*, or *science of morals*, being commonly applied (as I shall show immediately) to a department of ethics or deontology. But, since the science of jurisprudence is not unfrequently styled 'the science of *positive* law,' the science in question might be styled analogically 'the science of *positive* morality.' The department of the science in question which relates to international law, has actually been styled by Von Martens, a recent writer of celebrity, '*positives oder practisches Völkerrecht*:' that is to say, '*positive* international law,' or '*practical* international law.' Had he named that department of the science '*positive* international morality,' the name would have hit its import with perfect precision.

The science of ethics (or, in the language of Mr. Bentham, the science of deontology) may be defined in the following manner.—It affects to determine the test of positive law and morality, or it affects to determine the principles whereon they must be fashioned in order that they may merit approbation. In other words, it affects to expound them as they should be; or it affects to expound them as they ought to be; or it affects to expound them as they would be if they were good or worthy of praise; or it affects to expound them as they would be if they conformed to an assumed measure.

The science of ethics (or, simply and briefly, ethics) consists of two departments: one relating specially to positive law, the other relating specially to positive morality. The department which relates specially to positive law, is commonly styled the science of legislation, or, simply and briefly, legislation. The department which relates specially to positive morality, is commonly styled the science of morals, or, simply and briefly, morals.

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science of jurisprudence and science of positive morality; science of ethics or deontology, science of legislation, and science of morals.

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Meaning of
the epithet
good or *bad*
as applied
to a human
law.

The foregoing attempt to define the science of ethics naturally leads me to offer the following explanatory remark.

When we say that a human law is good or bad, or is worthy of praise or blame, or is what it should be or what it should not be, or is what it ought to be or what it ought not to be, we mean (unless we intimate our mere liking or aversion) this: namely, that the law agrees with or differs from a something to which we tacitly refer it as to a measure or test.

For example, According to either of the hypotheses which I stated in preceding lectures, a human law is good or bad as it agrees or does not agree with the law of God: that is to say, with the law of God as indicated by the principle of utility, or with the law of God as indicated by the moral sense. To the adherent of the theory of utility, a human law is good if it be generally useful, and a human law is bad if it be generally pernicious. For, in *his* opinion, it is consonant or not with the law of God, inasmuch as it is consonant or not with the principle of general utility. To the adherent of the hypothesis of a moral sense, a human law is good if he likes it he knows not why, and a human law is bad if he hates it he knows not wherefore. For, in *his* opinion, that his inexplicable feeling of liking or aversion shows that the human law pleases or offends the Deity.

To the atheist, a human law is good if it be generally useful, and a human law is bad if it be generally pernicious. For the principle of general utility would serve as a measure or test, although it were not an index to an ulterior measure or test. But if he call the law a good one without believing it useful, or if he call the law a bad one without believing it pernicious, the atheist simply intimates his mere liking or aversion. For, unless it be thought an index to the law set by the Deity, an inexplicable feeling of approbation or disapprobation can hardly be considered a measure or test. And, in the opinion of the atheist, there is no law of God which his inexplicable feeling can point at.

To the believer in a supposed revelation, a human law is good or bad as it agrees with or differs from the terms wherein the revelation is expressed.

In short, the goodness or badness of a human law is a phrase of relative and varying import. A law which is good to one man is bad to another, in case they tacitly refer it to different and adverse tests.

Meaning of the epithet *good* as applied to the law of God.

The Divine laws may be styled good, in the sense with which the atheist may apply the epithet to human. We may style them good, or worthy of praise inasmuch as they agree with utility considered as an ultimate test. And this is the only meaning with which we can apply the epithet to the laws of God. Unless we refer them to utility considered as an ultimate test, we have no test by which we can try them. To say that they are good because they are set by the Deity, is to say that they are good as measured or tried by themselves. But to say this is to talk absurdly: for every object which is measured, or every object which is brought to a test, is compared with a given object other than itself. —If the laws set by the Deity were not generally useful, or if they did not promote the general happiness of his creatures, or if their great Author were not wise and benevolent, they would not be good, or worthy of praise, but were devilish and worthy of execration.

Before I conclude the present digression, I must submit this further remark to the attention of the reader.

I have intimated in the course of this digression, that the phrase *law of nature*, or the phrase *natural law*, often signifies the law of God.

Natural law as thus understood, and the *natural law* which I mentioned in my fourth lecture, are disparate expressions. The *natural law* which I there mentioned, is a portion of positive law and positive morality. It consists of the human rules, legal and moral, which have obtained at all times and obtained at all places.

The expression *law of nature*, or *natural law*, has two disparate meanings. It signifies the law of God, or a portion of positive law and positive morality.

According to the compound hypothesis which I mentioned in my fourth lecture. these human rules, legal and moral, have been fashioned on the law of God as indicated by *the moral sense*. Or, adopting the language of the classical Roman jurists, these human rules, legal and moral, have been fashioned on the Divine law as known by *natural reason*.

But, besides the human rules which have obtained with all mankind, there are human rules, legal and moral, which have been limited to peculiar times, or limited to peculiar places.

Now, according to the compound hypothesis which I mentioned in my fourth lecture, these last have not been fashioned on the law of God, or have been fashioned on the law of God as conjectured by the light of utility.

Being fashioned on the law of God as known by an infallible guide, human rules of the first class are styled *the law of*

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nature: For they are not of human position purely or simply, but are laws of God or Nature clothed with human sanctions. As obtaining at all times and obtaining at all places, they are styled by the classical jurists *jus gentium*, or *jus omnium gentium*.

But human rules of the second class are styled *positive*. For, not being fashioned on the law of God, or being fashioned on the law of God as merely conjectured by utility, they, certainly or probably, are of purely human position. They are not laws of God or Nature clothed with human sanctions.

As I stated in my fourth lecture, and shall show completely hereafter, the distinction of human rules into natural and positive involves the compound hypothesis which I mentioned in that discourse.¹⁴

The connection of the present (the fifth) lecture with the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth.

Positive laws, the appropriate matter of jurisprudence, are related in the way of resemblance, or by a close or remote analogy, to the following objects.—1. In the way of resemblance, they are related to the laws of God. 2. In the way of resemblance, they are related to those rules of positive morality which are laws properly so called. 3. By a close or strong analogy, they are related to those rules of positive morality which are merely opinions or sentiments held or felt by men in regard to human conduct. 4. By a remote or slender analogy, they are related to laws merely metaphorical, or laws merely figurative.

To distinguish positive laws from the objects now enumerated, is the purpose of the present attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence.

In pursuance of the purpose to which I have now adverted, I stated, in my first lecture, the essentials of a *law* or *rule* (taken with the largest signification which can be given to the term *properly*).

In my second, third, and fourth lectures, I stated the marks or characters by which the laws of God are distinguished from other laws. And, stating those marks or characters, I explained the nature of the index to his unrevealed laws, or I explained and examined the hypotheses which regard the nature of that index. I made this explanation

¹⁴ The above digression was in both the previous editions comprised in a disquisition in the form of a note, which appears to have been penned by the author after some portion of the original edition was in the press. By inserting in the text the greater part of this note, after modifying, in accordance with the suggestions contained in another part of

it, one of the minor points of classification contained in the first Lecture, I have endeavoured to represent the final intention of the author. The place of the intrusion is marked by the use of the word 'digression' in the marginal note at the commencement of the inserted passage (p. 175 *antè*).—R. C.

at a length which may seem disproportionate, but which I have deemed necessary because these laws, and the index by which they are known, are the standard or measure to which all other laws should conform, and the standard measure or test by which they should be tried.

But before I can complete the purpose to which I have adverted above, I must examine or discuss especially the following principal topics (and must touch upon other topics of secondary or subordinate importance).—1. I must examine the marks or characters by which positive laws are distinguished from other laws. 2. I must examine the distinguishing marks of those positive moral rules which are laws properly so called. 3. I must examine the distinguishing marks of those positive moral rules which are styled *laws* or *rules* by an analogical extension of the term. 4. I must examine the distinguishing marks of laws merely metaphorical, or laws merely figurative.

In order to an explanation of the marks which distinguish positive laws, I must analyze the expression *sovereignty*, the correlative expression *subjection*, and the inseparably connected expression *independent political society*. For the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated thus. Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the expression) it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.

But my analysis of those expressions occupies so large a space, that, in case I placed it in the lecture which I am now delivering, the lecture which I am now delivering would run to insufferable length.

The purpose mentioned above will, therefore, be completed in the following order.

Excluding from my present discourse my analysis of those expressions, I shall complete, in my present discourse, the purpose mentioned above, so far as I can complete it consistently with that exclusion. In my present discourse, I shall examine or discuss especially the following principal topics: namely, the distinguishing marks of those positive moral rules which are laws properly so called: the distinguishing marks of those positive moral rules which are styled

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laws or *rules* by an analogical extension of the term: the distinguishing marks of the laws which are styled *laws* by a metaphor.

I shall complete, in my sixth lecture, the purpose mentioned above, by explaining the marks or characters which distinguish positive laws, or laws strictly so called: an explanation involving an analysis of the capital expression *sovereignty*, the correlative expression *subjection*, and the inseparably connected expression *independent political society*.

Having shown the connection of my present discourse with foregoing and following lectures, I proceed to examine or discuss its appropriate topics or subjects.

The essentials of a law proper-

In my first lecture, I endeavoured to resolve a *law* (taken with the largest signification which can be given to the term *properly*) into the necessary or essential elements of which it is composed.

which those essentials import.

Now those essentials of a law proper, together with certain consequences which those essentials import, may be stated briefly in the following manner.—1. Laws properly so called are a species of *commands*. But, being a *command*, every law properly so called flows from a *determinate* source, or emanates from a *determinate* author. In other words, the author from whom it proceeds is a *determinate* rational being, or a *determinate* body or aggregate of rational beings. For whenever a *command* is expressed or intimated, one party signifies a wish that another shall do or forbear: and the latter is obnoxious to an evil which the former intends to inflict in case the wish be disregarded. But every *signification* of a wish made by a single individual, or made by a body of individuals as a *body* or *collective whole*, supposes that the individual or body is *certain* or *determinate*. And every *intention* or *purpose* held by a single individual, or held by a body of individuals as a *body* or *collective whole*, involves the same supposition. 2. Every sanction properly so called is an eventual evil *annexed* to a *command*. Any eventual evil may operate as a *motive* to conduct: but, unless the conduct be commanded and the evil be annexed to the command purposely to enforce obedience, the evil is not a *sanction* in the proper acceptation of the term. 3. Every duty properly so called supposes a *command* by which it is created. For every sanction properly so called is an eventual evil *annexed* to a *command*. And duty properly so called is obnoxiousness to evils of the kind.

The laws of God, and positive laws, are laws properly so called.

Now it follows from these premises, that the laws of God, and positive laws, are laws proper, or laws properly so called.

The laws of God are laws proper, inasmuch as they are *commands* express or tacit, and therefore emanate from a *certain* source.

Positive laws, or laws strictly so called, are established directly or immediately by authors of three kinds:—by monarchs, or sovereign bodies, as supreme political superiors: by men in a state of subjection, as subordinate political superiors: by subjects, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights. But every positive law, or every law strictly so called, is a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number in the character of political superior: that is to say, a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. And being a *command* (and therefore flowing from a *determinate* source), every positive law is a law proper, or a law properly so called.

The generic character of positive moral rules.

Besides the human laws which I style positive law, there are human laws which I style positive morality, rules of positive morality, or positive moral rules.

The generic character of laws of the class may be stated briefly in the following negative manner.—No law belonging to the class is a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number in the character of political superior. In other words, no law belonging to the class is a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.

But of positive moral rules, some are laws proper, or laws properly so called: others are laws improper, or laws improperly so called. Some have all the essentials of an *imperative* law or rule: others are deficient in some of those essentials, and are styled *laws* or *rules* by an analogical extension of the term.

Of positive moral rules, some are laws proper, but others are laws improper.

The positive moral rules which are laws properly so called, are distinguished from other laws by the union of two marks.—1. They are imperative laws or rules set by men to men. 2. They are not set by men as political superiors, nor are they set by men as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights.

The positive moral rules which are laws properly so called, are *commands*.

Inasmuch as they bear the latter of these two marks, they are not commands of sovereigns in the character of political

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superiors. Consequently, they are not positive laws: they are not clothed with legal sanctions, nor do they oblige legally the persons to whom they are set. But being *commands* (and therefore being established by *determinate* individuals or bodies), they are laws properly so called: they are armed with sanctions, and impose duties, in the proper acceptation of the terms.

It will appear from the following distinctions, that positive moral rules which are laws properly so called may be reduced to three kinds.

Of positive moral rules which are laws properly so called, some are established by men who are not subjects, or are not in a state of subjection: Meaning by 'subjects,' or by 'men in a state of subjection,' men in a state of subjection to a monarch or sovereign number.—Of positive moral rules which are laws properly so called, and are not established by men in a state of subjection, some are established by men living in the negative state which is styled a state of nature or a state of anarchy: that is to say, by men who are *not* in the state which is styled a state of government, or are *not* members, sovereign or subject, of any political society.—Of positive moral rules which are laws properly so called, and are not established by men in a state of subjection, others are established by sovereign individuals or bodies, but are not established by sovereigns in the character of political superiors. Or a positive moral rule of this kind may be described in the following manner: It is set by a monarch or sovereign number, but not to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.

Of laws properly so called which are set by subjects, some are set by subjects as subordinate political superiors. But of laws properly so called which are set by subjects, others are set by subjects as private persons: Meaning by 'private persons,' subjects not in the class of subordinate political superiors, or subordinate political superiors not considered as such.—Laws set by subjects as subordinate political superiors, are positive laws: they are clothed with legal sanctions, and impose legal duties. They are set by sovereigns or states in the character of political superiors, although they are set by sovereigns circuitously or remotely. Although they are made directly by subject or subordinate authors, they are made through legal rights granted by sovereigns or states, and held by those subject authors as mere trustees for the granters.—Of laws set by subjects as

private persons, some are not established by sovereign or supreme authority. And these are rules of positive morality: they are not clothed with legal sanctions, nor do they oblige legally the parties to whom they are set.—But of laws set by subjects as private persons, others are set or established in pursuance of legal rights residing in the subject authors. And these are positive laws or laws strictly so called. Although they are made directly by subject authors, they are made in pursuance of rights granted or conferred by sovereigns in the character of political superiors: they legally oblige the parties to whom they are set, or are clothed with legal sanctions. They are commands of sovereigns as political superiors, although they are set by sovereigns circuitously or remotel.⁽⁷⁾

(7) A law set by a subject as a private person, but in pursuance of a legal right residing in the subject author, is either a positive law purely or simply, or is compounded of a positive law and a rule of positive morality. Or (changing the expression) it is either a positive law purely or simply, or it is a positive law as viewed from one aspect, and a rule of positive morality as viewed from another.

The person who makes the law in pursuance of the legal right, is either legally bound to make the law, or he is not. In the first case, the law is a positive law purely or simply. In the second case, the law is compounded of a positive law and a positive moral rule.

For example, A guardian may have a right over his pupil or ward, which he is legally bound to exercise, for the benefit of the pupil or ward, in a given or specified manner. In other words, a guardian may be clothed with a right, over his pupil or ward, in trust to exercise the same, for the benefit of the pupil or ward, in a given or specified manner. Now if, in pursuance of his right, and agreeably to his duty or trust, he sets a law or rule to the pupil or ward, the law is a positive law purely or simply. It is properly a law which the state sets to the ward through its minister or instrument the guardian. It is not made by the guardian of his own spontaneous movement, or is made in pursuance of a duty which the state has imposed upon him. The position of the guardian is closely analogous to the position of subordinate political superiors; who hold their delegated powers of direct or judicial legislation as mere trustees for the sovereign granters.

Again: the master has legal rights,

over or against his slave, which are conferred by the state upon the master for his own benefit. And, since they are conferred upon him for his own benefit, he is not legally bound to exercise or use them. Now if, in pursuance of these rights, he sets a law to his slave, the law is compounded of a positive law and a positive moral rule. Being made by sovereign authority, and clothed by the sovereign with sanctions, the law made by the master is properly a positive law. But, since it is made by the master of his own spontaneous movement, or is not made by the master in pursuance of a legal duty, it is properly a rule of positive morality, as well as a positive law. Though the law set by the master is set circuitously by the sovereign, it is set or established by the sovereign at the pleasure of the subject author. The master is not the instrument of the sovereign or state, but the sovereign or state is rather the instrument of the master.

Before I dismiss the subject of the present note, I must make two remarks.

1. Of laws made by men as private persons, some are frequently styled 'laws *autonomic*.' Or it is frequently said of some of those laws, that they are made through an *αὐτονομία* residing in the subject authors. Now laws *autonomic*, or *autonomical*, are laws made by subjects, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights: that is to say, in pursuance of legal rights which they are free to exercise or not, or in pursuance of legal rights which are not saddled with trusts. A law of the kind is styled *autonomic*, because it is made by its author of his own spontaneous disposition, or not in pursuance of a duty imposed upon him by the state.

Laws set by men, as private persons, in pursuance of legal rights.

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It appears from the foregoing distinctions, that positive moral rules which are laws properly so called are of three kinds.—1. Those which are set by men living in a state of nature. 2. Those which are set by sovereigns, but not by sovereigns as political superiors. 3. Those which are set by subjects as private persons, and are not set by the subject authors in pursuance of legal rights.

To cite an example of rules of the first kind, were superfluous labour. A man living in a state of nature may impose an imperative law: though, since the man is in a state of nature, he cannot impose the law in the character of sovereign, and cannot impose the law in pursuance of a legal right. And the law being *imperative* (and therefore proceeding from a *determinate* source) is a law properly so called: though, for want of a sovereign author proximate or remote, it is not a positive law but a rule of positive morality.

An imperative law set by a sovereign to a sovereign, or by one supreme government to another supreme government, is an example of rules of the second kind. Since no supreme government is in a state of subjection to another, an imperative law set by a sovereign to a sovereign is not set by its author in the character of political superior. Nor is it set by its author in pursuance of a legal right: for every legal right is conferred by a supreme government, and is conferred on a person or persons in a state of subjection to the granter. Consequently, an imperative law set by a sovereign to a sovereign is not a positive law or a law strictly so called. But being *imperative* (and therefore proceeding from a *determinate* source), it amounts to a law in the proper signification of the term, although it is purely or simply a rule of positive morality.

If they be set by subjects as private persons, and be not set by their authors in pursuance of legal rights, the laws following are examples of rules of the third kind: namely,

It is clear, however, that the term *autonomic* is not exclusively applicable to laws of the kind in question. The term will apply to every law which is not made by its author in pursuance of a legal duty. It will apply, for instance, to every law which is made immediately or directly by a monarch or sovereign number: independence of legal duty being of the essence of sovereignty.

2. Laws which are positive law as

viewed from one aspect, but which are positive morality as viewed from another, I place simply or absolutely in the first of those capital classes. If, affecting exquisite precision, I placed them in each of those classes, I could hardly indicate the boundary by which those classes are severed without resorting to expressions of repulsive complexity and length.

imperative laws set by parents to children; imperative laws set by masters to servants; imperative laws set by lenders to borrowers; imperative laws set by patrons to parasites. Being *imperative* (and therefore proceeding from *determinate* sources); the laws foregoing are laws properly so called: though, if they be set by subjects as private persons, and be not set by their authors in pursuance of legal rights, they are not positive laws but rules of positive morality.

Again: A club or society of men, signifying its collective pleasure by a vote of its assembled members, passes or makes a law to be kept by its members severally under pain of exclusion from its meetings. Now if it be made by subjects as private persons, and be not made by its authors in pursuance of a legal right, the law voted and passed by the assembled members of the club is a further example of rules of the third kind. If it be made by subjects as private persons, and be not made by its authors in pursuance of a legal right, it is not a positive law or a law strictly so called. But being an *imperative* law (and the body by which it is set being therefore *determinate*), it may be styled a *law* or *rule* with absolute precision or propriety, although it is purely or simply a rule of positive morality.

The positive moral rules which are laws improperly so called, are *laws set or imposed by general opinion*: that is to say, by the general opinion of any class or any society of persons. For example, Some are set or imposed by the general opinion of persons who are members of a profession or calling: others, by that of persons who inhabit a town or province: others, by that of a nation or independent political society: others, by that of a larger society formed of various nations.

The positive moral rules which are laws improperly so called, are *laws set or imposed by general opinion*.

A few species of the laws which are set by general opinion have gotten appropriate names.—For example, There are laws or rules imposed upon gentlemen by opinions current amongst gentlemen. And these are usually styled *the rules of honour*, or *the laws or law of honour*.—There are laws or rules imposed upon people of fashion by opinions current in the fashionable world. And these are usually styled *the law set by fashion*.—There are laws which regard the conduct of independent political societies in their various relations to one another: Or, rather, there are laws which regard the conduct of sovereigns or supreme governments in their various relations to one another. And laws or rules of this species, which are imposed upon nations or sovereigns

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A law set or imposed by general opinion, is merely the opinion or sentiment of an indeterminate body of persons in regard to a kind of conduct.

by opinions current amongst nations, are usually styled *the law of nations* or *international law*.

Now a law set or imposed by general opinion is a law improperly so called. It is styled a *law* or *rule* by an analogical extension of the term. When we speak of a law set by general opinion, we denote, by that expression, the following fact.—Some *intermediate* body or *uncertain* aggregate of persons regards a kind of conduct with a sentiment of aversion or liking: Or (changing the expression) that indeterminate body opines unfavourably or favourably of a given kind of conduct. In *consequence* of that sentiment, or in *consequence* of that opinion, it is likely that they or some of them will be displeased with a party who shall pursue or not pursue conduct of that kind. And, in *consequence* of that displeasure, it is likely that *some* party (*what* party being undetermined) will visit the party provoking it with some evil or another.

The body by whose opinion the law is said to be set, does not *command*, expressly or tacitly, that conduct of the given kind shall be forborne or pursued. For, since it is not a body precisely determined or certain, it cannot, *as a body*, express or intimate a wish. *As a body*, it cannot *signify* a wish by oral or written words, or by positive or negative deportment. The so called *law* or *rule* which its opinion is said to impose, is merely the *sentiment* which it feels, or is merely the *opinion* which it holds, in regard to a kind of conduct.

A determinate member of the body, who opines or feels with the body, may doubtless be moved or impelled, by that very opinion or sentiment, to *command* that conduct of the kind shall be forborne or pursued. But the command expressed or intimated by that determinate party is not a law or rule imposed by general opinion. It is a law properly so called, set by a determinate author.—For example, The so called law of nations consists of opinions or sentiments current among nations generally. It therefore is not law properly so called. But one supreme government may doubtless *command* another to forbear from a kind of conduct which the law of nations condemns. And, though it is fashioned on law which is law improperly so called, this command is a law in the proper signification of the term. Speaking precisely, the command is a rule of positive morality set by a determinate author. For, as no supreme government is in a state of subjection to another, the government commanding does not command in its character of political

superior. If the government receiving the command were in a state of subjection to the other, the command, though fashioned on the law of nations, would amount to a positive law.

The foregoing description of a law set by general opinion imports the following consequences:—that the party who will enforce it against any future transgressor is never determinate and assignable. The party who actually enforces it against an actual transgressor is, of necessity, certain. In other words, if an actual transgressor be harmed in consequence of the breach of the law, and in consequence of that displeasure which the breach of the law has provoked, he receives the harm from a party, who, of necessity, is certain. But that certain party is not the executor of a *command* proceeding from the uncertain body. He has not been authorised by that uncertain body to enforce that so called law which its opinion is said to establish. He is not in the position of a minister of justice appointed by the sovereign or state to execute commands which it issues. He harms the actual offender against the so called law or (to speak in analogical language) he applies the sanction annexed to it, of his own spontaneous movement. Consequently, though a party who actually enforces it is, of necessity, certain, the party who will enforce it against any future offender is never determinate and assignable.

It follows from the foregoing reasons, that a so called law set by general opinion is not a law in the proper signification of the term. It also follows from the same reasons, that it is not armed with a sanction, and does not impose a duty, in the proper acceptation of the expressions. For a sanction properly so called is an evil annexed to a command. And duty properly so called is an obnoxiousness to evils of the kind.

A brief statement of the analogy between a law proper and a law set or imposed by general opinion.

But a so called law set by general opinion is closely analogous to a law in the proper signification of the term. And, by consequence, the so called sanction with which the former is armed, and the so called duty which the former imposes, are closely analogous to a sanction and a duty in the proper acceptation of the expressions.

The analogy between a law in the proper signification of the term and a so called law set by general opinion, may be stated briefly in the following manner.—1. In the case of a law properly so called, the determinate individual or body by whom the law is established wishes that conduct of a

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kind shall be forborne or pursued. In the case of a law imposed by general opinion, a wish that conduct of a kind shall be forborne or pursued is felt by the uncertain body whose general opinion imposes it. 2. If a party obliged by the law proper shall not comply with the wish of the determinate individual or body, he probably will suffer, in consequence of his not complying, the evil or inconvenience annexed to the law as a sanction. If a party obnoxious to their displeasure shall not comply with the wish of the uncertain body of persons, he probably will suffer, in consequence of his not complying, some evil or inconvenience from some party or another. 3. By the sanction annexed to the law proper, the parties obliged are inclined to act or forbear agreeably to its injunctions or prohibitions. By the evil which probably will follow the displeasure of the uncertain body, the parties obnoxious are inclined to act or forbear agreeably to the sentiment or opinion which is styled analogically a law. 4. In consequence of the law properly so called, the conduct of the parties obliged has a steadiness, constancy, or uniformity, which, without the existence of the law, their conduct would probably want. In consequence of the sentiment or opinion which is styled analogically a law, the conduct of the parties obnoxious has a steadiness, constancy, or uniformity, which, without the existence of that sentiment in the uncertain body of persons, their conduct would hardly present. For they who are obnoxious to the sanction which arms the law proper, commonly do or forbear from the acts which the law enjoins or forbids; whilst they who are obnoxious to the evil which will probably follow the displeasure of the uncertain body of persons, commonly do or forbear from the acts which the body approves or dislikes.—Many of the applications of the term *law* which are merely metaphorical or figurative, were probably suggested (as I shall show hereafter) by that uniformity of conduct which is consequent on a law proper.

Distinction
between a
determinate,
and an *in-*
determinate
body of
single or
individual
persons.

In the foregoing analysis of a law set by general opinion, the meaning of the expression '*indeterminate* body of persons' is indicated rather than explained. To complete my analysis of a law set by general opinion (and to abridge that analysis of sovereignty which I shall place in my sixth lecture), I will here insert a concise exposition of the following pregnant distinction: namely, the distinction between a *determinate*, and an *indeterminate* body of single or individual persons.—If my exposition of the distinction shall appear

obscure and crabbed, my hearers (I hope) will recollect that the distinction could hardly be expounded in lucid and flowing expressions.

I will first describe the distinction in general or abstract terms, and will then exemplify and illustrate the general or abstract description.

If a body of persons be determinate, *all* the persons who compose it are determined and assignable, or *every* person who belongs to it is determined and may be indicated.

But determinate bodies are of two kinds.

A determinate body of one of those kinds is distinguished by the following marks.—1. The body is composed of persons determined specifically or individually, or determined by characters or descriptions respectively appropriate to themselves. 2. Though every individual member must of necessity answer to many generic descriptions, every individual member is a member of the determinate body, not by reason of his answering to any generic description, but by reason of his bearing his specific or appropriate character.

A determinate body of the other of those kinds is distinguished by the following marks.—1. It comprises *all* the persons who belong to a given class, or who belong respectively to two or more of such classes. In other words, *every* person who answers to a given generic description, or to any of two or more given generic descriptions, is also a member of the determinate body. 2. Though every individual member is of necessity determined by a specific or appropriate character, every individual member is a member of the determinate body, not by reason of his bearing his specific or appropriate character, but by reason of his answering to the given generic description.

If a body be indeterminate, *all* the persons who compose it are not determined and assignable. Or (changing the expression) *every* person who belongs to it is not determined, and, therefore, cannot be indicated.—For an indeterminate body consists of *some* of the persons who belong to another and larger aggregate. But *how many of those persons* are members of the indeterminate body, or *which of those persons in particular* are members of the indeterminate body, is not and cannot be known completely and exactly.

For example, The trading firm or partnership of A B and C is a determinate body of the kind first described above. Every member of the firm is determined specifically, or by a character or description peculiar or appropriate to himself.

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And every member of the firm belongs to the determinate body, not by reason of his answering to any generic description, but by reason of his bearing his specific or appropriate character. It is as being that very individual person that A B or C is a limb of the partnership.

The British Parliament for the time being, is a determinate body of the kind lastly described above. It comprises the *only* person who answers for the time being to the generic description of king. It comprises *every* person belonging to the class of peers who are entitled for the time being to vote in the upper house. It comprises *every* person belonging to the class of commoners who for the time being represent the commons in parliament. And, though every member of the British Parliament is of necessity determined by a specific or appropriate character, he is not a member of the parliament by reason of his bearing that character, but by reason of his answering to the given generic description. It is not as being the individual George, but as being the individual who answers to the generic description of king, that George is king of Britain and Ireland, and a limb of the determinate body which is sovereign or supreme therein. It is not as being the individual Grey, or as being the individual Peel, that Grey is a member of the upper house, or Peel a member of the lower. Grey is a member of the upper house, as belonging to the class of peers entitled to vote therein. Peel is a member of the lower house, as answering the generic description 'representative of the commons in parliament.'—The generic characters of the persons who compose the British Parliament, are here described generally, and, therefore, inaccurately. To describe those generic characters minutely and accurately, were to render a complete description of the intricate and perplexed system which is styled the British Constitution.—A maxim of that Constitution may illustrate the subject of the present paragraph. The meaning of the maxim, 'the king never dies,' may, I believe, be rendered in the following manner. Though an actual occupant of the kingly office is human, mortal, and transient, the duration of the office itself has no possible limit which the British Constitution can contemplate. And on the death of an actual occupant, the office instantly devolves to that individual person who bears the generic character which entitles to take the crown: to that individual person who is then heir to the crown, according to the generic description contained in the Act of Settlement.

To exemplify the foregoing description of an indeterminate body, I will revert to the nature of a law set by general opinion. Where a so called law is set by *general* opinion, *most* of the persons who belong to a determinate body or class opine or feel alike in regard to a kind of conduct. But the number of that majority, or the several individuals who compose it, cannot be fixed or assigned with perfectness or accuracy. For example, A law set or imposed by the *general* opinion of a nation, by the *general* opinion of a legislative assembly, by the *general* opinion of a profession, or by the *general* opinion of a club, is an opinion or sentiment, relating to conduct of a kind, which is held or felt by *most* of those who belong to that certain body. But how many of that body, or which of that body in particular, hold or feel that given opinion or sentiment, is not and cannot be known completely and correctly. Consequently, that majority of the certain body forms a body uncertain. Or (changing the expression) the body which is formed by that majority is an indeterminate portion of a determinate body or aggregate.—Generally speaking, therefore, an indeterminate body is an indeterminate portion of a body determinate or certain. But a body or class of persons may also be indeterminate, because it consists of persons of a vague generic character. For example, The body or class of gentlemen consists of individual persons whose generic character of gentleman cannot be described precisely. Whether a given man were a genuine gentleman or not, is a question which different men might answer in different ways.—An indeterminate body may therefore be indeterminate after a twofold manner. It may consist of an uncertain portion of an uncertain body or class. For example, a law set or imposed by the *general* opinion of gentlemen is an opinion or sentiment of *most* of those who are commonly deemed gentlemanly. But what proportion of the class holds the opinion in question, or what proportion of the class feels the sentiment in question, is not less indeterminate than the generic character of gentlemen. The body by whose opinion the so called law is set, is, therefore, an uncertain portion of an uncertain body or aggregate.—And here I may briefly remark, that a certain portion of a certain body is itself a body determinate. For example, The persons who answer the generic description ‘representative of the commons in parliament,’ are a certain portion of the persons who answer the generic description ‘commoner of the united kingdom.’ A select committee of

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the representative body, or any portion of the body happening to form a house, is a certain or determined portion of the representatives of the commons in parliament. And, in any of these or similar cases, the certain portion of the certain body is itself a body determinate.

A determinate body of persons is capable of *corporate* conduct, or is capable, *as a body*, of positive or negative deportment. Whether it consist of persons determined by specific characters, or of persons determined or defined by a character or characters generic, every person who belongs to it is determined and may be indicated. In the first case, every person who belongs to it may be indicated by his specific character. In the second case, every person who belongs to it is also knowable: For *every* person who answers to the given generic description, or who answers to any of the given generic descriptions, is therefore a member of the body. Consequently, the entire body, or any proportion of its members, is capable, *as a body*, of positive or negative deportment: As, for example, of meeting at determinate times and places; of issuing expressly or tacitly a law or other command; of choosing and deputing representatives to perform its intentions or wishes; of receiving obedience from others, or from any of its own members.

But an indeterminate body is incapable of *corporate* conduct, or is incapable, *as a body*, of positive or negative deportment. An indeterminate body is incapable of corporate conduct, inasmuch as the several persons of whom it consists cannot be known and indicated completely and correctly. In case a portion of its members act or forbear in concert, that given portion of its members is, by that very concert, a determinate or certain body. For example, A law set or imposed by the *general* opinion of barristers condemns the sordid practice of hugging or caressing attorneys. And as those whose opinion or sentiment sets the so called law are an indeterminate part of the determinate body of barristers, they form a body uncertain and incapable of corporate conduct. But in case a number or portion of that uncertain body assembled and passed a resolution to check the practice of hugging, that number or portion of that uncertain body would be, by the very act, a certain body or aggregate. It would form a determinate body consisting of the determined individuals who assembled and passed the resolution. —A law imposed by general opinion may be the cause of a law in the proper acceptation of the term. But the law

properly so called, which is the consequent or effect, utterly differs from the so called law which is the antecedent or cause. The one is an opinion or sentiment of an uncertain body of persons; of a body essentially incapable of joint or corporate conduct. The other is set or established by the positive or negative deportment of a certain individual or aggregate.

For the purpose of rendering my exposition as little intricate as possible, I have supposed that a body of persons, forming a body determinate, either consists of persons determined by specific characters, or of persons determined or defined by a generic description or descriptions.—But a body of persons, forming a body determinate, may consist of persons determined by specific or appropriate characters, and also of persons determined by a character or characters generic. Let us suppose, for example, that the individual Oliver Cromwell was sovereign or supreme in England: or that the individual Cromwell, and the individuals Ireton and Fleetwood, formed a triumvirate which was sovereign in that country. Let us suppose, moreover, that Cromwell, or the triumvirs, convened a house of commons elected in the ancient manner: and that Cromwell, or the triumvirs, yielded a part in the sovereignty to this representative body. Now the sovereign or supreme body formed by Cromwell and the house, or the sovereign and supreme body formed by the triumvirs and the house, would have consisted of a person or persons determined or defined specifically, and of persons determined or defined by a generic character or description. The members of the house of commons would have been members of the sovereign body, as answering the generic description ‘representatives of the commons in parliament.’ But it is as being the very individual Cromwell, or as being the very individuals Cromwell, Ireton, and Fleetwood, that he or they would have formed a limb of the sovereign or supreme body. It is not as answering to a given generic description, or as acquiring a part in the sovereignty by a given generic mode, that he or they would have shared the sovereignty with the body representing the people.—A body of persons, forming a body determinate, may also consist of persons determined or defined specifically, and determined or defined moreover by a character or characters generic. A select committee of a body representing a people or nation, consists of individual persons named or appointed specifically to sit on that given com-

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mittee. But those specific individuals could not be members of the committee, unless they answered the generic description 'representative of the people or nation.'

It follows from the exposition immediately preceding that the one or the number which is sovereign in an independent political society is a *determinate* individual person or a *determinate* body of persons. If the sovereign one or number were not determinate or certain, it could not command expressly or tacitly, and could not be an object of obedience to the subject members of the community.—Inasmuch as this principle is amply explained by the exposition immediately preceding, I shall refer to it in my sixth lecture, as to a principle sufficiently known. The intricate and difficult analysis which I shall place in that discourse, will thus be somewhat facilitated, and not inconsiderably abridged.

As closely connected with the matter of the exposition immediately preceding, the following remark concerning supreme government may be put commodiously in the present place.—In order that a supreme government may possess much stability, and that the society wherein it is supreme may enjoy much tranquillity, the persons who take the sovereignty in the way of succession, must take or acquire by a given generic mode, or by given generic modes. Or (changing the expression) they must take by reason of their answering to a given generic description, or by reason of their respectively answering to given generic descriptions.—For example, The Roman Emperors or Princes (who were virtually monarchs or autocrats) did not succeed to the sovereignty of the Roman Empire or World by a given generic title: by a mode of acquisition given or preordained, and susceptible of generic description. It was neither as lineal descendant of Julius Cæsar or Augustus, nor by the testament or other disposition of the last possessor of the throne, nor by the appointment or nomination of the Roman people or senate, nor by the election of a determinate body formed of the military class, nor by any mode of acquisition generic and preordained, that every successive Emperor, or every successive Prince, acquired the virtual sovereignty of the Roman Empire or World. Every successive Emperor acquired by a mode of acquisition which was purely anomalous or accidental: which had not been predetermined by any law or custom, or by any positive law or rule of positive morality. Every actual occupant of the Imperial office or dignity (whatever may have been the manner wherein he

had gotten possession) was obeyed, for the time, by the bulk of the military class; was acknowledged, of course, by the impotent and trembling senate; and received submission, of course, from the inert and helpless mass which inhabited the city and provinces. By reason of this irregularity in the succession to the virtual sovereignty, the demise of an Emperor was not uncommonly followed by a shorter or longer dissolution of the general supreme government. Since no one could claim to succeed by a given generic title, or as answering for the time being to a given generic description, a contest for the prostrate sovereignty almost inevitably arose between the more influential of the actual military chiefs. And till one of the military candidates had vanquished and crushed his rivals, and had forced with an armed hand his way to the vacant throne, the generality or bulk of the inhabitants in the Roman Empire or World could hardly render obedience to one and the same superior. By reason, also, of this irregularity in the succession to the Imperial office, the general and habitual obedience to an actual occupant of the office was always extremely precarious. For, since he was not occupant by a given generic title, or by reason of his having answered to a given generic description, the title of any rebel, who might any how eject him, would not have been less legitimate or less constitutional than his own. Or (speaking with greater precision) there was no mode of acquiring the office, which could be styled legitimate, or which could be styled constitutional: which was susceptible of generic description, and which had been predetermined by positive law or morality. There was not, in the Roman World, any determinate person, whom positive law or morality had pointed out to its inhabitants as the exclusively appropriate object of general and habitual obedience.—The reasoning which applies in the case of a monarchy, will also apply, with few variations, in the case of a government by a number. Unless the members of the supreme body hold their respective stations by titles generic and fixed, the given supreme government must be extremely unstable, and the given society wherein it is supreme must often be torn by contests for the possession of shares in the sovereignty.

Before I close my analysis of those laws improperly so called which are closely analogous to laws in the proper acceptation of the term, I must advert to a seeming caprice of current or established language.

Laws set by
general
opinion, or
opinions or
sentiments
of indeter-

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bodies, are
the only
opinions or
sentiments
that have
gotten the
name of
laws. But
an opinion
or senti-
ment held
or felt by an
individual,
or by all the
members of
a certain
aggregate,
may be as
closely
analogous
to a law
proper as
the opinion
or senti-
ment of an
indetermi-
nate body.

A law set or imposed by *general* opinion, is an opinion or sentiment, regarding conduct of a kind, which is held or felt by an *indeterminate body*: that is to say, an indeterminate portion of a certain or uncertain aggregate.

Now a like opinion or sentiment held or felt by an *individual*, or held or felt *universally* by the members of a *body determinate*, may be as closely analogous to a law proper as a so called law set by *general* opinion. It may bear an analogy to a law in the proper acceptation of the term, exactly or nearly resembling the analogy to a law proper which is borne by an opinion or sentiment of an *indeterminate body*. An opinion, for example, of a patron, in regard to conduct of a kind, may be a law or rule to his own dependant or dependants, just as a like opinion of an indeterminate body is a law or rule to all who might suffer by provoking its displeasure. And whether a like opinion be held by an uncertain aggregate, or be held by *every* member of a precisely determined body, its analogy to a law proper is exactly or nearly the same.

But when we speak of a law set or imposed by opinion, we always or commonly mean (I rather incline to believe) a law set or imposed by *general* opinion: that is to say, an opinion or sentiment, regarding conduct of a kind, which is held or felt by an uncertain body or class. The term *law*, or *law set by opinion*, is never or rarely applied to a like opinion or sentiment of a precisely determined party: that is to say, a like opinion or sentiment held or felt by an individual, or held or felt universally by the members of a certain aggregate.

This seeming caprice of current or established language probably arose from the following causes.

An opinion, regarding conduct, which is held by an individual person, or which is held universally by a *small* determinate body, is commonly followed by consequences of comparatively trifling importance. The circle of the persons to whom its influence reaches, or whose desires or conduct it affects or determines, is rarely extensive. The analogy which such opinions bear to laws proper, has, therefore, attracted little attention, and has, therefore, not gotten them the name of *laws*.—An opinion held universally by a *large* determinate body, is not less largely influential, or is more largely influential, than an opinion of an uncertain portion of the same certain aggregate. But since the determinate body is large or numerous, an opinion held by *all* its members can hardly be distinguished from an opinion held by *most* of its members. An opinion held *universally* by the

members of the body determinate, is, therefore, equivalent in practice to a *general* opinion of the body, and is, therefore, classed with the laws which *general* opinion imposes.

Deferring to this seeming caprice of current or established language, I have forborne from ranking sentiments of precisely determined parties with the laws improperly so called which are closely analogous to the proper. I have restricted that description to sentiments, regarding conduct, of uncertain bodies or classes. My foregoing analysis or exposition of laws of that description, is, therefore, an analysis of laws set by *general* opinion.

If the description ought to embrace (as, I think, it certainly ought) opinions, regarding conduct, of precisely determined parties, my foregoing analysis or exposition will still be correct substantially. With a few slight and obvious changes, my foregoing analysis of a law set by *general* opinion will serve as an analysis of a law set by *any* opinion: of a law set by the opinion of an indeterminate body, and of a law set by the opinion of a precisely determined party.

For the character or essential difference of a law imposed by opinion, is this: that the law is not a *command*, issued expressly or tacitly, but is merely an *opinion* or *sentiment*, relating to conduct of a kind, which is held or felt by an uncertain body, or by a determinate party. A wish that conduct of the kind shall be pursued or forborne, is not *signified*, expressly or tacitly, by that uncertain body, or that determinate party: nor does that body or party *intend* to inflict an evil upon any whose conduct may deviate from the given opinion or sentiment. The opinion or sentiment is merely an opinion or sentiment, although it subjects a transgressor to the chance of a consequent evil, and may even lead to a command regarding conduct of the kind.

Between the opinion or sentiment of the indeterminate body, and the opinion or sentiment of the precisely determined party, there is merely the following difference.—The precisely determined party is *capable* of issuing a command in pursuance of the opinion or sentiment. But the uncertain body is not. For, being essentially incapable of joint or corporate conduct, it cannot, as a body, signify a wish or desire, and cannot, as a body, hold an intention or purpose.

It appears from the expositions in the preceding portion of my discourse, that laws properly so called, with such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper, are of three capital classes.—1. The law of God, or the laws of God.

The fore-

improper

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laws as are closely analogous to the proper, briefly recapitulated.

2. Positive law, or positive laws. 3. Positive morality, rules of positive morality, or positive moral rules.

It also appears from the same expositions, that positive moral rules are of two species.—1. Those positive moral rules which are express or tacit commands, and which are therefore laws in the proper acceptation of the term. 2. Those laws improperly so called (but closely analogous to laws in the proper acceptation of the term) which are set by general opinion, or are set by opinion: which are set by opinions of uncertain bodies; or by opinions of uncertain bodies, and opinions of determinate parties.

The sanc-

those laws

forced; the duties, proper and improper, which those laws respectively impose; and

improper, which those laws respectively confer.

The sanctions annexed to the laws of God, may be styled *religious*.—The sanctions annexed to positive laws, may be styled, emphatically, *legal*: for the laws to which they are annexed, are styled, simply and emphatically, *laws* or *law*. Or, as every positive law supposes a *πόλις* or *civitas*, or supposes a society political and independent, the epithet *political* may be applied to the sanctions by which such laws are enforced.—Of the sanctions which enforce compliance with positive moral rules, some are sanctions properly so called, and others are styled *sanctions* by an analogical extension of

term: that is to say, some are annexed to rules which are laws imperative and proper, and others enforce the rule which are laws set by opinion. Since rules of either species may be styled positive morality, the sanctions which enforce compliance with rules of either species may be styled *moral sanctions*. Or (changing the expression) we may say of rules of either species, that they are sanctioned or enforced *morally*.^(g)

The duties imposed by the laws of God may be styled *religious*.—The duties imposed by positive laws, may be styled, emphatically, *legal*: or, like the laws by which they are imposed, they may be said to be sanctioned *legally*.—Of the duties imposed by positive moral rules, some are duties properly so called, and others are styled *duties* by an analogical

(g) The term *morality*, *moral*, or *morally*, is often opposed tacitly to *immorality*, *immoral*, or *immorally*, and imports that the object to which it is applied or referred is approved of by the speaker or writer. But by the term *morality*, I merely denote the human rules which I style 'positive morality.' And by the terms '*moral sanctions*,' '*rules sanctioned morally*,' '*moral duties or rights*,' and '*duties or rights sanctioned morally*,' I merely mean that the rules to

which the sanctions are annexed, or by which the duties or rights are imposed or conferred, are positive moral rules: rules bearing the generic character which I have stated and explained above. If I mean to praise or blame a positive human rule, or a duty or right which the rule imposes or confers, I style it consonant to the law of God, or contrary to the law of God. Or (what, in effect, is the same thing) I style it generally useful, or generally pernicious.

extension of the term : that is to say, some are creatures of rules which are laws imperative and proper, and others are creatures of the rules which are laws set by opinion. Like the sanctions proper and improper by which they are respectively enforced, these duties proper and improper may be styled *moral*. Or we may say of the duties, as of the rules by which they are imposed, that they are sanctioned or enforced *morally*.

Every right supposes a duty incumbent on a party or parties other than the party entitled. Through the imposition of that corresponding duty, the right was conferred. Through the continuance of that corresponding duty, the right continues to exist. If that corresponding duty be the creature of a law imperative, the right is a right properly so called. If that corresponding duty be the creature of a law improper, the right is styled a *right* by an analogical extension of the term.—Consequently, a right existing through a duty imposed by the law of God, or a right existing through a duty imposed by positive law, is a right properly so called. Where the duty is the creature of a positive moral rule, the nature of the corresponding right depends upon the nature of the rule. If the rule imposing the duty be a law imperative and proper, the right is a right properly so called. If the rule imposing the duty be a law set by opinion, the right is styled a *right* through an analogical extension of the term.—Rights conferred by the law of God, or rights existing through duties imposed by the law of God, may be styled *Divine*.—Rights conferred by positive law, or rights existing through duties imposed by positive law, may be styled, emphatically, *legal*. Or it may be said of rights conferred by positive law, that they are sanctioned or protected *legally*.—The rights proper and improper which are conferred by positive morality, may be styled *moral*. Or it may be said of rights conferred by positive morality, that they are sanctioned or protected *morally*.^(h)

(h) Here I may briefly observe, that, in order to a complete determination of the appropriate province of jurisprudence, it is necessary to explain the import of the term *right*. For, as I have stated already, numerous positive laws proceed directly from subjects through *rights* conferred upon the authors by supreme political superiors. And, for various other reasons which will appear in my sixth lecture, the appropriate province of jurisprudence cannot be de-

fined completely, unless an explanation of the term *right* constitute a part of the definition. But, in order to an explanation of right *in abstract* (or in order to an explanation of the nature which is common to *all* rights), I must previously explain the differences of the principal kinds of rights, with the meanings of various terms which the term *right* implies. And as that previous explanation cannot be given with effect, till positive law is distinguished from

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The law of God, positive law, and positive morality, sometimes coincide, sometimes do not coincide, and sometimes conflict.

The body or aggregate of laws which may be styled the law of God, the body or aggregate of laws which may be styled positive law, and the body or aggregate of laws which may be styled positive morality, sometimes *coincide*, sometimes do *not* coincide, and sometimes *conflict*.

One of these bodies of laws *coincides* with another, when acts, which are enjoined or forbidden by the former, are also enjoined, or are also forbidden by the latter.—For example, The killing which is styled *murder* is forbidden by the positive law of every political society: it is also forbidden by a so called law which the general opinion of the society has set or imposed: it is also forbidden by the law of God as known through the principle of utility. The murderer commits a crime, or he violates a positive law: he commits a conventional immorality, or he violates a so called law which general opinion has established: he commits a sin, or he violates the law of God. He is obnoxious to punishment, or other evil, to be inflicted by sovereign authority: he is obnoxious to the hate and the spontaneous ill-offices of the generality or bulk of the society: he is obnoxious to evil or pain to be suffered here or hereafter by the immediate appointment of the Deity.

One of these bodies of laws does *not* coincide with another, when acts, which are enjoined or forbidden by the former, are not enjoined, or are not forbidden by the latter.—For example, Though smuggling is forbidden by positive law, and (speaking generally) is not less pernicious than theft, it is not forbidden by the opinions or sentiments of the ignorant or unreflecting. Where the impost or tax is itself of pernicious tendency, smuggling is hardly forbidden by the opinions or sentiments of any: And it is therefore practised by any without the slightest shame, or without the slightest fear of incurring general censure. Such, for instance, is the case where the impost or tax is laid upon the foreign commodity, not for the useful purpose of raising a public revenue, but for the absurd and mischievous purpose of protecting a domestic manufacture.—Offences against the game laws are also in point: for they are not offences against positive

the objects to which it is related, it follows that an explanation of the expression *right* cannot enter into the attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence.

At every step which he takes on his long and scabrous road, a difficulty simi-

lar to that which I have now endeavoured to suggest encounters the expositor of the science. As every department of the science is implicated with every other, any detached exposition of a single and separate department is inevitably a fragment more or less imperfect.

morality, although they are forbidden by positive law. A gentleman is not dishonoured, or generally shunned by gentlemen, though he shoots without a qualification. A peasant who wires hares escapes the censure of peasants, though the squires, as doing justiceship, send him to the prison and the tread-mill.

One of these bodies of laws *conflicts* with another, when acts, which are enjoined or forbidden by the former, are forbidden or enjoined by the latter.—For example, In most of the nations of modern Europe, the practice of duelling is forbidden by positive law. It is also at variance with the law which is received in most of those nations as having been set by the Deity in the way of express revelation. But in spite of positive law, and in spite of his religious convictions, a man of the class of gentlemen may be forced by the law of honour to give or to take a challenge. If he forbore from giving, or if he declined a challenge, he might incur the general contempt of gentlemen or men of honour, and might meet with slights and insults sufficient to embitter his existence. The negative *legal* duty which certainly is incumbent upon him, and the negative *religious* duty to which he believes himself subject, are therefore mastered and controlled by that positive *moral* duty which arises from the so called law set by the opinion of his class.

The simple and obvious considerations to which I have now adverted, are often overlooked by legislators. If they fancy a practice pernicious, or hate it they know not why, they proceed, without further thought, to forbid it by positive law. They forget that positive law may be superfluous or impotent, and therefore may lead to nothing but purely gratuitous vexation. They forget that the moral or the religious sentiments of the community may already suppress the practice as completely as it can be suppressed: or that, if the practice is favoured by those moral or religious sentiments, the strongest possible fear which legal pains can inspire may be mastered by a stronger fear of other and conflicting sanctions.⁽¹⁾

(1) There are classes of useful acts which it were useless to enjoin, and classes of mischievous acts which it were useless to forbid: for we are sufficiently prone to the useful, and sufficiently averse from the mischievous acts, without the incentives and restraints applied by religious sanctions, or by sanctions legal or moral. And, assuming that general

utility is the index to the Divine commands, we may fairly infer that acts of such classes are not enjoined or forbidden by the law of God; that he no more enjoins or forbids acts of the classes in question, than he enjoins or forbids such acts as are generally pernicious or useful.

There are also classes of acts, generally useful or pernicious, which demand

The acts and forbearances, which, according to the theory of utility, are objects of the law of God:

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In consequence of the frequent coincidence of positive law and morality, and of positive law and the law of God, the true nature and fountain of positive law is often absurdly mistaken by writers upon jurisprudence. Where positive law has been fashioned on positive morality, or where positive law has been fashioned on the law of God, they forget that the copy is the creature of the sovereign, and impute it to the author of the model.

For example : Customary laws are positive laws fashioned by judicial legislation upon pre-existing customs. Now, till they become the grounds of judicial decisions upon cases, and are clothed with legal sanctions by the sovereign one or number, the customs are merely rules set by opinions of the governed, and sanctioned or enforced morally : Though, when they become the reasons of judicial decisions upon cases, and are clothed with legal sanctions by the sovereign one or number, the customs are rules of positive law as well as of positive morality. But, because the customs were observed by the governed before they were clothed with sanctions by the sovereign one or number, it is fancied that customary laws exist *as positive laws* by the institution of the private persons with whom the customs originated.—Admitting the conceit, and reasoning by analogy, we ought to

and the acts and forbearances, which, according to the same theory, ought to be objects respectively of positive morality and law.

the incentives or restraints applied by religious sanctions, or by sanctions legal or moral. Without the incentives and restraints applied by religious sanctions, or applied by sanctions legal or moral, we are not sufficiently prone to those which are generally useful, and are not sufficiently averse from those which are generally pernicious. And, assuming that general utility is the index to the Divine commands, all these classes of useful, and all these classes of pernicious acts, are enjoined and forbidden respectively by the law of God.

Being enjoined or being forbidden by the Deity, all these classes of useful, and all these classes of pernicious acts, ought to be enjoined or forbidden by positive morality : that is to say, by the positive morality which consists of opinions or sentiments. But, this notwithstanding, some of these classes of acts ought not to be enjoined or forbidden by positive law. Some of these classes of acts ought not to be enjoined or forbidden even by the positive morality which consists of imperative rules.

Every act or forbearance that ought to be an object of positive law, ought to be an object of the positive morality which

consists of opinions or sentiments. Every act or forbearance that ought to be an object of the latter, is an object of the law of God as construed by the principle of utility. But the circle embraced by the law of God, and which may be embraced to advantage by positive morality, is larger than the circle which can be embraced to advantage by positive law. Inasmuch as the two circles have one and the same centre, the whole of the region comprised by the latter is also comprised by the former. But the whole of the region comprised by the former is not comprised by the latter.

To distinguish the acts and forbearances that ought to be objects of law, from those that ought to be abandoned to the exclusive cognisance of morality, is, perhaps, the hardest of the problems which the science of ethics presents. The only existing approach to a solution of the problem, may be found in the writings of Mr. Bentham : who, in most of the departments of the two great branches of ethics, has accomplished more for the advancement of the science than all his predecessors put together.—See, in particular, *his Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. xvii.

consider the sovereign the author of the positive morality which is often a consequence of positive law. Where a positive law, not fashioned on a custom, is favourably received by the governed, and enforced by their opinions or sentiments, we must deem the so called law, set by those opinions or sentiments, a law imperative and proper of the supreme political superior.

Again: The portion of positive law which is parcel of the *law of nature* (or, in the language of the classical jurists, which is parcel of the *jus gentium*) is often supposed to emanate, even as positive law, from a Divine or Natural source. But (admitting the distinction of positive law into law natural and law positive) it is manifest that law natural, considered as a portion of positive, is the creature of human sovereigns, and not of the Divine monarch. To say that it emanates, as positive law, from a Divine or Natural source, is to confound positive law with law whereon it is fashioned, or with law whereunto it conforms.¹⁵

The foregoing distribution of laws proper, and of such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper, tallies, in the main, with a division of laws which is given incidentally by Locke in his Essay on Human Understanding. And since this division of laws, or of the sources of duties or obligations, is recommended by the great authority which the writer has justly acquired, I gladly append it to my own division or analysis. The passage of his essay in which the division occurs, is part of an inquiry into the nature of *relation*, and is therefore concerned indirectly with the nature and kinds of *law*. With the exclusion of all that is foreign to the nature and kinds of law, with the exclusion of a few expressions which are obviously redundant, and with the correction of a few expressions which are somewhat obscure, the passage containing the divisions may be rendered in the words following: ^(k)

The foregoing distribution of laws proper, and of such improper laws as are closely analogous to the proper, tallies, in the main, with a division of laws which is given incidentally by Locke in his Essay on Human Understanding.

¹⁵ In J. S. M.'s notes of the lectures as originally delivered I find a considerable passage giving instances of the prevailing tendency to the confusion of ideas above referred to. I have not ventured on the attempt to incorporate the passage in the text, presuming that the author refrained advisedly from here pursuing the topic further, and that he deemed such instances less suitable to a written discourse than to an oral lecture.

I think it, however, of some value to preserve this passage, both as calculated

to aid the student in applying the principles stated in the text, and also as illustrative of the author's mode, when orally amplifying in presence of his class, the lecture which in substance he always had committed to writing. The passage, being inconveniently long to insert as a note here, I have placed in the form of a note at the end of this lecture.—R. C.

^(k) Locke's division or analysis is far from being complete, and the language in which it is stated is often extremely anapt. It must, however, be remembered, that the nature of *relation* gene-

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‘The conformity or disagreement men’s voluntary actions have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of, is a sort of relation which may be called *moral relation*.

‘Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumstances, they are framed into distinct complex ideas, are, as has been shown, so many *mixed modes*, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received, or polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once, when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there so many determined ideas of mixed modes.

‘But this is not all that concerns our actions. It is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of ideas. We have a further and greater concernment. And that is, to know whether such actions are morally good or bad.

‘Good or evil is nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us. *Moral good or evil*, then, is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker: which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward or punishment.

‘Of these moral rules or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of

rally (and not the nature of *law*, with its principal kinds) is the appropriate object of his inquiry. Allowing for the defects, which, therefore, were nearly inevitable, his analysis is strikingly accurate. It evinces that matchless power of precise and just thinking, with that religious regard for general utility and truth, which marked the incomparable man who emancipated human reason

from the yoke of mystery and jargon. And from this his incidental excursion into the field of law and morality, and from other passages of his essay wherein he touches upon them, we may infer the important services which he would have rendered to the science of ethics, if, complying with the instances of Molyneux, he had examined the subject exactly.

another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his rule, by some good and evil that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself: for that being a natural convenience or inconvenience, would operate of itself without a law. This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all *law* properly so called.

‘The laws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, seem to me to be these three: 1. The *Divine* law. 2. The *civil* law. 3. The law of *opinion* or *reputation*, if I may so call it.—By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties: by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent: and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

‘By the *Divine* law, I mean that law which God hath set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. This is the only true touchstone of *moral rectitude*. And by comparing them to this law, it is, that men judge of the most considerable *moral good* or *evil* of their actions: that is, whether as *duties* or *sins*, they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the Almighty.

‘The *civil* law, the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it, is a rule to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be *criminal* or no. This law nobody overlooks, the rewards and punishments that enforce it being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it: which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties and possessions of those who live according to its law, and has power to take away life, liberty or goods from him who disobeys.

‘The law of *opinion* or *reputation* is another law that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude or obliquity.

‘*Virtue* and *vice* are names pretended, and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in their own nature right or wrong: and as far as they really are so applied, they so far are coincident with the *Divine* law above mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these names *virtue* and *vice*, in the particular instances of their application through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed to such actions only as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, that men everywhere should

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give the name of *virtue* to those actions which amongst them are judged praiseworthy, and call that *vice* which they account blameable; since they would condemn themselves, if they should think anything *right*, to which they allowed not commendation; anything *wrong*, which they let pass without blame.

‘Thus the measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed *virtue* and *vice*, is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place. For though men uniting into politick societies have resigned up to the publick the disposing of all their force, so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens any further than the law of the country directs, yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst and converse with: and by this approbation and dislike, they establish amongst themselves what they will call *virtue* and *vice*.

‘That this is the common *measure of virtue and vice*, will appear to any one who considers, that, though that passes for *vice* in one country, which is counted *virtue* (or, at least, not *vice*) in another, yet everywhere *virtue* and praise, *vice* and blame go together. *Virtue* is everywhere that which is thought praiseworthy; and nothing but that which has the allowance of public esteem is called *virtue*. *Virtue* and praise are so united, that they are often called by the same name. “Sunt sua præmia laudi,” says Virgil. And, says Cicero, “nihil habet natura præstantius, quam *honestatem*, quam *laudem*, quam *dignitatem*, quam *decus* :” all which, he tells you, are names for the same thing. Such is the language of the heathen philosophers, who well understood wherein the notions of *virtue* and *vice* consisted.

‘But though, by the different temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men, it fell out, that what was thought praiseworthy in one place, escaped not censure in another, and so in different societies *virtues* and *vices* were changed, yet, as to the main, they for the most part kept the same everywhere. For since nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein everyone finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary, it is no wonder that esteem

and discredit, virtue and vice, should in a great measure everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong which the law of God hath established: there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world as obedience to the law He has set them, and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion as the neglect of it. And therefore men, without renouncing all sense and reason, and their own interest, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation or blame on that side which really deserved it not. Nay, even those men, whose practice was otherwise, failed not to give their approbation right: few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn, at least in others, the faults they themselves were guilty of. Whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the law of God, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, was pretty well observed.

‘ If any one shall imagine that I have forgotten my own notion of a law, when I make the law, whereby men judge of *virtue* and *vice*, to be nothing but the consent of private men who have not authority to make a law; especially wanting that which is so necessary and essential to a law, a power to enforce it: I think, I may say, that he who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives on men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the nature or history of mankind: The greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the law of God or the magistrate. The penalties that attend the breach of God’s law, some, nay, perhaps, most men seldom seriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many, whilst they break the law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for such breaches. And as to the punishments due from the law of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hope of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike, who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society.

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Solitude many men have sought and been reconciled to: but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with. This is a burthen too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be made up of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions.

‘The law of God, the law of politick societies, and the law of fashion or private censure, are, then, the three rules to which men variously compare their actions. And it is from their conformity or disagreement to one of these rules, that they judge of their rectitude or obliquity, and name them good or bad.

‘Whether we take the rule, to which, as to a touchstone, we bring our voluntary actions, from the fashion of the country, or from the will of a law-maker, the mind is easily able to observe the relation any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with the rule. And thus the mind hath a notion of *moral goodness or evil*: which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule. If I find an action to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by most men there worthy of praise or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious. If I have the will of a supreme invisible law-maker for my rule, then, as I suppose the action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, duty or sin. And if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legislative power of the country, I call it lawful or unlawful, no crime or a crime. So that whence-soever we take the rule of actions, or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, their rectitude or obliquity consists in their agreement or disagreement with the patterns prescribed by some law.

‘Before I quit this argument, I would observe that, in the relations which I call *moral relations*, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. For if I measure any thing by a supposed yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that supposed yard, though the yard I measure by be not exactly the standard. Measuring an action by a wrong rule, I shall judge amiss of its moral rectitude: but I shall not mistake the relation which

the action bears to the rule whereunto I compare it.'—*Essay concerning Human Understanding.* Book II. Chap. XXVIII.

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The analogy borne to a law proper by a law which opinion imposes, lies mainly in the following point of resemblance. In the case of a law set by opinion, as well as in the case of a law properly so called, a rational being or beings are obnoxious to contingent evil, in the event of their not complying with a known or presumed desire of another being or beings of a like nature. If, in either of the two cases, the contingent evil is suffered, it is suffered by a rational being, through a rational being: And it is suffered by a rational being, through a rational being, in consequence of the suffering party having disregarded a desire of a rational being or beings.—The analogy, therefore, by which the laws are related, mainly lies in the resemblance of the improper sanction and duty to the sanction and duty properly so called. The contingent evil in prospect which enforces the law improper, and the present obnoxiousness to that contingent evil, may be likened to the genuine sanction which enforces the law proper, and the genuine duty or obligation which the law proper imposes.—The analogy between a law in the proper acceptation of the term, and a law improperly so called which opinion sets or imposes, is, therefore, strong or close. The defect which excludes the latter from the rank of a law proper, merely consists in this: that the wish or desire of its authors has not been duly *signified*, and that they have no formed *intention* of inflicting evil or pain upon those who may break or transgress it.

Laws metaphorical or figurative.—The common negative nature of laws of the class.

But, beside the laws improper which are set or imposed by opinion, there are laws improperly so called which are related to laws proper by slender or remote analogies. And, since they have gotten the name of *laws* from their slender or remote analogies to laws properly so called, I style them laws metaphorical, or laws merely metaphorical.

The metaphorical applications of the term *law* are numerous and different. The analogies by which they are suggested, or by which metaphorical laws are related to laws proper, will, therefore, hardly admit of a common and positive description. But laws metaphorical, though numerous and different, have the following common and negative nature.—No property or character of any metaphorical law can be likened to a sanction or a duty. Consequently, every metaphorical law wants that point of resemblance which

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The common and negative nature of laws metaphorical or figurative, shown by examples.

mainly constitutes the analogy between a law proper and a law set by opinion.

To show that figurative laws want that point of resemblance, and are therefore remotely analogous to laws properly so called, I will touch slightly and briefly upon a few of the numberless cases in which the term *law* is extended and applied by a metaphor.

The most frequent and remarkable of those metaphorical applications is suggested by that uniformity, or that stability of conduct, which is one of the ordinary consequences of a law proper.—By reason of the sanction working on their wills or desires, the parties obliged by a law proper commonly adjust their conduct to the pattern which the law prescribes. Consequently, wherever we observe a uniform order of events, or a uniform order of co-existing phænomena, we are prone to impute that order to a *law* set by its author, though the case presents us with nothing that can be likened to a sanction or a duty.

For example: We say that the movements of lifeless bodies are determined by certain *laws*: though, since the bodies are lifeless and have no desires or aversions, they cannot be touched by aught which in the least resembles a sanction, and cannot be subject to aught which in the least resembles an obligation. We mean that they move in certain uniform modes, and that they move in those uniform modes through the pleasure and appointment of God: just as parties obliged behave in a uniform manner through the pleasure and appointment of the party who imposes the law and the duty.—Again: We say that certain actions of the lower and irrational animals are determined by certain *laws*: though, since they cannot understand the purpose and provisions of a law, it is impossible that sanctions should effectually move them to obedience, or that their conduct should be guided by a regard to duties or obligations. We mean that they act in certain uniform modes, either in consequence of instincts (or causes which we cannot explain), or else in consequence of hints which they catch from experience and observation: and that, since their uniformity of action is an effect of the Divine pleasure, it closely resembles the uniformity of conduct which is wrought by the authors of laws in those who are obnoxious to the sanctions.¹—In short,

⁽¹⁾ Speaking with absolute precision, Since their conduct is partly determined the lower animals, or the animals inferior to man, are not destitute of reason. by conclusions drawn from experience, they observe, compare, abstract, and

whenever we talk of *laws* governing the irrational world, the metaphorical application of the term *law* is suggested by this double analogy. 1. The successive and synchronous phænomena composing the irrational world, happen and exist, for the most part, in uniform series: which uniformity of succession and coexistence resembles the uniformity of conduct produced by an imperative law. 2. That uniformity of succession and co-existence, like the uniformity of conduct produced by an imperative law, springs from the will and intention of an intelligent and rational author.—When an atheist speaks of *laws* governing the irrational world, the metaphorical application is suggested by an analogy still more slender and remote than that which I have now analyzed. He means that the uniformity of succession and coexistence resembles the uniformity of conduct produced by an imperative rule. If, to draw the analogy closer, he ascribes those laws to an author, he personifies a verbal abstraction, and makes it play the legislator. He attributes the uniformity of succession and coexistence to *laws* set by *nature*: meaning, by *nature*, the world itself; or, perhaps, that very uniformity which he imputes to nature's commands.

Many metaphorical applications of the term *law* or *rule* are suggested by the analogy following.—An imperative law or rule guides the conduct of the obliged, or is a *norma*, model, or pattern, to which their conduct conforms. A proposed guide of human conduct, or a model or pattern offered to human imitation, is, therefore, frequently styled a *law* or *rule* of conduct, although there be not in the case a shadow of a sanction or a duty.

For example: To every law properly so called there are two distinct parties: a party by whom it is established, and a party to whom it is set. But, this notwithstanding, we often speak of a law set by a man to himself: meaning that he intends to pursue some given course of conduct as exactly as he would pursue it if he were bound to pursue it by a law. An intention of pursuing exactly some given course of conduct, is the only law or rule which a man can set to himself. The binding virtue of a law lies in the sanction annexed to

infer. But the intelligence of the lower animals is so extremely limited, that, adopting the current expression, I style them *irrational*. Some of the more sagacious are so far from being irrational, that they understand and observe laws set to them by human masters. But these laws being few and of little importance, I throw them, for the sake of simplicity, out of my account. I say universally of the lower animals, that they cannot understand a law, or guide their conduct by a duty.

it. But in the case of a so called law set by a man to himself, he is not constrained to observe it by aught that resembles a sanction. For though he may fairly purpose to inflict a pain on himself, if his conduct shall depart from the guide which he intends it shall follow, the infliction of the conditional pain depends upon his own will.—Again: When we talk of *rules* of art, the metaphorical application of the term *rules* is suggested by the analogy in question. By a *rule* of art, we mean a prescription or pattern which is offered to practitioners of an art, and which they are advised to observe when performing some given process. There is not the semblance of a sanction, nor is there the shadow of a duty. But the offered prescription or pattern may guide the conduct of practitioners, as a rule imperative and proper guides the conduct of the obliged.¹⁶

Laws metaphorical or figurative are often blended and confounded with laws imperative and proper.

The preceding disquisition on figurative laws is not so superfluous as some of my hearers may deem it. Figurative laws are not unfrequently mistaken for laws imperative and proper. Nay, attempts have actually been made, and by writers of the highest celebrity, to explain and illustrate the nature of laws imperative and proper, by allusions to so called laws which are merely such through a metaphor. Of these most gross and scarcely credible errors, various cases will be mentioned in future stages of my Course. For the present, the following examples will amply demonstrate that the errors are not impossible.

In an excerpt from Ulpian placed at the beginning of the Pandects, and also inserted by Justinian in the second title of his Institutes, a fancied *jus naturale*, common to all animals, is thus distinguished from the *jus naturale* or *gentium* to which I have adverted above. '*Jus naturale* est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam jus istud non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium, quæ in terra, quæ in mari nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. Hinc descendit maris atque feminæ conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus; hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio: videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia, feras etiam, istius juris peritia censer. *Jus gentium* est, quo gentes humanæ utuntur. Quod a *naturali* recedere, inde facile intelligere licet; quia illud omnibus animalibus, hoc solis hominibus

¹⁶ Supposed difference between law and rule.—*M.S. note.*

The author refers, in a memorandum, to notes on 'laws metaphorical, at the point which relates to Rules of Art'

and to 'metaphorical applications of the term *obligation*, like those of the term *law*.' Unhappily I have been unable to find them.—*S. A.*

inter se commune est.' The *jus naturale* which Ulpian here describes, and which he here distinguishes from the *jus naturale* or *gentium*, is a name for the instincts of animals. More especially, it denotes that instinctive appetite which leads them to propagate their kinds, with that instinctive sympathy which inclines parent animals to nourish and educate their young. Now the instincts of animals are related to laws by the slender or remote analogy which I have already endeavoured to explain. They incline the animals to act in certain uniform modes, and they are given to the animals for that purpose by an intelligent and rational Author. But these metaphorical laws which govern the lower animals, and which govern (though less despotically) the human species itself, should not have been blended and confounded, by a grave writer upon jurisprudence, with laws properly so called. It is true that the instincts of the animal man, like many of his affections which are not instinctive, are amongst the causes of laws in the proper acceptation of the term. More especially, the laws regarding the relation of husband and wife, and the laws regarding the relation of parent and child, are mainly caused by the instincts which Ulpian particularly points at. And that, it is likely, was the reason which determined this legal oracle to class the instincts of animals with laws imperative and proper. But nothing can be more absurd than the ranking with laws themselves the causes which lead to their existence. And if human instincts are laws because they are causes of laws, there is scarcely a faculty or affection belonging to the human mind, and scarcely a class of objects presented by the outward world, that must not be esteemed a law and an appropriate subject of jurisprudence.—I must, however, remark, that the *jus quod natura omnia animalia docuit* is a conceit peculiar to Ulpian: and that this most foolish conceit, though inserted in Justinian's compilations, has no perceptible influence on the detail of the Roman law. The *jus naturale* of the classical jurists generally, and the *jus naturale* occurring generally in the Pandects, is equivalent to the *natural law* of modern writers upon jurisprudence, and is synonymous with the *jus gentium*, or the *jus naturale et gentium*, which I have tried to explain concisely at the end of a preceding note. It means those positive laws and those rules of positive morality, which are not peculiar or appropriate to any nation or age, but obtain, or are thought to obtain, in all nations and ages: and which, by reason of

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their obtaining in all nations and ages, are supposed to be formed or fashioned on the law of God or Nature as known by the moral sense. , ‘Omnes populi’ (says Gaius), ‘qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum jure utuntur. Nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium est, vocaturque jus civile; quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis. Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peræque custoditur, vocaturque jus gentium; quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur.’ The universal *leges et mores* here described by Gaius, and distinguished from the *leges et mores* peculiar to a particular nation, are styled indifferently, by most of the classical jurists, *jus gentium*, *jus naturale*, or *jus naturale et gentium*. And the law of nature, as thus understood, is not intrinsically absurd. For as some of the dictates of utility are always and everywhere the same, and are also so plain and glaring that they hardly admit of mistake, there are legal and moral rules which are nearly or quite *universal*, and the expediency of which must be seen by merely *natural* reason, or by reason without the lights of extensive experience and observation. The distinction of law and morality into natural and positive, is a needless and futile subtilty: but still the distinction is founded on a real and manifest difference. The *jus naturale* or *gentium* would be liable to little objection, if it were not supposed to be the offspring of a moral instinct or sense, or of innate practical principles. But, since it is closely allied (as I shall show hereafter¹⁷) to that misleading and pernicious jargon, it ought to be expelled, with the *natural law* of the moderns, from the sciences of jurisprudence and morality.

The following passage is the first sentence in Montesquieu’s *Spirit of Laws*. ‘Les lois, dans la signification la plus étendue, sont les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des choses: et dans ce sens tous les êtres ont leurs lois: la Divinité a ses lois; le monde matériel a ses lois; les intelligences supérieures à l’homme ont leurs lois; les bêtes ont leurs lois; l’homme a ses lois.’ Now objects widely different, though bearing a common name, are here blended and confounded. Of the laws which govern the conduct of intelligent and rational creatures, some are laws imperative and proper, and others are closely analogous to laws of that description. But the so called laws which govern the material world, with the so called laws which govern the lower animals,

¹⁷ Lect. xxxii. *post*.

are merely laws by a metaphor. And the so called laws which govern or determine the Deity are clearly in the same predicament. If his actions were governed or determined by laws imperative and proper, he would be in a state of dependence on another and superior being. When we say that the actions of the Deity are governed or determined by laws, we mean that they conform to intentions which the Deity himself has conceived, and which he pursues or observes with inflexible steadiness or constancy. To mix these figurative laws with laws imperative and proper, is to obscure, and not to elucidate, the nature or essence of the latter.—The beginning of the passage is worthy of the sequel. We are told that laws are the necessary relations which flow from the nature of things. But what, I would crave, are relations? What, I would also crave, is the nature of things? And how do the necessary relations which flow from the nature of things differ from those relations which originate in other sources? The terms of the definition are incomparably more obscure than the term which it affects to expound.

If you read the disquisition in Blackstone on the nature of laws in general, or the fustian description of law in Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, you will find the same confusion of laws imperative and proper with laws which are merely such by a glaring perversion of the term. The cases of this confusion are, indeed, so numerous, that they would fill a considerable volume.

From the confusion of laws metaphorical with laws imperative and proper, I turn to a mistake, somewhat similar, which, I presume to think, has been committed by Mr. Bentham.

Physical or
natural
sanctions.

Sanctions proper and improper are of three capital classes : —the sanctions properly so called which are annexed to the laws of God : the sanctions properly so called which are annexed to positive laws : the sanctions properly so called, and the sanctions closely analogous to sanctions properly so called, which respectively enforce compliance with positive moral rules. But to sanction religious, legal, and moral, this great philosopher and jurist adds a class of sanctions which he styles *physical* or *natural*.

When he styles these sanctions *physical*, he does not intend to intimate that they are distinguished from other sanctions by the mode wherein they operate : he does not intend to intimate that these are the only sanctions which affect the suffering parties through physical or material means. Any

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sanction of any class may reach the suffering party through means of that description. If a man were smitten with blindness by the immediate appointment of the Deity, and in consequence of a sin he had committed against the Divine law, ~~he~~ would suffer a religious sanction through his physical or bodily organs. The thief who is hanged or imprisoned by virtue of a judicial command, suffers a legal sanction through physical or material means. If a man of the class of gentlemen violates the law of honour, and happens to be shot in a duel arising from his moral delinquency, he suffers a moral sanction in a physical or material form.

The meaning annexed by Mr. Bentham to the expression 'physical sanction,' may, I believe, be rendered in the following manner.—A physical sanction is an evil brought upon the suffering party by an act or omission of his own. But, though it is brought upon the sufferer by an act or omission of his own, it is not brought upon the sufferer through any Divine law, or through any positive law, or rule of positive morality. For example: If your house be destroyed by fire through your neglecting to put out a light, you bring upon yourself, by your negligent omission, a *physical* or *natural* sanction: supposing, I mean that your omission is not to be deemed a sin, and that the consequent destruction of your house is not to be deemed a punishment inflicted by the hand of the Deity. In short, though a physical sanction is an evil falling on a rational being, and brought on a rational being by an act or omission of his own, it is neither brought on the sufferer through a law imperative and proper, nor through an analogous law set or imposed by opinion. In case I borrowed the just, though tautological language of Locke, I should describe a physical sanction in some such terms as the following. 'It is an evil *naturally* produced by the conduct whereon it is consequent: and, being *naturally* produced by the conduct whereon it is consequent, it reaches the suffering party *without the intervention of a law.*'

Such physical or natural evils are related by the following analogy to sanctions properly so called. 1. When they are actually suffered, they are suffered by rational beings through acts or omissions of their own. 2. Before they are actually suffered, or whilst they exist in prospect, they affect the wills or desires of the parties obnoxious to them as sanctions properly so called affect the wills of the obliged. The parties are urged to the acts which may avert the evils from their

heads, or the parties are deterred from the acts which may bring the evils upon them.

But in spite of the specious analogy at which I have now pointed, I dislike, for various reasons, the application of the term *sanction* to these physical or natural evils. Of those reasons I will briefly mention the following. —1. Although these evils are suffered by intelligent rational beings, and by intelligent rational beings through acts or omissions of their own, they are not suffered as consequences of their not complying with desires of intelligent rational beings. The acts or omissions whereon these evils are consequent, can hardly be likened to breaches of duties, or to violations of imperative laws. The analogy borne by these evils to sanctions properly so called, is nearly as remote as the analogy borne by laws metaphorical to laws imperative and proper. 2. By the term *sanction*, as it is now restricted, the evils enforcing compliance with laws imperative and proper, or with the closely analogous laws which opinion sets or imposes, are distinguished from other evils briefly and commodiously. If the term were commonly extended to these physical or natural evils, this advantage would be lost. The term would then comprehend every possible evil which a man may bring upon himself by his own voluntary conduct. The term would then comprehend every contingent evil which can work on the will or desires as a motive to action or forbearance.

I close my disquisitions on figurative laws, and on those metaphorical sanctions which Mr. Bentham denominates *physical*, with the following connected remark.

Declaratory laws, laws repealing laws, and laws of imperfect obligation (in the sense of the Roman jurists), are merely analogous to laws in the proper acceptation of the term. Like laws imperative and proper, declaratory laws, laws repealing laws, and laws of imperfect obligation (in the sense of the Roman jurists), are signs of pleasure or desire proceeding from law-makers. A law of imperfect obligation (in the sense of the Roman jurists) is also allied to an imperative law by the following point of resemblance. Like a law imperative and proper, it is offered as a *norma*, or guide of conduct, although it is not armed with a legal or political sanction.

In strictness, declaratory laws, laws repealing laws, and laws of imperfect obligation (in the sense of the Roman jurists), ought to be classed respectively with laws metaphorical or figurative, and rules of positive morality.

Declaratory laws, and laws repealing laws, ought in strictness to be classed with laws metaphorical or figurative: for the analogy by which they are related to laws imperative and proper is extremely slender or remote. Laws of im-

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perfect obligation (in the sense of the Roman jurists) are laws set or imposed by the opinions of the law-makers, and ought in strictness to be classed with rules of positive morality. But though laws of these three species are merely analogous to laws in the proper acceptation of the term, they are closely connected with positive laws, and are appropriate subjects of jurisprudence. Consequently I treat them as improper laws of anomalous or eccentric sorts, and exclude them from the classes of laws to which in strictness they belong.

Note—on the prevailing tendency to confound what is with what ought to be law or morality, that is, 1st, to confound positive law with the science of legislation, and positive morality with deontology; and 2ndly, to confound positive law with positive morality, and both with legislation and deontology.—(See page 205, and note there.)

1st. Tendency to confound positive law with the science of legislation and positive morality with deontology.

Example from Blackstone.

The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation. This truth, when formally announced as an abstract proposition, is so simple and glaring that it seems idle to insist upon it. But simple and glaring as it is, when enunciated in abstract expressions the enumeration of the instances in which it has been forgotten would fill a volume.

Sir William Blackstone, for example, says in his 'Commentaries,' that the laws of God are superior in obligation to all other laws; that no human laws should be suffered to contradict them; that human laws are of no validity if contrary to them; and that all valid laws derive their force from that Divine original.

Now, he *may* mean that all human laws ought to conform to the Divine laws. If this be his meaning, I assent to it without hesitation. The evils which we are exposed to suffer from the hands of God as a consequence of disobeying His commands are the greatest evils to which we are obnoxious; the obligations which they impose are consequently paramount to those imposed by any other laws, and if human commands conflict with the Divine law, we ought to disobey the command which is enforced by the less powerful sanction; this is implied in the term *ought*: the proposition is identical, and therefore perfectly indisputable—it is our interest to choose the smaller and more uncertain evil, in preference to the greater and surer. If this be Blackstone's meaning, I assent to his proposition, and have only to object to it, that it tells us just nothing.

Perhaps, again, he means that human lawgivers are themselves obliged by the Divine laws to fashion the laws which they impose by that ultimate standard, because if they do not, God will punish them. To this also I entirely assent: for if the index to the law of God be the principle of utility, that law embraces the whole of our voluntary actions in so far as motives applied from without are required to give them a direction conformable to the general happiness.

But the meaning of this passage of Blackstone, if it has a meaning, seems rather to be this: that no human law which conflicts with the Divine law

is obligatory or binding; in other words, that no human law which conflicts with the Divine law *is a law*, for a law without an obligation is a contradiction in terms. I suppose this to be his meaning, because when we say of any transaction that it is invalid or void, we mean that it is not binding: as, for example, if it be a contract, we mean that the political law will not lend its sanction to enforce the contract.

Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God, who has commanded that human lawgivers shall not prohibit acts which have no evil consequences, the Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up, in pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity. An exception, demurrer, or plea, founded on the law of God was never heard in a Court of Justice, from the creation of the world down to the present moment.

But this abuse of language is not merely puerile, it is mischievous. When it is said that a law ought to be disobeyed, what is meant is that we are urged to disobey it by motives more cogent and compulsory than those by which it is itself sanctioned. If the laws of God are certain, the motives which they hold out to disobey any human command which is at variance with them are paramount to all others. But the laws of God are not always certain. All divines, at least all reasonable divines, admit that no scheme of duties perfectly complete and unambiguous was ever imparted to us by revelation. As an index to the Divine will, utility is obviously insufficient. What appears pernicious to one person may appear beneficial to another. And as for the moral sense, innate practical principles, conscience, they are merely convenient cloaks for ignorance or sinister interest: they mean either that I hate the law to which I object and cannot tell why, or that I hate the law, and that the cause of my hatred is one which I find it incommodious to avow. If I say openly, I hate the law, *ergo*, it is not binding and ought to be disobeyed, no one will listen to me; but by calling my hate my conscience or my moral sense, I urge the same argument in another and a more plausible form: I seem to assign a reason for my dislike, when in truth I have only given it a sounding and specious name. In times of civil discord the mischief of this detestable abuse of language is apparent. In quiet times the dictates of utility are fortunately so obvious that the anarchical doctrine sleeps, and men habitually admit the validity of laws which they dislike. To prove by pertinent reasons that a law is pernicious is highly useful, because such process may lead to the abrogation of the pernicious law. To incite the public to resistance by determinate views of *utility* may be useful, for resistance, grounded on clear and definite prospects of good, is sometimes beneficial. But to proclaim generally that all laws which are pernicious or contrary to the will of God are void and not to be tolerated, is to preach anarchy, hostile and perilous as much to wise and benign rule as to stupid and galling tyranny.

In another passage of his 'Commentaries,' Blackstone enters into an argument to prove that a master cannot have a right to the labour of his slave. Had he contented himself with expressing his *disapprobation*, a very well-grounded one certainly, of the institution of slavery, no objection could

Another example from Blackstone.

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Paley's definition of civil liberty.

have been made to his so expressing himself. But to dispute the existence or the possibility of the right is to talk absurdly. For in every age, and in almost every nation, the right has been given by positive law, whilst that pernicious disposition of positive law has been backed by the positive morality of the free or master classes.

Paley's admired definition of civil liberty appears to me to be obnoxious to the very same objection: it is a definition of civil liberty as it ought to be. 'Civil liberty,' he says, 'is the not being restrained by any law but which conduces in a greater degree to the public welfare;' and this is distinguished from *natural* liberty, which is the not being restrained at all. But when liberty is not exactly synonymous with right, it means, and can mean nothing else, but exemption from restraint or obligation, and is therefore altogether incompatible with law, the very idea of which implies restraint and obligation. But restraint is restraint although it be useful, and liberty is liberty though it may be pernicious. You may, if you please, call a useful restraint *liberty*, and refuse the name liberty to exemption from restraint when restraint is for the public advantage. But by this abuse of language you throw not a ray of light upon the nature of political liberty; you only add to the ambiguity and indistinctness in which it is already involved. I shall have to define and analyse the notion of liberty hereafter, on account of its intimate connexion with right, obligation, and sanction.

Example from the writers on international law.

Grotius, Puffendorf, and the other writers on the so-called law of nations, have fallen into a similar confusion of ideas: they have confounded positive international morality, or the rules which actually obtain among civilised nations in their mutual intercourse, with their own vague conceptions of international morality as it *ought to be*, with that indeterminate something which they conceived it would be, if it conformed to that indeterminate something which they call the law of nature. Professor Von Martens, of Göttingen, who died only a few years ago,¹⁸ is actually the first of the writers on the law of nations who has seized this distinction with a firm grasp, the first who has distinguished the rules which ought to be received in the intercourse of nations, or which would be received if they conformed to an assumed standard of whatever kind, from those which *are* so received, endeavour to collect from the practice of civilized communities what are the rules actually recognized and acted upon by them, and gave to these rules the name of positive international law.

2nd. Tendency to confound positive law with positive morality, and both with legislation and deontology. Examples from the Roman jurists.

I have given several instances in which law and morality as they ought to be are confounded with the law and morality which actually exist. I shall next mention some examples in which positive law is confounded with positive morality, and both with the science of legislation and deontology.

Those who know the writings of the Roman lawyers only by hearsay are accustomed to admire their philosophy. Now this, in my estimation, is the only part of their writings which deserves contempt. Their extraordinary merit is evinced not in general speculation, but as expositors of the Roman law. They have seized its general principles with great clearness and penetration, have applied these principles with admirable logic to the explanation of details, and have thus reduced this positive system of law to a compact and coherent whole. But the philosophy which they borrowed from the Greeks, or which, after the examples of the Greeks they themselves fashioned, is naught. Their attempts to define jurisprudence and to determine the province of the jurisconsult are absolutely pitiable, and it is hardly

¹⁸ This, it will be remembered, was spoken in the year 1830 or 1831.

conceivable how men of such admirable discernment should have displayed such contemptible imbecility.

At the commencement of the digest is a passage attempting to define jurisprudence. I shall first present you with this passage in a free translation, and afterwards in the original. 'Jurisprudence,' says this definition, 'is the knowledge of things divine and human; the science which teaches men to discern the just from the unjust.' 'Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, justique atque injusti scientia.' In the excerpt from Ulpian, which is placed at the beginning of the Digest, it is attempted to define the office or province of the jurisconsult. 'Law,' says the passage, derives its name from justice, *justitia*, and is the science or skill in the good and the equitable. Law being the creature of justice, we the jurisconsults may be considered as her priests, for justice is the goddess whom we worship, and to whose service we are devoted. Justice and equity are our vocation; we teach men to know the difference between the just and the unjust, the lawful and the unlawful; we strive to reclaim them from vice, not only by the terrors of punishment, but also by the blandishment of rewards; herein, unless we flatter ourselves, aspiring to sound and real philosophy, and not like some whom we could mention, contenting ourselves with vain and empty pretension.' 'Juri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen juris descendat. Est autem a justitia appellatum; nam, ut eleganter Celsus definit, jus est ars boni et æqui. Cujus merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet; justitiam namque colimus, et boni et æqui notitiam profitemur, æquum ab iniquo separantes, licitum ab illicito discernentes, bonos non solum metu poenarum verum etiam præmiorum quoque exhortatione efficere cupientes, veram, nisi fallor, philosophiam, non simulatam affectantes.'

Were I to present you with all the criticisms which these two passages suggest, I should detain you a full hour. I shall content myself with one observation on the scope and purpose of them both. That is, that they affect to define jurisprudence, or what comes exactly to the same thing, the office or province of the jurisconsult. Now jurisprudence, if it is anything, is the science of law, or at most the science of law combined with the art of applying it; but what is here given as a definition of it, embraces not only law, but positive morality, and even the test to which both these are to be referred. It therefore comprises the science of legislation and deontology. Further, it affirms that law is the creature of justice, which is as much as to say that it is the child of its own offspring. For when by *just* we mean anything but to express our own approbation we mean something which *accords with some given law*. True, we speak of law and justice, or of law and equity, as opposed to each other, but when we do so, we mean to express mere dislike of the law, or to intimate that it conflicts with another law, the law of God, which is its standard. According to this, every pernicious law is unjust. But, in truth, law is itself the standard of justice. What deviates from any law is unjust with reference to that law, though it may be just with reference to another law of superior authority. The terms just and unjust imply a standard, and conformity to that standard and a deviation from it; else they signify mere dislike, which it would be far better to signify by a grunt or a groan than by a mischievous and detestable abuse of articulate language. But justice is commonly erected into an entity, and spoken of as a legislator, in which character it is supposed to prescribe the law, conformity to which it should denote. The veriest dolt who is placed in a jury box, the merest old woman who happens to be raised to the

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bench, will talk finely of equity or justice—the justice of the case, the equity of the case, the imperious demands of justice, the plain dictates of equity. He forgets that he is there to enforce *the law of the land*, else he does not administer that justice or that equity with which alone he is immediately concerned.

Example
from Lord
Mansfield.

This is well known to have been a strong tendency of Lord Mansfield—a strange obliquity in so great a man. I will give an instance. By the English law, a promise to give something or to do something for the benefit of another is not binding without what is called a consideration, that is, a motive assigned for the promise, which motive must be of a particular kind. Lord Mansfield, however, overruled the distinct provisions of the law by ruling that moral obligation was a sufficient consideration. Now, moral obligation is an obligation imposed by opinion, or an obligation imposed by God: that is, moral obligation is anything which we choose to call so, for the precepts of positive morality are infinitely varying, and the will of God, whether indicated by utility or by a moral sense, is equally matter of dispute. This decision of Lord Mansfield, which assumes that the judge is to enforce morality, enables the judge to enforce just whatever he pleases.

I must here observe that I am not objecting to Lord Mansfield for assuming the office of a legislator. I by no means disapprove of what Mr. Bentham has chosen to call by the disrespectful, and therefore, as I conceive, injudicious, name of judge-made law. For I consider it injudicious to call by any name indicative of disrespect what appears to me highly beneficial and even absolutely necessary. I cannot understand how any person who has considered the subject can suppose that society could possibly have gone on if judges had not legislated, or that there is any danger whatever in allowing them that power which they have in fact exercised, to make up for the negligence or the incapacity of the avowed legislator. That part of the law of every country which was made by judges has been far better made than that part which consists of statutes enacted by the legislature. Notwithstanding my great admiration for Mr. Bentham, I cannot but think that, instead of blaming judges for having legislated, he should blame them for the timid, narrow, and piecemeal manner in which they have legislated, and for legislating under cover of vague and indeterminate phrases, such as Lord Mansfield employed in the above example, and which would be censurable in any legislator.

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The connection of the sixth lecture with the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth.

POSITIVE laws, the appropriate matter of jurisprudence, are related in the way of resemblance, or by a close or remote analogy, to the following objects.—1. In the way of resemblance, they are related to the laws of God. 2. In the way of resemblance, they are related to those rules of positive morality which are laws properly so called. 3. By a close or strong analogy, they are related to those rules of positive morality which are merely opinions or sentiments held or felt by men in regard to human conduct. 4. By a remote

or slender analogy, they are related to laws merely metaphorical, or laws merely figurative. LECT. VI

To distinguish positive laws from the objects now enumerated, is the purpose of the present attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence.

In pursuance of the purpose to which I have now adverted, I stated, in my first lecture, the essentials of a *law* or *rule* (taken with the largest signification which can be given to the term *properly*).

In my second, third, and fourth lectures, I stated the marks or characters by which the laws of God are distinguished from other laws. And, stating those marks or characters, I explained the nature of the index to his unrevealed laws, or I explained and examined the hypotheses which regard the nature of that index.

In my fifth lecture, I examined or discussed especially the following principal topics (and I touched upon other topics of secondary or subordinate importance).—I examined the distinguishing marks of those positive moral rules which are laws properly so called: I examined the distinguishing marks of those positive moral rules which are styled *laws* or *rules* by an analogical extension of the term: and I examined the distinguishing marks of laws merely metaphorical, or laws merely figurative.

I shall finish, in the present lecture, the purpose mentioned above, by explaining the marks or characters which distinguish positive laws, or laws strictly so called. And, in order to an explanation of the marks which distinguish positive laws, I shall analyze the expression *sovereignty*, the correlative expression *subjection*, and the inseparably connected expression *independent political society*. With the ends or final causes for which governments *ought* to exist, or with their different degrees of fitness to attain or approach those ends, I have no concern. I examine the notions of *sovereignty* and *independent political society*, in order that I may finish the purpose to which I have adverted above: in order that I may distinguish completely the appropriate province of jurisprudence from the regions which lie upon its confines, and by which it is encircled. It is necessary that I should examine those notions, in order that I may finish that purpose. For the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated thus. •Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign

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person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the expression) it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. Even though it sprung directly from another fountain or source, it is a positive law, or a law strictly so called, by the institution of that present sovereign in the character of political superior. Or (borrowing the language of Hobbes) 'the legislator is he, not by whose authority the law was first made, but by whose authority it continues to be a law.'

Having stated the topic or subject appropriate to my present discourse, I proceed to distinguish sovereignty from other superiority or might, and to distinguish society political and independent from society of other descriptions.

The distinguishing marks of sovereignty and independent political society.

The superiority which is styled sovereignty, and the independent political society which sovereignty implies, is distinguished from other superiority, and from other society, by the following marks or characters.—1. The *bulk* of the given society are in a *habit* of obedience or submission to a *determinate* and *common* superior: let that common superior be a certain individual person, or a certain body or aggregate of individual persons. 2. That certain individual, or that certain body of individuals, is *not* in a habit of obedience to a determinate human superior. Laws (improperly so called) which opinion sets or imposes, may permanently affect the conduct of that certain individual or body. To express or tacit commands of other determinate parties, that certain individual or body may yield occasional submission. But there is no determinate person, or determinate aggregate of persons, to whose commands, express or tacit, that certain individual or body renders habitual obedience.

Or the notions of sovereignty and independent political society may be expressed concisely thus.—If a *determinate* human superior, *not* in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive *habitual* obedience from the *bulk* of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent.

The relation of sovereignty and subjection.

To that determinate superior, the other members of the society are *subject*: or on that determinate superior, the other members of the society are *dependent*. The position of its

other members towards that determinate superior, is a *state of subjection*, or a *state of dependence*. The mutual relation which subsists between that superior and them, may be styled *the relation of sovereign and subject*, or *the relation of sovereignty and subjection*.

Hence it follows, that it is only through an ellipsis, or an abridged form of expression, that the *society* is styled *independent*. The party truly independent (independent, that is to say, of a determinate human superior), is not the society, but the sovereign portion of the society: that certain member of the society, or that certain body of its members, to whose commands, expressed or intimated, the generality or bulk of its members render habitual obedience. Upon that certain person, or certain body of persons, the other members of the society are *dependent*: or to that certain person, or certain body of persons, the other members of the society are *subject*. By 'an independent political society,' or 'an independent and sovereign nation,' we mean a political society consisting of a sovereign and subjects, as opposed to a political society which is merely subordinate: that is to say, which is merely a limb or member of another political society, and which therefore consists entirely of persons in a state of subjection.

Strictly speaking, the sovereign portion of the society, and not the society itself is independent, sovereign, or supreme.

In order that a given society may form a society political and independent, the two distinguishing marks which I have mentioned above must unite. The *generality* of the given society must be in the *habit* of obedience to a *determinate* and *common* superior: whilst that determinate person, or determinate body of persons, must *not* be habitually obedient to a determinate person or body. It is the union of that positive, with this negative mark, which renders that certain superior sovereign or supreme, and which renders that given society (including that certain superior) a society political and independent.

In order that a given society may form a society political and independent, the two distinguishing marks which are mentioned above must unite.

To show that the union of those marks renders a given society a society political and independent, I call your attention to the following positions and examples.

1. In order that a given society may form a society political, the generality or bulk of its members must be in a *habit* of obedience to a determinate and common superior.

In case the generality of its members obey a determinate superior, but the obedience be rare or transient and not habitual or permanent, the relation of sovereignty and subjection is not created thereby between that c

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and the members of that given society. In other words, that determinate superior and the members of that given society do not become thereby an independent political society. Whether that given society be political and independent or not, it is not an independent political society whereof that certain superior is the sovereign portion.

For example: In 1815 the allied armies occupied France; and so long as the allied armies occupied France, the commands of the allied sovereigns were obeyed by the French government, and, through the French government, by the French people generally. But since the commands and the obedience were comparatively rare and transient, they were not sufficient to constitute the relation of sovereignty and subjection between the allied sovereigns and the members of the invaded nation. In spite of those commands, and in spite of that obedience, the French government was sovereign or independent. Or in spite of those commands, and in spite of that obedience, the French government and its subjects were an independent political society whereof the allied sovereigns were not the sovereign portion.

Now if the French nation, before the obedience to those sovereigns, had been an independent society in a state of nature or anarchy, it would not have been changed by the obedience into a society political. And it would not have been changed by the obedience into a society political, because the obedience was not habitual. For, inasmuch as the obedience was not habitual, it was not changed by the obedience from a society political and independent, into a society political but subordinate.—A given society, therefore, is not a society political, unless the generality of its members be in a *habit* of obedience to a determinate and common superior.

Again: A feeble state holds its independence precariously, or at the will of the powerful states to whose aggressions it is obnoxious. And since it is obnoxious to their aggressions, it and the bulk of its subjects render obedience to commands which they occasionally express or intimate. Such, for instance, is the position of the Saxon government and its subjects in respect of the conspiring sovereigns who form the Holy Alliance. But since the commands and the obedience are comparatively few and rare, they are not sufficient to constitute the relation of sovereignty and subjection between the powerful states and the feeble state with its subjects. In spite of those commands, and in spite of that obedience,

the feeble state is sovereign or independent. Or in spite of those commands, and in spite of that obedience, the feeble state and its subjects are an independent political society whereof the powerful states are not the sovereign portion. Although the powerful states are permanently *superior*, and although the feeble state is permanently *inferior*, there is neither a *habit* of command on the part of the former, nor a *habit* of obedience on the part of the latter. Although the latter is unable to defend and maintain its independence, the latter is independent of the former in fact or practice.

From the example now adduced, as from the example adduced before, we may draw the following inference: that a given society is not a society political, unless the generality of its members be in a *habit* of obedience to a determinate and common superior.—By the obedience to the powerful states, the feeble state and its subjects are not changed from an independent, into a subordinate political society. And they are not changed by the obedience into a subordinate political society, because the obedience is not habitual. Consequently, if they were a natural society (setting that obedience aside), they would not be changed by that obedience into a society political.

2. In order that a given society may form a society political, habitual obedience must be rendered, by the *generality* or *bulk* of its members, to a determinate and *common* superior. In other words, habitual obedience must be rendered, by the *generality* or *bulk* of its members, to *one and the same* determinate person, or determinate body of persons.

Unless habitual obedience be rendered by the *bulk* of its members, and be rendered by the bulk of its members to *one and the same* superior, the given society is either in a state of nature, or is split into two or more independent political societies.

For example: In case a given society be torn by intestine war, and in case the conflicting parties be nearly balanced, the given society is in one of the two positions which I have now supposed.—As there is no common superior to which the bulk of its members render habitual obedience, it is not a political society single or undivided.—If the bulk of each of the parties be in a habit of obedience to its head, the given society is broken into two or more societies, which, perhaps, may be styled independent political societies.—If the bulk of each of the parties be not in that habit of obe-

dience, the given society is simply or absolutely in a state of nature or anarchy. It is either resolved or broken into its individual elements, or into numerous societies of an extremely limited size: of a size so extremely limited, that they could hardly be styled societies independent and *political*. For, as I shall show hereafter, a given independent society would hardly be styled *political*, in case it fell short of a *number* which cannot be fixed with precision, but which may be called considerable, or not extremely minute.

3. In order that a given society may form a society political, the generality or bulk of its members must habitually obey a superior *determinate* as well as common.

On this position I shall not insist here. For I have shown sufficiently in my fifth lecture, that no indeterminate party can command expressly or tacitly, or can receive obedience or submission: that no indeterminate body is capable of corporate conduct, or is capable, as a body, of positive or negative deportment.

4. It appears from what has preceded, that, in order that a given society may form a society political, the bulk of its members must be in a habit of obedience to a certain and common superior. But, in order that the given society may form a society political and independent, that certain superior must *not* be habitually obedient to a determinate human superior.

The given society may form a society political and independent, although that certain superior be habitually affected by laws which opinion sets or imposes. The given society may form a society political and independent, although that certain superior render occasional submission to commands of determinate parties. But the society is not independent, although it may be political, in case that certain superior habitually obey the commands of a certain person or body.

Let us suppose, for example, that a viceroy obeys habitually the author of his delegated powers. And, to render the example complete, let us suppose that the viceroy receives habitual obedience from the generality or bulk of the persons who inhabit his province.—Now though he commands habitually within the limits of his province, and receives habitual obedience from the generality or bulk of its inhabitants, the viceroy is not sovereign within the limits of his province, nor are he and its inhabitants an independent political society. The viceroy, and (through the viceroy) the generality or bulk of its inhabitants, are habitually obedient

or submissive to the sovereign of a larger society. He and the inhabitants of his province are therefore in a state of subjection to the sovereign of that larger society. He and the inhabitants of his province are a society political but subordinate, or form a political society which is merely a limb of another.

A natural society, a society in a state of nature, or a society independent but natural, is composed of persons who are connected by mutual intercourse, but are not members, sovereign or subject, of any society political. None of the persons who compose it lives in the positive state which is styled a state of subjection: or all the persons who compose it live in the negative state which is styled a state of independence.

A society independent but natural.

Considered as entire communities, and considered in respect of one another, independent political societies live, it is commonly said, in a state of nature. And considered as entire communities, and as connected by mutual intercourse, independent political societies form, it is commonly said, a natural society. These expressions, however, are not perfectly apposite. Since all the members of each of the related societies are members of a society political, none of the related societies is strictly in a state of nature: nor can the larger society formed by their mutual intercourse be styled strictly a natural society. Speaking strictly, the several members of the several related societies are placed in the following positions. The sovereign and subject members of each of the related societies form a society political: but the sovereign portion of each of the related societies lives in the negative condition which is styled a state of independence.

Society formed by the intercourse of independent political societies.

Society formed by the intercourse of independent political societies, is the province of international law, or of the law obtaining between nations. For (adopting a current expression) international law, or the law obtaining between nations, is conversant about the conduct of independent political societies considered as entire communities: *circa negotia et causas gentium integrarum*. Speaking with greater precision, international law, or the law obtaining between nations, regards the conduct of sovereigns considered as related to one another.

And hence it inevitably follows, that the law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. As I have already intimated,

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the law obtaining between nations is law (improperly so called) set by general opinion. The duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally received and respected.

A society political but subordinate.

A society political but subordinate is merely a limb or member of a society political and independent. All the persons who compose it, including the person or body which is its immediate chief, live in a state of subjection to one and the same sovereign.

A society not political, but forming a limb or member of a society political and independent.

Besides societies political and independent, societies independent but natural, society formed by the intercourse of independent political societies, and societies political but subordinate, there are societies which will not quadrate with any of those descriptions. Though, like a society political but subordinate, it forms a limb or member of a society political and independent, a society of the class in question is not a political society. Although it consists of members living in a state of subjection, it consists of subjects considered as private persons.—A society consisting of parents and children, living in a state of subjection, and considered in those characters, may serve as an example.

To distinguish societies political but subordinate from societies not political but consisting of subject members, is to distinguish the rights and duties of subordinate political superiors from the rights and duties of subjects considered as private persons. And before I can draw that distinction, I must analyze many expressions of large and intricate meaning which belong to the detail of jurisprudence. But an explanation of that distinction is not required by my present purpose. To the accomplishment of my present purpose, it is merely incumbent upon me to determine the notion of sovereignty, with the inseparably connected notion of independent political society. For every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set directly or circuitously by a monarch or sovereign number to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.

The definition of the abstract term independent political society (including the

The definition of the abstract term *independent political society* (including the definition of the correlative term *sovereignty*) cannot be rendered in expressions of perfectly precise import, and is therefore a fallible test of specific or particular cases. The least imperfect definition which the

abstract term will take, would hardly enable us to fix the class of every possible society. It would hardly enable us to determine of every *independent* society, whether it were *political* or *natural*. It would hardly enable us to determine of every *political* society, whether it were *independent* or *subordinate*.

In order that a given society may form a society political and independent, the positive and negative marks which I have mentioned above must unite. The *generality* or *bulk* of its members must be in a *habit* of obedience to a *certain* and *common* superior: whilst that certain person, or certain body of persons, must *not* be habitually obedient to a certain person or body.

But, in order that the *bulk* of its members may render obedience to a *common* superior, *how many* of its members, or *what proportion* of its members, must render obedience to *one and the same* superior? And, assuming that the bulk of its members render obedience to a common superior, *how often* must they render it, and *how long* must they render it, in order that that obedience may be *habitual*?—Now since these questions cannot be answered precisely, the positive mark of sovereignty and independent political society is a fallible test of specific or particular cases. It would not enable us to determine of every *independent* society, whether it were *political* or *natural*.

In the cases of independent society which lie, as it were, at the extremes, we should apply that positive test without a moment's difficulty, and should fix the class of the society without a moment's hesitation.—In some of those cases, so large a proportion of the members obey the same superior, and the obedience of that proportion is so frequent and continued, that, without a moment's difficulty and without a moment's hesitation, we should pronounce the society *political*: that, without a moment's difficulty and without a moment's hesitation, we should say the *generality* of its members were in a *habit* of obedience or submission to a certain and *common* superior. Such, for example, is the ordinary state of England, and of every independent society somewhat advanced in civilization.—In other of those cases, obedience to the same superior is rendered by so few of the members, or general obedience to the same is so unfrequent and broken, that, without a moment's difficulty and without a moment's hesitation, we should pronounce the society *natural*: that, without a moment's difficulty and without a moment's hesi-

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definition of the correlative term *sovereignty*) cannot be rendered in expressions of perfectly precise import, and is therefore a fallible test of specific or particular cases.

. VI tation, we should say the *generality* of its members were *not* in a *habit* of obedience to a certain and *common* superior. Such, for example, is the state of the independent and savage societies which subsist by hunting or fishing in the woods or on the coasts of New Holland.

But in the cases of independent society which lie between the extremes, we should hardly find it possible to fix with absolute certainty the class of the given community. We should hardly find it possible to determine with absolute certainty, whether the generality of its members did or did not obey one and the same superior. Or we should hardly find it possible to determine with absolute certainty, whether the general obedience to one and the same superior was or was not habitual. For example : During the height of the conflict between Charles the First and the Parliament, the English nation was broken into two distinct societies : each of which societies may perhaps be styled political, and may certainly be styled independent. After the conflict had subsided, those distinct societies were in their turn dissolved ; and the nation was reunited, under the common government of the Parliament, into one independent and political community. But at what juncture precisely, after the conflict had subsided, was a common government completely re-established ? Or at what juncture precisely, after the conflict had subsided, were those distinct societies completely dissolved, and the nation completely reunited into one political community ? When had so many of the nation rendered obedience to the Parliament, and when had the general obedience become so frequent and lasting, that the *bulk* of the nation were *habitually* obedient to the body which affected sovereignty ? And after the conflict had subsided, and until that juncture had arrived, what was the class of the society which was formed by the English people ?—These are questions which it were impossible to answer with certainty, although the facts of the case were precisely known.

The positive mark of sovereignty and independent political society is therefore a fallible test. It would not enable us to determine of every *independent* society, whether it were *political* or *natural*.

The negative mark of sovereignty and independent political society is also an uncertain measure. It would not enable us to determine of every *political* society, whether it were *independent* or *subordinate*.—Given a determinate and common superior, and also that the bulk of the society

habitually obey that superior, is that common superior free from a habit of obedience to a determinate person or body? Is that common superior sovereign and independent, or is that common superior a superior in a state of subjection?

In numerous cases of political society, it were impossible to answer this question with absolute certainty. For example: Although the Holy Alliance dictates to the Saxon government, the commands which it gives, and the submission which it receives, are comparatively few and rare. Consequently, the Saxon government is sovereign or supreme, and the Saxon government and its subjects are an independent political society, notwithstanding its submission to the Holy Alliance. But, in case the commands and submission were somewhat more numerous and frequent, we might find it impossible to determine certainly the class of the Saxon community. We might find it impossible to determine certainly where the sovereignty resided: whether the Saxon government were a government supreme and independent; or were in a *habit* of obedience, and therefore in a state of subjection, to the allied or conspiring monarchs.¹⁹

The definition or general notion of independent political society, is therefore vague or uncertain. Applying it to specific or particular cases, we should often encounter the difficulties which I have laboured to explain.

The difficulties which I have laboured to explain, often embarrass the application of those positive moral rules which are styled international law.

For example: When did the revolted colony, which is now the Mexican nation, ascend from the condition of an insurgent province to that of an independent community? When did the body of colonists, who affected sovereignty in Mexico, change the character of rebel leaders for that of a supreme government? Or (adopting the current language about governments *de jure* and *de facto*) when did the body of colonists, who affected sovereignty in Mexico, become sovereign *in fact*?—And (applying international law to the specific or particular case) when did international law authorize neutral nations to admit the independence of Mexico with the sovereignty of the Mexican government?

Now the questions suggested above are equivalent to this:

¹⁹ A very apt instance of this kind of difficulty is suggested by the present relation of Prussia to the other states now comprised in the North German Confederation.—R. C.

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—When had the inhabitants of Mexico obeyed that body so generally, and when had that general obedience become so frequent and lasting, that the *bulk* of the inhabitants of Mexico were *habitually* disobedient to Spain, and probably would not resume their discarded habit of submission?

Or the questions suggested above are equivalent to this: —When had the inhabitants of Mexico obeyed that body so generally, and when had that general obedience become so frequent and lasting, that the inhabitants of Mexico were independent of Spain in practice, and were likely to remain permanently in that state of practical independence?

At that juncture exactly (let it have arrived when it may), neutral nations were authorized, by the morality which obtains between nations, to admit the independence of Mexico with the sovereignty of the Mexican government. But, by reason of the perplexing difficulties which I have laboured to explain, it was impossible for neutral nations to hit that juncture with precision, and to hold the balance of justice between Spain and her revolted colony with a perfectly even hand.

This difficulty presents itself under numerous forms in international law: indeed almost the only difficult and embarrassing questions in that science arise out of it. And as I shall often have occasion to show, law strictly so called is not free from like difficulties. What can be more indefinite, for instance, than the expressions *reasonable* time, *reasonable* notice, *reasonable* diligence? Than the line of demarcation which distinguishes libel and fair criticism; than that which constitutes a violation of copyright; than that degree of mental aberration which constitutes idiocy or lunacy? In all these cases, the difficulty is of the same nature with that which adheres to the phrases sovereignty and independent society; it arises from the vagueness or indefiniteness of the terms in which the definition or rule is inevitably conceived. And this, I suppose, is what people were driving at when they have agitated the very absurd enquiry whether questions of this kind are questions of law or of fact. The truth is that they are questions neither of law nor of fact. The fact may be perfectly ascertained, and so may the law, as far as it is capable of being ascertained. The rule is known, and so is the given species, as the Roman jurists term it; the difficulty is in bringing the species under the rule; in determining not what the law is, or what the fact is, but whether the given law is applicable to the given fact.

I have tacitly supposed, during the preceding analysis,

that every independent society forming a society political possesses the essential property which I will now describe.

In order that an independent society may form a society political, it must not fall short of a *number* which cannot be fixed with precision, but which may be called considerable, or not extremely minute. A given independent society, whose number may be called inconsiderable, is commonly esteemed a *natural*, and not a *political* society, although the generality of its members be habitually obedient or submissive to a certain and common superior.

In order that an independent society may form a society political, it must not fall short of a *number* which cannot be fixed with precision, but which may be called considerable, or not extremely minute.

Let us suppose, for example, that a single family of savages lives in absolute estrangement from every other community. And let us suppose that the father, the chief of this insulated family, receives habitual obedience from the mother and children.—Now, since it is not a limb of another and larger community, the society formed by the parents and children is clearly an independent society. And, since the rest of its members habitually obey its chief, this independent society would form a society political, in case the number of its members were not extremely minute. But, since the number of its members is extremely minute, it would (I believe) be esteemed a society in a state of nature: that is to say, a society consisting of persons not in a state of subjection. Without an application of the terms which would somewhat smack of the ridiculous, we could hardly style the society a society *political* and independent, the imperative father and chief a *monarch* or *sovereign*, or the obedient mother and children *subjects*.—‘*La puissance politique*’ (says Montesquieu) ‘comprend nécessairement l’union de plusieurs familles.’

Again: let us suppose a society which may be styled independent, or which is not a limb of another and larger community. Let us suppose that the number of its members is not extremely minute. And let us suppose it in the savage condition, or in the extremely barbarous condition which closely approaches the savage.

Inasmuch as the given society lives in the savage condition, or in the extremely barbarous condition which closely approaches the savage, the generality or bulk of its members is not in a habit of obedience to one and the same superior. For the purpose of attacking an external enemy, or for the purpose of repelling an attack made by an external enemy, the generality or bulk of its members, who are capable of bearing arms, submits to one leader, or to

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one body of leaders. But so soon as that exigency passes, this transient submission ceases; and the society reverts to the state which may be deemed its ordinary state. The bulk of each of the families which compose the given society, renders habitual obedience to its own peculiar chief: but those domestic societies are themselves independent societies, or are not united or compacted into one political society by general and habitual obedience to a certain and common superior. And, as the bulk of the given society is not in a habit of obedience to one and the same superior, there is no law (simply or strictly so styled) which can be called the law of that given society or community. The so-called laws which are common to the bulk of the community, are purely and properly customary laws: that is to say, laws which are set or imposed by the general opinion of the community, but which are not enforced by legal or political sanctions.—The state which I have briefly delineated, is the ordinary state of the savage and independent societies which live by hunting or fishing in the woods or on the coasts of New Holland. It is also the ordinary state of the savage and independent societies which range in the forests or plains of the North American continent. It was also the ordinary state of many of the German nations whose manners are described by Tacitus.

Now, since the bulk of its members is not in a habit of obedience to one and the same superior, the given independent society would (I believe) be esteemed a society in a state of nature: that is to say, a society consisting of persons not in a state of subjection. But such it could not be esteemed, unless the term *political* were restricted to independent societies whose numbers are not inconsiderable. Supposing that the term *political* applied to independent societies whose numbers are extremely minute, each of the independent families which constitute the given society would form of itself a political community: for the bulk of each of those families renders habitual obedience to its own peculiar chief. And, seeing that each of those families would form of itself an independent political community, the given independent society could hardly be styled with strictness a natural society. Speaking strictly, that given society would form a congeries of independent political communities. Or, seeing that a few of its members might not be members also of those independent families, it would form a congeries of independent political communities mingled with a few indi-

viduals living in a state of nature.—Unless the term *political* were restricted to independent societies whose numbers are not inconsiderable, few of the many societies which are commonly esteemed natural could be styled natural societies with perfect precision and propriety.

For the reasons which I have now produced, and for reasons which I pass in silence, we must, I believe, arrive at the following conclusion.—A given independent society, whose number may be called inconsiderable, is commonly esteemed a *natural*, and not a *political* society, although the generality of its members be habitually obedient or submissive to a certain and common superior.

And arriving at that conclusion, we must proceed to this further conclusion.—In order that an independent society may form a society political, it must not fall short of a *number* which may be called considerable.

The lowest possible number which will satisfy that vague condition cannot be fixed precisely. But, looking at many of the communities which commonly are considered and treated as independent political societies, we must infer that an independent society may form a society political, although the number of its members exceed not a few thousands, or exceed not a few hundreds. The ancient Grison Confederacy (like the ancient Swiss Confederacy with which the Grison was connected) was rather an alliance or union of independent political societies, than one independent community under a common sovereign. Now the number of the largest of the societies which were independent members of the ancient Grison Confederacy hardly exceeded a few thousands. And the number of the smallest of those numerous confederated nations hardly exceeded a few hundreds.

The definition of the terms *sovereignty* and *independent political society*, is, therefore, embarrassed by the difficulty following, as well as by the difficulties which I have stated in a foregoing department of my discourse.—In order that an independent society may form a society political, it must not fall short of a *number* which may be called considerable. And the lowest possible number which will satisfy that vague condition cannot be fixed precisely.

But here I must briefly remark, that, though the essential property which I have now described is an essential or necessary property of *independent* political society, it is not an essential property of *subordinate* political society. If the independent society, of which it is a limb or member, be a

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political and not a natural society, a subordinate society may form a society political, although the number of its members might be called extremely minute. For example: A society incorporated by the state for political or public purposes is a society or body politic: and it continues to bear the character of a society or body politic, although its number be reduced, by deaths or other causes, to that of a small family or small domestic community.

Certain of the definitions of the term *sovereignty*, and of the implied or correlative term *independent political society*, which have been given by writers of celebrity.

Having tried to determine the notion of sovereignty, with the implied or correlative notion of independent political society, I will produce and briefly examine a few of the definitions of those notions which have been given by writers of celebrity.

Distinguishing *political* from *natural* society, Mr. Bentham, in his Fragment on Government, thus defines the former: 'When a number of persons (whom we may style *subjects*) are supposed to be in the *habit* of paying *obedience* to a person, or an assemblage of persons, of a known and certain description (whom we may call *governor* or *governors*), such persons altogether (*subjects* and *governors*) are said to be in a state of *political* society.' And in order to exclude from his definition such a society as the single family conceived of above, he adds a second essential of political society, namely that the society should be capable of indefinite duration.—Considered as a definition of independent political society, this definition is inadequate or defective. In order that a given society may form a society political and independent, the superior habitually obeyed by the bulk or generality of its members must not be habitually obedient to a certain individual or body: which negative character or essential of independent political society Mr. Bentham has forgotten to notice. And, since the definition in question is an inadequate or defective definition of *independent* political society, it is also an inadequate or defective definition of political society in general. Before we can define political society, or can distinguish political society from society not political, we must determine the nature of those societies which are at once political and independent. For a political society which is not independent is a member or constituent parcel of a political society which is. Or (changing the expression) the powers or rights of subordinate political superiors are merely emanations of sovereignty. They are merely particles of sovereignty committed by sovereigns to subjects.

According to the definition of independent political so-

ciety which is stated or supposed by Hobbes in his excellent treatises on government, a society is not a society political and independent, unless it can maintain its independence, against attacks from without, by its own intrinsic or unaided strength. But if power to maintain its independence by its own intrinsic strength be a character or essential property of an independent political society, the name will scarcely apply to any existing society, or to any of the past societies which occur in the history of mankind. The weaker of such actual societies as are deemed political and independent, owe their precarious independence to positive international morality, and to the mutual fears or jealousies of stronger communities. The most powerful of such actual societies as are deemed political and independent, could hardly maintain its independence, by its own intrinsic strength, against an extensive conspiracy of other independent nations.—Any political society is (I conceive) independent, if it be not dependent in fact or practice: if the party habitually obeyed by the bulk or generality of its members be not in a habit of obedience to a determinate individual or body.

In his great treatise on international law, Grotius defines sovereignty in the following manner. ‘*Summa potestas civilis illa dicitur, cujus actus alterius juri non subsunt, ita ut alterius voluntatis humanæ arbitrio irriti possint reddi. Alterius cum dico, ipsum excludo, qui summa potestate utitur; cui voluntatem mutare licet.*’ Which definition is thus rendered by his translator and commentator Barbeyrac. ‘*La puissance souveraine est celle dont les actes sont indépendans de tout autre pouvoir supérieur, en sorte qu’ils ne peuvent être annulés par aucune autre volonté humaine. Je dis, par aucune autre volonté humaine; car il faut excepter ici le souverain lui-même, à qui il est libre de changer de volonté.*’—Now in order that an individual or body may be sovereign in a given society, two essentials must unite. The generality of the given society must render habitual obedience to that certain individual or body: whilst that individual or body must not be habitually obedient to a determinate human superior. In order to an adequate conception of the nature of international morality, as in order to an adequate conception of the nature of positive law, the former as well as the latter of those two essentials of sovereignty must be noted or taken into account. But, this notwithstanding, the former and positive essential of sove-

LECT. VI reign or supreme power is not inserted by Grotius in that his formal definition. And the latter and negative essential is stated inaccurately. Sovereign power (according to Grotius) is perfectly or completely independent of other human power; inasmuch that its acts cannot be annulled by any human will other than its own. But if perfect or complete independence be of the essence of sovereign power, there is not in fact the human power to which the epithet *sovereign* will apply with propriety. Every government, let it be never so powerful, renders occasional obedience to commands of other governments. Every government defers frequently to those opinions and sentiments which are styled international law. And every government defers habitually to the opinions and sentiments of its own subjects. If it were not in a habit of obedience to the commands of a determinate party, a government has all the independence which a government can possibly enjoy.

According to Von Martens of Göttingen (the writer on positive international law already referred to), 'a sovereign government is a government which *ought* not to receive commands from any external or foreign government.'—Of the conclusive and obvious objections to this definition of sovereignty the following are only a few. 1. If the definition in question will apply to sovereign governments, it will also apply to subordinate. If a sovereign ought to be free from the commands of foreign governments, so ought every government which is merely the creature of a sovereign, and which holds its powers or rights as a mere trustee for its author. 2. Whether a given government be or be not supreme, is rather a question of fact than a question of international law. A government reduced to subjection is actually a subordinate government, although the state of subjection wherein it is actually held be repugnant to the positive morality which obtains between nations or sovereigns. Though, according to that morality, it *ought* to be sovereign or independent, it is subordinate or dependent in practice. 3. It cannot be affirmed absolutely of a sovereign or independent government, that it *ought* not to receive commands from foreign or external governments. The intermeddling of independent governments with other independent governments is often repugnant to the morality which actually obtains between nations. But according to that morality which actually obtains between nations (and to that international morality which general utility commends), no independent

government ought to be freed completely from the supervision and control of its fellows. 4. In this definition by Von Martens (as in that which is given by Grotius) there is not the shadow of an allusion to the positive character of sovereignty. The definition points at the relations which are borne by sovereigns to sovereigns: but it omits the relations, not less essential, which are borne by sovereigns to their own subjects.

I have now endeavoured to determine the general notion of sovereignty, including the general notion of independent political society. But in order that I may further elucidate the nature or essence of sovereignty, and of the independent political society which sovereignty implies, I will call the attention of my hearers to a few concise remarks upon the following subjects or topics.—1. The various shapes which sovereignty may assume, or the various possible forms of supreme government. 2. The real and imaginary limits which bound the power of sovereigns, and by which the power of sovereigns is supposed to be bounded. 3. The origin of government, with the origin of political society: or the causes of the habitual obedience which is rendered by the bulk of subjects, and from which the power of sovereigns to compel and restrain the refractory is entirely or mainly derived.

The ensuing portion of the present lecture is concerned with the following topics.
—1. The forms of supreme government. 2. The limits of sovereign power. 3. The origin of government, or the origin of political society.

An independent political society is divisible into two portions: namely, the portion of its members which is sovereign or supreme, and the portion of its members which is merely subject. The sovereignty can hardly reside in *all* the members of a society: for it can hardly happen that some of those members shall not be naturally incompetent to exercise sovereign powers. In most actual societies, the sovereign powers are engrossed by a single member of the whole, or are shared exclusively by a very few of its members: and even in the actual societies whose governments are esteemed popular, the sovereign number is a slender portion of the entire political community. An independent political society governed by itself, or governed by a sovereign body consisting of the whole community, is not impossible: but the existence of such societies is so extremely improbable, that, with this passing notice, I throw them out of my account.^(m)

The forms of supreme government.

(m) If every member of an independent political society were adult and of sound mind, every member would be naturally competent to exercise sovereign powers:

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Every supreme government is a *monarchy* (properly so called), or an *aristocracy* (in the generic meaning of the expression). In other words, it is a government of one, or a government of a number.

Every society political and independent is therefore divisible into two portions : namely, the portion of its members which is sovereign or supreme, and the portion of its members which is merely subject. In case that sovereign portion consists of a single member, the supreme government is properly a *monarchy*, or the sovereign is properly a *monarch*. In case that sovereign portion consist of a number of members, the supreme government may be styled an *aristocracy* (in the generic meaning of the expression).—And here I may briefly remark, that a monarchy or government of one, and an aristocracy or government of a number, are essentially and broadly distinguished by the following important difference. In the case of a monarchy or government of one, the sovereign portion of the community is simply or purely sovereign. In the case of an aristocracy or government of a number, that sovereign portion is sovereign as viewed from one aspect, but is also subject as viewed from another. In the case of an aristocracy or government of a number, the sovereign number is an aggregate of individuals, and, commonly, of smaller aggregates composed by those individuals. Now, considered collectively, or considered in its corporate character, that sovereign number is sovereign and independent. But, considered severally, the individuals and smaller aggregates composing that sovereign number are subject to the supreme body of which they are component parts.

In every society, therefore, which may be styled political and independent, *one* of the individual members engrosses the sovereign powers, or the sovereign powers are shared by a *number* of the individual members less than the number of the individuals composing the entire community. Changing the phrase, every supreme government is a *monarchy* (properly so called), or an *aristocracy* (in the generic meaning of the expression).^(u)

and if we suppose a society so constituted, we may also suppose a society which strictly is governed by itself, or in which the supreme government is strictly a government of all. But in every actual society, many of the members are naturally incompetent to exercise sovereign powers : and even in an actual society whose government is the most popular, the members naturally incompetent to exercise sovereign powers are not the only members excluded from the sovereign body. If we add to the members excluded by reason of natural incom-

petence the members (women, for example), excluded without that necessity, we shall find that a great majority even of such a society is merely in a state of subjection. Consequently, though a government of all is not impossible, every actual society is governed by one of its members, or by a number of its members which lies between one and all.

(^u) In every monarchy, the monarch renders habitual deference to the opinions and sentiments held and felt by his subjects. But in almost every monarchy, he defers especially to the opinions and sentiments, or he consults especially the interests and prejudices, of some

Governments which may be styled aristocracies (in the generic meaning of the expression) are not unfrequently distinguished into the three following forms: namely, *oligarchies*, *aristocracies* (in the specific meaning of the name), and *democracies*. If the proportion of the sovereign number to the number of the entire community be deemed extremely small, the supreme government is styled an *oligarchy*. If the proportion be deemed small, but not extremely small, the supreme government is styled an *aristocracy* (in the specific meaning of the name). If the proportion be deemed large, the supreme government is styled *popular*, or is styled a *democracy*. But these three forms of aristocracy (in the generic meaning of the expression) can hardly be distinguished with precision, or even with a distant approach to it. A government which one man shall deem an oli-

Of such distinctions between aristocracies as are founded on differences between the proportions which the number of the sovereign body may bear to the number of the community.

especially influential though narrow portion of the community. If the monarchy be military, or if the main instrument of rule be the sword, this influential portion is the military class generally, or a select body of the soldiery. If the main instrument of rule be not the sword, this influential portion commonly consists of nobles, or of nobles, priests, and lawyers. For example: In the Roman world, under the sovereignty of the princes or emperors, this influential portion was formed by the standing armies, and, more particularly, by the Prætorian guard: as, in the Turkish empire, it consists, or consisted, of the corps of Janizaries. In France, after the kings had become sovereign, and before the great revolution, this influential portion was formed by the nobility of the sword, the secular and regular clergy, and the members of the parliaments or higher courts of justice.

Hence it has been concluded, that there are no monarchies properly so called: that every supreme government is a government of a number: that in every community which seems to be governed by one, the sovereignty really resides in the seeming monarch or autocrat, with that especially influential though narrow portion of the community to whose opinions and sentiments he especially defers. This, though plausible, is an error. If he habitually obeyed the *commands* of a determinate portion of the community, the sovereignty would reside in the miscalled monarch, with that determinate body of his miscalled subjects: or the sovereignty would reside exclusively in that determinate body, whilst he would be merely a minister of

In case the corps of Janizaries, acting as an organised body, habitually addressed commands to the Turkish sultan, the Turkish sultan, if he habitually obeyed those commands would not be sovereign in the Turkish empire. The sovereignty would reside in the corps of Janizaries, with the miscalled sultan or monarch: or the sovereignty would reside exclusively in the corps of Janizaries, whilst he would be merely their vizier or prime minister. But habitual deference to opinions of the community, or habitual and especial deference to opinions of a portion of the community, consists with that independence which is one of the essentials of sovereignty. If it did not, none of the governments deemed supreme would be truly sovereign; for habitual deference to opinions of the community, or habitual and especial deference to opinions of a portion of the community, is rendered by every aristocracy, or by every government of a number, as well as by every monarch. Nay, supreme government would be impossible: for if the sovereignty resided in the portion of the community to whose opinions and sentiments the sovereign especially deferred, it would reside in a body uncertain (that is to say, nowhere), or in a certain body not in a habit of command. A confusion of laws properly so called with laws improper imposed by opinion, is the source of the error in question. The habitual independence which is one of the essentials of sovereignty, is merely habitual independence of laws imperative and proper. By laws which opinion imposes, every member of every society is habitually determined.

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garchy, will appear to another a liberal aristocracy : whilst a government which one man shall deem an aristocracy, will appear to another a narrow oligarchy. A government which one man shall deem a democracy, will appear to another a government of a few : whilst a government which one man shall deem an aristocracy, will appear to another a government of many. The proportion, moreover, of the sovereign number to the number of the entire community, may stand, it is manifest, at any point in a long series of minute degrees.

The distinctions between aristocracies to which I have now adverted, are founded on differences between the proportions which the number of the sovereign body may bear to the number of the community.

Of such distinctions between aristocracies as are founded on differences between the modes wherein the sovereign number may share the sovereign powers.

Other distinctions between aristocracies are founded on differences between the modes wherein the sovereign number may share the sovereign powers.

For though the sovereign number may be a homogeneous body, or a body of individual persons whose political characters are similar, it is commonly a mixed or heterogeneous body, or a body of individual persons whose political characters are different. The sovereign number, for example, may consist of an oligarchical or narrower, and a democratical or larger body : of a single individual person styled an emperor or king, and a body oligarchical, or a body democratical : or of a single individual person bearing one of those names, and a body of the former description, with another of the last-mentioned kind. And in any of these cases, or of numberless similar cases, the various constituent members of the heterogeneous and sovereign body may share the sovereign powers in any of infinite modes.

Of such aristocracies as are styled limited monarchies.

The infinite forms of aristocracy which result from those infinite modes, have not been divided systematically into kinds and sorts, or have not been distinguished systematically by generic and specific names. But some of those infinite forms have been distinguished broadly from the rest, and have been marked with the common name of *limited monarchies*.

Now (as I have intimated above, and shall show more fully hereafter), the difference between monarchies or governments of one, and aristocracies or governments of a number, is of all the differences between governments the most precise or definite, and, in regard to the pregnant distinction between positive law and morality, incomparably

the most important. And, since this capital difference between governments of one and a number is involved in some obscurity through the name of *limited monarchy*, I will offer a few remarks upon the various forms of aristocracy to which that name is applied.

In all or most of the governments which are styled limited monarchies, a single individual shares the sovereign powers with an aggregate or aggregates of individuals: the share of that single individual, be it greater or less, surpassing or exceeding the share of any of the other individuals who are also constituent members of the supreme and heterogeneous body. And by that pre-eminence of share in the sovereign or supreme powers, and (perhaps) by precedence in rank or other honorary marks, that single individual is distinguished, more or less conspicuously, from any of the other individuals with whom he partakes in the sovereignty.

But in spite of that pre-eminence, and in spite of that precedence, that foremost individual member of the mixed or heterogeneous aristocracy, is not a monarch in the proper acceptation of the term: nor is the mixed aristocracy of which he is the foremost member, a monarchy properly so called. Unlike a monarch in the proper acceptation of the term, that single individual is not a sovereign, but is one of a sovereign number. Unlike a monarch properly so called, that single individual, considered singly, lives in a state of subjection. Considered singly, he is subject to the sovereign body of which he is merely a limb.

Limited monarchy, therefore, is not monarchy. It is one or another of those infinite forms of aristocracy which result from the infinite modes wherein the sovereign number may share the sovereign powers. And, like any other of those infinite forms, it belongs to one or another of those three forms of aristocracy which I have noticed in a preceding paragraph. If the number of the sovereign body (the so called monarch included) bear to the number of the community an extremely small proportion, the so called monarchy is an oligarchy. If the same proportion be small, but not extremely small, the so called limited monarchy is an aristocratical government (in the specific meaning of the name). If the same proportion be large, the so called limited monarchy is a democratical or popular government, or a government of many.^(*)

(*) 'The government of a kingdom where- in the king is limited, is by most writers called monarchy. Such a king, however, is not sovereign, but is a minister of him

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As meaning monarchical power limited by positive law, the name *limited monarchy* involves a contradiction in terms. For a monarch properly so called is sovereign or supreme; and, as I shall show hereafter, sovereign or supreme power is incapable of legal limitation, whether it reside in an individual, or in a number of individuals. It is true that the power of an aristocracy, styled a limited monarchy, is limited by positive morality, and also by the law of God. But, the power of every government being limited by those restraints, the name *limited monarchy*, as pointing to those restraints, is not a whit more applicable to such aristocracies as are marked with it, than to monarchies properly so called.—And as the name is absurd or inappropriate, so is its application capricious. Although it is applied to some of the aristocracies wherein a single individual has the pre-eminence mentioned above, it is also withheld from others to which it is equally applicable. Its application, indeed, is commonly determined by a purely immaterial circumstance: by the nature of the title, or the nature of the name of office, which that foremost member of the mixed aristocracy happens to bear. If he happen to bear a title which commonly is borne by monarchs in the proper acceptation of the term, the supreme government whereof he is a member is usually styled a limited monarchy. Otherwise, the supreme government whereof he is a member is usually marked with a different name. For example: The title of *βασιλεὺς*, *rex*, or *king*, is commonly borne by monarchs in the proper acceptation of the term: and since our own king happens to bear that title, our own mixed aristocracy of king, lords, and commons, is usually styled a limited monarchy. If his share in the sovereign powers were exactly what it is now, but he were called protector, president, or stadtholder, the mixed aristocracy of which he is a member would probably be styled a republic. And for such verbal differences between forms of supreme govern-

or them who truly have the sovereign power.' 'The king whose power is limited, is not the sovereign of the assembly which hath the power to limit it. The sovereignty, therefore, is in that assembly which hath the power to limit him. And, by consequence, the government is not monarchy, but aristocracy or democracy.'—In these extracts from Hobbes' *Leviathan*, the true nature of the supreme governments which are styled limited monarchies is well stated. It cannot, however, be said, with perfect precision, that the so called limited monarch is

merely a minister of the sovereign. He commonly, it is true, has subordinate political powers, or is a minister of the sovereign body: but, unless he also partook in the supreme powers, or unless he were a member, as well as a minister of the body, he would hardly be complimented with the magnificent name of monarch, and the sovereign government of which he was merely a servant would hardly be styled a monarchy. I shall revert to the character or position of a so called limited monarch, when I come to consider the limits of sovereign power.

ment has the peace of mankind been frequently troubled by ignorant and headlong fanatics.^(p)

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(p) The present is a convenient place for the following remarks upon terms.

The term 'sovereign,' or '*the sovereign*,' applies to a sovereign body as well as to a sovereign individual. '*Il sovrano*' and '*le souverain*' are used by Italian and French writers with this generic and commodious meaning. I say *commodious*: for supreme government, abstracted from form, is frequently a subject of discourse. '*Die Obrigkeit*' (the person or body *over* the community) is also applied indifferently, by German writers, to a sovereign individual or a sovereign number: though it not unfrequently signifies the aggregate of the political superiors who in capacities supreme and subordinate govern the given society. But though 'sovereign' is a generic name for sovereign individuals and bodies, it is not unfrequently used as if it were appropriate to the former: as if it were synonymous with 'monarch' in the proper acceptation of the term. 'Sovereign,' as well as 'monarch,' is also often misapplied to the foremost individual member of a so called limited monarchy. Our own king, for example, is neither 'sovereign' nor 'monarch': but, this notwithstanding, he hardly is mentioned oftener by his appropriate title of 'king,' than by those inappropriate and affected names.

'Republic,' or 'commonwealth,' has the following amongst other meanings.—
1. Without reference to the form of the government, it denotes the main object for which a government should exist. It denotes the weal or good of an independent political society: that is to say, the aggregate good of all the individual members, or the aggregate good of those of the individual members whose weal is deemed by the speaker worthy of regard.
2. Without reference to the form of the government, it denotes a society political and independent.
3. Any aristocracy, or government of a number, which has not acquired the name of a limited monarchy, is commonly styled a republican government, or, more briefly, a republic. But the name 'republican government,' or the name 'republic,' is applied emphatically to such of the aristocracies in question as are deemed democracies or governments of many.
4. 'Republic' also denotes an independent political society whose supreme government is styled republican.

The meanings of 'state,' or '*the state*.'

are numerous and disparate: of which numerous and disparate meanings the following are the most remarkable—1. '*The state*' is usually synonymous with '*the sovereign*.' It denotes the individual person, or the body of individual persons, which bears the supreme powers in an independent political society. This is the meaning which I annex to the term, unless I employ it expressly with a different import. 2. By the Roman lawyers, the expression '*status reipublicæ*' seems to be used in two senses. As used in one of those senses, it is synonymous with 'republic,' or 'commonwealth,' in the first of the four meanings which I have enumerated above: that is to say, it denotes the weal or good of an independent political society. As used in the other of those senses, it denotes the individual or body which is sovereign in a given society, together with the subject individuals and subject bodies who hold political rights from that sovereign one or number. Or (changing the phrase) it denotes the respective conditions of the several political superiors who with sovereign and delegated powers govern the community in question. And the '*status reipublicæ*,' as thus understood, is the appropriate subject of *public law* in the definite meaning of the term: that is to say, the portion of a *corpus juris* which is concerned with political conditions, or with the powers, rights, and duties of political superiors. It is hardly necessary to remark, that the expression '*status reipublicæ*' is not coextensive or synonymous with the expression '*status*.' The former is a collective name for political or public conditions, or for the powers, rights, and duties of political superiors. The latter is synonymous with the term 'condition,' and denotes a private condition as well as a political or public. 3. Where a sovereign body is compounded of minor bodies, or of one individual person and minor bodies, those minor bodies are not unfrequently styled 'states' or 'estates.' For example: Before the kings of France had become substantially sovereign, the sovereignty resided in the king with the three *estates* of the realm. 4. An independent political society is often styled a 'state,' or a 'sovereign and independent state.'

An independent political society is often styled a 'nation,' or a 'sovereign and independent nation.' But the term

Various meanings of the following terms: 1. The term 'sovereign,' or '*the sovereign*.' 2. The term 'republic,' or 'commonwealth.' 3. The term 'state,' or '*the state*.' 4. The term 'nation.'

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To the foregoing brief analysis of the forms of supreme government, I append a short examination of the four following topics: for they are far more intimately connected with the subject of that analysis than with any of the other subjects which the scope of my lecture embraces. 1. The exercise of sovereign powers, by a monarch or sovereign body, through political subordinates or delegates representing their sovereign author. 2. The distinction of sovereign and other political powers, into such as are *legislative*, and such as are *executive* or *administrative*. 3. The true natures of the communities or governments which are styled by writers on positive international law *half-sovereign states*. 4. The nature of a *composite state*, or a *supreme federal government*: with the nature of a *system of confederated states*, or a *permanent confederacy of supreme governments*.

Of the exercise of sovereign powers, by a monarch or sovereign body, through political subordinates or delegates representing their sovereign author.

In an independent political society of the smallest possible magnitude, inhabiting a territory of the smallest possible extent, and living under a monarchy or an extremely narrow oligarchy, all the supreme powers brought into exercise (save those committed to subjects as private persons) might possibly be exercised directly by the monarch or supreme body. But by every actual sovereign (whether the sovereign be one individual, or a number or aggregate of individuals), some of those powers are exercised through political subordinates or delegates representing their sovereign author. This exercise of sovereign powers through political subordinates or delegates, is rendered absolutely necessary, in every actual society, by innumerable causes. For example, if the number of the society be large, or if its territory be large, although its number be small, the quantity of work to be done in the way of political government is more than can be done by the sovereign without the assistance of ministers. If the society be governed by a popular body, there is some of the business of government which cannot be done by the sovereign without the intervention of representatives; for there is some of the business of government to which the body is incompetent by reason of its own bulk; and some of the business of government the body is prevented from performing by the private avocations of its members. If the society be governed by a popular body whose members live dispersedly

'nation,' or the term '*gens*,' is used more properly with the following meaning. It denotes an aggregate of persons, exceeding a single family, who are connected through blood or lineage, and,

perhaps, through a common language. And, thus understood, a 'nation' or '*gens*' is not necessarily an independent political society.

throughout an extensive territory, the sovereign body is constrained by the wide dispersion of its members to exercise through representatives some of its sovereign powers.

In most or many of the societies whose supreme governments are monarchical, or whose supreme governments are oligarchical, or whose supreme governments are aristocratical (in the specific meaning of the name), many of the sovereign powers are exercised by the sovereign directly, or the sovereign performs directly much of the business of government.

Many of the sovereign powers are exercised by the sovereign directly, or the sovereign performs directly much of the business of government, even in some of the societies whose supreme governments are popular. For example: In all or most of the democracies of ancient Greece and Italy, the sovereign people or number, formally assembled, exercised directly many of its sovereign powers. And in some of the Swiss Cantons whose supreme governments are popular, the sovereign portion of the citizens, regularly convened, performs directly much of the business of government.

But in many of the societies whose supreme governments are popular, the sovereign or supreme body (or any numerous body forming a component part of it) exercises through representatives, whom it elects and appoints, the whole, or nearly the whole, of its sovereign or supreme powers. In our own country, for example, one component part of the sovereign or supreme body is the numerous body of *the commons* (in the strict signification of the name): that is to say, such of the commons (in the large acceptation of the term) as share the sovereignty with the king and the peers, and elect the members of the commons' house. Now the commons exercise through representatives the whole of their sovereign powers; or they exercise through representatives the whole of their sovereign powers, except their sovereign power of electing and appointing representatives to represent them in the British Parliament. So that if the commons were sovereign without the king and the peers, not a single sovereign power, save that which I have now specified, would be exercised by the sovereign directly.

Where a sovereign body (or any smaller body forming a component part of it) exercises through representatives the whole of its sovereign powers, it may delegate those its powers to those its representatives, in either of two modes. 1. It may delegate those its powers to those its representatives, subject to a trust or trusts. 2. It may delegate those

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its powers to those its representatives, absolutely or unconditionally: insomuch that the representative body, during the period for which it is elected and appointed, occupies completely the place of the electoral; or insomuch that the former, during the period for which it is elected and appointed, is invested completely with the sovereign character of the latter.

For example: The commons delegate their powers to the members of the commons' house, in the second of the above-mentioned modes. During the period for which those members are elected, or during the parliament of which those members are a limb, the sovereignty is possessed by the king and the peers, with the members of the commons' house, and not by the king and the peers, with the delegating body of the commons: though when that period expires, or when that parliament is any how dissolved, the delegated share in the sovereignty reverts to that delegating body, or the king and the peers, with the delegating body of the commons, are then the body wherein the sovereignty resides. So that if the commons were sovereign without the king and the peers, their present representatives in parliament would be the sovereign in effect, or would possess the entire sovereignty free from trust or obligation.—The powers of the commons are delegated so absolutely to the members of the commons' house, that this representative assembly might concur with the king and the peers in defeating the principal ends for which it is elected and appointed. It might concur, for instance, in making a statute which would lengthen its own duration from seven to twenty years; or which would annihilate completely the actual constitution of the government, by transferring the sovereignty to the king or the peers from the tripartite body wherein it resides at present.

But though the commons delegate their powers in the second of the above-mentioned modes, it is clear that they might delegate them subject to a trust or trusts. The representative body, for instance, might be bound to use those powers consistently with specific ends pointed out by the electoral: or it might be bound, more generally and vaguely, not to annihilate, or alter essentially, the actual constitution of the supreme government. And if the commons were sovereign without the king and the peers, they might impose a similar trust upon any representative body to which they might delegate the entire sovereignty.

Where such a trust is imposed by a sovereign or supreme

body (or by a smaller body forming a component part of it), the trust is enforced by legal, or by merely moral sanctions. The representative body is bound by a positive law or laws: or it is merely bound by a fear that it may offend the bulk of the community, in case it shall break the engagement which it has contracted with the electoral.

And here I may briefly remark, that this last is the position which really is occupied by the members of the commons' house. Adopting the language of most of the writers who have treated of the British Constitution, I commonly suppose that the present parliament, or the parliament for the time being, is possessed of the sovereignty: or I commonly suppose that the king and the lords, with the members of the commons' house, form a tripartite body which is sovereign or supreme. But, speaking accurately, the members of the commons' house are merely trustees for the body by which they are elected and appointed: and, consequently, the sovereignty always resides in the king and the peers, with the electoral body of the commons. That a trust is imposed by the party delegating, and that the party representing engages to discharge the trust, seems to be imported by the correlative expressions *delegation* and *representation*. It were absurd to suppose that the delegating empowers the representative party to defeat or abandon any of the purposes for which the latter is appointed: to suppose, for example, that the commons empower their representatives in parliament to relinquish their share in the sovereignty to the king and the lords.—The supposition that the powers of the commons are delegated absolutely to the members of the commons' house probably arose from the following causes. 1. The trust imposed by the electoral body upon the body representing them in parliament, is tacit rather than express: it arises from the relation between the bodies as delegating and representative parties, rather than from oral or written instructions given by the former to the latter. But since it arises from that relation, the trust is general and vague. The representatives are merely bound, generally and vaguely, to abstain from any such exercise of the delegated sovereign powers as would tend to defeat the purposes for which they are elected and appointed. 2. The trust is simply enforced by moral sanctions. In other words, that portion of constitutional law which regards the duties of the representative towards the electoral body, is positive morality merely. Nor is this extraordinary. For (as I shall show hereafter) all constitu-

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tional law, in every country whatever, is, as against the sovereign, in that predicament: and much of it, in every country, is also in that predicament, even as against parties who are subject or 'subordinate to the sovereign, and who therefore might be held from infringing it by legal or political sanctions.

If a trust of the kind in question were enforced by legal sanctions, the positive law binding the representative body might be made by the representative body and not by the electoral. For example: If the duties of the commons' house towards the commons who appoint it were enforced by legal sanctions, the positive law binding the commons' house might be made by the parliament: that is to say, by the commons' house itself in conjunction with the king and the peers. Or, supposing the sovereignty resided in the commons without the king and the peers, the positive law binding the commons' house might be made by the house itself as representing the sovereign or state.—But, in either of these cases, the law might be abrogated by its immediate author without the direct consent of the electoral body. Nor could the electoral body escape from that inconvenience, so long as its direct exercise of its sovereign or supreme powers was limited to the election of representatives. In order that the electoral body might escape from that inconvenience, the positive law binding its representatives must be made directly by itself or with its direct concurrence. For example: In order that the members of the commons' house might be bound legally and completely to discharge their duties to the commons, the law must be made directly by the commons themselves in concurrence with the king and the lords: or, supposing the sovereignty resided in the commons without the king and the peers, the law must be made directly by the commons themselves as being exclusively the sovereign. In either of these cases, the law could not be abrogated without the direct consent of the electoral body itself. For the king and the lords with the electoral body of the commons, or the electoral body of the commons as being exclusively the sovereign, would form an extraordinary and ulterior legislature: a legislature superior to that ordinary legislature which would be formed by the parliament or by the commons' house. A law of the parliament, or a law of the commons' house, which affected to abrogate a law of the extraordinary and ulterior legislature, would not be obeyed by the courts of justice. The tribunals would

enforce the latter in the teeth of the former. They would examine the competence of the ordinary legislature to make the abrogating law, as they now examine the competence of any subordinate corporation to establish a by-law or other statute or ordinance. In the state of New York, the ordinary legislature of the state is controlled by an extraordinary legislature, in the manner which I have now described. The body of citizens appointing the ordinary legislature, forms an extraordinary and ulterior legislature by which the constitution of the state was directly established: and any law of the ordinary legislature, which conflicted with a constitutional law directly proceeding from the extraordinary, would be treated by the courts of justice as a legally invalid act.—That such an extraordinary and ulterior legislature is a good or useful institution, I pretend not to affirm. I merely affirm that the institution is possible, and that in one political society the institution actually obtains.

From the exercise of sovereign powers by the sovereign directly, and also by the sovereign through political subordinates or delegates, I pass to the distinction of sovereign, and other political powers, into such as are *legislative*, and such as are *executive* or *administrative*.

Of the distinction of sovereign, and other political powers, into such as are *legislative*, and such as are *executive* or *administrative*.

It seems to be supposed by many writers, that legislative political powers, and executive political powers, may be distinguished precisely, or, at least, with an approach to precision: and that in every society whose government is a government of a number, or, at least, in every society whose government is a limited monarchy, the legislative sovereign powers, and the executive sovereign powers, belong to distinct parties. According, for example, to Sir William Blackstone, the legislative sovereign powers reside in the parliament: that is to say, in the tripartite sovereign body formed by the king, the members of the house of lords, and the members of the house of commons. But, according to the same writer, the executive sovereign powers reside in the king alone.

Now the distinction of political powers into such as are *legislative*, and such as are *executive*, scarcely coincides with the distinction of those powers into such as are *supreme* and such as are *subordinate*: for it is stated or assumed by the writers who make the former distinction, that sovereign political powers (and, indeed, subordinate also) are divisible into such as are legislative and such as are executive. If the distinction of political powers into legislative and executive

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have any determinate meaning, its meaning must be this: The former are powers of establishing laws, and of issuing other commands: whilst the latter are powers of administering, or of carrying into operation, laws or other commands already established or issued. But the distinction, as thus understood, is far from approaching to precision. For of all the instruments or means by which laws and other commands are administered or executed, laws and other commands are incomparably the most frequent: insomuch that most of the powers deemed executive or administrative are themselves legislative powers, or involve powers which are legislative. For example: As administered or executed by courts of justice, laws are mainly administered through judgments or decrees: that is to say, through commands issued in particular cases by supreme or subordinate tribunals. And, in order that the laws so administered may be administered well, they must be administered agreeably to laws which are merely subservient to that purpose. Thus: All laws or rules determining the practice of courts, or all laws or rules determining judicial procedure, are purely subsidiary to the due execution of others.

That the legislative sovereign powers, and the executive sovereign powers, belong, in any society, to distinct parties, is a supposition too palpably false to endure a moment's examination. Of the numerous proofs of its falsity which it were easy to produce the following will more than suffice.—1. Of the laws or rules made by the British parliament, or by any supreme legislature, many are subsidiary, and are intended to be subsidiary, to the due execution of others. And as making laws or rules subservient to that purpose, it is not less *executive* than courts of justice as making regulations of procedure.—2. In almost every society, *judicial* powers, commonly esteemed *executive* or *administrative*, are exercised directly by the supreme legislature. For example: The Roman emperors or princes, who were virtually sovereign in the Roman empire or world, not only issued the *edictal* constitutions which were general rules or laws, but, as forming the highest or ultimate tribunal of appeal, they also issued the particular constitutions which were styled *decretes* or judgments. In *libera republica*, or before the virtual dissolution of the free or popular government, the sovereign Roman people, then the supreme legislature, was a high court of justice for the trial of criminal causes. The powers of supreme judicature inhering in the modern parliament, or

the body formed by the king and the upper and lower houses, have ever (I believe) been dormant, or have never been brought into exercise: for, as making the particular but *ex post facto* statutes which are styled acts of attainder, it is not properly a court of justice. But the ancient parliament, formed by the king and the barons, of which the modern is the offspring, was the ultimate court of appeal as well as the sovereign legislature.—3. The present British constitution affords not the slightest countenance to the supposition which I am now examining. It is absurd to say that the parliament has the legislative sovereign powers, but that the executive sovereign powers belong to the king alone. If the parliament (as Blackstone affirms) be sovereign or absolute, every sovereign power must belong to that sovereign body, or to one or more of its members as forming a part or parts of it. The powers of the king considered as detached from the body, or the powers of any of its members considered in the same light, are not sovereign powers, but are simply or purely subordinate: or (changing the phrase) if the king or any of its members, considered as detached from the body, be invested with political powers, that member as so detached is merely a minister of the body, or those political powers are merely emanations of its sovereignty. Besides, political powers which surely may be deemed *executive* are exercised by each of the houses; whilst political powers which surely may be deemed *legislative* are exercised by the king. In civil causes, the house of lords is the ultimate court of appeal; and of all the political powers which are deemed executive or administrative, judicial powers are the most important and remarkable. The executive or administrative powers which reside in the lower house, are not so weighty and obvious as those which belong to the upper: but still it were easy to show that it exercises powers of the kind. For example: Exercising judicature, through select committees of its members, it adjudges that elections of its members are legally valid or void.²⁰ The political powers exercised by the king which surely may be deemed legislative, are of vast extent and importance. As captain general, for example, he makes articles of war: that is to say, laws which regard especially the discipline or government of the soldiery. As administering the law, through subordinate courts of justice, he is the author of the rules of procedure which they

²⁰ This judicial power in regard to to subordinate judges, by 'The elections is for the first time committed mentary Elections Act 1868.'—R. C.

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have established avowedly, or in the properly legislative mode: and (what is of greater importance) he is the author of that measureless system of judge-made rules of law, or rules of law made in the judicial manner, which has been established covertly by those subordinate tribunals as directly exercising their judicial functions.²¹

Of all the larger divisions of political powers, the division of those powers into *supreme* and *subordinate* is perhaps the only precise one. The former are the political powers, infinite in number and kind, which, partly brought into exercise, and partly lying dormant, belong to a sovereign or state: that is to say, to the monarch properly so called, if the government be a government of one: and, if the government be a government of a number, to the sovereign body considered collectively, or to its various members considered as component parts of it. The latter are those portions of the supreme powers which are delegated to political subordinates: such political subordinates being subordinate or subject merely, or also immediate partakers in those very supreme powers of portions or shares wherein they are possessed as ministers and trustees.

The true
natures of
the com-
munities or
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styled by
writers on
positive in-
ternational
law *half*
sovereign
states.

There were formerly in Europe many of the communities or governments which are styled by writers on positive international law *half sovereign states*. In consequence of the mighty changes wrought by the French revolution, such communities or governments have wholly or nearly disappeared: and I advert to the true natures of such communities or governments, not because they are intrinsically of any importance or interest, but because the incongruous epithet *half* or *imperfectly sovereign* obscures the essence of sovereignty and independent political society. It seems to import that the governments marked with it are sovereign and subject at once.

²¹ Division of governments according to *forma imperii* (Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy), or *forma regiminis* (despotic or republican). The latter is founded on a fancied distinction between

executive and legislative. See Kant, *Entwurf zum ewigen Frieden*, pp. 25-30. Krug, *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch Philosophie, &c.*, Vol. IV., p. 37. Politz, *Staatswissenschaft*, Vol. I. MS. Note.

[On referring to Kant's 'Entwurf,' I found it filled with the marginal notes with which almost all the Author's books treating of the subjects of his patient and penetrating study, are enriched. The blank leaves in the covers are also covered with Tables, to which he had reduced Kant's definitions of the several forms of Government. They are inserted

at the end of this Lecture, not only on account of their intrinsic value, but as affording an example of the manner in which books were dealt with by one who never quitted a subject till he had thoroughly mastered it, and placed it before his own mind with luminous distinctness.—S. A.]

According to writers on positive international law, a government half or imperfectly sovereign occupies the following position.—In spite of its half or imperfect dependence, it has most of the political and sovereign powers which belong to a government wholly or perfectly supreme. More especially, in all or most of its foreign relations, or in all or most of its relations to foreign or external governments, it acts and is treated as a perfectly sovereign government, and not as a government in a state of subjection to another: inasmuch that it makes and breaks alliances, and makes war or peace, without authority from another government, or of its own discretion. But, this notwithstanding, the government, or a member of the government, of another political society, has political powers over the society deemed imperfectly independent. For example: In the Germanico-Roman or Romano-Germanic empire, the particular German governments depending on the empire immediately, or holding of the emperor by tenure *in capite* were deemed imperfectly sovereign in regard to that general government which consisted of the emperor and themselves as forming the Imperial Diet. For though in their foreign relations they were wholly or nearly independent, they were bound (in reality or show) by laws of that general government: and its tribunals had appellate judicature (substantially or to appearance) over the political and half independent communities wherein they were half supreme. Most, indeed, of the governments deemed imperfectly supreme, are governments which in their origin had been substantially vassal: but which had insensibly escaped from most of their feudal bonds, though they still continued apparently in their primitive state of subjection.

Now I think it will appear on analysis, that every government deemed imperfectly supreme is really in one or another of the three following predicaments. It is perfectly subject to that other government in relation to which it is deemed imperfectly supreme: Or it is perfectly independent of the other, and therefore is of itself a truly sovereign government: Or in its own community it is jointly sovereign with the other, and is therefore a constituent member of a government supreme and independent. And if every government deemed imperfectly supreme be really in one or another of the three foregoing predicaments, there is no such political mongrel as a government sovereign and subject.—1. The political powers of the government deemed imperfectly supreme, may be exercised entirely and habitually at the

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pleasure and bidding of the other. On which supposition, its so called half sovereignty is merely nominal and illusive. It is perfectly subject to the other government, though that its perfect subjection may be imperfect in ostent. For example: Although, in its own name, and as of its own discretion, it makes war or peace, its power of making either is merely nominal and illusive, if the power be exercised habitually at the bidding of the other government.—2. The political powers exercised by the other government over the political society deemed imperfectly independent, may be exercised through the permission, or through the authority, of the government deemed imperfectly supreme. On which supposition, the government deemed imperfectly supreme is of itself a truly sovereign government: those powers being legal rights over its own subjects, which it grants expressly or tacitly to another sovereign government. (For, as I shall show hereafter, a sovereign government, with the permission or authority of another, may possess legal rights against the subjects of the latter.) For example: The great Frederic of Prussia, as prince-elector of Brandenburg, was deemed half or imperfectly sovereign in respect of his feudal connection with the German empire. Potentially and in practice, he was thoroughly independent of the Imperial government: and, supposing it exercised political powers over his subjects of the electorate, it virtually exercised them through his authority, and not through his obedience to its commands. Being in a habit of thrashing its armies, he was not in a habit of submission to his seeming feudal superior.—3. The political powers of the government deemed imperfectly supreme, may not be exercised entirely and habitually at the pleasure and bidding of the other: but yet its independence of the other may not be so complete, that the political powers exercised by the other over the political society deemed imperfectly independent, are merely exercised through its permission or authority. For example: We may suppose that the elector of Bavaria was independent of the Imperial government, in all or most of his foreign, and in most of his domestic relations: but that, this his independence notwithstanding, he could not have abolished completely, without incurring considerable danger, the appellate judicature of the Imperial tribunals over the Bavarian community. But on the supposition which I have now stated and exemplified, the sovereignty of the society deemed imperfectly independent resides in the government deemed imperfectly supreme

together with the other government: and, consequently, the government deemed imperfectly supreme is properly a constituent member of a government supreme and independent. The supreme government of the society deemed imperfectly independent, is one of the infinite forms of supreme government by a number, which result from the infinite modes wherein the sovereign number may share the sovereign powers. There is in the case, nothing extraordinary but this: that all the constituent members of the supreme government in question are not exclusively members of the political society which it governs; since one of them is also sovereign in another political society, or is also a constituent member of another supreme government. In consequence of this anomaly, the interests and pretensions of the constituent members more or less antagonize. But in almost every case of supreme government by a number, the interests and pretensions of the members more or less antagonize, although the supreme government be purely domestic. Whether a supreme government be purely domestic, or one of its limbs be also a limb of another, the supreme government is perpetuated through the mutual concessions of its members, notwithstanding the opposition of their interests and pretensions, and the bloody or bloodless conflicts which the opposition may occasionally beget.—For the reasons produced and suggested in the course of the foregoing analysis, I believe that no government is sovereign and subject at once: that no government can be styled with propriety *half* or *imperfectly*

(a) The application of the epithet *half sovereign* seems to be capricious. For example: Over most of the political communities wherein the Roman Catholic is the prevalent and established religion, legislative and judicial powers are exercised by the Pope: that is to say, by an external government, or a member of an external government. But those political communities, or their domestic and temporal governments, are not denominated, therefore, by writers on international law, half independent or half supreme. It seems to be supposed by such writers, that, in every political community occupying that position, those powers are merely exercised by the authority of the domestic government, or the domestic government and the Pope are jointly sovereign. On the first of which suppositions, the former is of itself perfectly sovereign: and on the

last of which suppositions, the former is a constituent member of a government supreme and independent.

According, indeed, to some of such writers, if those powers be exclusively exercised in matters strictly ecclesiastical, the sovereignty of the domestic government is not impaired by the exercise, though they are not merely exercised through its permission or authority. And, consequently, it is not necessary to suppose that it shares the sovereignty with the Pope, or to mark it with the incongruous epithet of half or imperfectly supreme. But though those powers be exclusively exercised in matters strictly ecclesiastical, still they are legislative and judicial powers. And how is it possible to distinguish precisely, matters which are strictly ecclesiastical, from matters which are not? the powers of ecclesiastical regiment which none but the church

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Before I dismiss the riddle which I have now endeavoured to resolve, I must state or suggest the following difference. —In numberless cases, political powers are exercised over a political community, by the government, or a member of the government, of an external political community. But the government of the former community is scarcely denominated half or imperfectly sovereign, unless the government of the latter, or the member of the government of the latter, possess those political powers as being the government of the latter, or as being a member of its government. For example: The particular German governments which depended on the empire immediately, are denominated half sovereign: for the powers exercised by the Imperial government over their respective communities, were exercised by that government as being that very government, or as being (at least, to appearance) the general government of Germany. But the government of the British Islands is not imperfectly sovereign in regard to the government of Hanover: nor is the government of Hanover an imperfectly sovereign government in regard to the government of the British Islands. For though the king of the British Islands is also king of Hanover, he is not king in either country as being king in the other. The powers which he exercises there, have no dependence whatever on his share in the sovereignty here: nor have the powers which he exercises here, any dependence on his sovereignty (or his share in the sovereignty) there.—The difference which I have now suggested, is analogous to the difference, in the Roman law, between *real* and *personal* servitudes: or to the resembling difference, in the law of England, between easements *appurtenant* and easements *in gross*. A *real* right of servitude, or a right of easement *appurtenant*, belongs to the party invested with the right, as being the owner or occupier of specifically determined land. A *personal* right of servitude, or a right of easement *in gross*, does not belong to the party as being such owner or occupier, but (according to the current jargon) is annexed to, or inheres in, his person.

Before I proceed to composite states, and systems of confederated states, I will try to explain a difficulty that is closely connected with the subjects which I have examined in the present section.—I have remarked already, and shall endeavour to demonstrate hereafter, that all the individuals

wield, from the powers of ecclesiastical regiment (or the *jus circa sacra*) which secular and profane governments may handle without sin?

or aggregates composing a sovereign number are subject to the supreme body of which they are component parts. Now where a member of a body which is sovereign in one community, is exclusively sovereign in another, how does the sovereignty of that member in the latter of the two communities, consist with the subjection of that member to the body which is sovereign in the former? Supposing, for example, that our own king was monarch and autocrator in Hanover, how would his subjection to the sovereign body of king, lords, and commons, consist with his sovereignty in his German kingdom? A limb or member of a sovereign body would seem to be shorn, by its habitual obedience to the body, of the habitual independence which must needs belong to it as sovereign in a foreign community.—To explain the difficulty, we must assume that the characters of sovereign, and member of the sovereign body, are practically distinct: that, as monarch (for instance) of the foreign community, a member of the sovereign body neither habitually obeys it, nor is habitually obeyed by it. For if, as monarch of the foreign community, he habitually obeyed the body, the body would be sovereign in that community, and he would be merely its minister: and, if, as monarch of the foreign community, he were habitually obeyed by the body, he, and not the body, would be sovereign in the other society. Insomuch that if the characters were practically blended, or, remaining practically distinct, thoroughly conflicted, one of the following results would probably ensue. The member would become subject, or else exclusively sovereign, in both communities: or to preserve his sovereignty in the one, or his part sovereignty in the other, he would renounce his connection with the latter, or with the former society.

Wherever a member of a body sovereign in one community, is also a member of a body sovereign in another, there is the same or a similar difficulty. A state of subjection to the former, and a state of subjection to the latter, may become incompatible: just as a state of subjection may become incompatible with the independence which is one of the essentials of sovereignty.

It not unfrequently happens, that two or more independent political societies become subject to a common sovereign: but that after their union, through that common subjection, they still are governed distinctly, and distinguished by their ancient titles. In this case, there is not the difficulty suggested above. The monarch or sovereign body

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ruling the two societies, is one and the same sovereign: and, through their subjection to that common sovereign, they are one society political and independent.

The nature of a composite state, or a supreme federal government: with the nature of a system of confederated states, or a permanent confederacy of supreme governments.

It frequently happens, that one society political and independent arises from a federal union of several political societies: or, rather, that one government political and sovereign arises from a federal union of several political governments. By some of the writers on positive international law, such an independent political society, or the sovereign government of such a society, is styled a *composite state*. But the sovereign government of such a society, might be styled more aptly, as well as more popularly, a *supreme federal government*.

It also frequently happens, that several political societies which are severally independent, or several political governments which are severally sovereign, are compacted by a permanent alliance. By some of the writers on positive international law, the several societies or governments, considered as thus compacted, are styled a *system of confederated states*. But the several governments, considered as thus compacted, might be styled more aptly, as well as more popularly, a *permanent confederacy of supreme governments*.

I advert to the nature of a composite state, and to that of a system of confederated states, for the following purposes.—It results from positions which I shall try to establish hereafter, that the power of a sovereign is incapable of legal limitation. It also results from positions which I have tried to establish already, that in every society political and independent, the sovereign is *one* individual, or *one* body of individuals: that unless the sovereign be *one* individual, or *one* body of individuals, the given independent society is either in a state of nature, or is split into two or more independent political societies. But in a political society styled a composite state, the sovereignty is so shared by various individuals or bodies, that the *one* sovereign body whereof they are the constituent members, is not conspicuous and easily perceived. In a political society styled a composite state, there is not obviously *any* party truly sovereign and independent: there is not obviously *any* party armed with political powers incapable of legal limitation. Accordingly, I advert to the nature of a supreme federal government, to show that the society which it rules is ruled by one sovereign, or is ruled by a party truly sovereign and independent. And adverting to the nature of a composite state, I also advert to the nature of a system of confederated states. For the

fallacious resemblance of those widely different objects, tends to produce a confusion which I think it expedient to obviate: and, through a comparison or contrast of those widely different objects, I can indicate the nature of the former, more concisely and clearly.

1. In the case of a *composite state*, or a *supreme federal government*, the several united governments of the several united societies, together with a government common to those several societies, are jointly sovereign in each of those several societies, and also in the larger society arising from the federal union. Or, since the political powers of the common or general government were relinquished and conferred upon it by those several united governments, the nature of a composite state may be described more accurately thus. As compacted by the common government which they have concurred in creating, and to which they have severally delegated portions of their several sovereignties, the several governments of the several united societies are jointly sovereign in each and all.

It will appear on a moment's reflection, that the common or general government is not sovereign or supreme. It will also appear on a moment's reflection, that none of the several governments is sovereign or supreme, even in the several society of which it is the immediate chief.

If the common or general government were sovereign or supreme, the several united societies, though constituting one society, would not constitute a composite state: or, though they would be governed by a common and supreme government, their common and supreme government would not be federal. For in almost every case of independent political society, several political societies, governed by several governments, are comprised by the one society which is political and independent: insomuch that a government supreme and federal, and a government supreme but not federal, are merely distinguished by the following difference. Where the supreme government is not federal, each of the several governments, considered in that character, is purely subordinate: or none of the several governments, considered in that character, partakes of the sovereignty. But where the supreme government is properly federal, each of the several governments, *which were immediate parties to the federal compact*, is, in that character, a limb of the sovereign body. Consequently, although they are subject to the sovereign body of which they are constituent members, those

Lect. VI several governments, even considered as such, are not purely in a state of subjection.—But since those several governments, even considered as such, are not purely in a state of subjection, the common or general government which they have concurred in creating is not sovereign or supreme.

Nor is any of those several governments sovereign or supreme, even in the several society of which it is the immediate chief. If those several governments were severally sovereign, they would not be members of a composite state: though, if they were severally sovereign, and yet were permanently compacted, they would form (as I shall show immediately) a system of confederated states.

To illustrate the nature of a composite state, I will add the following remark to the foregoing general description.—Neither the immediate tribunals of the common or general government, nor the immediate tribunals of the several united governments, are bound, or empowered, to administer or execute *every* command that it may issue. The political powers of the common or general government, are merely those portions of their several sovereignties, which the several united governments, as parties to the federal compact, have relinquished and conferred upon it. Consequently, its competence to make laws and to issue other commands, may and ought to be examined by its own immediate tribunals, and also by the immediate tribunals of the several united governments. And if, in making a law or issuing a particular command, it exceed the limited powers which it derives from the federal compact, all those various tribunals are empowered and bound to disobey.—And since each of the united governments, as a party to the federal compact, has relinquished a portion of its sovereignty, neither the immediate tribunals of the common or general government, nor the immediate tribunals of the other united governments, nor even the tribunals which itself immediately appoints, are bound, or empowered, to administer or execute *every* command that it may issue. Since each of the united governments, as a party to the federal compact, has relinquished a portion of its sovereignty, its competence to make laws and to issue other commands, may and ought to be examined by all those various tribunals. And if it enact a law or issue a particular command, as exercising the sovereign powers which it has relinquished by the compact, all those various tribunals are empowered and bound to disobey.

If, then, the general government were of itself sovereign, or if the united governments were severally sovereign, the united societies would not constitute one composite state. The united societies would constitute one independent society, with a government supreme but not federal; or a knot of societies severally independent, with governments severally supreme. Consequently, the several united governments *as forming one aggregate body*, or they and the general government *as forming a similar body*, are jointly sovereign in each of the united societies, and also in the larger society arising from the union of all.

Now since the political powers of the common or general government are merely delegated to it by the several united governments, it is not a constituent member of the sovereign body, but is merely its subject minister. Consequently, the sovereignty of each of the united societies, and also of the larger society arising from the union of all, resides in the united governments *as forming one aggregate body*: that is to say, as signifying their joint pleasure, or the joint pleasure of a majority of their number, agreeably to the modes or forms determined by their federal compact.

By that aggregate body, the powers of the general government were conferred and determined: and by that aggregate body, its powers may be revoked, abridged, or enlarged.—To that aggregate body, the several united governments, though not merely subordinate, are truly in a state of subjection. Otherwise, those united governments would be severally sovereign or supreme, and the united societies would merely constitute a system of confederated states. Besides, since the powers of the general government were determined by that aggregate body, and since that aggregate body is competent to enlarge those powers, it necessarily determined the powers, and is competent to abridge the powers, of its own constituent members. For every political power conferred on the general government, is subtracted from the several sovereignties of the several united governments.—From the sovereignty of that aggregate body, we may deduce, as a necessary consequence, the fact which I have mentioned above: namely, that the competence of the general government, and of any of the united governments, may and ought to be examined by the immediate tribunals of the former, and also by the immediate tribunals of any of the latter. For since the general government, and also the united governments, are subject to that aggregate body, the respective

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courts of justice which they respectively appoint, ultimately derive their powers from that sovereign and ultimate legislature. Consequently, those courts are ministers and trustees of that sovereign and ultimate legislature, as well as of the subject legislatures by which they are immediately appointed. And, consequently, those courts are empowered, and are even bound to disobey, wherever those subject legislatures exceed the limited powers which that sovereign and ultimate legislature has granted or left them.

The supreme government of the United States of America, agrees (I believe) with the foregoing general description of a supreme federal government. I believe that the common government, or the government consisting of the congress and the president of the united states, is merely a subject minister of the united states' governments. I believe that none of the latter is properly sovereign or supreme, even in the state or political society of which it is the immediate chief. And, lastly, I believe that the sovereignty of each of the states, and also of the larger state arising from the federal union, resides in the states' governments *as forming one aggregate body*: meaning by a state's government, not its ordinary legislature, but the body of its citizens which appoints its ordinary legislature, and which, the union apart, is properly sovereign therein. If the several immediate chiefs of the several united states, were respectively single individuals, or were respectively narrow oligarchies, the sovereignty of each of the states, and also of the larger state arising from the federal union, would reside in those several individuals, or would reside in those several oligarchies, *as forming a collective whole.*^(r)

2. A *composite state*, and a *system of confederated states*, are broadly distinguished by the following essential difference. In the case of a *composite state*, the several united societies are one independent society, or are severally subject

(r) The Constitution of the United States, or the constitution of their general government, was framed by deputies from the several states in 1787. It may (I think) be inferred from the fifth article, that the sovereignty of each of the states, and also of the larger state arising from the federal union, resides in the states' governments *as forming one aggregate body*. It is provided by that article, that 'the congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution:

or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments: which amendments, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, *when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by convention in three-fourths thereof.*' See also the tenth section of the first article: in which section, some of the disabilities of the several states' governments are determined expressly.

to one sovereign body: which, through its minister the general government, and through its members and ministers the several united governments, is habitually and generally obeyed in each of the united societies, and also in the larger society arising from the union of all. In the case of a *system of confederated states*, the several compacted societies are not one society, and are not subject to a common sovereign: or (changing the phrase) each of the several societies is an independent political society, and each of their several governments is properly sovereign or supreme. Though the aggregate of the several governments was the framer of the federal compact, and may subsequently pass resolutions concerning the entire confederacy, neither the terms of that compact, nor such subsequent resolutions, are enforced in any of the societies by the authority of that aggregate body. To each of the confederated governments, those terms and resolutions are merely articles of agreement which it spontaneously adopts: and they owe their legal effect, in its own political society, to laws and other commands which it makes or fashions upon them, and which, of its own authority, it addresses to its own subjects. In short, a system of confederated states is not essentially different from a number of independent governments connected by an ordinary alliance. And where independent governments are connected by an ordinary alliance, none of the allied governments is subject to the allied governments considered as an aggregate body: though each of the allied governments adopts the terms of the alliance, and commonly enforces those terms, by laws and commands of its own, in its own independent community. Indeed, a system of confederated states, and a number of independent governments connected by an ordinary alliance, cannot be distinguished precisely through general or abstract expressions. So long as we abide in general expressions, we can only affirm generally and vaguely, that the compact of the former is intended to be permanent, whilst the alliance of the latter is commonly intended to be temporary: and that the ends or purposes which are embraced by the compact, are commonly more numerous, and are commonly more complicated, than those which the alliance contemplates.

I believe that the German Confederation, which has succeeded to the ancient Empire, is merely a system of confederated states. I believe that the present Diet is merely an assembly of ambassadors from several confederated but

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severally independent governments : that the resolutions of the Diet are merely articles of agreement which each of the confederated governments spontaneously adopts : and that they owe their legal effect, in each of the compacted communities, to laws and commands which are fashioned upon them by its own immediate chief. I also believe that the Swiss Confederation was and is of the same nature. If, in the case of the German, or of the Swiss Confederation, the body of confederated governments enforces its own resolutions, those confederated governments are one composite state, rather than a system of confederated states. The body of confederated governments is properly sovereign : and to that aggregate and sovereign body, each of its constituent members is properly in a state of subjection.

The limits
of sove-
reign
power.

From the various shapes which sovereignty may assume or from the various possible forms of supreme government, I proceed to the limits, real and imaginary, of sovereign or supreme power.

The essen-
tial differ-
ence of a
positive
law.

Subject to the slight correctives which I shall state at the close of my discourse, the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be put in the following manner.—Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign person or body, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the expression) it is set, directly or circuitously, by a monarch or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.

It follows
from the es-
sential dif-
ference of a
positive
law, and
from the
nature of
sovereignty
and inde-
pendent po-
litical so-
ciety, that
the power
of a
monarch
properly so
called, or
the power
of a sove-
reign num-
ber in its
collegiate

Now it follows from the essential difference of a positive law, and from the nature of sovereignty and independent political society, that the power of a monarch properly so called, or the power of a sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, is incapable of *legal* limitation. A monarch or sovereign number bound by a legal duty, were subject to a higher or superior sovereign : that is to say, a monarch or sovereign number bound by a legal duty, were sovereign and not sovereign. Supreme power limited by positive law, is a flat contradiction in terms.

Nor would a political society escape from legal despotism, although the power of the sovereign were bounded by legal restraints. The power of the superior sovereign immediately imposing the restraints, or the power of some other sovereign

superior to that superior, would still be absolutely free from the fetters of positive law. For unless the imagined restraints were ultimately imposed by a sovereign not in a state of subjection to a higher or superior sovereign, a series of sovereigns ascending to infinity would govern the imagined community. Which is impossible and absurd.

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and sovereign capacity, is incapable of legal limitation.

Monarchs and sovereign bodies have attempted to oblige themselves, or to oblige the successors to their sovereign powers. But in spite of the laws which sovereigns have imposed on themselves, or which they have imposed on the successors to their sovereign powers, the position that 'sovereign power is incapable of legal limitation' will hold universally or without exception.

Attempts

themselves, or to oblige the successors to their sovereign powers.

The immediate author of a law of the kind, or any of the sovereign successors to that immediate author, may abrogate the law at pleasure. And though the law be not abrogated, the sovereign for the time being is not constrained to observe it by a legal or political sanction. For if the sovereign for the time being were legally bound to observe it, that present sovereign would be in a state of subjection to a higher or superior sovereign.

As it regards the successors to the sovereign or supreme powers, a law of the kind amounts, at the most, to a rule of positive morality. As it regards its immediate author, it is merely a law by a metaphor. For if we would speak with propriety, we cannot speak of a law set by a man to himself: though a man may adopt a principle as a guide to his own conduct, and may observe it as he would observe it if he were bound to observe it by a sanction.

The laws which sovereigns affect to impose upon themselves, or the laws which sovereigns affect to impose upon their followers, are merely principles or maxims which they adopt as guides, or which they commend as guides to their successors in sovereign power. A departure by a sovereign or state from a law of the kind in question, is not illegal. If a law which it sets to its subjects conflict with a law of the kind, the former is legally valid, or legally binding.

For example: The sovereign Roman people solemnly voted or resolved, that they would never pass, or even take into consideration, what I will venture to denominate a *bill of pains and penalties*. For though, at the period in question, the Roman people were barbarians, they keenly felt a truth which is often forgotten by legislators in nations boasting of refinement: namely, that punishment ought to

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be inflicted agreeably to prospective rules, and not in pursuance of particular and *ex post facto* commands. This solemn resolution or vote was passed with the forms of legislation, and was inserted in the twelve tables in the following imperative terms: *privilegia ne irroganto*. But although the resolution or vote was passed with the forms of legislation, although it was clothed with the expressions appropriate to a law, and although it was inserted as a law in a code or body of statutes, it scarcely was a law in the proper acceptation of the term, and certainly was not a law simply and strictly so called. By that resolution or vote, the sovereign people adopted, and commended to their successors in the sovereignty, an ethical principle or maxim. The present and future sovereign which the resolution affected to oblige, was not bound or estopped by it. Privileges enacted in spite of it by the sovereign Roman people, were not illegal. The Roman tribunals might not have treated them as legally invalid acts, although they conflicted with the maxim, wearing the guise of a law, *privilegia ne irroganto*.

Again: By the authors of the union between England and Scotland, an attempt was made to oblige the legislature, which, in consequence of that union, is sovereign in both countries. It is declared in the Articles and Acts, that the preservation of the Church of England, and of the Kirk of Scotland, is a fundamental condition of the union: or, in other words, that the Parliament of Great Britain shall not abolish those churches, or make an essential change in their structures or constitutions. Now, so long as the bulk of either nation shall regard its established church with love and respect, the abolition of the church by the British Parliament would be an *immoral* act; for it would violate positive morality which obtains with the bulk of the nation, or would shock opinions and sentiments which the bulk of the nation holds. Assuming that the church establishment is commended by the revealed law, the abolition would be *irreligious*: or, assuming that the continuance of the establishment were commended by general utility, the abolition, as generally pernicious, would also amount to a *sin*. But no man, talking with a meaning, would call a parliamentary abolition of either or both of the churches an *illegal* act. For if the parliament for the time being be sovereign in England and Scotland, it cannot be bound legally by that condition of the union which affects to confer

immortality upon those ecclesiastical institutions. That condition of the union is not a positive law, but is counsel or advice offered by the authors of the union to future supreme legislatures.

By the two examples which I have now adduced, I am led to consider the meanings of the epithet *unconstitutional*, as it is contradistinguished in the epithet *illegal*, and as it is applied to conduct of a monarch, or to conduct of a sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity. The epithet *unconstitutional*, as thus opposed and applied, is sometimes used with a meaning which is more general and vague, and is sometimes used with a meaning which is more special and definite. I will begin with the former.

The meanings of the epithet *unconstitutional*, as it is contradistinguished to the epithet *illegal*, and as it is applied to conduct of a monarch, or to conduct of a sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity.

1. In every, or almost every, independent political society, there are principles or maxims which the sovereign habitually observes, and which the bulk of the society, or the bulk of its influential members, regard with feelings of approbation. Not unfrequently, such maxims are expressly adopted, as well as habitually observed, by the sovereign or state. More commonly, they are not expressly adopted by the sovereign or state, but are simply imposed upon it by opinions prevalent in the community. Whether they are expressly adopted by the sovereign or state, or are simply imposed upon it by opinions prevalent in the community, it is bound or constrained to observe them by merely moral sanctions. Or (changing the phrase) in case it ventured to deviate from a maxim of the kind in question, it would not and could not incur a legal pain or penalty, but it probably would incur censure, and might chance to meet with resistance, from the generality or bulk of the governed.

Now, if a law or other act of a monarch or sovereign number conflict with a maxim of the kind to which I have adverted above, the law or other act may be called *unconstitutional* (in that more general meaning which is sometimes given to the epithet). For example: The *ex post facto* statutes which are styled acts of attainder, may be called *unconstitutional*, though they cannot be called *illegal*. For they conflict with a principle of legislation which parliament has habitually observed, and which is regarded with approbation by the bulk of the British community.

In short, when we style an act of a sovereign an *unconstitutional* act (with that more general import which is sometimes given to the epithet), we mean, I believe, this: That

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the act is inconsistent with some given principle or maxim: that the given supreme government has expressly adopted the principle, or, at least, has habitually observed it: that the bulk of the given society, or the bulk of its influential members, regard the principle with approbation: and that, since the supreme government has habitually observed the principle, and since the bulk of the society regard it with approbation, the act in question must thwart the expectations of the latter, and must shock their opinions and sentiments. Unless we mean this, we merely mean that we deem the act in question generally pernicious: or that, without a definite reason for the disapprobation which we feel, we regard the act with dislike.

2. The epithet *unconstitutional* as applied to conduct of a sovereign, and as used with the meaning which is more special and definite, imports that the conduct in question conflicts with *constitutional law*.

And here I would briefly remark, that I mean by the expression *constitutional law*, the positive morality, or the compound of positive morality and positive law, which fixes the constitution or structure of the given supreme government. I mean the positive morality, or the compound of positive morality and positive law, which determines the character of the person, or the respective characters of the persons, in whom, for the time being, the sovereignty shall reside: and, supposing the government in question an aristocracy or government of a number, which determines moreover the mode wherein the sovereign powers shall be shared by the constituent members of the sovereign number or body.

Now, against a monarch properly so called, or against a sovereign body in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, constitutional law is positive morality merely, or is enforced merely by moral sanctions: though, as I shall show hereafter, it may amount to positive law, or may be enforced by legal sanctions, against the members of the body considered severally. The sovereign for the time being, or the predecessors of the sovereign, may have expressly adopted, and expressly promised to observe it. But whether constitutional law has thus been expressly adopted, or simply consists of principles current in the political community, it is merely guarded, against the sovereign, by sentiments or feelings of the governed. Consequently, although an act of the sovereign which violates constitutional law, may be styled with propriety *unconstitutional*, it is not an infringement of law

simply and strictly so called, and cannot be styled with propriety *illegal*.

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For example: From the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu down to the great revolution, the king for the time being was virtually sovereign in France. But, in the same country, and during the same period, a traditional maxim cherished by the courts of justice, and rooted in the affections of the bulk of the people, determined the succession to the throne: It determined that the throne, on the demise of an actual occupant, should invariably be taken by the person who then might happen to be heir to it agreeably to the canon of inheritance which was named the Salic law. Now, in case an actual king, by a royal ordinance or law, had attempted to divert the throne to his only daughter and child, that royal ordinance or law might have been styled with perfect propriety an *unconstitutional* act. It would have conflicted with the traditional maxim which fixed the constitution of the monarchy, and which was guarded from infringement by sentiments prevalent in the nation. But *illegal* it could not have been called: for, inasmuch as the actual king was virtually sovereign, he was inevitably independent of legal obligation. Nay, if the governed had resisted the unconstitutional ordinance, their resistance would have been illegal or a breach of positive law, though consonant to the positive morality which is styled constitutional law, and perhaps to that principle of utility which is the test of positive rules.

Again: An act of the British parliament vesting the sovereignty in the king, or vesting the sovereignty in the king and the upper or lower house, would essentially alter the structure of our present supreme government, and might therefore be styled with propriety an *unconstitutional* law. In case the imagined statute were also generally pernicious, and in case it offended moreover the generality or bulk of the nation, it might be styled *irreligious* and *immoral* as well as *unconstitutional*. But to call it *illegal* were absurd: for if the parliament for the time being be sovereign in the united kingdom, it is the author, directly or circuitously, of all our positive law, and exclusively sets us the measure of legal justice and injustice.^(*)

(*) It is affirmed by Hobbes, in his masterly treatises on government, that 'no law can be unjust:' which proposition has been deemed by many, an immoral or pernicious paradox. If we look at

the scope of the treatises in which it occurs, or even at the passages by which it is immediately followed, we shall find that the proposition is neither pernicious nor paradoxical, but is merely a truism

The meaning of Hobbes's proposition that 'no

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Considered severally, the members of a sovereign body are in a state of subjection to the body, and may therefore be legally bound, even as members of the body,

But when I affirm that the power of a sovereign is incapable of legal limitation, I always mean by a 'sovereign,' a monarch properly so called, or a sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity. Considered collectively, or considered in its corporate character, a sovereign number is sovereign and independent: but, considered severally, the individuals and smaller aggregates composing that sovereign number are subject to the supreme body of which they are component parts. Consequently, though the body is inevitably independent of legal or political duty, any of the individuals or aggregates whereof the body is composed may be

put in unguarded terms. His meaning is obviously this: that 'no *positive* law is *legally* unjust.' And the decried proposition, as thus understood, is indisputably true. For positive law is the measure or test of legal justice and injustice: and, consequently, if positive law might be legally unjust, positive law might be unjust as measured or tried by itself. In the passages immediately following, he tells us that positive law may be generally pernicious: that is to say, may conflict with the Divine law which general utility indicates, and, as measured or tried by that law, may be unjust. He might have added, that it also may be unjust as measured by positive morality, although it must needs be just as measured by itself, and although it happen to be just as measured by the law of God.

Just or unjust, justice or injustice, is a term of relative and varying import.

For *just or unjust, justice or injustice*, is a term of relative and varying import. Whenever it is uttered with a determinate meaning, it is uttered with relation to a determinate law which the speaker assumes as a standard of comparison. This is hinted by Locke at the end of the division of laws which I have inserted in my fifth lecture; and it is, indeed, so manifest, on a little sustained reflection, that it hardly needs the authority of that great and venerable name.

By the epithet *just*, we mean that a given object, to which we apply the epithet, accords with a given law to which we refer it as to a test. And as that which is *just* conforms to a determinate law, *justice* is the conformity of a given object to the same or a similar measure: for *justice* is the abstract term which corresponds to the epithet *just*. By the epithet *unjust*, we mean that the given

object conforms not to the given law. And since the term *injustice* is merely the corresponding abstract, it signifies the nonconformity of the given and compared object to that determinate law which is assumed as the standard of comparison.—And since such is the relative nature of justice and injustice, one and the same act may be just and unjust as tried by different measures. Or (changing the expression) an act may be just as agreeing with a given law, although the act itself, and the law with which it agrees, are both of them unjust as compared with a different rule. For example: Where positive law conflicts with positive morality, that which is just as tried by the former, is also unjust, as tried by the latter: or where law or morality conflicts with the law of God, that which is just as tried by the human rule, is also unjust as tried by the Divine.

Though it signifies conformity or nonconformity to any determinate law, the term *justice* or *injustice* sometimes denotes emphatically, conformity or nonconformity to the ultimate measure or test: namely, the law of God. This is the meaning annexed to *justice*, when law and justice are opposed: when a positive human rule is styled unjust. And when it is used with this meaning, *justice* is nearly equivalent to *general utility*. The only difference between them consists in this: that, as agreeing immediately with the law of God, a given and compared action is *just*; whilst, as agreeing immediately with the principle which is the index to the law of God, that given and compared action is *generally useful*. And hence it arises, that when we style an action just or unjust, we not uncommonly mean that it is generally useful or pernicious.²²

²² The substance of the remainder of this note, as it stood in the former editions, is contained in the note inserted in this

edition at the end of lecture V (p. 220, and following pages. See also note 16, p. 205.)—R. C.

legally bound by laws of which the body is the author. For example: A member of the house of lords, or a member of the house of commons, may be legally bound by an act of parliament, which, as one of the sovereign legislature, he has concurred with others in making. Nay, he may be legally bound by statutes, or by rules made judicially, which have immediately proceeded from subject or subordinate legislatures: for a law which proceeds immediately from a subject or subordinate legislature is set by the authority of the supreme.

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by laws of
which it is
the author.

And hence an important difference between monarchies or governments of one, and aristocracies or governments of a number.

Against a monarch properly so called, or against a sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, *constitutional law* (as I have remarked already) is enforced, or protected from infringement, by merely moral sanctions. Against a monarch properly so called, or against a sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, constitutional law and the law of nations are nearly in the same predicament. Each is positive morality rather than positive law. The former is guarded by sentiments current in the given community, as the latter is guarded by sentiments current amongst nations generally.

But, considered severally, the members of a sovereign body, even as members of the body, may be legally bound by laws of which the body is the author, and which regard the constitution of the given supreme government.—In case it be clothed with a legal sanction, or the means of enforcing it judicially be provided by its author, a law set by the body to any of its own members is properly a positive law: It is properly a positive law, or a law strictly so called, although it be imposed upon the obliged party as a member of the body which sets it. If the means of enforcing it judicially be not provided by its author, it is rather a rule of positive morality than a rule of positive law. But it wants the essentials of a positive law, not through the character of the party to whom it is set or directed, but because it is not invested with a legal or political sanction, or is a law of imperfect obligation in the sense of the Roman jurists.—In case the law be invested with a legal or political sanction, and regard the constitution or structure of the given supreme government, a breach of the law, by the party to whom it is set, is not only *unconstitutional* but is also

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illegal. The breach of the law is *unconstitutional*, inasmuch as the violated law regards the constitution of the state. The breach of the law is also *illegal*, inasmuch as the violated law may be enforced by judicial procedure.

For example: The king, as a limb of the parliament, might be punishable by act of parliament, in the event of his transgressing the limits which the constitution has set to his authority: in the event, for instance, of his pretending to give to a proclamation of his own the legal effect of a statute emanating from the sovereign legislature. Or the members of either house might be punishable by act of parliament, if, as forming a limb of the parliament, they exceeded their constitutional powers: if, for instance, they pretended to give that legal effect to an ordinance or resolution of their own body.

Where, then, the supreme government is a monarchy or government of one, constitutional law, as against that government, is inevitably nothing more than positive morality. Where the supreme government is an aristocracy or government of a number, constitutional law, as against the members of that government, may either consist of positive morality, or of a compound of positive morality and positive law. Against the sovereign body in its corporate and sovereign character, it is inevitably nothing more than positive morality. But against the members considered severally, be they individuals or be they aggregates of individuals, it may be guarded by legal or political, as well as by moral sanctions.

In fact or practice, the members considered severally, but considered as members of the body, are commonly free, wholly or partially, from legal or political restraints. For example: The king, as a limb of the parliament, is not responsible legally, or cannot commit a legal injury: and, as partaking in conduct of the assembly to which he immediately belongs, a member of the house of lords, or a member of the house of commons, is not amenable to positive law. But though this freedom from legal restraints may be highly useful or expedient, it is not necessary or inevitable. Considered severally, the members of a sovereign body, be they individuals or be they aggregates of individuals, may clearly be legally amenable, even as members of the body, to laws which the body imposes.

And here I may remark, that if a member considered severally, but ~~considered~~ as a member of the body, be wholly

or partially free from legal or political obligation, that legally irresponsible aggregate, or that legally irresponsible individual, is restrained or debarred in two ways from an unconstitutional exercise of its legally unlimited power. 1. Like the sovereign body of which it is a member, it is obliged or restrained morally: that is to say, it is controlled by opinions and sentiments current in the given community. 2. If it affected to issue a command which it is not empowered to issue by its constitutional share in the sovereignty, its unconstitutional command would not be legally binding, and disobedience to that command would therefore not be illegal. Nay, although it would not be responsible legally for thus exceeding its powers, those whom it commissioned to execute its unconstitutional command, would probably be amenable to positive law, if they tried to accomplish their mandate. For example: If the king or either of the houses, by way of proclamation or ordinance, affected to establish a law equivalent to an act of parliament, the pretended statute would not be legally binding, and disobedience to the pretended statute would therefore not be illegal. And although the king or the house would not be responsible legally for this supposed violation of constitutional law or morality, those whom the king or the house might order to enforce the statute, would be liable civilly or criminally, if they attempted to execute the order.

I have affirmed above, that, taken or considered severally, all the individuals and aggregates composing a sovereign number are subject to the supreme body of which they are component parts. By the matter contained in the last paragraph, I am led to clear the proposition to which I have now adverted, from a seeming difficulty.

Generally speaking, if a member of a sovereign body, taken or considered severally, be not amenable to positive law, it is merely as a member of the body that he is free from legal obligation. Generally speaking, he is bound, in his other characters, by legal restraints. But in some of the mixed aristocracies which are styled limited monarchies, the so called limited monarch is exempted or absolved completely from legal or political duty. For example: According to a maxim of the English law, the king is incapable of committing wrong: that is to say, he is not responsible legally for aught that he may please to do, or for any forbearance or omission.

But though he is absolved completely from legal or

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political duty, it cannot be thence inferred that the king is sovereign or supreme, or that he is not in a state of subjection to the sovereign or supreme parliament of which he is a constituent member.

Of the numerous proofs of this negative conclusion, which it were easy to produce, the following will amply suffice.—

1. Although he is free in fact from the fetters of positive law, he is not incapable of legal obligation. A law of the sovereign parliament, made with his own assent, might render himself and his successors legally responsible. But a monarch properly so called, or a sovereign number in its corporate and sovereign character, cannot be rendered, by any contrivance, amenable to positive law.—
2. If he affected to transgress the limits which the constitution has set to his authority, disobedience on the part of the governed to his unconstitutional commands, would not be illegal: whilst the ministers or instruments of his unconstitutional commands, would be legally amenable, for their unconstitutional obedience, to laws of that sovereign body whereof he is merely a limb. But commands issued by sovereigns cannot be disobeyed by their subjects without an infringement of positive law: whilst the ministers or instruments of such a sovereign command, cannot be legally responsible to any portion of the community, excepting the author of their mandate.—
3. He habitually obeys the laws set by the sovereign body of which he is a constituent member. If he did not, he must speedily yield his office to a less refractory successor, or the British constitution must speedily expire. If he habitually broke the laws set by the sovereign body, the other members of the body would probably devise a remedy: though a prospective and definite remedy, fitted to meet the contingency, has not been provided by positive law, or even by constitutional morality. Consequently, he is bound by a cogent sanction to respect the laws of the body, although that cogent sanction is not predetermined and certain. A law which is set by the opinion of the upper and lower houses (besides a law which is set by the opinion of the community at large) constrains him to observe habitually the proper and positive laws which are set by the entire parliament.—But habitually obeying the laws of a determinate and sovereign body, he is not properly sovereign: for such habitual obedience consists not with that independence which is one of the essentials of sovereignty. And habitually obeying the laws of a certain and supreme body, he is really in a state

of subjection to that certain and supreme body, though the other members of the body, together with the rest of the community, are commonly styled his subjects. It is mainly through the forms of procedure which obtain in the courts of justice, that he is commonly considered sovereign. He is clothed by the British constitution, or rather by the parliament of which he is a limb, with subordinate political powers of administering the law, or rather of supervising its administration. Infringements of the law are, therefore, in the style of procedure, offences against the king. In truth, they are not offences against the king, but against that sovereign body of king, lords, and commons, by which our positive law is directly or circuitously established. And to that sovereign body, and not to the king, the several members of the body, together with the rest of the community, are truly subject.

But if sovereign or supreme power be incapable of legal limitation, or if every supreme government be legally absolute, wherein (it may be asked) doth political liberty consist, and how do the supreme governments which are commonly deemed free, differ from the supreme governments which are commonly deemed despotic?

I answer, that political or civil liberty is the liberty from legal obligation, which is left or granted by a sovereign government to any of its own subjects: and that, since the power of the government is incapable of legal limitation, the government is legally free to abridge their political liberty, at its own pleasure or discretion. I say it is *legally* free to abridge their political liberty, at its own pleasure or discretion. For a government may be hindered by *positive morality* from abridging the political liberty which it leaves or grants to its subjects: and it is bound by the *law of God*, as known through the principle of utility, not to load them with legal duties which general utility condemns.—There are kinds of liberty from legal obligation, which will not quadrate with the foregoing description: for persons in a state of nature are independent of political duty, and independence of political duty is one of the essentials of sovereignty. But *political* or *civil* liberty supposes political society, or supposes a *πόλις* or *civitas*: and it is the liberty from legal obligation which is left by a state to its subjects, rather than the liberty from legal obligation which is inherent in sovereign power.

The nature of political or civil liberty together with the supposed difference between free and despotic governments.

Political or civil liberty has been erected into an idol and

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extolled with extravagant praises by doting and fanatical worshippers. But political or civil liberty is not more worthy of eulogy than political or legal restraint. Political or civil liberty, like political or legal restraint, may be generally useful, or generally pernicious; and it is not as being liberty, but as conducing to the general good, that political or civil liberty is an object deserving applause.

To the ignorant and bawling fanatics who stun you with their pother about liberty, political or civil liberty seems to be the principal end for which government ought to exist. But the final cause or purpose for which government ought to exist, is the furtherance of the common weal to the greatest possible extent. And it must mainly attain the purpose for which it ought to exist, by two sets of means: *first*, by conferring such rights on its subjects as general utility commends, and by imposing such relative duties (or duties corresponding to the rights) as are necessary to the enjoyment of the former: *secondly*, by imposing such absolute duties (or by imposing such duties without corresponding rights) as tend to promote the good of the political community at large, although they promote not specially the interests of determinate parties. Now he who is clothed with a legal right, is also clothed with a political liberty: that is to say, he has the liberty from legal obligation, which is necessary to the enjoyment of the right. Consequently, in so far as it attains its appropriate purpose by conferring rights upon its subjects, government attains that purpose through the medium of political liberty. But since it must impose a duty wherever it confers a right, and should also impose duties which have no corresponding rights, it is less through the medium of political liberty, than through that of legal restraint, that government must attain the purpose for which it ought to exist. To say that political liberty ought to be its principal end, or to say that its principal end ought to be legal restraint, is to talk absurdly: for each is merely a mean to that furtherance of the common weal, which is the only ultimate object of good or beneficent sovereignty. But though both propositions are absurd, the latter of the two absurdities is the least remote from the truth.—As I shall show hereafter, political or civil liberties rarely exist apart from corresponding legal restraints. Where persons in a state of subjection are free from legal duties, their liberties (generally speaking) would be nearly useless to themselves, unless they were protected in the enjoyment of their liberties,

by legal duties on their fellows: that is to say, unless they had legal rights (importing such duties on their fellows) to those political liberties which are left them by the sovereign government. I am legally free, for example, to move from place to place, in so far as I can move from place to place consistently with my legal obligations: but this my political liberty would be but a sorry liberty, unless my fellow-subjects were restrained by a political duty from assaulting and imprisoning my body. Through the ignorance or negligence of a sovereign government, some of the civil liberties which it leaves or grants to its subjects, may not be protected against their fellows by answering legal duties: and some of those civil liberties may perhaps be protected sufficiently by religious and moral obligations. But, speaking generally, a political or civil liberty is coupled with a legal right to it: and, consequently, political liberty is fostered by that very political restraint from which the devotees of the idol liberty are so fearfully and blindly averse.⁽¹⁾

From the nature of political or civil liberty, I turn to the supposed difference between free and despotic governments.

Every supreme government is *free* from legal restraints: or (what is the same proposition dressed in a different phrase) every supreme government is legally *despotic*. The distinction, therefore, of governments into *free* and *despotic*, can hardly mean that some of them are freer from restraints than others: or that the subjects of the governments which are denominated free, are protected against their governments by positive law.

Nor can it mean that the governments which are denominated free, leave or grant to their subjects more of political liberty than those which are styled despotic. For the epithet *free* importing praise, and the epithet *despotic* importing blame, they who distinguish governments into free and despotic, suppose that the first are better than the second. But inasmuch as political liberty may be generally useful or pernicious, we cannot infer that a government is better than

(1) Political or civil liberties are left or granted by sovereigns in two ways; namely, through permissions coupled with commands, or through simple permissions. If a subject possessed of a liberty be clothed with a legal right to it, the liberty was granted by the sovereign through a permission coupled with a command: a permission to the subject who is clothed with the legal right, and a command to the subject or subjects who

are burthened with the relative duty. But a political or civil liberty left or granted to a subject, may be merely protected against his fellows by religious and moral obligations. In other words, the subject possessed of the political liberty may not be clothed with a legal right to it. And, on that supposition, the political or civil liberty was left or granted to the subject through a simple permission of the sovereign or state.

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another government, because the sum of the liberties which the former leaves to its subjects, exceeds the sum of the liberties which are left to its subjects by the latter. The excess in the sum of the liberties which the former leaves to its subjects, may be purely mischievous. It may consist of freedom from restraints which are required by the common weal; and which the government would lay upon its subjects, if it fulfilled its duties to the Deity. In consequence, for example, of that mischievous freedom, its subjects may be guarded inadequately against one another, or against attacks from external enemies.

They who distinguish governments into free and despotic, probably mean this:

The rights which a government confers, and the duties which it lays on its subjects, ought to be conferred and imposed for the advancement of the common weal, or with a view to the aggregate happiness of all the members of the society. But in every political society, the government deviates, more or less, from that ethical principle or maxim. In conferring rights and imposing duties, it more or less disregards the common or general weal, and looks, with partial affection, to the peculiar and narrower interests of a portion or portions of the community.—Now the governments which deviate less from that ethical principle or maxim, are better than the governments which deviate more. But, according to the opinion of those who make the distinction in question, the governments which deviate less from that ethical principle or maxim, are *popular* governments (in the largest sense of the expression): meaning by a *popular* government (in the largest sense of the expression), any aristocracy (limited monarchy or other) which consists of such a number of the given political community as bears a large proportion to the number of the whole society. For it is supposed by those who make the distinction in question, that, where the government is democratical or popular, the interests of the sovereign number, and the interests of the entire community, are nearly identical, or nearly coincide: but that, where the government is properly monarchical, or where the supreme powers reside in a comparatively few, the sovereign one or number has numerous sinister interests, or interests which are not consistent with the good or weal of the general.—According, therefore, to those who make the distinction in question, the duties which a government of many lays upon its subjects, are more consonant to the general good than

the duties which are laid upon its subjects by a government of one or a few. Consequently, though it leaves or grants not to its subjects, more of political liberty than is left or granted to its subjects by a government of one or a few, it leaves or grants to its subjects more of the political liberty *which conduces to the common weal*. But, as leaving or granting to its subjects more of that *useful* liberty, a government of many may be styled *free*: whilst, as leaving or granting to its subjects less of that *useful* liberty, a government of one or a few may be styled *not free*, or may be styled *despotic* or *absolute*. Consequently, a *free* government, or a *good* government, is a democratical or popular government (in the largest sense of the expression): whilst a *despotic* government, or a *bad* government, is either a monarchy properly so called, or any such narrow aristocracy (limited monarchy or other) as is deemed an oligarchy.

They who distinguish governments into free and despotic, are therefore lovers of democracy. By the epithet *free*, as applied to governments of many, they mean that governments of many are comparatively *good*: and by the epithet *despotic*, as applied to monarchies or oligarchies, they mean that monarchies or oligarchies are comparatively *bad*. The epithets *free* and *despotic* are rarely, I think, employed by the lovers of monarchy or oligarchy. If the lovers of monarchy or oligarchy did employ those epithets, they would apply the epithet *free* to governments of one or a few, and the epithet *despotic* to governments of many. For they think the former comparatively *good*, and the latter comparatively *bad*; or that monarchical or oligarchical governments are better adapted than popular, to attain the ultimate purpose for which governments ought to exist. They deny that the latter are less misled than the former, by interests which are not consistent with the common or general weal: or, granting that excellence to governments of many, they think it greatly outweighed by numerous other excellencies which they ascribe to governments of one or to governments of a few.

But with the respective merits or demerits of various forms of government, I have no direct concern. I have examined the current distinction between free and despotic governments, because it is expressed in terms which are extremely inappropriate and absurd, and which tend to obscure the independence of political or legal obligation, that is common to sovereign governments of all forms or kinds.

That the power of a sovereign is incapable of legal limita- Why it has

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doubted,
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power of a
sovereign is
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tion, has been doubted, and even denied. But the difficulty, like thousands of others, probably arose from a verbal ambiguity.—The foremost individual member of a so called limited monarchy, is styled improperly *monarch* or *sovereign*. Now the power of a monarch or sovereign, thus improperly so styled, is not only capable of legal limitations, but is sometimes actually limited by positive law. But monarchs or sovereigns, thus improperly so styled, were confounded with monarchs, and other sovereigns, in the proper acceptation of the terms. And since the power of the former is capable of legal limitations, it was thought that the power of the latter might be bounded by similar restraints.

The proposition is asserted expressly by renowned political writers of opposite parties or sects.

Whatever may be its origin, the error is remarkable. For the legal independence of monarchs in the proper acceptation of the term, and of sovereign bodies in their corporate and sovereign capacities, not only follows inevitably from the nature of sovereign power, but is also asserted expressly by renowned political writers of opposite parties or sects: by celebrated advocates of the governments which are decked with the epithet *free*, as by celebrated advocates of the governments which are branded with the epithet *despotic*.

‘If it be objected (says Sidney) that I am a defender of arbitrary powers, I confess I cannot comprehend how any society can be established or subsist without them. The difference between good and ill governments is not, that those of one sort have an arbitrary power which the others have not; for they all have it; but that in those which are well constituted, this power is so placed as it may be beneficial to the people.’

‘It appeareth plainly (says Hobbes) to my understanding, that the sovereign power whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular and aristocraticall commonwealths, is as great as men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequence of the want of it, which is warre of every man against his neighbour, is much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences: but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds from the subjects’ disobedience. And whosoever, thinking sovereign power too great, will seek to make it lesse, must subject himselfe to a power which can limit it: that is to say, to a greater.’—‘One of the opinions (says the same writer) which are repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, is this: that he who hath the sovereign power is

subject to the civill lawes. It is true that all sovereigns are subject to the lawes of nature; because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or by any commonwealth, be abrogated. But to the civill lawes, or to the lawes which the sovereign maketh, the sovereign is not subject: for if he were subject to the civill lawes, he were subject to himselfe; which were not subjection, but freedom. The opinion now in question, because it setteth the civill lawes above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him: which is to make a new sovereign; and, again, for the same reason, a third to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the commonwealth.—‘The difference (says the same writer) between the kinds or forms of commonwealth, consisteth not in a difference between their powers, but in a difference between their aptitudes to produce the peace and security of the people: which is their end.’^(*)

(*) By his modern censors, French, German, and even English, Hobbes's main design in his various treatises on politics, is grossly and thoroughly mistaken. With a marvellous ignorance of the writings which they impudently presume to condemn, they style him ‘the apologist of *tyranny*,’ meaning by that rant, that his main design is the defence of monarchical government. Now, though he prefers monarchical, to popular, or oligarchical government, it is certain that his main design is the establishment of these propositions: 1. That sovereign power, *whether it reside in one, or in many or a few*, cannot be limited by positive law: 2. That a present or established government, *be it a government of one, or a government of many or a few*, cannot be disobeyed by its subjects consistently with the common weal, or consistently with the law of God as known through utility or the scriptures.—That his principal purpose is not the defence of monarchy, is sufficiently evinced by the following passages from his *Leviathan*. ‘The prosperity of a people ruled by an aristocraticall or democraticall assembly, cometh not from aristocracy or democracy, but from the obedience and concord of the subjects: nor do the people flourish in a monarchy, because they are ruled by one man, but because they obey him. Take away in a state of any kind, the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about

by disobedience to doe no more than reforme the commonwealth, shall find that they doe thereby destroy it.’ ‘In monarchy one man is supreme: and all other men who have power in the state, have it by his commission, and during his pleasure. In aristocracy or democracy there is one supreme assembly: which supreme assembly hath the same unlimited power that in monarchy belongeth to the monarch. And which is the best of these three kinds of government, is not to be disputed there where any of them is already established.’ So many similar passages occur in the same treatise, and also in his treatise *De Cive*, that they who confidently style him ‘the apologist of tyranny or monarchy,’ must have taken their notion of his purpose from mere hearsay. A dip here or there into either of the decried books, would have led them to withhold their sentence. To those who have really read, although in a cursory manner, these the most lucid and easy of profound and elaborate compositions, the current conception of their object and tendency is utterly laughable.

The capital errors in Hobbes's political treatises are the following:—1. He inculcates too absolutely the religious obligation of obedience to present or established government. He makes not the requisite allowance for the anomalous and excepted cases wherein disobedience is counselled by that very principle of utility which indicates the duty of submission. Writing in a season of civil

Before I discuss the origin of political government and society, I will briefly examine a topic allied to the liberty of sovereigns from political or legal restraints.

discord, or writing in apprehension of its approach, he naturally fixed his attention to the glaring mischiefs of resistance, and scarcely adverted to the mischiefs which obedience occasionally engenders. And although his integrity was not less remarkable than the gigantic strength of his understanding, we may presume that his extreme timidity somewhat corrupted his judgment, and inclined him to insist unduly upon the evils of rebellion and strife.—2. Instead of directly deriving the existence of political government from a perception by the bulk of the governed of its great and obvious expediency, he ascribes the origin of sovereignty, and of independent political society, to a fictitious agreement or covenant. He imagines that the future subjects covenant with one another, or that the future subjects covenant with the future sovereign, to obey without reserve every command of the latter: And of this imaginary covenant, immediately preceding the formation of the political government and community, the religious duty of the subjects to render unlimited submission, and the divine right of the sovereign to exact and receive such submission, are, according to Hobbes, necessary and permanent consequences. He supposes, indeed, that the subjects are induced to make that agreement, by their perception of the expediency of government, and by their desire to escape from anarchy. But, placing his system immediately on that interposed figment, instead of resting it directly on the ultimate basis of utility, he often arrives at his conclusions in a sophistical and quibbling manner, though his conclusions are commonly such as the principle of utility will warrant. The religious duty of the subjects to render unlimited obedience, and the divine right of the sovereign to exact and receive such obedience, cannot, indeed, be reckoned amongst those of Hobbes's conclusions which that principle will justify. In truth, the duty and the right cannot be inferred logically even from his own fiction. For, according to his own fiction, the subjects were induced to promise obedience, by their perception of the utility of government: and, since their inducement to the promise was that perception of utility, they hardly promised to obey in those anomalous cases wherein evils of anarchy are surpassed by

the evils of submission. And though they promised to obey even in those cases, they are not religiously obliged to render unlimited obedience: for, as the principle of general utility is the index to religious obligations, no religious obligation can possibly arise from a promise whose tendency is generally pernicious. Besides though the subject founders of the political community were religiously obliged by their mischievous promise, a religious obligation would hardly be imposed upon their followers, by virtue of a mischievous agreement to which their followers were strangers. The last objection, however, is not exclusively applicable to Hobbes's peculiar fiction. That, or a like objection, may be urged against all the romances which derive the existence of government from a fancied original contract. Whether we suppose, with Hobbes, that the subjects were the only promisers, or we suppose, with others, that the sovereign also covenanted; whether we suppose, with Hobbes, that they promised unlimited obedience, or we suppose, with others, that their promise contained reservations; we can hardly suppose that the contract of the founders, unless it be presently useful, imposes religious obligations on the present members of the community.

If these two capital errors be kept in mind by the reader, Hobbes's extremely celebrated but extremely neglected treatises may be read to great advantage. I know of no other writer (excepting our great contemporary Jeremy Bentham) who has uttered so many truths, at once new and important, concerning the necessary structure of supreme political government, and the larger of the necessary distinctions implied by positive law. And he is signally gifted with the talent, peculiar to writers of genius, of inciting the mind of the student to active and original thought.

The authors of the antipathy with which he is commonly regarded, were the papistical clergy of the Roman Catholic Church, the high church clergy of the Church of England, and the Presbyterian clergy of the true blue complexion. In matters ecclesiastical (a phrase of uncertain meaning, and therefore of measureless compass), independence of secular authority was more or less affected by churchmen of each of those factions. In other words they held that their own

A sovereign government of one, or a sovereign government of a number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, has no legal rights (in the proper acceptation of the term) against its own subjects.

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church was coordinate with the secular government: or that the secular government was not of itself supreme, but rather partook in the supreme powers with one or more of the clerical order. Hobbes's unfailing loyalty to the present temporal sovereign, was alarmed and offended by this anarchical pretension: and he repelled it with a weight of reason, and an aptness and pungency of expression, which the aspiring and vindictive priests did bitterly feel and resent. Accordingly, they assailed him with the poisoned weapons which are ministered by malignity and cowardice. All of them twitted him (agreeably to their wont) with flat atheism; whilst some of them affected to style him an apologist of tyranny or misrule, and to rank him with the perverse writers (Machiavelli, for example) who really have applauded tyranny maintained by ability and courage. By these calumnies, those conspiring and potent factions blackened the reputation of their common enemy. And so deep and enduring is the impression which they made upon the public mind, that 'Hobbes the Atheist,' or 'Hobbes the apologist of tyranny,' is still regarded with pious, or with republican horror, by all but the extremely few who have ventured to examine his writings.

Of positive atheism; of mere scepticism concerning the existence of the Deity; or of, what is more impious and mischievous than either, a religion imputing to the Deity human infirmities and vices; there is not, I believe, in any of his writings, the shadow of a shade.

It is true that he prefers monarchical (though he intimates his preference rarely), to popular or oligarchical government. If, then, tyranny be synonymous with monarchy, he is certainly an apologist and fautor of tyranny, inasmuch as he inclines to the one, rather than the many or the few. But if tyranny be synonymous with misrule, or if tyranny be specially synonymous with monarchical misrule, he is not of the apologists and fautors of tyranny, but may rank with the ablest and most zealous of its foes. Scarcely a single advocate of free or popular institutions, even in these latter and comparatively enlightened ages, perceives and inculcates so clearly and earnestly as he, the principal cause

and preventive of tyrannous or bad government. The principal cause of tyrannous or bad government, is ignorance, on the part of the multitude of sound *political science* (in the largest sense of the expression): that is to say, *political æconomy*, with the two great branches of *ethics*, as well as *politics* (in the strict acceptation of the term). And if such be the principal cause of tyrannous or bad government, the principal preventive of the evil must lie in the diffusion of such knowledge throughout the mass of the community. Compared with this, the best political constitution that the wit of man could devise, were surely a poor security for good or beneficent rule. — Now in those departments of his treatises on politics, which are concerned with 'the office (or duty) of the sovereign,' Hobbes insists on the following propositions: *That good and stable government is simply or nearly impossible, unless the fundamentals of political science be known by the bulk of the people*: that the bulk of the people are as capable of receiving such science as the loftiest and proudest of their superiors in station, wealth, or learning: that to provide for the diffusion of such science throughout the bulk of the people, may be classed with the weightiest of the duties which the Deity lays upon the sovereign: that he is bound to hear their complaints, and even to seek their advice, in order that he may better understand the nature of their wants, and may better adapt his institutions to the advancement of the general good: that he is bound to render his laws as compendious and clear as possible, and also to promulge a knowledge of their more important provisions through every possible channel: that if the bulk of his people know their duties imperfectly, for want of the instruction which he is able and bound to impart, he is responsible religiously for all their breaches of the duties whereof he hath left them in ignorance.

In regard to the respective aptitudes of the several forms of government to accomplish the ultimate purpose for which government ought to exist, Hobbes's opinion closely resembles the doctrine, which, about the middle of the eighteenth century, was taught by the French philo-

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Every legal right is the creature of a positive law : and it answers to a relative duty imposed by that positive law, and incumbent on a person or persons other than the person or

sophers who are styled emphatically the *Economists*.—In order, say the *Economists*, to the being of a good government, two things must preexist : 1. Knowledge by the bulk of the people, of the elements of political science (in the largest sense of the expression) : 2. A numerous body of citizens versed in political science, and not misled by interests conflicting with the common weal, who may shape the political opinions, and steer the political conduct, of the less profoundly informed, though instructed and rational multitude.—Without that knowledge in the bulk of the people, and without that numerous body of '*gens lumineux*,' the government, say the *Economists*, will surely be bad, be it a government of one or a few, or be it a government of many. If it be a government of one or a few, it will consult exclusively the peculiar and narrow interests of a portion or portions of the community : for it will not be constrained to the advancement of the general or common good, by the general opinion of a duly instructed society. If it be a government of many, it may not be diverted from the advancement of the general or common good, by partial and sinister regard for peculiar and narrow interests : but, being controlled by the general opinion of the society, and that society not being duly instructed, it will often be turned from the paths leading to its appropriate end, by the restive and tyrannous prejudices of an ignorant and asinine multitude.—But, given that knowledge in the bulk of the people, and given that numerous body of '*light-diffusing* citizens,' the government, say the *Economists*, let the form be what it may, will be strongly and steadily impelled to the furtherance of the general good, by the sound and commanding morality obtaining throughout the community. And, for numerous and plausible reasons (which my limits compel me to omit), they affirm, that, in any society thus duly instructed, monarchical government would not only be the best, but would surely be chosen by that enlightened community, in preference to a government of a few, or even to a government of many.

Such is the opinion (stated briefly, and without their peculiar phraseology) which was taught by Quesnai and the other *Economists* about the middle of

the last century. And such is also the opinion (although he conceived it less clearly, and less completely, than they) which was published by their great precursor, in the middle of the century preceding.

The opinion taught by the *Economists* is rather, perhaps, defective, than positively erroneous. Their opinion, perhaps, is sound, so far as it reaches : but they leave an essential consideration uncavassed and nearly untouched.—In a political community not duly instructed, a government good and stable is, I believe, impossible : and in a political community duly instructed, monarchy, I incline to believe, were better than democracy. But in a political community not duly instructed, is not popular government, with all its awkward complexness, less inconvenient than monarchy ? And, unless the government be popular, can a political community not duly instructed, emerge from darkness to light ? from the ignorance of political science, which is the principal cause of misrule, to the knowledge of political science, which were the best security against it ?—To these questions, the *Economists* hardly advert : and, unhappily, the best of possible governments for a society already enlightened, is, when compared with these, a question of little importance. The *Economists*, indeed, occasionally admit, '*que dans l'état d'ignorance l'autorité est plus dangereuse dans les mains d'un seul, qu'elle ne l'est dans les mains de plusieurs.*' But with this consideration they rarely meddle. They commonly infer or assume, that, since in *the state of ignorance* the government is inevitably bad, the form of the government, during that state, is a matter of consummate indifference. Agreeing with them in most of their premises, I arrive at an inference extremely remote from theirs ; namely, that in a community already enlightened, the form of the government were nearly a matter of indifference ; but that where a community is still in *the state of ignorance*, the form of the government is a matter of the highest importance.

The political and economical system of Quesnai and the other *Economists*, is stated concisely and clearly by M. Mercier de la Rivière in his '*L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des Sociétés*

persons in whom the right resides. To every legal right, there are therefore three parties: The sovereign government of one or a number which sets the positive law, and which through the positive law confers the legal right, and imposes the relative duty: the person or persons on whom the right is conferred: the person or persons on whom the duty is imposed, or to whom the positive law is set or directed.—As I shall show hereafter, the person or persons invested with the right, are not necessarily members of the independent political society wherein the author of the law is sovereign or supreme. The person or persons invested with the right, may be a member or members, sovereign or subject, of another society political and independent. But (taking the proposition with the slight correctives which I shall state hereafter) the person or persons on whom the duty is imposed, or to whom the law is set or directed, are necessarily members of the independent political society wherein the author of the law is sovereign or supreme. For unless the party burthened with the duty were subject to the author of the law, the party would not be obnoxious to the legal or political sanction by which the duty and the right are respectively enforced and protected. A government can hardly impose legal duties or obligations upon members of foreign societies: although it can invest them with legal rights, by imposing relative duties upon members of its own community. A party bearing a legal right, is not necessarily burthened with a legal trust. Consequently, a party may bear and exercise a legal right, though the party cannot be touched by the might or power of its author. But unless the opposite party, or the party burthened with the relative duty, could be touched by the might of its author, the right and the relative duty, with the law which confers and imposes them, were merely nominal and illusory. And (taking the proposition with the slight correctives which I shall state hereafter) a person obnoxious to the sanction enforcing a positive law, is necessarily subject to the author of the law, or is necessarily a member of the society, wherein the author is sovereign.

sovereign capacity, has no legal rights (in the proper acceptation of the term) against its own subjects.

It follows from the essentials of a legal right, that a sovereign government of one, or a sovereign government of a number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, has no legal rights (in the proper acceptation of the term) against its own subjects.

To every legal right, there are three several parties:

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namely, a party bearing the right; a party burthened with the relative duty; and a sovereign government setting the law through which the right and the duty are respectively conferred and imposed. A sovereign government cannot acquire rights through laws set by itself to its own subjects. A man is no more able to confer a right on himself, than he is able to impose on himself a law or duty. Every party bearing a right (divine, legal, or moral) has necessarily acquired the right through the might or power of another: that is to say, through a law and a duty (proper or improper) laid by that other party on a further and distinct party. Consequently, if a sovereign government had legal rights against its own subjects, those rights were the creatures of positive laws set to its own subjects by a third person or body. And, as every positive law is laid by a sovereign government on a person or persons in a state of subjection to itself, that third person or body were sovereign in that community whose own sovereign government bore the legal rights: that is to say, the community were subject to its own sovereign, and were also subject to a sovereign conferring rights upon its own. Which is impossible and absurd. (*)

But so far as they are bound by the law of God to obey their temporal sovereign, a sovereign government has *rights divine* against its own subjects: rights which are conferred

'Right is
might.'

(*) It has often been affirmed that 'right is might,' or that 'might is right.' But this paradoxical proposition (a great favourite with shallow scoffers and buffoons) is either a flat truism affectedly and darkly expressed, or is thoroughly false and absurd.

If it mean that a party who possesses a right possesses the right through might or power of his own, the proposition is false and absurd. For a party who possesses a right necessarily possesses the right through the might or power of another: namely, the author of the law by which the right is conferred, and by which the duty answering to the right is laid on a third and distinct party. Speaking generally, a person who is clothed with a right is weak rather than mighty; and unless he were shielded from harm by the might of the author of the right, he would live, by reason of his weakness, in ceaseless insecurity and alarm. For example: Such is the predicament of persons clothed with legal rights, who are merely subject members of a political society, and

who owe their legal rights to the might and pleasure of their sovereign.

If it mean that right and might are one and the same thing, or are merely different names for one and the same object, the proposition in question is also false and absurd. My physical ability to move about, when my body is free from bonds, may be called *might* or *power*, but cannot be called a *right*: though my ability to move about *without hindrance from you*, may doubtless be styled a *right*, with perfect precision and propriety, if I owe the ability to a law imposed upon you by another.

If it mean that every right is a creature of might or power, the proposition is merely a truism disguised in paradoxical language. For every right (divine, legal, or moral) rests on a relative duty; that is to say, a duty lying on a party or parties other than the party or parties in whom the right resides. And, manifestly, that relative duty would not be a duty substantially, if the law which affects to impose it were not sustained by might.

upon itself, through duties which are laid upon its subjects, by laws of a common superior. And so far as the members of its own community are severally constrained to obey it by the opinion of the community at large, it has also *moral*

I will briefly remark before I conclude the note, that 'right' has two meanings which ought to be distinguished carefully.

The noun substantive '*a right*' signifies that which jurists denominate '*a faculty*:' that which resides in a determinate party or parties, by virtue of a given law; and which avails against a party or parties (or answers to a duty lying on a party or parties) other than the party or parties in whom it resides. And the noun substantive '*rights*' is the plural of the noun substantive '*a right*.' But the expression '*right*,' when it is used as an adjective, is equivalent to the adjective '*just*:' as the adverb '*rightly*' is equivalent to the adverb '*justly*.' And when it is used as the abstract name corresponding to the adjective '*right*,' the noun substantive '*right*' is synonymous with the noun substantive '*justice*.'—If, for example, I owe you a hundred pounds, you have '*a right*' to the payment of the money: a right importing an obligation to pay the money, which is incumbent upon me. Now in case I make the payment to which you have '*a right*,' I do that which is '*right*' or just, or I do that which consists with '*right*' or justice.—Again: I have '*a right*' to the quiet enjoyment of my house: a right importing a duty to forbear from disturbing my enjoyment, which lies upon other persons generally, or lies upon the world at large. Now they who practise the forbearance to which I have '*a right*,' conduct themselves therein '*rightly*' or justly. Or so far as they practise the forbearance to which I have '*a right*,' their conduct is '*right*' or just. Or so far as they practise the forbearance to which I have '*a right*,' they are observant of '*right*' or justice.

It is manifest that '*right*' as signifying '*faculty*,' and '*right*' as signifying '*justice*,' are widely different though not unconnected terms. But, nevertheless, the terms are confounded by many of the writers who attempt a definition of '*right*:' and their attempts to determine the meaning of that very perplexing expression, are, therefore, sheer jargon. By many of the German writers on the sciences of law and morality (as by Kant, for example, in his '*Metaphysical Principles of Jurisprudence*'), '*right*' in the one sense is blended with '*right*' in the

other. And through the disquisition on '*right*' or '*rights*,' which occurs in his '*Moral Philosophy*,' Paley obviously wavers between the dissimilar meanings.

An adequate definition of '*a right*,' or of '*right*' as signifying '*faculty*,' cannot, indeed, be rendered easily. In order to a definition of '*a right*,' or of '*right*' as signifying '*faculty*,' we must determine the respective differences of the principal kinds of rights, and also the respective meanings of many intricate terms which are implied by the term to be defined.

The Italian '*diritto*,' the French '*droit*,' the German '*recht*,' and the English '*right*,' signify '*right*' as meaning '*faculty*,' and also signify '*justice*:' though each of those several tongues has a name which is appropriate to '*justice*,' and by which it is denoted without ambiguity.

In the Latin, Italian, French, and German, the name which signifies '*right*' as meaning '*faculty*,' also signifies '*law*:' '*jus*,' '*diritto*,' '*droit*,' or '*recht*,' denoting indifferently either of the two objects. Accordingly, the '*recht*' which signifies '*law*,' and the '*recht*' which signifies '*right*' as meaning '*faculty*,' are confounded by German writers on the philosophy or *rationale* of law, and even by German expositors of particular systems of jurisprudence. Not perceiving that the two names are names respectively for two disparate objects, they make of the two objects, or make of the two names, one '*recht*.' Which one '*recht*,' as forming a *genus* or kind, they divide into two *species* or two sorts: namely, the '*recht*' equivalent to '*law*,' and the '*recht*' equivalent to '*right*' as meaning '*faculty*.' And since the strongest and wariest minds are often ensnared by ambiguous words, their confusion of those disparate objects is a venial error. Some, however, of these German writers are guilty of a grave offence against good sense and taste. They thicken the mass which that confusion produces, with a misapplication of terms borrowed from the Kantian philosophy. They divide '*recht*,' as forming the *genus* or kind, into '*recht* in the *objective* sense,' and '*recht* in the *subjective* sense;' denoting by the former of those unapposite phrases, '*law*;' and denoting by the latter, '*right*' as meaning '*faculty*.'

'Right' as meaning '*faculty*,' '*right*' as meaning '*justice*,' and '*right*' as meaning '*law*.'

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rights (or rights arising from positive morality) against its own subjects severally considered: rights which are conferred upon itself by the opinion of the community at large, and which answer to relative duties laid upon its several subjects by the general or prevalent opinion of the same indeterminate body.

Consequently, when we say that a sovereign government, as against its own subjects, has or has not a *right* to do this or that, we necessarily mean by a *right* (supposing we speak exactly), a right *divine* or *moral*: we necessarily mean (supposing we speak exactly), that it has or has not a right derived from a law of God, or derived from a law improperly so called which the general opinion of the community sets to its members severally.

But when we say that a government, as against its own subjects, has or has not a *right* to do this or that, we not uncommonly mean that we deem the act in question *generally useful* or *pernicious*. This application of the term *right*, resembles an application of the term *justice* to which I have adverted above.—An act which conforms to the Divine law, is styled, emphatically, just: an act which does not, is styled, emphatically, unjust. An act which is generally useful, conforms to the Divine law as known through the principle of utility: an act which is generally pernicious, does not conform to the Divine law as known through the same exponent. Consequently, ‘an act which is just or unjust,’ and ‘an act which is generally useful or generally pernicious,’ are nearly equivalent expressions.—An act which a sovereign government has a Divine right to do, it, emphatically, has a right to do: if it has not a Divine right, it, emphatically, has not a right. An act which were generally useful, the Divine law, as known through the principle of utility, has conferred on the sovereign government a right to do: an act which were generally pernicious, the Divine law, as known through the same exponent, has not conferred on the sovereign government a right to do. Consequently, an act which

The confusion of ‘law’ and ‘right,’ our own writers avoid: for the two disparate objects which the terms respectively signify, are commonly denoted in our own language by palpably distinct marks. I say that they are commonly

denoted in our own language by palpably distinct marks: for the modern ‘right’ (which probably comes from the Anglo Saxon, and therefore is allied to the German ‘recht,’ means, in a few instances, ‘law.’²⁸

¹ ‘Hale and Blackstone (as I have signed in the Outline) are misled by this double meaning of the word *jus*.

They translate *jus personarum et rerum*, “rights of persons and things:” which is mere jargon.—MS. Note.

the government has a right to do, is an act which were generally useful: as an act which the government has not a right to do, is an act which were generally pernicious.

To ignorance or neglect of the palpable truths which I have expounded in the present section, we may impute a pernicious jargon that was current in our own country on the eve of her horrible war with her North American children. By the great and small rabble in and out of parliament, it was said that the government sovereign in Britain was also sovereign in the colonies; and that, since it was sovereign in the colonies, it had a *right* to tax their inhabitants. It was objected by Mr. Burke to the project of taxing their inhabitants, that the project was *inexpedient*: pregnant with probable evil to the inhabitants of the colonies, and pregnant with probable evil to the inhabitants of the mother country. But to that most rational objection, the sticklers for the scheme of taxation returned this asinine answer. They said that the British government had a *right* to tax the colonists; and that it ought not to be withheld by paltry considerations of *expediency*, from enforcing its sovereign right against its refractory subjects.—Now, assuming that the government sovereign in Britain was properly sovereign in the colonies, it had no legal right to tax its colonial subjects; although it was not restrained by positive law, from dealing with its colonial subjects at its own pleasure or discretion. If, then, the sticklers for the scheme of taxation had any determinate meaning, they meant that the British government was empowered by the law of God to tax its American subjects. But it had not a Divine right to tax its American subjects, unless the project of taxing them accorded with general utility: for every Divine right springs from the Divine law; and to the Divine law, general utility is the index. Consequently, when the sticklers for the scheme of taxation opposed *the right to expediency*, they opposed the right to the only test by which it was possible to determine the reality of the right itself.

A sovereign government of one, or a sovereign government of a number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, may appear in the character of defendant, or may appear in the character of demandant, before a tribunal of its own appointment, or deriving jurisdiction from itself. But from such an appearance of a sovereign government, we cannot infer that the government lies under legal duties, or has legal rights against its own subjects.

From an appearance of a sovereign government before a tribunal of its own, we cannot infer that the government lies

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Supposing that the claim of the plaintiff against the sovereign defendant were truly founded on a positive law, it were founded on a positive law set to the sovereign defendant by a third person or body: or (changing the phrase) the sovereign defendant would be in a state of subjection to another and superior sovereign. Which is impossible and absurd.—And supposing that the claim of the sovereign demandant were truly founded on a positive law, it were founded on a positive law set by a third party to a member, or members of the society wherein the demandant is supreme: or (changing the phrase) the society subject to the sovereign demandant, were subject, at the same time, to another supreme government. Which is also impossible and absurd.

Besides, where the sovereign government appears in the character of defendant, it appears to a claim founded on a so called law which it has set to itself. It therefore may defeat the claim by abolishing the law entirely, or by abolishing the law in the particular or specific case.—Where it appears in the character of demandant, it apparently founds its claim on a positive law of its own, and it pursues its claim judicially. But although it reaches its purpose through a general and prospective rule, and through the medium of judicial procedure, it is legally free to accomplish its end by an arbitrary or irregular exercise of its legally unlimited power.

The rights which are pursued against it before tribunals of its own, and also the rights which it pursues before tribunals of its own, are merely *analogous* to legal rights (in the proper acceptation of the term): or (borrowing the brief and commodious expressions by which the Roman jurists commonly denote an analogy) they are legal rights *quasi*, or legal rights *uti*.—The rights which are pursued against it before tribunals of its own, it may extinguish by its own authority. But, this notwithstanding, it permits the demandants to prosecute their claims: And it yields to those claims, when they are established judicially, *as if* they were truly founded on positive laws set to itself by a third and distinct party.—The rights which it pursues before tribunals of its own, are powers which it is free to exercise according to its own pleasure. But, this notwithstanding, it prosecutes its claims through the medium of judicial procedure, *as if* they were truly founded on positive laws set to parties defendant by a third person or body.²⁴

²⁴ A good government will not arbitrarily (or by *ex post facto* commands) abrogate *quasi* rights which it has conferred. And, where possible, will accomplish its ends by prospective rules.—MS.

The foregoing explanation of the seeming legal rights which are pursued against sovereign governments before tribunals of their own, tallies with the style of judicial procedure, which, in all or most nations, is observed in cases of the kind. The object of the plaintiff's claim is not demanded as of right, but is begged of the sovereign defendant as a grace or favour.

In our own country, claims pursued judicially against our own king are presented to the courts of justice in the same or a similar style. The plaintiff *petitions* the royal defendant to grant him his so called right: or he *shows* to the royal defendant his so called right and injury, and prays the royal defendant to yield him fitting redress.— But where a claim is pursued judicially against our own king, this mendicant style of presenting the claim is merely accidental. It arises from the mere accident to which I have adverted already: namely, that our own king, though not properly sovereign, is completely free in fact from legal or political duties. Since he is free in fact from every legal obligation, no one has a legal right (in the proper acceptation of the term) against the king: for if any had a legal right against the king, the king were necessarily subject to an answering legal duty. But seeing that our own king is merely a limb of the parliament, and is virtually in a state of subjection to that sovereign body or aggregate, he is capable of legal duties: that is to say, duties imposed upon him by that sovereign body or aggregate in its collegiate and sovereign character. For the same reason, he is capable of legal rights: that is to say, rights conferred upon him by that sovereign body or aggregate, and answering to relative duties imposed by the same body on others of its own subjects. Accordingly, the king has legal rights against others of his fellow subjects: though by reason of his actual exemption from every legal obligation, none of his fellow subjects have legal rights against him.

Though a sovereign government of one, or a sovereign government of a number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, cannot have legal rights against its own subjects, it may have a legal right against a subject or subjects of another sovereign government. For seeing that a legal or political right is not of necessity saddled with a legal or political trust, the positive law conferring the right may not be set to the government on which the right is conferred. The law conferring the right (as well as the relative duty

Though a sovereign government of one or a sovereign government of a number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, cannot have legal right against its

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own subjects, it may have a legal right against a subject or subjects of another sovereign government.

answering to the right) may be laid or imposed exclusively on the subject or subjects of the government by which the right is imparted. The possession of a legal or political right against a subject or subjects of another sovereign government, consists, therefore, with that independence which is one of the essentials of sovereignty. And since the legal right is acquired from another government, and through a law which it sets to a subject or subjects of its own, the existence of the legal right implies no absurdity. It is neither acquired through a positive law set by the government which acquires it, nor through a positive law set by another government to a member or members of the society wherein the acquirer is supreme.²⁵

political government and society.

now have defined or determined the general notion of sovereignty, including the general notion of independent political society: And, in order that I might further elucidate the nature or essence of sovereignty, and of the independent political society which sovereignty implies, I have considered the possible forms of supreme political government with the limits, real or imaginary, of supreme political power. To complete my intended disquisition on the nature or essence of sovereignty, and of the independent political society that sovereignty implies, I proceed to the origin or causes of the habitual or permanent obedience, which, in every society political and independent, is rendered by the bulk of the community to the monarch or sovereign number. In other words, I proceed to the origin or causes of political government and society.

The proper purpose or end of a sovereign political government, or the purpose or end for which it ought to exist, is the greatest possible advancement of human happiness: Though, if it would duly accomplish its proper purpose or end, or advance as far as is possible the weal or good of mankind, it commonly must labour directly and particularly to advance as far as is possible the weal of its own community.

²⁵ In our own courts of law and equity it is held as undoubted, that foreign sovereigns, whether in name monarchs or republics, can sue in their sovereign capacity; and they are recognised as plaintiffs in our courts of law and equity by the same name and style under which they are recognised by our own sovereign (that is, nominally, by Her Majesty) in diplomatic intercourse.—(Case of the King of Spain, judgment by Lord Lynd-

hurst in the House of Lords. 2 Bligh Reports. New series, p. 31. Case of the United States of America v. Wagner, Court of Chancery, May 29, June 11, 17. 1867. Judgment by Lord Chancellor Chelmsford and Lord Justices Turner and Cairns.)

As to the possibility of a sovereign being subject to another sovereign, to certain limited effects, see concluding explanations in this chapter.—R. C.

The good of the universal society formed by mankind, is the aggregate good of the particular societies into which mankind is divided: just as the happiness of any of those societies is the aggregate happiness of its single or individual members. Though, then the weal of mankind is the proper object of a government, or though the test of its conduct is the principle of general utility, it commonly ought to consult directly and particularly the weal of the particular community which the Deity has committed to its rule. If it truly adjust its conduct to the principle of general utility, it commonly will aim immediately at the particular and more precise, rather than the general and less determinate end.

It were easy to show, that the general and particular ends never or rarely conflict. Universally, or nearly universally, the ends are perfectly consistent, or rather are inseparably connected. An enlightened regard for the common happiness of nations, implies an enlightened patriotism; whilst the stupid and atrocious patriotism which looks exclusively to country, and would further the interests of country at the cost of all other communities, grossly misapprehends and frequently crosses the interests that are the object of its narrow concern.— But the topic which I now have suggested, belongs to the province of ethics, rather than the province of jurisprudence. It belongs especially to the peculiar department of ethics, which is concerned with international morality: which affects to determine the morality that ought to obtain between nations, or to determine the international morality commended by general utility.*

(*) The proper purpose or end of a sovereign political government, or the purpose or end for which it ought to exist, is conceived inadequately, or is conceived obscurely, by most or many of the speculators on political government and society.

To advance as far as is possible the weal or good of mankind, is more generally but more vaguely its proper purpose or end: To advance as far as is possible the weal of its own community, is more particularly and more determinately the purpose or end for which it ought to exist. Now if it would accomplish the general object, it commonly must labour directly to accomplish the particular: And it hardly will accomplish the particular object, unless it regard the general. Since, then, each of the objects is inseparably connected with

the other, either may be deemed the paramount object for which the sovereign government ought to exist. We therefore may say, for the sake of conciseness, that its proper paramount purpose, or its proper absolute end, is 'the greatest possible advancement of *the common happiness or weal*:' meaning indifferently by 'the common happiness or weal,' the common happiness or weal of its own particular community, or the common happiness or weal of the universal community of mankind. (Here I may remark, that in my fourth lecture, from page 150 to page 163, I shortly examined a current misconception of the theory of general utility; and that the brief suggestions which I then threw out, may easily be fitted to the topic on which I now have touched.)

To advance as far as is possible the

The proper purpose or end of political government and society or the purpose or end for which they ought to exist.

From the proper purpose or end of a sovereign political government, or from the purpose or end for which it ought

weal or good of mankind, or to advance as far as is possible the weal of its own community, is, then, the paramount or absolute end for which a sovereign government ought to exist. We may say of the government itself, what Bacon says of the law which it sets to its subjects: 'Finis et scopus quem intueri debet, non alius est, quam ut cives feliciter degant.' The way, indeed, of the government to the attainment of its absolute end, lies through the attainment of ends which may be styled subordinate or instrumental: Or in order that the government may accomplish its proper absolute end, the government must accomplish ends subserving that absolute end, or serving as means to its accomplishment. But the subordinate or instrumental ends through which the government must accomplish its paramount or absolute end, will hardly admit of a complete description, or a description approaching to completeness. Certainly they are not to be determined, and are not to be suggested justly, by a short and sweeping definition. For, assuming that the government accomplished thoroughly its paramount or absolute purpose, its care would extend (as Bacon adequately affirms) '*ad omnia circa bene esse civitatis*;' its care would extend to *all* the means through which it probably might minister to the furtherance of the common weal.

But, by most or many of the speculators on political government and society, one or a few of the instrumental ends through which a government must accomplish its proper absolute end, are mistaken for that paramount purpose.

For example: It is said by many of the speculators on political government and society, that 'the end of every government is to institute and protect property.' And here I must remark, by the

by, that the propounders of this absurdity give to the term 'property' an extremely large and not very definite signification. They mean generally by the term 'property,' legal rights, or legal faculties: And they mean not particularly by the term 'property,' the legal rights, or legal faculties, which are denominated strictly 'rights of property or dominion.' If they limited the term 'property' to legal rights of dominion, their proposition would stand thus: 'The creation and protection of legal rights of dominion, is the end of every government; but the creation of legal rights which are not rights of dominion (as legal rights, for example, which are properly effects of contracts), is not parcel of its end, or falls not within its scope.' Consequently, their proposition amounts to this: 'To confer on its subjects legal rights, and to preserve those rights from infringement, is the end of every government.'²⁶ Now the proper paramount purpose of a sovereign political government, is not the creation and protection of legal rights or faculties, or (in the terms of the proposition) the institution and protection of property. If the creation and protection of legal rights were its proper paramount purpose, its proper paramount purpose might be the advancement of misery, rather than the advancement of happiness; since many of the legal rights which governments have created and protected (as the rights of masters, for example, to and against slaves), are generally pernicious, rather than generally useful. To advance as far as is possible the common happiness or weal, a government must confer on its subjects legal rights: that is to say, a government must confer on its subjects *beneficent* legal rights, or such legal rights as general utility commends. And, having conferred on its subjects

²⁶ The maintenance of the Rights which are vested in private individuals (i.e. in the governed) is not the only end for which Government ought to exist. It is often expedient that it should be invested with powers which neither directly nor indirectly subserve that end,

though they minister to that ultimate purpose for which Rights themselves should exist: viz. the general well-being.²⁷ (e.g. Powers to construct roads, etc.) See Hugo, *Lehrbuch des Naturrechts*, p. 183.--MS. Note.

[*Neque tamen jus publicum ad hoc tantum spectat, ut addatur tanquam cunctos jugi privato, ne illud violetur atque cessent injuriæ; sed extenditur etiam ad*

religionem et arma et disciplinam et ornamenta et opes, denique ad omnia
NENE

to exist, we may readily infer the causes of that habitual obedience which would be paid to the sovereign by the bulk of an enlightened society. Supposing that a given society were adequately instructed or enlightened, the habitual obedience to its government which was rendered by the bulk of the community, would exclusively arise from reasons bottomed in the principle of utility. If they thought the government perfect, or that the government accomplished perfectly its proper purpose or end, this their conviction or

beneficent legal rights, the government, moreover, must preserve those rights from infringement, by enforcing the corresponding sanctions. But the institution and protection of beneficent legal rights, or of the kinds of property that are commended by general utility, is merely a subordinate and instrumental end through which the government must accomplish its paramount or absolute purpose.—As affecting to determine the absolute end for which a sovereign government ought to exist, the proposition in question is, therefore, false. And, considered as a definition of the means through which the sovereign government must reach that absolute end, the proposition in question is defective. If the government would duly accomplish its proper paramount purpose, it must not confine its care to the creation of legal rights, and to the creation and enforcement of the answering relative duties. There are absolute legal duties, or legal duties without corresponding rights, that are not a whit less requisite to the advancement of the general good than legal rights themselves with the relative duties which they imply. Nor would a government accomplish thoroughly its proper paramount purpose, if it merely conferred and protected the requisite rights, and imposed and enforced the requisite absolute duties: that is to say, if it merely established and issued the requisite laws and commands, and looked to their due execution. The sum of the subordinate ends which may subserve

its absolute end, is scarcely comprised by a good legislation and a good administration of justice: Though a good legislation with a good administration of justice, or good laws well administered, are doubtless the chief of the means through which it must attain to that end, or (in Bacon's figurative language) are the *nerves* of the common weal.

The prevalent mistake which I now have stated and exemplified, is committed by certain of the writers on the science of political œconomy, whenever they meddle incidentally with the connected science of legislation. Whenever they step from their own into the adjoining province, they make expressly, or they make tacitly and unconsciously, the following assumption: that the proper absolute end of a sovereign political government is to further as far as is possible the growth of the national wealth. If they think that a political institution fosters production and accumulation, or that a political institution damps production and accumulation, they pronounce, without more, that the institution is good or bad. They forget that the wealth of the community is not the weal of the community, though wealth is one of the means requisite to the attainment of happiness. They forget that a political institution may further the weal of the community, though it checks the growth of its wealth; and that a political institution which quickens the growth of its wealth, may hinder the advancement of its weal.

like those of political œconomists are made by utilitarians, only of a more general nature. Instead of confounding (specifically) some subordinate end of government with the paramount end of the same, they take a part of human happiness, or a part of the means towards it, for the whole of human or the whole of those means.

¶ The exclusion of poetry or the fine or the degrading them to 'the

agreeable.' Their eminent utility. The wisdom to be got from poets. Give examples.)

This partial view of human happiness, or of means towards it, will always be taken till a system of ethical teleology be constructed: i.e. an analysis of happiness, the means towards it, and therefore the ends to be pursued directly.—*MS. Fragment.*]

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opinion would be their motive to obey. If they deemed the government faulty, a fear that the evil of resistance might surpass the evil of obedience, would be their inducement to submit: for they would not persist in their obedience to a government which they deemed imperfect, if they thought that a better government might probably be got by resistance, and that the probable good of the change outweighed its probable mischief.

Since every actual society is inadequately instructed or enlightened, the habitual obedience to its government which is rendered by the bulk of the community, is partly the consequence of custom: They partly pay that obedience to that present or established government, because they, and perhaps their ancestors, have been in a habit of obeying it. Or the habitual obedience to the government which is rendered by the bulk of the community, is partly the consequence of prejudices: meaning by 'prejudices,' opinions and sentiments which have no foundation whatever in the principle of general utility. If, for example, the government is monarchical, they partly pay that obedience to that present or established government because they are fond of monarchy inasmuch as it is monarchy, or because they are fond of the race from which the monarch has descended. Or if, for example, the government is popular, they partly pay that obedience to that present or established government, because they are fond of democracy inasmuch as it is democracy, or because the word 'republic' captivates their fancies and affections.

But though that habitual obedience is partly the consequence of custom, or though that habitual obedience is partly the consequence of prejudices, it partly arises from a reason bottomed in the principle of utility.²⁸ It partly arises

²⁸ As connected with the proper purpose or end of political government and society, I may mention one cause which always will make political government (or political government *quasi*) necessary or highly expedient: namely, the uncertainty, scantiness, and imperfection of positive moral rules. Hence the necessity for a common governing (or common guiding) head to whom the community may in concert defer.

It is possible to conceive a society in which legal sanctions would lie dormant, or in which *quasi* government would merely recommend, or utter laws of imperfect obligation (in the sense of Roman

Jurists). But however perfect and universal the inclination to act up to rules tending to the general good, it is impossible to dispense with a governing or guiding head.

(Uncertainty of existence of positive moral rules: want of the precision and detail required by dispositions regarding the objects about which positive law is conversant. Hence Godwin, Fichte, and others have made a great mistake.)

In many cases, however, notwithstanding its defectiveness, it is necessary to abandon acts to positive morality. (See Note, p. 204.)—MS. Fragment.

from a perception, by the generality or bulk of the community, of the expediency of political government: or (changing the phrase) it partly arises from a preference, by the generality or bulk of the community, of any government to anarchy. If, for specific reasons, they are attached to the established government, their general perception of the utility of government concurs with their special attachment. If they dislike the established government, their general perception of the utility of government controls and masters their dislike. They detest the established government: but if they would change it for another by resorting to resistance, they must travel to their object through an intervening anarchy which they detest more.

The habitual obedience to the government which is rendered by the bulk of the community, partly arises, therefore, in almost every society, from the cause which I now have described: namely, a perception, by the bulk of the community, of the utility of political government, or a preference by the bulk of the community, of any government to anarchy. And this is the only cause of the habitual obedience in question, which is common to all societies, or nearly all societies. It therefore is the only cause of the habitual obedience in question, which the present general disquisition can properly embrace. The causes of the obedience in question which are peculiar to particular societies, belong to the province of statistics, or the province of particular history.

The only general cause of the *permanence* of political governments, and the only general cause of the *origin* of political governments, are exactly or nearly alike. Though every government has arisen in part from specific or particular causes, almost every government must have arisen in part from the following general cause: namely, that the bulk of the natural society from which the political was formed, were desirous of escaping to a state of government, from a state of nature or anarchy. If they liked specially the government to which they submitted, their general perception of the utility of government concurred with their special inclination. If they disliked the government to which they submitted, their general perception of the utility of government controlled and mastered their repugnance.

The specific or particular causes of specific or particular governments, are rather appropriate matter for particular history, than for the present general disquisition. •

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he position 'that every government continues through the people's consent,' and the position 'that every government rises through the people's consent,' examined and explained.

According to a current opinion (or according to a current expression), the permanence and origin of every government are owing to the people's *consent*: that is to say, every government continues through the *consent* of the people, or the bulk of the political community: and every government arises through the *consent* of the people, or the bulk of the natural society from which the political is formed. According to the same opinion dressed in a different phrase, the power of the sovereign flows from the people, or the people is the fountain of sovereign power.

Now the permanence of every government depends on the habitual obedience which it receives from the bulk of the community. For if the bulk of the community were fully determined to destroy it, and to brave and endure the evils through which they must pass to their object, the might of the government itself, with the might of the minority attached to it, would scarcely suffice to preserve it, or even to retard its subversion. And though it were aided by foreign governments, and therefore were more than a match for the disaffected and rebellious people, it hardly could reduce them to subjection, or constrain them to permanent obedience, in case they hated it mortally, and were prepared to resist it to the death.—But all obedience is *voluntary* or *free*, or every party who obeys *consents* to obey. In other words, every party who obeys *wills* the obedience which he renders, or is determined to render it by some *motive* or another. That acquiescence which is purely involuntary, or which is purely the consequence of physical compulsion or restraint, is not obedience or submission. If a man condemned to imprisonment were dragged to the prison by the jailers, he would not obey or submit. But if he were liable to imprisonment in the event of his refusing to walk to it, and if he were determined to walk to it by a fear of that further restraint, the man would render obedience to the sentence or command of the judge. Moved by his dislike of the contingent punishment, he would *consent* to the infliction of the present.—Since, then, a government continues through the obedience of the people, and since the obedience of the people is voluntary or free, every government continues through the *consent* of the people, or the bulk of the political society. If they like the government, they are determined to obey it habitually, or to *consent* to its continuance, by their special inclination or attachment. If they hate the government, they are determined to obey it habitually, or to *consent* to its

continuance, by their dread of a violent revolution. They consent to what they abhor, because they avoid thereby what they abhor more.—As correctly or truly apprehended, the position, ‘that every government continues through the people’s *consent*,’ merely amounts to this: That, in every society political and independent, the people are determined by motives of some description or another, to obey their government habitually: and that, if the bulk of the community ceased to obey it habitually, the government would cease to exist.

But the position in question, as it is often understood, is taken with one or another of the two following meanings.

Taken with the first of those meanings, the position amounts to this: That the bulk of every community, without inconvenience to themselves, can abolish the established government: and that being able to abolish it without inconvenience to themselves, they yet consent to its continuance or pay it habitual obedience. Or, taken with the first of those meanings, the position amounts to this: That the bulk of every community approve of the established government, or prefer it to every government which could be substituted for it: and that they consent to its continuance, or pay it habitual obedience, by reason of that their approbation or by reason of that their preference. As thus understood, the position is ridiculously false: the habitual obedience of the people in most or many communities, arising wholly or partly from their fear of the probable evils which they might suffer by resistance.

Taken with the second of those meanings, the position amounts to this: That, if the bulk of a community dislike the established government, the government *ought* not to continue: or that, if the bulk of a community dislike the established government, the government therefore is bad or pernicious, and the general good of the community requires its abolition. And, if every actual society were adequately instructed or enlightened, the position, as thus understood, would approach nearly to the truth. For the dislike of an enlightened people towards their established government, would beget a violent presumption that the government was faulty or imperfect. But, in every actual society, the government has neglected to instruct the people in sound political science; or pains have been taken by the government, or the classes that influence the government, to exclude the bulk of the community from sound political science, —

perhaps is forced upon them: that is to say, they could not withhold their submission from that particular government, unless they struggled through evils which they are loath to endure, or unless they resisted to the death. Determined by a fear of the evils which would follow a refusal to submit, (and, probably, by a general perception of the utility of political government,) they freely submit to a government from which they are specially averse.

The expression 'that every government arises through the people's *consent*,' is often uttered with the following meaning: That the bulk of a natural society about to become a political, or the inchoate subjects of an inchoate political government, *promise*, expressly or tacitly, to obey the future sovereign. The expression, however, as uttered with the meaning in question, confounds *consent* and *promise*, and therefore is grossly incorrect. That the inchoate subjects of every inchoate government *will* or *consent* to obey it, is one proposition: that they *promise*, expressly or tacitly, to render it obedience, is another proposition. Inasmuch as they actually obey, they *will* or *consent* to obey: or their *will* or *consent* to obey, is evinced by their actual obedience. But a *will* to render obedience, as evinced by actual obedience, is not of necessity a tacit *promise* to render it: although by a *promise* to render obedience, a *will* or *consent* to render it is commonly expressed or intimated.

That the inchoate subjects of every inchoate government *promise* to render it obedience, is a position involved by an hypothesis which I shall examine in the next section.

In every community ruled by a monarch, the subject members of the community lie under duties to the monarch; and in every community ruled by a sovereign body, the subject members of the community (including the several members of the body itself), lie under duties to the body in its collective and sovereign capacity. In every community ruled by a monarch, the monarch lies under duties towards his subjects: and in every community ruled by a sovereign body, the collective and sovereign body lies under duties to its subjects (including its own members considered severally).

The hypothesis of the *original covenant* or the *fundamental civil pact*.

The duties of the subjects towards the sovereign government, are partly religious, partly legal, and partly moral.

The religious duties of the subjects towards the sovereign government, are creatures of the Divine law as known

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through the principle of utility. If it thoroughly accomplish the purpose for which it ought to exist, or further the general weal to the greatest possible extent, the subjects are bound religiously to pay it habitual obedience. And, if the general good which probably would follow submission outweigh the general good which probably would follow resistance, the subjects are bound religiously to pay it habitual obedience, although it accomplish imperfectly its proper purpose or end.—The legal duties of the subjects towards the sovereign government, are creatures of positive laws which itself has imposed upon them, or which are incumbent upon them by its own authority and might.—The moral duties of the subjects towards the sovereign government, are creatures of positive morality. They mainly are creatures of laws (in the improper acceptation of the term) which the general opinion of the community itself sets to its several members.

The duties of the sovereign government towards the subjects are partly religious and partly moral. If it lay under legal duties towards the subjects, it were not a supreme, but were merely a subordinate government.

Its religious duties towards the subjects, are creatures of the Divine law as known through the principle of utility. It is bound by the Divine law as known through the principle of utility, to advance as far as is possible the weal or good of mankind: and, to advance as far as is possible the weal or good of mankind, it commonly must labour directly and particularly to advance as far as is possible the happiness of its own community.—Its moral duties towards the subjects, are creatures of positive morality. They mainly are creatures of laws (in the improper acceptation of the term) which the general opinion of its own community lays or imposes upon it.

It follows from the foregoing analysis, that the duties of the subjects towards the sovereign government, with the duties of the sovereign government towards the subjects, originate respectively in three several sources: namely, the Divine law (as indicated by the principle of utility), positive law, and positive morality. And, to my understanding, it seems that we account sufficiently for the origin of those obligations, when we simply refer them to those their obvious fountains. It seems to my understanding, that an ampler solution of their origin is not in the least requisite, and, indeed, is impossible. But there are many writers on

political government and society, who are not content to account for their origin, by simply referring them to those their manifest sources. It seems to the writers in question, that we want an ampler solution of the origin of those obligations, or, at least, of the origin of such of them as are imposed by the law of God. And, to find that ampler solution which they believe requisite, those writers resort to the hypothesis of the *original covenant* or *contract*, or the *fundamental civil pact*.^(*)

By the writers who resort to it, this renowned and not exploded hypothesis is imagined and rendered variously. But the purport or effect of the hypothesis, as it is imagined and rendered by most of those writers, may be stated generally thus:

To the formation of every society political and independent, or to the institution of every *πόλις* or *civitas*, all its future members then in being are joint or concurring parties: for all are parties to an agreement in which it then originates, and which is also the basis whereon it afterwards rests. As being the necessary source of the independent political society, or as being a condition necessarily preceding its existence, this agreement of all is styled the *original covenant*: as being the necessary basis whereon the *civitas* afterwards rests, it is styled *pactum civile fundamentale*.—In the process of making this covenant or pact, or the process of forming the society political and independent, there are three several stages: which three several stages may be described in the following manner. 1. The future members of the community just about to be created, jointly resolve to unite themselves into an independent political society: signifying and determining withal the paramount purpose of their union, or even more or fewer of its subordinate or instrumental ends. And here I must briefly remark, that the paramount purpose of their union, or the paramount purpose of the community just about to be created, is the paramount purpose (let it be what it may) for which a society political and independent ought to be founded and perpetuated. By the writers who resort to the hypothesis,

(*) I style the supposed covenant 'the *original covenant* or *convention*,' rather than 'the *original contract*.' Every convention, agreement, or pact, is not a contract properly so called: though every contract properly so called is a convention, agreement, or pact. A contract

properly so called, is a convention which binds legally the promising party or parties. But admitting the hypothesis, the supposed '*original covenant*' would not and could not engender legal or political duties.

this paramount purpose or absolute end is conceived differently: their several conceptions of this purpose or end, differing with the several natures of their respective ethical systems. To writers who admit the system which I style the theory of utility, this purpose or end is the advancement of human happiness. To a multitude of writers who have flourished and flourish in Germany, the following is the truly magnificent though somewhat mysterious object of political government and society: namely, the extension over the earth, or over its human inhabitants, of the empire of right or justice. It would seem that this right or justice, like the good Ulpian's justice, is absolute, eternal, and immutable. It would seem that this right or justice is not a creature of law: that it was anterior to every law; exists independently of every law; and is the measure or test of all law and morality. Consequently, it is not the right or justice which is a creature of the law of God, and to which the name of 'justice' is often applied emphatically. It rather is a something, perfectly self-existent, to which his law conforms, or to which his law should conform. I, therefore, cannot understand it, and will not affect to explain it. Merely guessing at what it may be, I take it for the right or justice mentioned in a preceding note: I take it for general utility darkly conceived and expressed. Let it be what it may, it doubtless is excellently good, or is superlatively fair or high, or (in a breath) is preeminently worthy of praise. For, compared with the extension of its empire over mankind, the mere advancement of their happiness is a mean and contemptible object. 2. Having resolved to unite themselves into an independent political society, all the members of the inchoate community jointly determine the constitution of its sovereign political government. In other words, they jointly determine the member or members in whom the sovereignty shall reside: and, in case they will that the sovereignty shall reside in more than one, they jointly determine the mode wherein the sovereign number shall share the sovereign powers. 3. The process of forming the independent political society, or the process of forming its supreme political government, is completed by promises given and accepted: namely, by a promise of the inchoate sovereign to the inchoate subjects, by promises of the latter to the former, and by a promise of each of the latter to all and each of the rest. The promise made by the sovereign, and the promises made by the subjects, are made to a common object: namely, the

accomplishment of the paramount purpose of the independent political society, and of such of its subordinate purposes as were signified by the resolution to form it. The purport of the promise made by the sovereign, and the purport of the promises made by the subjects, are, therefore, the following. The sovereign promises generally to govern to the paramount end of the independent political society: and, if any of its subordinate ends were signified by the resolution to form it, the sovereign moreover promises specifically to govern specifically to those subordinate ends. The subjects promise to render to the sovereign a qualified or conditional obedience: that is to say, to render to the sovereign all the obedience which shall consist with that paramount purpose and those subordinate purposes.—The resolution of the members to unite themselves into an independent political society, is styled *pactum unionis*. Their determination of the constitution or structure of the sovereign political government, is styled *pactum constitutionis* or *pactum ordinationis*. The promise of the sovereign to the subjects, with the promises of the subjects to the sovereign and to one another, are styled *pactum subjectionis*: for, through the promises of the subjects, or through the promises of the subjects coupled with the promise of the sovereign, the former are placed completely in a state of subjection to the latter, or the relation of subjection and sovereignty arises between the parties. But of the so-called *pact of union*, the so-called *pact constituent*, and the so-called *pact of subjection*, the last only is properly a convention. The so-called *pact of union* and the so-called *pact constituent* are properly resolves or determinations introductory to the *pact of subjection*: the *pact of subjection* being the original covenant or the fundamental civil pact.—Through this original covenant, or this fundamental pact, the sovereign is bound (or at least is bound religiously) to govern as is mentioned above: and the subjects are bound (or, at least, are bound religiously) to render to the sovereign for the time being, the obedience above described. And the binding virtue of this fundamental pact is not confined to the founders of the independent political society. The binding virtue of this fundamental pact extends to the following members of the same community. For the promises which the founders of the community made for themselves respectively, import similar promises which they make for their respective successors. Through the promise made by the original sove-

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reign, following sovereigns are bound (or at least, are bound religiously) to govern as is mentioned above. Through the promises made by the original subjects, following subjects are bound (or at least, are bound religiously) to render to the sovereign for the time being, the obedience above described. —In every society political and independent, the duties of the sovereign towards the subjects (or the religious duties of the sovereign towards the subjects) spring from an original covenant like that which I now have delineated: And in every society political and independent, the duties of the subjects towards the sovereign (or the religious duties of the subjects towards the sovereign) arise from a similar pact. Unless we suppose that such an agreement is incumbent on the sovereign and subjects, we cannot account adequately for those their respective obligations. Unless the subjects were held to render it by an agreement that they shall render it, the subjects would not be obliged, or would not be obliged sufficiently, to render to the sovereign the requisite obedience: that is to say, the obedience requisite to the accomplishment of the proper purpose or end of the independent political society. Unless the sovereign were held by an agreement to govern as is mentioned above, the sovereign would not be obliged, or would not be obliged sufficiently, from governing despotically or arbitrarily: that is to say, governing with little or no regard to the proper purpose or end of a supreme political government.

Such, I believe, is the general purport of the hypothesis, as it is imagined and rendered by most of the writers who resort to it.

But, as I have remarked above, the writers who resort to the hypothesis imagine and render it variously.—According, for example, to some of those writers, The original subjects, covenanting for themselves and their followers, promise obedience to the original and following sovereigns. But the original sovereign is not a promising party to the fundamental civil pact. The original sovereign does not agree with the subjects, that the sovereign powers shall be used to a given end or ends, or that those powers shall be used in a given mode or modes.—And by the different writers who render the hypothesis thus, the purport of the subjects' promises is imagined. For example: Some suppose that the obedience promised by the subjects, is the qualified or conditional obedience briefly described above; whilst others suppose that the obedience promised by the subjects, is an

obedience passive or unlimited.—The writers, in short, who suppose an original covenant, think variously concerning the nature of the end for which a supreme government ought to exist. They think moreover variously concerning the extent of the obedience which a supreme government ought to receive from its subjects. And to his own opinion concerning the nature of that end, or to his own opinion concerning the extent of that obedience, each of the writers in question endeavours to shape the hypothesis.—But though the writers who resort to the hypothesis imagine and render it variously, they concur in this: That the duties of the subjects towards the sovereign (or the religious duties of the subjects towards the sovereign) are creatures of the original covenant. And the writers who fancy that the original sovereign was a promising party to the pact, also concur in this: That the duties of the sovereign towards the subjects (or the religious duties of the sovereign towards the subjects) are engendered by the same agreement.

A complete though concise exposition of the various forms or shapes in which various writers imagine and render the hypothesis, would fill a considerable volume. Besides, the ensuing strictures apply exactly, or may be fitted easily, to any original covenant that has been or can be conceived; although they are directed more particularly to the fancied original covenant which I have delineated above. My statement of the purport of the hypothesis, I, therefore, conclude here. And I now will suggest shortly a few of the conclusive objections to which the hypothesis is open.

1. To account for the duties of subjects towards their sovereign government, or for those of the sovereign government towards its subjects, or for those of each of the parties towards the other, is the scope of every writer who supposes an original covenant.—But, to account for the duties of subjects towards their sovereign government, or for those of the sovereign government towards its subjects, we need not resort to the hypothesis of a fundamental civil pact. We sufficiently account for the origin of those respective obligations, when we refer them simply (or without the supposition of an original covenant) to their apparent and obvious fountains: namely, the law of God, positive law, and positive morality.—Besides, although the formation of an independent political society were really preceded by a fundamental civil pact, scarce any of the duties lying thereafter on the

subjects, or of the duties lying thereafter on the sovereign, would be engendered or influenced by that foregoing convention.—The hypothesis, therefore, of an original covenant, is needless, and is worse than needless. It affects to assign the cause of certain phænomena: namely, the duties of subjects towards their sovereign government, or the duties of the sovereign government towards its subjects, or the duties of each of the parties towards the other. But the cause which it assigns is superfluous; inasmuch as there are other causes which are at once obvious and adequate: And that superfluous cause is inefficient as well as superfluous, or could not have produced the phænomena whereof it is the fancied source.

It will appear from the following analysis, that, although the formation of an independent political society were really preceded by an original covenant, scarce any of the duties lying thereafter on the subjects, or of the duties lying thereafter on the sovereign, would be engendered or affected by that foregoing agreement. In other words, the covenant would hardly oblige (*legally, religiously, or morally*) the original or following subjects, or the original or following sovereigns.

Every convention which obliges legally (or every contract properly so called) derives its legal efficacy from a positive law. Speaking exactly, it is not the convention that obliges legally, or that engenders the legal duty: but the law obliges legally, or engenders the legal duty, through the convention. In other words, the positive law annexes the duty to the convention: or it determines that duties of the given class shall follow conventions of the given description.—Consequently, if the sovereign government were bound *legally* by the fundamental civil pact, the legal duty lying on the government were the creature of a positive law: that is to say, the legal duty lying on the government were the creature of a positive law annexing the duty to the pact. And, seeing that a law set by the government to itself were merely a law through a metaphor, the positive law annexing the duty to the pact would be set to the sovereign government by another and superior sovereign. Consequently, the sovereign government legally bound by the pact would be in a state of subjection.—Through a positive law set by their own sovereign, the subjects might be bound legally to keep the original covenant. But the legal or political duty thus incumbent on the subjects, would properly proceed from the law set

by their own sovereign, and not from the covenant itself. If they were bound legally to keep the original covenant, without a positive law set by their own sovereign, the subjects would be bound legally to keep the original covenant, through a positive law set by another sovereign: that is to say, they would be in a state of subjection to their own sovereign government, and also to a sovereign government conferring rights upon their own.

Every convention which obliges (properly or improperly), derives its efficacy from law (proper or improper). As obliging legally, a convention derives its efficacy from law positive: As obliging religiously or morally, it derives its efficacy from the law of God or from positive morality.—Consequently, if the sovereign or subjects were bound *religiously* by the fundamental civil pact, the religious duty lying on the sovereign, or the religious duty lying on the subjects, would properly proceed from the Divine law, and not from the pact itself. The party bound religiously would be bound by the law of God through the original covenant: or the religious duty lying on the party, would be annexed to the original covenant by the law of God.

Now the proper absolute end of an independent political society, and the nature of the index to the law of God, are conceived differently by different men. But whatever be the absolute end of an independent political society, and whatever be the nature of the index to the law of God, the sovereign would be bound religiously, without an original covenant, to govern to that absolute end: whilst the subjects would be bound religiously, without an original covenant, to render to the sovereign the obedience which the accomplishment of the end might require. Consequently, whether it consisted or conflicted with that proper absolute end, the original covenant would not oblige religiously either of the two parties.—If the original covenant consisted with that absolute end, the original covenant would be superfluous, and therefore would be inoperative. The religious duties lying on the sovereign and subjects, would not be effects or consequences, mediately or immediately, of the fundamental civil pact. Inasmuch as the Divine law would impose those religious duties, although the pact had not been made, they would not be effects or consequences annexed to the pact by the law, or would not be imposed by the law through the pact.—If the original covenant conflicted with that absolute end, it would also conflict with the law which is

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For example: Let us suppose that the principle of utility is the index to the law of God; and that, since the principle of utility is the index to the law of God, the greatest possible advancement of the common happiness or weal is the proper absolute end of an independent political society. Let us suppose, moreover, that the accomplishment of this absolute end was the scope of the original covenant. Now no religious obligation would be laid on the sovereign or subjects through the fundamental pact. For the sovereign would be bound religiously, without the fundamental pact, to govern to the very end at which its authors had aimed: whilst the subjects would be bound religiously, without the fundamental pact, to render to the sovereign the obedience which the accomplishment of the end might require. And if the accomplishment of this same end were not the scope of the pact, the pact would conflict with the law as known through the principle of utility, and would not oblige religiously either of the two parties. To make a promise which general utility condemns, is an offence against the law of God: but to break a promise of a generally pernicious tendency, is the fulfilment of a religious duty.

And though the original sovereign or the original subjects might have been bound religiously by the original covenant, why or how should it bind religiously the following sovereigns or subjects? Duties to the subjects for the time being, would be laid by the law of God on all the following sovereigns; and duties to the sovereign for the time being, would be laid by the law of God on all the following subjects: but why should those obligations be laid on those following parties, through the fundamental pact? through or in consequence of a pact made without their authority, and even without their knowledge? Legal obligations often lie upon parties (as, for example, upon heirs or administrators,) through or in consequence of promises made by other parties whose legal representatives they are: whose faculties or means of fulfilling obligations devolve or descend to them by virtue of positive law. And I perceive readily, why the legal obligations which are consequent on those promises, extend from the makers of the promises to the parties who legally represent them. It is expedient, for various reasons, that positive law should impose obligations on the makers of certain promises: and for the same, or nearly the same,

reasons, it is expedient that the legal duties which are laid on the makers themselves, should pass to the parties who legally represent them, and who take their faculties or means. But I am unable to perceive, why or how a promise of the original sovereign or subjects should bind religiously the following sovereigns or subjects: Though I see that the cases of legal obligation to which I now have adverted, probably suggested the groundless conceit to those who devised the hypothesis of a fundamental civil pact.

If the sovereign were bound *morally* to keep the original covenant, the sovereign would be bound by opinions current amongst the subjects, to govern to the absolute end at which its authors had aimed: And if the subjects were bound *morally* to keep the original covenant, the subjects would be bound severally by opinions of the community at large, to render to the sovereign the obedience which the accomplishment of the end might require. But the moral obligations thus incumbent on the sovereign, with the moral obligations thus incumbent on the subjects, would not be engendered or affected by the original covenant. They would not be imposed by the positive morality of the community, through or in consequence of the pact. For the opinions obliging the sovereign to govern to that absolute end, with the opinions obliging the subjects to render that requisite obedience, would not be consequents of the pact, but would have been its antecedents: inasmuch as the pact itself would have been made by the founders of the community, because those very opinions were held by all or most of them.

We may, if we like, imagine and assume, that the fancied original covenant was conceived and constructed by its authors, with some particularity and precision: that, having determined the absolute end of their union, it specified some of the ends positive or negative, or some of the means or modes positive or negative, through which the sovereign government should rule to that absolute end. The founders, for example, of the independent political society (like the Roman people who adopted the Twelve Tables), might have adverted specially to the monstrous and palpable mischiefs of *ex post facto* legislation: and therefore the fancied covenant might have determined specially, that the sovereign government about to be formed should forbear from legislation of the kind. And if any of those positive or negative ends were specified by the original covenant, the promise of the subjects to render obedience to the sovereign, was made

with special reservations; it was not extended to any of the cases wherein the sovereign might deviate from any of the subordinate ends which the covenant determined specially.

Now the bulk or generality of the subjects, in an independent political community, might think alike or uniformly concerning the absolute end to which their sovereign government ought to rule: and yet their uniform opinions concerning that absolute end might bind or control their sovereign very imperfectly. Notwithstanding the uniformity of their opinions concerning that absolute end, the bulk of the subjects might think variously concerning the conduct of their sovereign: since the proper absolute end of a sovereign political government, or the absolute end for which it ought to exist, is inevitably conceived in a form, or is inevitably stated in expressions, extremely abstract and vague. For example: The bulk or generality of the subjects might possibly concur in thinking, that the proper absolute end of their sovereign political government was the greatest possible advancement of the general or common weal: but whether a positive law made by it *ex post facto* did or did not comport with its proper absolute end, is clearly a question which they might answer variously, notwithstanding the uniformity of their opinions concerning that paramount purpose. Unless, then, the bulk of the subjects thought alike or uniformly concerning more or fewer of its proper subordinate ends, they hardly would oppose to the government, in any particular case, a uniform, simultaneous, and effectual resistance. Consequently, the sovereign government would not be affected constantly by the fear of an effectual resistance from the subject members of the community: and, consequently, their general and uniform opinions concerning its paramount purpose would bind or control it feebly.—But if the mass of the subjects thought alike or uniformly concerning more or fewer of its proper subordinate ends, the uniform opinions of the mass, concerning those subordinate ends, would probably control it potently. Speaking generally, the proper subordinate ends of a sovereign political government (let those ends or means be what they may) may be imagined in forms, or may be stated in expressions, which are neither extremely abstract, nor extremely vague. Consequently, if the government ventured to deviate from any of the subordinate ends to which those uniform opinions were decidedly favourable, the bulk or generality of the subjects would pro-

bably unite in resenting, and even in resisting its measures : for if they tried its measures by one and the same standard, and if that standard or test were determinate and not dubious, their respective opinions concerning its measures would exactly or nearly tally. Consequently, a fear of encountering an effectual resistance, in case it should venture to deviate from any of those ends, would constantly hold the government to all the subordinate ends which the uniform opinions of the mass decidedly favoured.—The extent to which a government is bound by the opinions of its subjects, and the efficacy of the moral duties which their opinions impose upon it, therefore depend mainly on the two following causes : First, the number of its subordinate ends (or the number of the ends subserving its absolute end) concerning which the mass of its subjects think alike or uniformly : secondly, the degree of clearness and precision with which they conceive the ends in respect whereof their opinions thus coincide. The greater is that number, and the greater is that degree, the more extensively, and the more effectually, is the government bound or controlled by the positive morality of the community.

Now it follows from what I have premised, that, if an original covenant had determined clearly and precisely some of the subordinate ends whereto the sovereign should rule, the sovereign would be bound effectually by the positive morality of the community, to rule to the subordinate ends which the covenant had thus specified : supposing (I, of course, understand) that those same subordinate ends were favoured by opinions and sentiments which the mass of the subjects for the time being held and felt. And here (it might be argued) the sovereign would be bound morally to rule to those same ends, through the fundamental pact, or in consequence of the fundamental pact. For (it might be said) the efficacy of the opinions binding the sovereign government would mainly arise from the clearness and precision with which those same ends were conceived by the mass of the subjects ; whilst the clearness and precision of their conceptions would mainly arise from the clearness and precision with which those same ends had been specified by the original covenant. It will, however, appear on a moment's reflection, that the opinions of the generality of the subjects, concerning those same ends, would not be engendered by but rather would have engendered the covenant : For if most of the subject founders of the independent political society

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had not been affected by opinions exactly similar, why were those same ends specially determined by the covenant of which those subject founders were the principal authors? And, granting that the clearness with which they were specified by the covenant would impart an answering clearness to the conceptions of the following subjects, that effect on the opinions held by the following subjects would not be wrought by the covenant as being a *covenant or pact*: that is to say, as being a *promise, or mutual promises, proffered and accepted*. That effect would be wrought by the covenant as being a luminous statement of those same subordinate ends. And any similar statement which might circulate widely (as a similar statement, for example, by a popular and respected writer), would work a similar effect on the opinions of the following subjects. Stating clearly and precisely those same subordinate ends, it would naturally give to their conceptions of those same subordinate ends a corresponding clearness and precision.

The following (I think) is the only, or nearly the only case, wherein an original covenant, as being a covenant or pact, might generate or influence any of the duties lying on the sovereign or subjects.

It might be believed by the bulk of the subjects, that an agreement or convention (or a promise proffered and accepted) has that mysterious efficacy which is expressly or tacitly ascribed to it by those who resort to the hypothesis of a fundamental civil pact.—It might be believed by the bulk of the subjects, that unless their sovereign government had *promised* so to govern, it would not be bound by the law of God, or would not be bound sufficiently by the law of God, to govern to what they esteemed its proper absolute end. It might be believed moreover by the bulk of the subjects, that the promise made by the original sovereign was a promise made in effect by each of the following sovereigns, and therefore it might be believed by the bulk of the subjects, that their sovereign government was bound religiously to govern to that absolute end, rather because it had *promised* to govern to that absolute end, than by reason of the intrinsic worth belonging to the end itself.—Now, if the mass of the subjects potently believed these positions, the duties of the government towards its subjects, which the positive morality of the community imposed upon it, would be engendered or affected by the original covenant. They would be imposed upon it, wholly or in part,

because the original covenant had preceded or accompanied the institution of the independent political society. For if it departed from any of the ends determined by the original covenant, the mass of its subjects would be moved to anger, (and perhaps to eventual rebellion,) by its breach of its *promise*, real or supposed, rather than by that misrule of which they esteemed it guilty. Its breach of its promise, as being a breach of a promise, would be the cause of their offence, wholly or in part. For they would impute to the promise, real or supposed, a proper and absolute worth; or they would care for the promise, real or supposed, without regard to its scope and tendency.

It appears from the foregoing analysis, that, although the formation of the independent political society had really been preceded by a fundamental civil pact, none of the *legal* or *religious* duties lying on the sovereign or subjects could be engendered or influenced by that preceding convention: that there is only a single case, or are only a few cases, wherein it could engender or influence any of the *moral* duties lying on the same parties. It will appear from the following analysis, that, where it might engender or influence any of those *moral* duties, that preceding convention would probably be pernicious.

Of the duties of the sovereign towards the subjects, and of the duties of the subjects towards the sovereign, it is only those which are moral, or are imposed by positive morality, that any original covenant could possibly affect. And, considered with reference to those, an original covenant would be simply useless, or would be positively pernicious.

An original covenant would be simply useless, if it merely determined the absolute end of the sovereign political government: if it merely determined that the absolute end of the government was the greatest possible advancement of the common happiness or weal. For though the covenant might give uniformity to the opinions of the mass of the subjects, it would only affect their opinions concerning that absolute end: And, as I have shown already, the uniformity of their opinions concerning the paramount purpose, would hardly influence the conduct of their sovereign political government.

But the covenant might specify some of the means, or some of the subordinate or instrumental ends, through which the government should rule to that its absolute end, or through which it should so rule as to further the common weal. And as specially determining any of those means,

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For the opinions of the following members of the independent political community, concerning the subordinate ends to which the government should rule, would or would not be affected by the covenant or pact of the founders.

If the covenant of the founders of the community did not affect the opinions of its following members, the covenant would be simply useless.

If the covenant of the founders of the community did affect the opinions of its following members, the covenant probably would be positively pernicious. For the opinions of the following members would probably be affected by the covenant as being a covenant or pact made by the founders. They probably would impute to the subordinate ends specified by the original covenant, a worth extrinsic and arbitrary, or independent of their intrinsic merits. A belief that the specified ends were of a useful or beneficent tendency, or were ends tending to the furtherance of the common happiness or weal, would not be their reason, or would not be their only reason, for regarding the ends with respect. They probably would respect the specified ends, or probably would partly respect them, because the venerable founders of the independent political society (by the venerable covenant or pact which was the basis of the social fabric) had determined that those same ends were some of the ends or means through which the weal of the community might be furthered by its sovereign government. Now the venerable age or times wherein the community was founded, would probably be less enlightened (notwithstanding its claims to veneration) than any of the ensuing and degenerate ages through which the community might endure. Consequently, the following pernicious effect would be wrought by the original covenant. The opinions held in an age comparatively ignorant, concerning the subordinate ends to which the government should rule, would influence, more or less, through the medium of the covenant, the opinions held, concerning those ends, in ages comparatively knowing.—Let us suppose, for example, that the formation of the British community was preceded by a fundamental pact. Let us suppose, (a ‘most unforced’ supposition,) that the ignorant founders of the community deemed foreign commerce hurtful to domestic industry. Let us, therefore, suppose, moreover, that the government about

to be formed promised for itself and its successors, to *protect* the industry of its own society, by forbidding and preventing the importation of foreign manufactures. Now if the fundamental pact made by our worthy ancestors were devoutly revered by many of ourselves, it would hinder the diffusion of sound oeconomic doctrines through the present community. The present sovereign government would, therefore, be prevented by the pact, from legislating wisely and usefully in regard to our commercial intercourse with other independent nations. If the government attempted to withdraw the restrictions which the laws of preceding governments have laid on our foreign commerce, the fallacies which now are current, and the nonsense which now is in vogue, would not be the only fallacies, and would not be the only nonsense, wherewith the haters of improvement would belabour the audacious innovators. All who delighted in ‘things ancient,’ would certainly accuse it of infringing a principle which was part of the very basis whereon the community rested: which the wise and venerable authors of the fundamental pact itself had formerly adopted and consecrated. Nay, the lovers of darkness assuredly would affirm, and probably would potently believe, that the government was *incompetent* to withdraw the restrictions which the laws of preceding governments have laid on our foreign commerce: that being, as it were, a *privy* of the first or original government, it was *estopped* by the solemn promise which that government had given.

Promises or oaths on the part of the original sovereign, or promises or oaths on the part of succeeding sovereigns, are not the efficient securities, *moral or religious*, for beneficent government or rule.—The best of *moral* securities, or the best of the securities yielded by positive morality, would arise from a wide diffusion, through the mass of the subjects, of the soundest political science which the lights of the age could afford. If they conceived correctly the paramount end of their government, with the means or subordinate ends through which it must accomplish that end, none of its measures would be grossly foolish or wicked, and its conduct positive and negative would commonly be wise and beneficent.—The best of *religious* securities, or the best of the securities yielded by religious convictions, would arise from worthy opinions, held by rulers and subjects, concerning the wishes and purposes of the Good and Wise Monarch, and

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2. It appears from the foregoing strictures on the hypothesis of the original covenant, that the hypothesis is needless, and is worse than needless: that we are able to account sufficiently, without resorting to the hypothesis, for the duties of subjects towards their sovereign government, with the duties of the sovereign government towards its subjects; and that, though the formation of the independent political society had really been preceded by a fundamental civil pact, scarce any of those obligations would be engendered or influenced by that preceding agreement. It will appear from the following strictures, that the hypothesis of the fundamental pact is not only a fiction, but is a fiction approaching to an impossibility: that the institution of a *πόλις* or *civitas*, or the formation of a society political and independent, was never preceded or accompanied, and could hardly be preceded or accompanied, by an original covenant properly so called, or by aught resembling the idea of a proper original covenant.

Every convention properly so called, or every pact or agreement properly so called, consists of a *promise* (or mutual promises) *proffered and accepted*. Wherever mutual promises are proffered and accepted, there are, in strictness, two or more conventions: for the promise proffered by each, and accepted by the other of the agreeing parties, is of itself an agreement. But where the performance of either of the promises is made by either to depend on the performance of the other, the several conventions are cross or implicated conventions, and commonly are deemed, therefore, one convention.—Where one only of the agreeing parties gives or passes a promise, the promise which is proffered by the one, and which is accepted by the other, is, in the language of jurists, ‘a convention *unilateral*.’ Where each of the agreeing parties gives or passes a promise, and the performance of either of the promises is made to depend on the performance of the other, the several promises respectively proffered and accepted, are, in the language of jurists, a ‘convention *bilateral*.’ Where each of the agreeing parties gives or passes a promise, but the performance of either of the promises is not made to depend on the performance of the other, each of the several conventions is a separate unilateral convention, although the several conventions be made at one time. For example: If I promise you to render you a service, and if you accept the proffered promise, the promise prof-

ferred and accepted forms a convention unilateral. If I promise *you* to render you a service, and you promise *me* to render me a service *therefor*, the promises respectively proffered, if they are respectively accepted, form a convention bilateral. If each of us promise the other to render the other a service, but the render of either of the services is not made to depend on the render of the other, the promises proffered and accepted are separate unilateral conventions, although they be proffered and accepted at one and the same time.—Since, then, a convention bilateral is formed by the implication of several unilateral conventions, every convention is properly a unilateral convention, or a *promise proffered and accepted*.

The essentials of a convention may be stated generally thus. 1. The promisor, or the party who proffers the promise, promises the promisee, or the party to whom it is proffered, that he will do or perform some given act or acts, will forbear or abstain from some given act or acts, or will do or perform and also forbear or abstain. And the acts or forbearances which he promises, or the acts and forbearances which he promises, may be styled the object of his promise, and also the object of the convention. 2. The promisor *signifies* to the promisee, that he *intends* to do the acts, or to observe the forbearances, which form the object of his promise. If he signifies this his intention by spoken or written words, (or by signs which custom or usage has rendered equivalent to words,) his proffered promise is *express*. If he signifies this his intention by signs of another nature, his proffered promise is still a genuine promise, but is *implied* or *tacit*. If, for example, I receive goods from a shopkeeper, telling him that I mean to pay for them, I promise expressly to pay for the goods which I receive : for I signify an intention to pay for them, through spoken or written language. Again : Having been accustomed to receive goods from the shopkeeper, and also to pay for the goods which I have been accustomed to receive, I receive goods which the shopkeeper delivers at my house, without signifying by words spoken or written, (or by signs which custom or usage has rendered equivalent to words,) any intention or purpose of paying for the goods which he delivers. Consequently, I do not promise expressly to pay for the particular goods. I promise, however, tacitly. For by receiving the particular goods, under the various circumstances which have preceded and accompanied the reception, I signify to the party who delivers them, my intention of paying for the goods, as decidedly as

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I should signify it if I told him that I meant to pay. The only difference between the express, and the tacit or implied promise, lies in the difference between the natures of the signs through which the two intentions are respectively signified or evinced. 3. The promisee *accepts* the proffered promise. In other words, he *signifies* to the promisor, expressly or tacitly, his *belief* or *expectation* that the latter will do or forbear agreeably to the intention or purpose which the latter has expressed or intimated. Unless the promise be accepted, or such a belief or expectation be signified expressly or tacitly, the promise is not a convention. If the acts or forbearances which form the object of the promise be afterwards done or observed, they are done or observed spontaneously by the promising party, or not by reason of the promise considered as such: for the promise would not be enforced (legally or morally) by a rational supreme government or a sane public opinion. In the technical language of the Roman jurists, and by most of the modern jurists who are familiar with that technical language, a promise proffered but not accepted is styled a *pollicitation*.

Consequently, the main essentials of a convention are these: First, a *signification* by the promising party, of his *intention* to do the acts, or to observe the forbearances, which he promises to do or observe: secondly, a *signification* by the promisee, that he *expects* the promising party will fulfil the proffered promise. And that this signification of intention and this signification of expectation are of the very essence of a proper convention or agreement, will appear on a moment's reflection.

The conventions enforced by positive law or morality, are enforced legally or morally for various reasons. But of the various reasons for enforcing any convention, the following is always one.—Sanctions apart, a convention *naturally* raises in the mind of the promisee, (or a convention *tends* to raise in the mind of the promisee,) an *expectation* that its object will be accomplished: and to the expectation naturally raised by the convention, he as naturally shapes his conduct. Now, as much of the business of human life turns or moves upon conventions, frequent disappointments of those expectations which conventions naturally excite, would render human society a scene of baffled hopes, and of thwarted projects and labours. To prevent disappointments of such expectations, is therefore a main object of the legal and moral rules whose direct and appropriate purpose is the en-

forcement of pacts or agreements. But the promisee would not entertain the expectation, unless the corresponding intention were signified by the promising party: and, unless the existence of the expectation were signified by the promisee, the promising party would not be apprised of its existence, although the proffered promise had actually raised it. Without the signification of the intention, there were no promise properly so called: without the signification of the expectation, there were no sufficient reason for enforcing the genuine promise which really may have been proffered.⁽⁷⁾

It follows from the foregoing statement of the main essentials of a convention, that an original covenant properly so called, or aught resembling the idea of a proper original covenant, could hardly precede the formation of an independent political society.

According to the hypothesis of the original covenant, in so far as it regards the promise of the original sovereign, the sovereign promises to govern to the absolute end of the union, (and, perhaps, to more or fewer of its subordinate or instrumental ends). And the promise is proffered to, and is accepted by, *all* the original subjects. In case the inchoate government be a government of one, the promise passes from the monarch to all the members of the community (excepting the monarch himself). In case the inchoate government be a government of a number, it passes from the sovereign body (in its collective and sovereign capacity) to all the subject members of the inchoate community (including the members of the body considered severally).—According to the hypothesis of the original covenant, in so far as it re-

(7) The incidental statement, in the text, of the essentials of a convention or pact, is sufficient for the limited purpose to which I have there placed it. If I were expounding directly the *rationale* of the doctrine of contracts, I should annex to the general statement which I have placed in the text, many explanations and restrictions which now I must pass in silence. A good exposition of that *rationale* (which jargon and bad logic have marvellously perplexed and obscured) would involve a searching analysis of the following intricate expressions: promise; solicitation; convention, agreement, or pact; contract; quasi-contract.

But I will add to the statement in the text, before I conclude the note, the following remark on that *consent* which is of the essence of a convention. That

consent which is of the essence of a convention, is formed of the intention signified by the promisor, and of the corresponding expectation signified by the promisee. This intention with this expectation is styled the *consensus* of the parties, because the intention and expectation chime or go together, or because they are directed to a common object; namely, the acts or forbearances which form the object of the convention. But the term *consent*, as used with a wider meaning, signifies any compliance with any wish of another. And, taking the term with this wider meaning, subjects (as I have shown already) *consent* to obey their sovereign, whether they promise or not to render obedience, and whatever be the nature of the motives by which they are determined to render it.

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gards the promise of the original subjects, they promise to render to the sovereign a passive and unlimited obedience, or they promise to render to the sovereign such a qualified obedience as shall consist with a given end or with given ends. And the promise of the subjects passes from *all* the subjects: from all and each of the subjects to the monarch or sovereign body, or from each of the subjects to all and each of the rest. In case the inchoate government be a government of one, it passes from all the members of the inchoate community (excepting the monarch). In case the inchoate government be a government of a number, it passes from all the members of the inchoate community (including the several members of the sovereign body).

Now it appears from the foregoing statement of the main essentials of a convention, that the promise of the sovereign to the subjects would not be a covenant properly, unless the subjects *accepted* it. But the subjects could hardly accept it, unless they apprehended its object. Unless they apprehended its object, it hardly could raise in their minds any determinate expectation: and unless it raised in their minds a determinate expectation, they hardly could signify virtually any determinate expectation, or could hardly accept virtually the proffered promise. The signs of acceptance which might actually fall from them, would not be signs of virtual acceptance, but would be in reality unmeaning noise or show.—Now the ignorant and weaker portion of the inchoate community (the portion, for example, which was not adult) could hardly apprehend the object of the sovereign's promise, whether the promise were general or special: whether the sovereign promised generally to govern to the absolute end of the independent political society, or promised moreover specially to govern specially and directly to certain subordinate ends. We know that the great majority, in any actual community, have no determinate notions concerning the absolute end to which their sovereign government ought to rule: that they have no determinate notions concerning the ends or means through which it should aim at the accomplishment of that its paramount purpose. It surely, therefore, were absurd to suppose, that all or many of the members of any inchoate community would have determinate notions (or notions approaching to determinateness) concerning the scope of their union, or concerning the means to its attainment. Consequently, most or many of the original subjects would ~~not~~ apprehend the object of the original sovereign's

promise: and, not apprehending its object, they would not accept it in effect, although they might accept it in show. With regard to most or many of the original subjects, the promise of the original sovereign were hardly a covenant or pact, but were rather a pollicitation.

The remarks which I now have made on the promise of the original sovereign, will apply, with a few adaptations, to the promise of the original subjects. If really they proffered to the sovereign (or if really they proffered to one another) that promise to render obedience which the hypothesis supposes or feigns, they would *signify* expressly or tacitly an *intention* of fulfilling it. But such a signification of intention could not be made by all of them, or even by most or many of them: for by most or many of them, the object of the fancied promise would not be apprehended determinately, or with a distant approach to determinateness.—If you feign that the promise to obey passes from the subjects to the subjects, you thicken the absurdity of the fiction. You fancy that a promise is proffered by parties to whom the object of the promise is nearly or quite unintelligible: and, seeing that the promisors are also the promisees, you fancy that the promise is accepted by parties to whom the object of the promise is equally incomprehensible.

If you would suppose an original covenant which as a mere hypothesis will hold water, you must suppose that the society about to be formed is composed entirely of adult members: that all these adult members are persons of sane mind, and even of much sagacity and much judgment: and that being very sagacious and very judicious, they also are perfectly familiar, or at least are passably acquainted, with political and ethical science. On these bare possibilities, you may build an original covenant which shall be a coherent fiction.

It hardly is necessary to add, that the hypothesis of the original covenant, in any of its forms or shapes, has no foundation in actual facts. There is no historical evidence, that the hypothesis has ever been realised: that the formation of any society political and independent has actually been preceded by a proper original covenant, or by aught approaching to the idea.

In a few societies political and independent, (as, for example, in the Anglo-American States,) the sovereign political government has been determined at once, and agreeably to a scheme or plan. But, even in these

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who determined the constitution (either as scheming or planning, or as simply voting or adopting it) were merely a slender portion of the whole of the independent community, and were virtually sovereign therein before the constitution was determined: insomuch that the constitution was not constructed by the whole of an inchoate community, but rather was constructed by a fraction of a community already consummate or complete. If you would show me an actual case exactly squaring with the idea of a proper original covenant, you must show me a society political and independent, with a government political and sovereign, which all the members of the society who were then in existence jointly founded and constituted. You must show me, also, that all the subject or sovereign authors of this society and government were parties expressly or tacitly to a true or genuine convention resembling the original covenants which I have mentioned above.—In most societies political and independent, the constitution of the supreme government has *grown*. By which fustian but current phrase, I intend not to intimate that it hath come of itself, or is a marvellous something fashioned without hands. For though we say of governments which we mean to praise, ‘that they are governments of laws, and not governments of men,’ all human governments are governments of men: And, without men to make them, and without men to enforce them, human laws were just nothing at all, or were merely idle words scribbled on paper or parchment. I intend to intimate, by the phrase in question, that the constitution of the supreme government has not been determined at once, or agreeably to a scheme or plan: that positive moral rules of successive generations of the community (and, perhaps, positive laws made by its successive sovereigns) have determined the constitution, with more or less of exactness, slowly and unsystematically. Consequently, the supreme government was not constituted by the original members of the society: Its constitution has been the work of a long series of authors, comprising the original members and many generations of their followers. And the same may be said of most of the ethical maxims which opinions current with the subjects constrain the sovereign to observe. The original sovereign government could not have promised its subjects to govern by those maxims. For the current opinions which actually enforce those maxims, are not coeval with the independent political society, but rather have arisen insensibly since the society was

formed.— In some societies political and independent, oaths or promises are made by rulers on their accession to office. But such an oath or promise, and an original covenant to which the original sovereign is a promising party, have little or no resemblance. That the formation of the society political and independent preceded the conception of the oath itself, is commonly implied by the terms of the latter. The swearing party, moreover, is commonly a limited monarch, or occupies some position like that of a limited monarch: that is to say, the swearing party is not sovereign, but is merely a limb or member of a sovereign body.

And if actual original covenants might be detected in history, they would not sustain the hypothesis. For, according to the hypothesis, an original covenant *necessarily* precedes the formation of an independent political society. And in numerous cases of independent political society, the formation of the society, as we know from history, was *not* preceded by an original covenant: Or, at least, the formation of the society, as we know from history, was *not* preceded by an *express* original covenant.

It is said, however, by the advocates of the hypothesis, (for the purpose of obviating the difficulty which these negative cases present,) that a *tacit* original covenant preceded the formation of the society, although its formation was not preceded by an *express* covenant of the kind.

Now (as I have shown above) an actual signification of intention on the part of the promisor, with an actual acceptance of the promise on the part of the promisee, are of the very essence of a *genuine* convention or pact, be it express, or be it tacit. The only difference between an express, and a tacit or implied convention, lies in this: That, where the convention is express, the intention and acceptance are signified by language, or by signs which custom or usage has rendered equivalent to language: but that, where the convention is tacit or implied, the intention and acceptance are not signified by words, or by signs which custom or usage has made tantamount to words.⁽²⁾

(2) Quasi-contracts, or contracts *quasi* or *uti*, ought to be distinguished carefully from tacit or implied contracts. A tacit or implied contract is a genuine contract: that is to say, a genuine convention which binds legally, or to which positive law annexes an obligation. But a quasi-contract is not a genuine convention, and, by consequence, is not a genuine

contract. It is some fact or event, *not* a genuine convention, to which positive law annexes an obligation, *as if* (*quasi* or *uti*) it *were* a genuine convention. And the analogy between a contract and a contract *quasi* or *uti*, merely lies in the resemblance between the two obligations which are annexed respectively to the two facts or events. In other re-

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Most or many, therefore, of the members of the inchoate society, could not have been parties, as promisors or promisees, to a tacit original covenant. Most or many of the members could not have signified virtually the requisite intention or acceptance: for they could not have conceived the object (as I have shown above) with which, according to the hypothesis, an original covenant is concerned.

Besides, in many of the negative cases to which I now am adverting, the position and deportment of the original sovereign government, and the position and deportment of

spects the two facts are dissimilar. For example: The payment and receipt of money erroneously supposed to be owed, is a fact or event amounting to a contract *quasi*. There is nothing in the fact or event that savours of a convention or pact; for the fulfilment of an existing obligation, and not the creation of a future obligation, is the scope or design of the transaction between the payor and payee. But since the money is not owed, and is not given as a gift, a legal obligation to return it lies upon the payee from the moment of the erroneous payment. Although he is not obliged *ex contractu*, he is obliged *quasi ex contractu*, as if he truly had contracted to return the money. The payee is obliged to return it, as he might have been obliged, if he had promised to return it, and the payor had accepted his promise.

In the language of English jurisprudence, facts or events which are contracts *quasi* or *uti*, are styled *implied contracts*, or *contracts which the law implies*: that is to say, contracts *quasi* or *uti*, and genuine though tacit contracts, are denoted by a common name, or by names nearly alike. And, consequently, contracts, *quasi* or *uti*, and implied or tacit contracts, are commonly or frequently confounded by English lawyers. See, in particular, Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries, B. II. Ch. 30., and B. III. Ch. 9.

As the reader may see in the annexed outline (pp. 46, 55), rights of one great class are rights *in personam certam*: that is to say, rights which avail exclusively against persons determined specifically, or which answer to duties that lie exclusively on persons determined specifically. To the duties answering to such rights, the Roman lawyers limit the expression *obligationes*: and since they have no name appropriate to rights of the class, they apply that expression to the rights themselves as well as to the answering duties which the rights import.

Now rights *in personam*, or *obligationes*, arise principally from facts of two classes: namely, genuine *contracts* express or tacit, and *delicts* or injuries. But besides contracts and delicts, there are facts or events, *not* contracts or delicts, to which positive law annexes *obligationes*. By the Roman lawyers, these facts or events are styled *quasi-contracts*: or the obligations annexed to these facts or events, are styled obligations *quasi ex contractu*. These facts or events are styled *quasi-contracts*, for two reasons. 1. Inasmuch as the obligations annexed to them resemble the obligations annexed to contracts, they are, in that respect, *analogous* to contracts. 2. The only resemblance between their *species* or *sorts*, lies in the resemblance between the obligations which are respectively annexed to them. Consequently, the common name of *quasi-contracts* is applied to the *genus* or *kind*, for want of a generic term more apt and significant.—As the expression is employed by the Roman lawyers, '*obligationes quasi ex contractu*' is equivalent to '*anomalous obligations*' or to '*miscellaneous obligations*': that is to say, *obligationes*, or rights *in personam*, which are annexed to facts that are neither *contracts* nor *delicts*; and which being annexed to facts that are neither contracts nor delicts, cannot be brought under either of those two principal classes into which rights *in personam* are aptly divisible. '*Obligationes* (say the Digests) aut *ex contractu nascuntur*, aut *ex maleficio* (sive *delicto*), aut *proprio quodam jure ex variis causarum figuris*.'—The confusion of quasi-contracts with tacit yet genuine contracts, is certainly not imputable to the Roman jurists. But with modern lawyers, (how, I cannot conjecture,) this gross confusion of ideas is extremely frequent. It is, indeed, the cause of most of the nonsense and jargon which have covered the nature of conventions with nearly impenetrable obscurity.

the bulk of the original subjects, exclude the supposition of a tacit original covenant. For example: Where the original government begins in a violent conquest, it scarcely promises tacitly, by its violences towards the vanquished, that it will make their weal the paramount end of its rule. And a tacit promise to render obedience to the intrusive and hated government, scarcely passes from the reluctant subjects. They presently *will* to obey it, or presently *consent* to obey it, because they are determined to obey it, by their fear of its military sword. But the *will* or *consent* to obey it presently, to which they are thus determined, is scarcely a tacit *promise* (or a tacit manifestation of intention) to render it future obedience. For they intimate pretty significantly, by the reluctance with which they obey it, that they would kick with all their might against the intrusive government, if the military sword which it brandishes were not so long and fearful.

By the recent and present advocates of the hypothesis of the original covenant, (who chiefly are German writers on political government and society,) it commonly is admitted that original covenants are not historical facts: that an actual original covenant never preceded the formation of any actual society political and independent. But they zealously maintain, notwithstanding this sweeping admission, that the only sufficient basis of an independent political society is a fundamental civil pact. Their doctrine, therefore, touching the original covenant amounts to this: namely, that the original covenant hath not preceded the formation of *any* society political and independent: but that though it hath not preceded the formation of *any*, it yet precedeth inevitably the formation of *every*.—Such is a taste or sample of the high ideal philosophy which the Germans oppose exultingly to the philosophy of Bacon and Locke: to the earthy, grovelling, *empirical* philosophy, which deigns to scrutinise facts, or stoops to observation and induction.

It would seem that the propounders of this lucid and coherent doctrine, mean to insist on one or another of the two following positions. 1. That an *express* original covenant has not preceded the formation of any society political and independent: but that a *tacit* original covenant (or an original covenant imported by the fact of the formation) necessarily precedes the formation of every society of the kind. 2. That the formation of a society political and independent *must* have been preceded by a fundamental civil pact, if the

VI sovereign political government be *rightful, lawful, or just*—
 ‘wenn es *rechtsbeständig* sein soll:’ Meaning by ‘rightful,’
 ‘lawful,’ or ‘just,’ consonant to the law of God (as known
 somehow or other), or consonant to the right or justice
 (mentioned in foregoing pages) which exists independently
 of law, and is the test of all law.

On which of these positions they mean to insist, I cannot determine: for they waver impartially between the two, or evince a perceptible inclination to neither. And an attempt to determine the position on which they mean to insist, were profitless labour: seeing that both positions are false and absurd.—As I have shown above, a tacit original covenant could scarcely precede the formation of an independent political society. And, granting the second of the two positions, no sovereign government has been or can be lawful. For, according to their own admission, the formation of a society political and independent was never preceded actually by a fundamental civil pact: And, as I have shown above, a proper original covenant, or aught approaching to the idea, could scarcely precede the formation of any society of the kind.^(a)

3. I close my strictures on the hypothesis of the original covenant, with the following remark:

It would seem that the hypothesis was suggested to its

(*) For the notions or language, concerning the original covenant, of recent German writers on political government and society, I refer the curious reader to the following books.—1. Kant’s *Metaphysical Principles of Jurisprudence*. For the original covenant, see the head *Das Staatsrecht*.—2. A well made *Philosophical Dictionary* (in four octavo volumes), by Professor Krug of the University of Leipzig. For the original covenant, see the article *Staatsursprung*.—3. An *Exposition of the Political Sciences* (*Staatswissenschaften*), by Professor Pölitz of the same University: an elaborate and useful work in five octavo volumes. For the original covenant, see the head *Staats und Staatenrecht*.—4. The *Historical Journal* (for Nov. 1799) of Fr. v. Gentz: a celebrated servant of the Austrian government.

For, in Germany, the lucid and coherent doctrine to which I have adverted in the text, is not maintained exclusively by mere metaphysical speculators, and mere university-professors, of politics and jurisprudence. We are gravely assured by Gentz, that the original co-

venant (meaning this same doctrine touching the original covenant) is the very basis of the science of politics: that, without a correct conception of the original covenant, we cannot judge soundly on any of the questions or problems which the science of politics presents. ‘Der gesellschaftliche Vertrag (says he) ist die Basis der allgemeinen Staatswissenschaft. Eine richtige Vorstellung von diesem Vertrage ist das erste Erforderniss zu einem reinen Urtheile über alle Fragen und Aufgaben der Politik.’ Nay, he thinks that this same doctrine touching the original covenant, is probably the happiest result of the newer German philosophy; insomuch that the fairest product of the newer German philosophy, is the conceit of an original covenant which never was made anywhere, but which is the necessary basis of political government and society.—Warmly admiring German literature, and profoundly respecting German scholarship, I cannot but regret the proneness of German philosophy to vague and misty abstraction.

authors, by one or another of these suppositions. 1. Where there is no convention, there is no duty. In other words, whoever is obliged, is obliged through a promise given and accepted. 2. Every convention is necessarily followed by a duty. In other words, wherever a promise is given and accepted, the promising party is obliged through the promise, let its object and tendency be what they may.—It is assumed, expressly or tacitly, by Hobbes, Kant, and others, that he who is bound has necessarily given a promise, and that he who has given a promise is necessarily bound.

It follows from the first supposition, that unless the sovereign and subjects were bound through a pact, neither of the parties would lie under duties to the other. It follows from the second supposition, that if the sovereign and subjects were parties to an original covenant, (either immediately, or as representing the founders of the community,) each of the parties would be bound to the other, assuredly and indissolubly. As the duties of each towards the other would be imposed through a pact, they would possess a certain sacredness which perhaps they might want if they were imposed otherwise.

But both suppositions are grossly and obviously false.—Of religious, legal, and moral duties, some are imposed by the laws which are their respective sources, through or in consequence of conventions. But others are annexed to facts which have no resemblance to a convention, or to aught that can be deemed a promise. Consequently, a sovereign government might lie under duties to its subjects, and its subjects might lie under duties towards itself, though neither it nor its subjects were bound through a pact.—And as duties are annexed to facts which are not pacts or conventions, so are there pacts or conventions which are not followed by duties. Conventions are not enforced by divine or human law, without reference to their objects and tendencies. There are many conventions which positive morality reprobates: There are many which positive law will not sustain, and many which positive law actively annuls: There are many which conflict with the law of God, inasmuch as their tendencies are generally pernicious. Consequently, although the sovereign and subjects were parties to an original covenant, neither the sovereign nor subjects would of necessity be bound by it.

From the origin or causes of political government and society, I pass to the distinction of sovereign governments

inction
sovereign

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into governments *de jure* and governments *de facto*. For the two topics are so connected, that the few brief remarks which I shall make on the latter, may be placed aptly at the end of my disquisition on the former.

In respect of the distinction now in question, governments are commonly divided into three kinds: First, governments which are governments *de jure* and also *de facto*; secondly, governments which are governments *de jure* but not *de facto*; thirdly, governments which are governments *de facto* but not *de jure*. A government *de jure* and also *de facto*, is a government deemed lawful, or deemed rightful or just, which is present or established: that is to say, which receives presently habitual obedience from the bulk or generality of the members of the independent political community. A government *de jure* but not *de facto*, is a government deemed lawful, or deemed rightful or just, which, nevertheless, has been supplanted or displaced: that is to say, which receives not presently (although it received formerly) habitual obedience from the bulk of the community. A government *de facto* but not *de jure*, is a government deemed unlawful, or deemed wrongful or unjust, which, nevertheless, is present or established: that is to say, which receives presently habitual obedience from the bulk of the community. A government supplanted or displaced, and not deemed lawful, is neither a government *de facto* nor a government *de jure*.—Any government deemed lawful, be it established or be it not, is a government *de jure*. By a government, however, *de jure*, we often mean a government which is deemed lawful, but which, nevertheless, has been supplanted or displaced. Any established government, be it deemed lawful or be it deemed unlawful, is a government *de facto*. By a government, however, *de facto*, we often mean a government which is deemed unlawful, but which, nevertheless, is established or present.—It scarcely is necessary to add, that every government properly so called is a government *de facto*. In strictness, a so called government *de jure* but not *de facto*, is not a government. It merely is that which was a government once, and which (according to the speaker) ought to be a government still.

In respect of *positive law*, a sovereign political government which is established or present, is neither lawful nor unlawful: In respect of *positive law*, it is neither rightful nor wrongful, it is neither just nor unjust. Or (changing the expression) a sovereign political government which is established or present, is neither *legal* nor *illegal*.

In every society political and independent, the actual positive law is a creature of the actual sovereign. Although it was positive law under foregoing sovereigns, it is positive law presently, or is positive law, through the power and authority of the present supreme government. For though the present government may have supplanted another, and though the supplanted government be deemed the lawful government, the supplanted government is stripped of the might which is requisite to the enforcement of the law considered as positive law. Consequently, if the law were not enforced by the present supreme government, it would want the appropriate sanctions which are essential to positive law, and, as positive law, would not be law imperative: that is to say, as positive law, it would not be law.—To borrow the language of Hobbes, ‘The legislator is he (not by whose authority the law was first made, but) by whose authority it continues to be law.’

Consequently, an established sovereign government, in respect of the positive law of its own independent community, is neither lawful nor unlawful. If it were lawful or unlawful, in respect of the positive law of its own independent community, it were lawful or unlawful by law of its own making, or were lawful or unlawful by its own appointment. Which is absurd.—And if it were lawful or unlawful, in respect of the positive law of another independent community, it were lawful or unlawful by the appointment of another sovereign: that is to say, it were not an actual supreme, but an actual subordinate government. Which also is absurd.

In respect of the positive law of that independent community wherein it once was sovereign, a so called government *de jure* but not *de facto*, is not, and cannot be, a lawful government: for the positive law of that independent community is now positive law by the authority of the government *de facto*. And though it now were positive law by the authority of the displaced government, the displaced government, in respect of this law, were neither lawful nor unlawful: for if, in respect of this law, the displaced government were lawful or unlawful, it were lawful or unlawful by law of its own making, or were lawful or unlawful by its own appointment. The truth is, that, in respect of the positive law of that independent community, the supplanted government, though deemed *de jure*, is unlawful: for, being positive law by the authority of the government *de facto*, this

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positive law proscribes the supplanted government, and determines that attempts to restore it are legal wrongs.—In respect of the positive law of another independent community, a so called government *de jure* but not *de facto*, is neither lawful nor unlawful. For if, in respect of this law, it were lawful or unlawful, it were lawful or unlawful by the appointment of the law-maker; that is to say, it were not an ousted supreme, but an ousted subordinate government.

In respect, then, of *positive law*, the distinction of sovereign governments into lawful and unlawful is a distinction without a meaning. For, as tried by this test, or as measured by this standard, a so called government *de jure* but not *de facto* cannot be lawful: And, as tried by the same test, or measured by the same standard, a government *de facto* is neither lawful nor unlawful.

In respect, however, of *positive morality*, the distinction of sovereign governments into lawful and unlawful, is not a distinction without a meaning. For, in respect of positive morality, a government not *de facto* is not of necessity unlawful. And, in respect of positive morality, the term 'lawful' or 'unlawful,' as applied to a government *de facto*, is not of necessity jargon.

A government *de facto* may be lawful, or a government *de facto* may be unlawful, in respect of the positive morality of that independent community wherein it is established. If the opinions of the bulk of the community favour the government *de facto*, the government *de facto* is morally lawful in respect of the positive morality of that particular society. If the opinions of the bulk of the community be adverse to the government *de facto*, it is morally unlawful in respect of the same standard. The bulk, however, of the community, may regard it with indifference: or a large portion of the community may regard it with favour, whilst another considerable portion regards it with aversion. And, in either of these cases, it is neither morally lawful, nor morally unlawful, in respect of the positive morality of that independent community wherein it is established.—And what I have said of a government *de facto*, in regard to the morality of the community wherein it is established, may also be said of a government not a government *de facto*, in regard to the morality of the community wherein it formerly ruled.

And a government *de facto*, or a government not *de facto*, may be morally lawful, or morally unlawful, in respect of the

positive morality which obtains between nations or states. Though positive international morality looks mainly at the possession, every government in possession, or every government *de facto*, is not acknowledged of course by other established governments. In respect, therefore, of positive international morality, a government *de facto* may be unlawful, whilst a government not *de facto* may be a government *de jure*.

A government, moreover, *de facto*, or a government not *de facto*, may be lawful or unlawful in respect of the law of God. Tried by the Divine law, as known through the principle of utility, a sovereign government *de facto* is lawfully a sovereign government, if the general happiness or weal requires its continuance: Tried by the same law, as known through the same index, a sovereign government *de facto* is not lawfully sovereign, if the general happiness or weal requires its abolition. Tried by the Divine law, as known through the principle of utility, a government not *de facto* is yet a government *de jure*, if the general happiness or weal requires its restoration: Tried by the same law, as known through the same exponent, a government not *de facto* is also not *de jure*, if the general happiness or weal requires its exclusion.^(B)

A positive law may be defined generally in the following manner: or the essential difference of a positive law (or the difference which severs it from a law not a positive law) may be stated generally in the following manner.—Every positive law (or every law simply and strictly so called) is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign individual or body, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein its author is supreme. In other words, It is set, directly or circuitously, by a monarch or sovereign number, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.

A general definition of a positive law: Or a

that difference by which it is severed from a law not a positive law.

This definition of a positive law is assumed expressly or tacitly throughout the foregoing lectures. But it only approaches to a perfectly complete and perfectly exact defini-

This definition of a positive law is assumed expressly

It appears from the Author's Memoranda that he intended to insert here 'Notes on Governments *de facto* and *de jure*; and on 'Rights of Sovereign Governments and Governments lawful or

unlawful by Divine law.' Also on 'Sovereignty of the People.' It appears that he intended to connect this subject with that treated of at the conclusion of Lecture II.—S. A.

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or tacitly throughout the foregoing lectures. But it only approaches to a perfectly complete and perfectly exact definition. And, consequently, the determination of the province of jurisprudence, which is attempted in the foregoing lectures, only approaches to a perfectly complete and perfectly exact determination.

tion. It is open to certain correctives which I now will briefly suggest.

The party or parties to whom a law is set, or the party or parties on whom a duty is laid, are necessarily obnoxious to the sanction which enforces the law and the duty. In other words, every law properly so called is set by a superior to an inferior or inferiors: It is set by a party armed with might, to a party or parties whom that might can reach. If the party to whom it is set could not be touched by the might of its author, its author would signify to the party a wish or desire, but would not impose on the party a proper and imperative law. Now (speaking generally) a party who is obnoxious to a legal sanction, or to the might of the author of the law which the legal sanction enforces, is a member of the independent community wherein the author is sovereign. In other words, a party who is obnoxious to a legal sanction is a subject of the author of the law to which the sanction is annexed. But as none but members of the community wherein the law obtains are obnoxious to the legal sanction which enforces a positive law, the positive law is imposed exclusively on a member or members of that independent community. Although the positive law may affect to oblige strangers (or parties who are not members of that independent community), none but members of that independent community are virtually or truly bound by it.—Besides, if the positive law of one independent community bound legally the members of another, the other independent community were not an independent community, but were merely a subordinate community forming a limb of the first. If it bound the sovereign government of the other independent community, that sovereign government would be in a state of subjection to the sovereign author of the law. If it bound the subject members of the other independent community, the sovereign author of the law would usurp the functions and authority of their own sovereign government: or their own sovereign government would be displaced or supplanted by the foreign and intrusive lawgiver. So that if the positive law of every independent community bound legally the members of others, the subjects in every community would be subject to all sovereigns, and every sovereign government would be sovereign in all societies. In other words, the subject members of every independent community would be in a state of subjection to every supreme government; whilst every supreme government would be the subject of the rest,

Speaking, then, generally, we may say that a positive law is set or directed exclusively to a subject or subjects of its author: or that a positive law is set or directed exclusively to a member or members of the community wherein its author is sovereign. But, in many cases, the positive law of a given independent community imposes a duty on a *stranger*: on a party who is *not* a member of the given independent community, or is only a member to certain limited purposes. For such, in these cases, is the position of the stranger, that, though he is properly a member of a foreign independent community, and therefore is properly a subject of a foreign supreme government, he yet is obnoxious to the sanction by which the duty is enforced, or to the might of the author of the law through which the duty is imposed. And such, in these cases, is also the position of the stranger, that the imposition of the legal duty consists with the sovereignty of the government of which he is properly a subject. Although the legal duty is laid on one of its subjects, it is not laid on the foreign government itself: nor does the author of the law, by imposing the legal duty, exercise sovereign power in the community of the foreign government, or over one of its subjects as being one of its subjects.—For example: A party not a member of a given independent community, but living within its territory and within the jurisdiction of its sovereign, is bound or obliged, to a certain limited extent by its positive law. Living within the territory, he is obnoxious to the legal sanctions by which the law is enforced. And the legal duties imposed upon him by the law are consistent with the sovereignty of the foreign government of which he is properly a subject. For the duties are not imposed upon the foreign government itself, or upon a party within its independent community: nor are they laid upon the obliged party as being one of its subjects, but as being a member, to certain limited purposes, of the community wherein he resides. Again: If a stranger not residing within the given community be the owner of land or moveables lying within its territory, a convention of the stranger, with any of its members or a stranger, may be enforced against him by its positive law. For if he be sued on the agreement, and judgment be given for the plaintiff, the tribunal may execute its judgment by resorting to the land or moveables, although the defendant's body is beyond the reach of its process. And this execution of the judgment consists with the sovereignty of the government

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or tacitly throughout the foregoing lectures. But it only approaches to a perfectly complete and perfectly exact definition. And, consequently, the determination of the province of jurisprudence, which is attempted in the foregoing lectures, only approaches to a perfectly complete and perfectly exact determination.

tion. It is open to certain correctives which I now will briefly suggest.

The party or parties to whom a law is set, or the party or parties on whom a duty is laid, are necessarily obnoxious to the sanction which enforces the law and the duty. In other words, every law properly so called is set by a superior to an inferior or inferiors: It is set by a party armed with might, to a party or parties whom that might can reach. If the party to whom it is set could not be touched by the might of its author, its author would signify to the party a wish or desire, but would not impose on the party a proper and imperative law. Now (speaking generally) a party who is obnoxious to a legal sanction, or to the might of the author of the law which the legal sanction enforces, is a member of the independent community wherein the author is sovereign. In other words, a party who is obnoxious to a legal sanction is a subject of the author of the law to which the sanction is annexed. But as none but members of the community wherein the law obtains are obnoxious to the legal sanction which enforces a positive law, the positive law is imposed exclusively on a member or members of that independent community. Although the positive law may affect to oblige strangers (or parties who are not members of that independent community), none but members of that independent community are virtually or truly bound by it.—Besides, if the positive law of one independent community bound legally the members of another, the other independent community were not an independent community, but were merely a subordinate community forming a limb of the first. If it bound the sovereign government of the other independent community, that sovereign government would be in a state of subjection to the sovereign author of the law. If it bound the subject members of the other independent community, the sovereign author of the law would usurp the functions and authority of their own sovereign government: or their own sovereign government would be displaced or supplanted by the foreign and intrusive lawgiver. So that if the positive law of every independent community bound legally the members of others, the subjects in every community would be subject to all sovereigns, and every sovereign government would be sovereign in all societies. In other words, the subject members of every independent community would be in a state of subjection to every supreme government; whilst every supreme government would be the subject of the rest, and, at the same time, would be their sovereign.

Speaking, then, generally, we may say that a positive law is set or directed exclusively to a subject or subjects of its author: or that a positive law is set or directed exclusively to a member or members of the community wherein its author is sovereign. But, in many cases, the positive law of a given independent community imposes a duty on a *stranger*: on a party who is *not* a member of the given independent community, or is only a member to certain limited purposes. For such, in these cases, is the position of the stranger, that, though he is properly a member of a foreign independent community, and therefore is properly a subject of a foreign supreme government, he yet is obnoxious to the sanction by which the duty is enforced, or to the might of the author of the law through which the duty is imposed. And such, in these cases, is also the position of the stranger, that the imposition of the legal duty consists with the sovereignty of the government of which he is properly a subject. Although the legal duty is laid on one of its subjects, it is not laid on the foreign government itself: nor does the author of the law, by imposing the legal duty, exercise sovereign power in the community of the foreign government, or over one of its subjects as being one of its subjects.—For example: A party not a member of a given independent community, but living within its territory and within the jurisdiction of its sovereign, is bound or obliged, to a certain limited extent by its positive law. Living within the territory, he is obnoxious to the legal sanctions by which the law is enforced. And the legal duties imposed upon him by the law are consistent with the sovereignty of the foreign government of which he is properly a subject. For the duties are not imposed upon the foreign government itself, or upon a party within its independent community: nor are they laid upon the obliged party as being one of its subjects, but as being a member, to certain limited purposes, of the community wherein he resides. Again: If a stranger not residing within the given community be the owner of land or moveables lying within its territory, a convention of the stranger, with any of its members or a stranger, may be enforced against him by its positive law. For if he be sued on the agreement, and judgment be given for the plaintiff, the tribunal may execute its judgment by resorting to the land or moveables, although the defendant's body is beyond the reach of its process. And this execution of the judgment consists with the sovereignty of the government

of which the stranger is properly a subject. For the judgment is not executed against that foreign government, or within the independent community of which it is the chief: nor is it executed against the defendant as being one of its subjects, but as owning land or moveables within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. If the judgment were executed within the jurisdiction of the foreign supreme government, the execution would wound the sovereignty of the foreign supreme government, unless the judgment were executed through its permission and authority. And if the judgment were executed through its permission and authority, the duty enforced against the defendant would be imposed in effect by the law of his own community: the law of his own community adopting the law of the other, by reason of a special convention between the respective governments, or of a rule of international morality which the governments acknowledge and observe.—In all the cases, therefore, which I now have noted and exemplified, the positive law of a given independent society may impose a duty on a stranger. By reason of the obstacles mentioned in the last paragraph, the binding virtue of the positive law cannot extend generally to members of foreign communities. But in the cases which I now have noted and exemplified those obstacles do not intervene. For the stranger is obnoxious to the sanctions by which the law is enforced: and the enforcement of the law against the stranger is not inconsistent with the sovereignty of a foreign supreme government.

The definition, therefore, of a positive law, which is assumed expressly or tacitly throughout the foregoing lectures, is not a perfectly complete and perfectly exact definition. In the cases noted and exemplified in the last paragraph, a positive law obliges legally, or a positive law is set or directed to, a *stranger* or *strangers*: that is to say, a person or persons *not* of the community wherein the author of the law is sovereign or supreme. Now, since the cases in question are omitted by that definition, the definition is too narrow, or is defective or inadequate. To render that definition complete or adequate, a comprehensive summary of these anomalous cases (or, perhaps, a full enumeration of these anomalous cases) must be tacked to the definition in the way of supplement.—But positive law, the subject of the definition, is the subject of the foregoing attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence. And since the definition is defective or inadequate, and is assumed ex-

pressly or tacitly throughout the foregoing lectures, the determination of the province of jurisprudence, which is attempted in those discourses, is not a perfectly complete and perfectly exact determination.

But I think that the foregoing attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence, and the definition of a positive law which the attempt assumes throughout, have as much of completeness and exactness as the scope of the attempt requires.—To determine the province of jurisprudence is to distinguish positive law (the appropriate matter of jurisprudence) from the various objects (noted in the foregoing lectures) to which it is allied or related in the way of resemblance or analogy. But so numerous are the ties by which it is connected with those objects, or so numerous are the points at which it touches those objects, that a perfect determination of the province of jurisprudence were a perfect exposition of the science in all its manifold parts. An adequate exposition of the science (the only adequate determination of the province of jurisprudence) is really the ambitious aim of the entire Course of Lectures of which the foregoing attempt is merely the opening portion. But a perfect determination of the province of jurisprudence is not the purpose of the attempt itself. Its purpose is merely to *suggest* (with as much of completeness and exactness as consist with generality and brevity) the subject of that adequate exposition of the science of jurisprudence, or the subject of that adequate determination of the province of jurisprudence, which is the purpose of the entire Course.—Since such is the scope of the foregoing attempt, the definition of a positive law which it assumes throughout has as much of completeness and exactness as its scope requires. To render that definition complete or adequate, a comprehensive summary of the anomalous cases in question (or, perhaps, a full enumeration of the anomalous cases in question) must be tacked to the definition in the way of supplement. But these anomalous cases belong to the departments of my Course which are concerned with the detail of the science. They hardly were appropriate matter for the foregoing *general* attempt to determine the province of jurisprudence: for the foregoing attempt to *suggest* the subject of the science, with as much of completeness and exactness as consist with generality and brevity. Accordingly, the definition or notion of a positive law which is assumed expressly or tacitly throughout the preceding lectures, omits entirely the ano-

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malous cases in question. And the truth of the positions and inferences contained by the preceding lectures is not, I believe, impaired, or is not impaired materially, by this omission and defect.

And though the definition is not complete, it approaches nearly to completeness. Allowing for the omission of the anomalous cases in question, it is, I believe, an adequate definition of its subject. I hardly could have rendered a juster definition of the subject, in brief and abstract expressions: that is to say, unless I had descended from the generals to the detail of the science of jurisprudence.

An explanation of a seeming defect in the foregoing general definition of independent political society.

Defining sovereignty and independent political society (or stating their characters or distinguishing marks), I have said that a given society is a society political and independent, if the bulk or generality of its members habitually obey the commands of a determinate and independent party: meaning by 'a determinate and independent party' a determinate individual, or a determinate body of individuals, not obeying habitually the express or tacit commands of a determinate human superior.—But who are the members of a given society? By what characters, or by what distinguishing marks, are its members severed from persons who are not of its members? Or how is a given person determined to a given community?—By the foregoing general definition of independent political society (or the foregoing general statement of its characters or distinguishing marks) the questions which I now have suggested are not resolved or touched: And it may seem, therefore, that the foregoing general definition is not complete or adequate. But, for the following reasons, I believe that the foregoing definition, considered as a general definition, is, notwithstanding, complete or adequate: that a general definition of independent political society (or such a definition as is applicable to every society of the kind) could hardly resolve the questions which I have suggested above.

1. It is not through one mode, or it is not through one cause, that the members of a given society are members of that community. In other words, it is not through one mode, or it is not through one cause, that they are subjects of the person or body sovereign therein. A person may be a member of a given society, or a person may be determined to a given society, by any of numerous modes, or by any of numerous causes: as, for example, by birth within the territory which it occupies; by birth without its territory, but

of parents being of its members; by simple residence within its territory; or by naturalization.^(y)—Again: A subject member of one society may be, at the same time, a subject member of another. A person, for example, who is naturalized in one independent society, may yet be a member completely, or to certain limited purposes, of that independent society which he affects to renounce: or a member of one society who simply resides in another, may be a member completely of the former society, and, to limited purposes, a member of the latter. Nay, a person who is sovereign in one society, may be, at the same time, a subject member of another. Such, for example, would be the plight of a so called limited monarch, if he were monarch and autocrator in a foreign independent community.—Now if the foregoing definition of independent political society had affected to resolve the questions which I have suggested above, I must have discussed the topics which I have touched in the present paragraph. I must have gone from the generals into the detail of jurisprudence; and therefore I must have wandered from the proper purpose or scope of the foregoing general attempt to determine the province of the science.

2. By a general definition of independent political society (or such a definition as is applicable to every society of the kind), I could not have resolved completely the questions suggested above, although I had discussed the topics touched in the last paragraph. For the modes through which persons are members of particular societies (or the causes by which persons are determined to particular societies) differ in different communities. These modes are fixed differently in different particular societies, by their different particular systems of positive law or morality. In some societies, for example, a person born of aliens within the territory of the community, is, *ipso jure*, or without an act of his own, a perfect member of the community within whose territory he is born; but, in other societies, he is not a perfect member (or is merely a resident alien) unless he acquire the

(y) The following brief explanation may be placed pertinently here.

Generally speaking, a society political and independent occupies a determined territory. Consequently, when we imagine an independent political society, we commonly imagine it in that plight: And, according to the definition of independent political society which is assumed expressly or tacitly by many writers, the occupation (by the given

society) of a determined territory, or seat, is of the very essence of a society of the kind. But this is an error. History presents us with societies of the kind, which have been, as it were, *in transitu*. Many, for example, of the barbarous nations which invaded and settled in the Roman Empire, were not, for many years before their final establishment, occupants of determined seats.

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character by fulfilling certain conditions. (See the French Code, Article 9.) It therefore is only in relation to a given particular society that the questions suggested above can be completely resolved.

Restric-
tions or ex-
planations
of the two
following
positions:
namely,
that a sove-
reign go-
vernment
cannot be
*bound le-
gally*, and
that it can-
not have
legal rights
against its
own sub-
jects.

I have assumed expressly or tacitly throughout the foregoing lectures that a sovereign government of one, or a sovereign government of a number in its collective and sovereign capacity, cannot be *bound legally*. In the sense with which I have assumed it, the position will hold universally. But it needs a slight restriction, or rather a slight explanation, which may be placed conveniently at the close of my present discourse.

It is true universally, that as being the sovereign of the community wherein it is sovereign, a sovereign government cannot be bound legally: And this is the sense with which I have assumed the position throughout the foregoing lectures. But, as being a subject of a foreign supreme government (either generally or to certain limited purposes), it may be bound by laws (simply and strictly so called) of that foreign supreme government. In the case which I now am supposing, the sovereign political government bound by positive laws bears two characters, or bears two persons: namely, the character or person of sovereign in its own independent society, and the character or person of subject in the foreign independent community. And in order to the existence of the case which I now am supposing, its two characters or two persons must be distinct in practice, as well as in name and show. The laws which are laid upon it by the foreign supreme government may really be laid upon it as chief in its own society: and, on this supposition, it is subject (in that character) to the sovereign author of the laws, in case the obedience which it yields to them amounts to a *habit* of obedience. But if the laws be exclusively laid upon it as subject in the foreign community, its sovereignty is not impaired by the obedience which it yields to them, although the obedience amounts to a *habit*.—The following cases will amply illustrate the meaning which I have stated in general expressions.—Let us suppose that our own king is properly monarch in Hanover: and that our own king, as limited monarch in Britain, is not absolved completely from legal obligation. Now if, as chief in Hanover, he be not in a habit of obedience to the sovereign British parliament, the legal duties incumbent upon him consist with his sovereignty in his German kingdom. For the duties are incumbent upon

him (not as autocrator there, but) as limited monarch here : as member of the sovereign body by which he is legally bound.—Before the French Revolution, the sovereign government of the Canton of Bern had money in the English funds : And if the English law empowered it to hold lands, it might be the owner of lands within the English territory, as well as the owner of money in the English funds. Now, assuming that the government of Bern is an owner of lands in England, it also is subject to the legal duties with which property in land is saddled by the English law. But by its subjection to those duties, and its habitual observance of the law through which those duties are imposed, its sovereignty in its own Canton is not annulled or impaired. For the duties are incumbent upon it (not as governing there, but) as owning lands here : as being, to limited purposes, a member of the British community, and obnoxious, through the lands, to the process of the English tribunals.

I have said in a preceding section, that a sovereign government of one, or a sovereign government of a number in its collective and sovereign capacity, cannot have *legal rights* (in the proper acceptation of the term) against its own subjects. In the sense with which I have advanced it, the position will hold universally. But it needs a slight restriction, or rather a slight explanation, which I now will state or suggest.

It is true universally, that against a subject of its own, as being a subject of its own, a sovereign political government cannot have legal rights : And this is the sense with which I have advanced the position. But against a subject of its own, as being generally or partially a subject of a foreign government, a sovereign political government may have legal rights. For example : Let us suppose that a Russian merchant is resident and domiciled in England : that he agrees with the Russian emperor, to supply the latter with naval stores : and that the laws of England, or the English tribunals, lend their sanctions to the agreement. Now, according to these suppositions, the emperor bears a right, given by the law of England, against a Russian subject. But the emperor has not the right through a law of his own, or against a Russian subject in that capacity or character. He bears the legal right against a subject of his own, through the positive law of a foreign independent society ; and he bears it against his subject (not as being his subject, but) as being, to limited purposes, a subject of a foreign sovereign. And the

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relative legal duty lying on the Russian merchant consists with the emperor's autocracy in all the Russias. For since it lies upon the merchant as resident and domiciled in England, the sovereign British parliament, by imposing the duty upon him, does not interfere with the autocrat in his own independent community.

NOTE TO PAGE 258.

In a note at p. 258, I have referred to Tables drawn out in the blank leaves of Kant's 'Entwurf zum ewigen Frieden.' They are in pencil, and were obviously constructed by Mr. Austin solely for his own satisfaction.

The reader is desired to observe that the opinions embodied in these Tables are not given as Mr. Austin's. In the note to Table II., as we see, he questions one important assumption.

The Tables are not numbered, so that I have been guided in their arrangement mainly by the order in which they follow.—S. A.

TABLE I.

Forma Imperii, or Staatsform : i.e. the form of the Sovereignty.

Monarchy, or government of one.	Aristocracy, or government of some.	Democracy, or government of all.
Despotic or Republican.		Despotic.

TABLE II.

Forma Regiminis—Regierungsform, or Staatsverfassung.

Despotical; 'wherein the legislative and executive powers are united in the sovereign one or number.*

Republican; 'wherein the legislative powers reside in the sovereign one or number, *with representatives of the subjects*; and the executive powers, in the sovereign one or number.†

* On this division, as expounded in Kant's text, Mr. Austin remarks :—' The making of a law, and the execution of a law, are necessarily different processes. But how is it necessary that the two processes should be performed by different persons?'


† The power of appointing representatives, is often called political liberty; i.e. a portion in the Sovereignty.—Kant.

The passage in Kant's book to which Table II. refers, ends as follows:

'The sort or mode of government (*Regierungsart*) is beyond all comparison more important to a people than the form of a Sovereignty (*Staatsform*); although a great deal also depends on the greater or less adaptability of the latter to attain by gradual reforms to the character of a perfect Republic. To that end, however, the Representative System is absolutely indispensable; without it (be the form of the Sovereignty what it may) the government is despotic and arbitrary. None of the ancient so-called republics knew of this, and they therefore inevitably subsided into despotisms; the most endurable form of which is, the sovereign rule of one.'—Kant, 'Entwurf,' p. 29.

In a note, Kant refers here to the often quoted line of Pope, which he translates, '*die bestgeführte ist die beste.*' 'If that,' says he, 'is equivalent to saying that the best administered is the best administered, Pope (to quote Swift's expression) only cracked a nut which rewarded him with a maggot. But if it means that the best administered, is also the best constituted government, it is utterly false, (*grundfalsch*); for examples of good government prove nothing in favour of the form. Who ever governed better than Titus or Marcus Aurelius? and yet the one left a Domitian, the other a Commodus, as his successor.'—S. A.

TABLE III.



Republican Governments are





TABLE IV.



* Democracy, or the government of all, is necessarily autocratical or despotic.
—Kant.

† Legislative powers = Sovereignty: Consequently, in no republican (or syn-
cratical) government is the so-called sovereign, sovereign. It is merely co-sovereign
with the active portion of the citizens. As Regent (when considered by itself) it
is subject-minister of the joint sovereign.—Note by Mr. Austin.

‡ In the text, Kant says, 'Alle, die doch nicht alle sind:' referring obviously
to the exceptions made in all schemes of universal suffrage.—S. A.

TABLE V.

Autocracy.		Syncracy.	
1. Monarchy.	2. Polyarchy.	3. Monarchy.	4. Polyarchy.
Properly sovereign.		Nominally sovereign, but sharing sovereignty with active citizens.	

TABLE VI.

Forma Regiminis.

Autocracy : wherein the legislative and executive powers are united in the sovereign one or number.	Syncracy : wherein the <i>executive</i> powers reside in the sovereign one or number ; but the <i>legislative</i> powers, in the sovereign one or number, <i>with</i> the active (as distinguished from the passive) portion of the subject citizens.
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Representative (i.e. of active citizens).	Non-representative.
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TABLE VII.

Autocracies.		Syncracies.	
Monarchies.	Aristocracies and Democracies.	Monarchies.	Aristocracies.
Sovereign government of one.	Sovereign governments of a number.	Not sovereign, but sharing sovereignty with active citizens.†	

* The share of the active citizens in the sovereignty is called *political liberty*.
Kant.
† See Krug, vol. iv. p. 36, and Pölitiz, vol. i. p. 173 et

LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE.

ANALYSIS OF PERVADING NOTIONS.

LECTURE XII.²⁹

ANALYSIS OF THE TERM RIGHT.

I HAVE endeavoured in the preceding Lectures to accomplish the following objects: 1st, To determine the essentials of a *Law* (in the largest signification which can be given to the term *properly*): 2ndly, To distinguish the laws proper which are set by God to Man, and the laws proper and improper which are sanctioned or oblige *morally*, from the laws proper which are sanctioned or oblige *legally*, or are established directly or indirectly by *sovereign* authority. LECT. XII

Having attempted to determine generally the nature of Law, and to mark the boundaries of the field which is occupied by the science of Jurisprudence, I shall now endeavour to unfold (as briefly as I can) the essential properties of Rights: meaning by Rights, *legal* rights, or rights which are creatures of Law, strictly or simply so called.

There are, indeed, Rights which arise from other sources: namely, from the laws of God or Nature, and from laws which are sanctioned morally. But the peculiarities of these may be easily collected, by considering the peculiarities of the sources from which they flow. Accordingly, I shall not pause to examine them in a direct or formal manner, although I shall advert to them occasionally in the course of the ensuing Lectures. At present I dismiss them with the following remarks. 1st, Like the Obligations to which they correspond, natural and moral Rights (or rights which are Natural and Moral Rights, or Rights which are merely sanctioned religiously or morally.

²⁹ This lecture was marked xii. in the former edition, being the twelfth lecture in one of the courses as delivered by the author. I have thought it advisable for the purposes of reference to adhere to the same numbering. There is, however, no *hiatus* between this and the last lecture, which in fact contained the matter of several of the lectures orally delivered. —R. C.

XII merely sanctioned religiously or morally) are *imperfect*. In other words, they are not armed with the legal sanction, or cannot be enforced judicially. 2ndly, The Rights (if such they can be called) which are conferred by positive morality, partake of the nature of the source from which they emanate. —So far as positive morality consists of laws *improper*, the rights which are said to arise from it are rights *by way of analogy*.

For example, rights which are derived from the Law of Nations are related to rights which are derived from positive Law, by a remote or faint resemblance. They are neither armed with the legal sanction, nor are they creatures of Law established by *determinate* superiors.

Strictly speaking, there are no rights but those which are the creatures of law; and I speak of any other kind of rights only in order that I may conform to the received language, which certainly does allow us to speak of moral rights not sanctioned by law; thus, for example, we speak of rights created by treaty.

Ideas, the
analysis of
which is
inevitably
involved in
that of
right.

In attempting to explain the nature of a legal Right, I shall inevitably advert to the import of the following terms:

1st, Law, Duty, and Sanction. For, though every law does not create a right, every right is the creature of Law. And, though every obligation and sanction does not imply a right, every right implies an obligation and a sanction.

2ndly, Person, Thing, Act and Forbearance. For rights are exercised by persons; or if not *exercised* by persons, *reside* in persons. And persons, things, acts and forbearances, are the *subjects* or *objects* of rights and obligations, or (changing the shape of the expression) are the *matter* about which they are conversant.

3rdly, Injury;—Wrong;—or Breach of Obligation or Duty by *commission* or *omission*. For as rights suppose or imply obligations and sanctions, so do obligations or sanctions suppose injuries or wrongs. In other words, their ends or purposes are the *prevention* of injuries or wrongs, and the *redress* of the damage or mischief which is commonly the consequence or effect.

4thly, Intention and Negligence (including under the latter of these terms what may be called rashness or temerity). For every wrong (whether it be positive or negative, or consist of a *commission* or *omission*) supposes intention or negligence on the part of the wrongdoer.

5thly, Will and Motive. For the import of the expres-

sions '*will*' and '*motive*' is implied in the import of the expressions '*intention*' and '*negligence*.' And, further obligation and sanction operate upon the *will* of the obliged, and are thereby distinguished from the *compulsion* or *restraint*, which (for want of a better name) may be styled merely physical. Nothing is more frequent in jurisprudence than the confusion of motive with intention; and of this confusion the law of England affords a flagrant instance, when it lays down that murder must be committed of *malice aforethought*. By this is merely meant that it must be committed intentionally. Malice is properly the name of a motive: namely, that of malevolence or ill-will; but it is not by any means necessary in the law of England that the act should have been committed from ill-will: on the contrary, the great majority of murders are committed from motives altogether different—such as that of obtaining the property of the murdered person—: it is only necessary that the murder should be intentional. There is one case of peculiar absurdity, that of murders said to be committed out of malice or ill-will to all mankind. For example, if a workman throws rubbish from the top of a building without giving warning to the passers-by, and if he consequently kills one of them, it would be too obvious an absurdity to pretend that he acted from ill-will towards the particular person, whom in all probability he has never before seen or heard of, but he is said to have acted from malice or ill-will towards all mankind; the real ground for his punishment being that he has acted with gross and mischievous negligence; that he has shown a want of regard for the lives and safety of others, which ought to subject him to legal punishment. He has committed the offence not from a peculiar motive but from the want of a certain motive, and his state of mind requires to be distinguished from intention, as intention and negligence both require to be distinguished from motives.

Finally, Political or Civil *Liberty*:—a term which, not unfrequently, is synonymous with *right*; but which often denotes simply *exemption from obligation*, conferred in a peculiar manner: namely by the indirect or circuitous process which is styled '*permission*.' For it will be shown in the sequel that when the law only permits, it as clearly confers a right as when it commands.

Having attempted to explain the import of the term '*Right*,' and having touched upon the import of the ~~terms~~

. XII which I have now enumerated, I shall advert to the ambiguities by which some of these expressions are obscured. I shall point particularly at the varying significations of 'Law,' 'Right,' and 'Obligation.' In attempting to unfold the notions which are signified by the term 'Right,' and to indicate the import of the terms with which it is inseparably connected, I shall scarcely find it possible to avoid repetition. For each of these expressions is so implicated with the rest, that the explication of any of them involves allusions to the others. For the same reason, the parts of the analysis will probably be obscure: though I hope that the whole may express the intended meaning, or, at least, may suggest it to the hearer.

Having briefly pointed at the purpose of the following analysis, and apologised for its repetitions and obscurities, I now proceed to the subject of it.

Obligations
or Duties
are positive
or negative.

Every Law (properly so called) is an express or tacit, a direct or circuitous *Command*.

By every command, an *Obligation* is imposed upon the party to whom it is addressed or intimated. Or (changing the expression) it *obliges* the party by virtue of the corresponding sanction.

Every Obligation or Duty (terms, which, for the present, I consider as synonymous) is *positive* or *negative*. In other words, the party upon whom it is incumbent is commanded to do or perform, or is commanded to forbear or abstain.

In order to the fulfilment of a positive obligation, the act or acts which are enjoined by the Command must be done or performed by, or on the part of, the obliged. In order to the fulfilment of a negative obligation, he must forbear from the act or acts which the Command prohibits or forbids. In the one case, the active intervention of the obliged is necessary. In the other case, the active intervention of the obliged is not only needless but is inconsistent with the purpose of the obligation.

An obligation to deliver goods agreeably to a contract, to pay damages in satisfaction of a wrong, or to yield the possession of land in pursuance of a judicial order, is a positive obligation. An obligation to abstain from killing, from taking the goods of another without his consent, or from entering his land without his licence, is a negative obligation.

I observe that *forbearances* have been styled by Mr. Bentham³⁰ *negative services*. And, if we like, we may call them by that, or by any other name. But whether established language authorise the expressions seems to be doubtful. If you abstain from knocking me on the head, or from taking my purse, or from blackening my reputation, it can scarcely be said with propriety that ‘you render me a service.’ In ordinary language ‘you forbear from doing me a mischief.’ It would seem that Mr. Bentham has transferred to the *object* of an obligation, an expression which applies correctly to the obligation itself. A forbearance, in pursuance of an obligation, is hardly a ‘negative service,’ though the obligation of which it is the object is properly a ‘negative obligation.’

LECT. XII
Forbearances cannot be styled with propriety *negative services*.

Obligations may also be distinguished into *relative* and *absolute*.

Obligations are relative or absolute.

A relative obligation is incumbent upon one party, and correlates with a right residing in another party. Changing the expression, A relative obligation corresponds or answers to a right, or implies, and is implied by, a Right. Where an obligation is absolute, there is no right with which it correlates. There is no right to which it corresponds or answers. It neither implies, nor is implied by a right. Here, as elsewhere, the term ‘absolute’ is a negative or privative expression. Here, as elsewhere, it denotes the *absence* of an object to which the speaker or writer expressly or tacitly refers.

But, in order to the complete explanation of a negative or privative expression, we must first explain the object of which it denotes the absence. Consequently, I shall begin with rights, and with the obligations which are implied by rights; and I shall then proceed to the obligations which have *no* corresponding rights, or which (in a word) are *absolute*.

Since rights reside in *persons*, and since *persons*, *things*, *acts*, and *forbearances* are the subjects or objects of rights, I must advert to the respective significations of these various related expressions, before I address myself to rights and to the obligations with which they correlate.

Rights imply *persons*, *things*, *acts*, and *forbearances*.

Persons are divisible into two classes:—physical or natural persons, and legal or fictitious persons.

Persons natural or fictitious.

In this instance, ‘*physical*’ or ‘*natural*’ bears the signification which is usually attached to it in the language of

³⁰ *Traité de Législation*, I. p. 154.

LECT. XII Jurisprudence, and (I believe) in the language of other sciences. Its import is negative. It denotes a person not fictitious or legal, and is used to distinguish persons, properly so called, from persons which are such by a figment, and for the sake of brevity in discourse. Consequently, when we speak of '*persons*' simply, and without *opposing* them to legal or fictitious persons, we mean persons properly so called, or persons physical or natural.

Meaning of
'physical
person,' or
'person'
simply.

By a physical or natural *person*, or, by a *person* simply, I mean *homo*, or a *man*, in the largest signification of the term: that is to say, as including *every* being which can be deemed *human*. This is the meaning which is given to the term *person*, in familiar discourse. And this, I believe, is the meaning which is given to it by the Roman Lawyers (from whose writings it has been borrowed by modern jurists) when they denote by it a physical or natural person, and not a legal or fictitious one.

Many of the modern Civilians have narrowed the import of the term *person* as meaning a physical or natural person.

They define a person thus: '*homo, cum statu suo consideratus*:' a 'human being, invested with a condition or *status*.' And, in this definition, they use the term *status* in a restricted sense: As including only those conditions which comprise *rights*; and as excluding conditions which are purely onerous or burthensome, or which consist of duties merely. According to this definition, human beings who have no rights are not *persons*, but *things*; being classed with other things which have no rights residing in themselves, but are merely the subjects of rights residing in others. Such, in the Roman Law, down to the age of the Antonines, was the position of the *slave*. In respect of his master, and also in respect of strangers, he was subject to Obligations or Duties. But he had no Rights as against his master, or even as against strangers. His master might deal with him, as if he had been a *thing* of which his master was the owner:—might use, abuse, and even destroy him, without stint or measure, and with absolute impunity. In case he were killed or maltreated by a third party, the act was not a wrong against the slave himself, but was merely an offence against the dominion or property which resided in the master. In a word, the slave (like a thing) was susceptible of *damage*, but was not susceptible of *injury*. '*Servo ipsi nulla injuria intelligitur fieri: sed domino per eum fieri videtur.*'²¹

Agreeably to this definition, as understood by the modern civilians above mentioned, a *person* is a human being invested with *rights*. Or a *person* is a human being capable of *rights*.

But this I am convinced, was not the notion attached to the term '*person*' by the Roman Lawyers themselves, when they denoted by it a physical or natural person.

For, first, in all their divisions of persons, or in all their distributions of persons into various classes, slaves, who had no rights, are considered as *persons*, and '*persona*' and '*homo*' are synonymous or equivalent expressions. '*Summa divisio de jure personarum, hæc est; quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi.*' Again: '*Sequitur de jure personarum alia divisio. Nam quædam personæ sui juris sunt; quædam alieno juri subjectæ. Sed rursus earum personarum quæ alieno juri subjectæ sunt, aliæ in potestate, aliæ in manu, aliæ in mancipio sunt. Videamus nunc de iis quæ alieno juri subjectæ sunt: Ac prius dispiciamus de iis qui in alienâ potestate sunt. In potestate itaque sunt servi dominorum.*'³²

In these passages from the Institutes of Gaius (and in various corresponding passages in the Institutes and Digest of Justinian) slaves (who had no rights) are treated as a class of *persons*, and '*homo*' and '*persona*' are applied indifferently, or as if they were equivalent expressions. And, in penning these passages, the attention of the authors must

³² Gaii Institutionum Comment. Lib. I. § 9, 48-52. At the passage indicated the following note is written by the author's hand in the margin of his own copy:—

Slaves are ranked by Gaius amongst persons. If the *enjoyment of rights* be necessary to satisfy the term, a slave (in the earlier ages of Rome) was *not* a person, but a thing. If *subjection to obligation* suffices to constitute a person, a slave without rights belongs to the class of persons. In the age of Gaius, slaves were persons in every sense of the term; since, by certain Constitutions, they were protected for *their own* advantage, even against their masters. 'A person' (to which 'condition' or 'status' is the corresponding abstract term) seems to be susceptible of only two definitions: the narrower, 'a human being considered as enjoying or invested with Rights:' the more extensive, 'a human being considered as subjected to Obligations.' Men living without a government (*i.e.* without any common superior

to which that term would apply) might be morally or religiously '*persons*,' but being subject to no obligations, and enjoying no rights *politically sanctioned*, would legally speaking be '*homines*' merely.—*Marginal Note.*

And again, at p. 295, Lib. III. § 220, *et seq.*, is the following:—

A slave (as the subject of property) may be damaged; but (as having no rights) is not himself susceptible of injury (*ante*, I. § 53, Constitution of Antonine). The rights, however, which are there spoken of were given to the slave as against his master; and damage or even death inflicted upon the former by a third person may still have been considered as an injury done to the property of the latter (*vide* III. § 213). The Constitution, however, of Antonine seems to imply that the causeless killing of another's slave was already a *crime*; and, by consequence, that the slave was not without rights, even as against a stranger.—*Marginal Notes.*

XII have been particularly directed to the just legal import of the term 'person.' For the purpose with which they were occupied was the division of persons, or the distribution of persons into *genera* and *species*.

Secondly, Although the slave had no rights, there are numerous places in the Institutes of Gaius, in the Institutes of Justinian, and also in his Digest or Pandects, in which a *status* or condition is ascribed to the slave, or in which the slave is spoken of as bearing a *status* or condition.

Even, therefore, if we admit that the definition in question will apply to the term 'person,' and that a person is a human being bearing a condition or *status*, it will not follow that the term 'person' is exclusively applicable to such human beings as are invested with *rights*.

If we admit the definition, while we look at the true import of the term *status*, the meaning of 'person' is this: namely, a human being considered as *invested with rights*, or considered as *subject to duties*.³³

Taking the term in that meaning, it would apply to every human creature, if a member of a political society, and not sovereign therein. It could not apply to a human being not a member of any political society, for a human being in that situation has no legal rights, and is free from legal obligations. Nor, taken in that meaning, can it apply to a monarch, for as I have before observed,³⁴ we cannot say with correctness, that sovereigns have legal rights, nor that they are subject to legal obligations. Obligations are imposed, and rights conferred by *laws*. He, therefore, who has rights, or who lies under obligations, occupies a position wherein sovereigns are not. He is in a state of subjection, or in a habit of obedience, to some determinate superior from whom he receives the law.

But, according to the meaning which was attached to it by the Roman Lawyers, neither of the significations in question belongs to the term 'person.' They neither confined it to human beings, considered as invested with rights; nor

³³ Hugo, *Lehrbuch der juristischen Encyclopädie*, vol. i. p. 300. Mr. Austin's copy of this book is filled with marginal notes. The following is from the page referred to (*Servitut.*):—

Wherever a man has a right to the services of another, whether it be unlimited, as in the case of unqualified slavery; or limited, as the right of the husband in the wife, the right of the

wife in the husband, etc., there is a combination of *Jus in Re* with *Jus ad Rem*; *jus in re*, as against other persons, *jus ad rem*, as against the person who is obliged to perform the services. All such rights belong to *Jura Personarum*; i.e. they suppose a *Status*.—*Marginal Note*.

³⁴ See p. 289 *et seq.*, *ante*.

did they even restrict it to human beings, considered as subject to obligations. The meaning which they attached to the term, is the familiar or vulgar meaning. With them '*persona*' denoted '*homo*,' or any being which can be styled *human*.

The modern limitation of the term '*person*' to '*human beings considered as invested with rights*,' appears to have arisen thus: 1st, A *person* was defined by many of the modern Civilians, 'a human being bearing a *status* or condition.' 2ndly, The authors of the definition used the term '*status*' in a peculiar and narrow sense. They assumed that every *status* comprises *rights*, or, at least, comprises capacities to acquire or take rights. They assumed that a *status* or condition could not be ascribed to any one who was excluded from all rights, and was simply subject to duties. Now there is no classical authority for defining a person, 'a human being bearing a *status* or condition.' And further, I could cite numerous passages from the Classical Jurists, in which a *status* or condition is ascribed to the *slave*: That is to say, to a human being who is excluded from rights; and whose condition or *status* is therefore purely onerous, or consists of duties merely. The truth appears to be that the authors of the definition considered the term '*status*' as equivalent to the term '*caput*:' a word denoting conditions of a particular class: conditions which *do* comprise rights, and comprise rights so numerous and important, that the conditions or *status* of which those rights are constituent parts, are marked and distinguished by a name importing pre-eminence.

For the purpose of ascertaining the meaning which should be assigned to the term *status*, I have searched the meanings which were annexed to it by the Roman Lawyers, through the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, and through the more voluminous Digest of the latter. And the result at which I have arrived is this: that *status* and *caput* are not synonymous expressions, but that the term *caput* signifies certain conditions which are *capital* or principal: which cannot be acquired and cannot be lost, without a mighty and conspicuous change in the legal position of the party. Such, for instance, are the *status libertatis* and the *status civitatis*: that is to say, the condition of the freeman, as opposed to the condition of the slave; and the condition of the citizen or member of the political society, as opposed to the condition of the foreigner.

Whatever may be the meanings of these terms as they are used by the Roman Lawyers, it is certain that they are not synonymous. For a condition or *status* is repeatedly ascribed to the slave, and yet it is affirmed of the slave 'that he has *nullum caput*.'

It is much to be wished, that the difference between them could be ascertained. For of all the perplexing questions which the science of Jurisprudence presents, the notion of *status* or *condition* is incomparably the most difficult. And much of the obscurity in which it is involved, arises from the manner in which it has been treated by the modern Commentators upon the Roman Law: Particularly from their habit of restricting the import of '*status*,' and of using it as if it were equivalent to the narrower expression '*caput*.'

I think, then, that I am justified by authority, as well as by the convenience which results from it, in imputing to the term *person* (as denoting a physical or natural person) the familiar or vulgar meaning; or in considering a physical or natural *person* as exactly equivalent to 'man' (in the largest signification of the term).

If *persona* (as meaning *man*) be equivalent to *homo*, and be not exclusively applicable to 'men *invested with rights*,' it follows that the slave is a *person*, though he be excluded from rights. If, indeed, we consider him from a certain aspect, we may, in a certain sense, style him a *thing*. But almost every person may be considered from a similar aspect, and may also be styled a *thing*, with equal propriety. As I shall show more fully when I get further on, persons must be considered from three points of view: As invested with rights; as lying under obligations or duties; and as being the subjects or objects of rights and obligations.

I have hitherto considered the *extension* of the term '*person*' as denoting a human being. And in regard to the *extension* of the term, *as denoting a human being*, I believe that Classical Jurists, when they used it with that meaning, used it with the large signification which it bears in familiar discourse:—as being synonymous with '*homo*,' or as applying to every being which can be styled *human*.

But, instead of denoting *men* (or human beings), it sometimes denotes the *conditions* or *status* with which men are invested. And taking the term in this signification, every human being who has rights and duties bears a *number* of persons. '*Unus homo sustinet plures personas*.' For example, every human being who has rights and duties, is

citizen or *foreigner*: that is to say, he is either a member of LECT.
a *given* independent society, or he is not a member of that
given independent society. He is also a *son*. Probably,
he is *husband* and *father*. It may happen, moreover, that he
is *guardian* or *tutor*. His *profession* or *calling* may give him
distinctive rights, or may subject him to distinctive duties.
And with the various conditions or *status* of citizen, son,
husband, father, guardian, advocate, attorney, or trader, he
may combine the condition of judge, or of member of the
supreme legislature, and so on to infinity.

The term '*person*,' as denoting a condition or *status*, is
therefore equivalent to *character*. It signified originally, a
mask worn by a player, and distinguishing the character
which he represented from the other characters in the piece.
From the mask which expressed the character, it was ex-
tended to the character itself. From characters represented
by players, or from dramatic characters, it was further
extended by a metaphor to conditions or *status*. For men, as
subjects of law, are distinguished by their respective *condi-*
tions; just as players, performing a play, are distinguished by
the several *persons* which they respectively enact or sustain.

By the Greek commentators on the Roman Law, or by
those who have translated the expositions of the Roman Law
into Greek (as Theophilus), *persona* is translated by the word
πρόσωπον, which signifies a visage or face, and is obviously
meant to denote character or *status*, and not in the other
import.

The term '*person*' has, therefore, two meanings, which
must be carefully distinguished. It denotes a *man* or *human*
being; or it signifies some *condition* borne by a man. A
person (as meaning a man) is one or individual: But a *single*
or *individual* person (meaning a man) may sustain a *number* of
persons (meaning conditions or status). The erroneous defi-
nition of a *person* to which I have already adverted, probably
arose in part from a confusion of these significations. Every
status or condition consists of rights or duties; or it consists
of both. And if we impute to a person (as meaning a *man*)
this essential of a person (as meaning a *condition*), it will
follow that a person (as meaning a man) must be defined
thus: A man invested with rights, or subject to obligations.

The further limitation of the term '*person*' to '*a man*
invested with rights,' probably arose (as I intimated before)
from an erroneous limitation of the term '*status*:' from the
restriction of the term to certain *capital* conditions, which

c. XII consist of *rights* as well as of duties; and wherein the rights are the more conspicuous and distinctive constituents or components. A Roman Citizen, for instance, was of course distinguished from a foreigner, chiefly by the numerous rights which he enjoyed: so was a freeman from a slave: insomuch that he who was reduced from the more advantageous of these situations to the other was said to undergo *capitis deminutio*: so predominating was the idea of the rights which he lost over that of the duties from which he became freed, although by the same event by which he lost the rights he became freed from the duties also. This last mentioned error, in short, arose from the confusion of *status* (the larger or generic expression) with *caput* (the narrower or specific).

Fictitious
or legal
persons.

Fictitious or legal persons are of three kinds: 1st, Some are collections or aggregates of physical persons: 2ndly, others are *things* in the proper signification of the term: 3rdly, others are collections or aggregates of rights and duties. The *collegia* of the Roman Law, and the corporations aggregate of the English, are instances of the first: the *prædium dominans* and *serviens* of the Roman Law, is an instance of the second: the *hæreditas jacens* of the Roman Law, is an instance of the third.

It is impossible that I should enter here upon the consideration of legal persons. For their natures are various; the ideas which they stand for are extremely complex; and they, therefore, belong to the detail, rather than to the *generalia* of the science. At present I will merely remark that they are persons by a figment, and for the sake of brevity in discourse. All rights reside in, and all duties are incumbent upon, physical or natural persons. But by ascribing them to feigned persons, and not to the physical persons whom they in truth concern, we are frequently able to abridge our descriptions of them.

To take the easiest instance; this is the case with the *prædium dominans* and *serviens* of the Roman Law. A *servitus* or easement over one *prædium* resides in every person who occupies another *prædium*: meaning by a *prædium*, a given piece of land, or a given building with the land on which it is erected. The servitude or easement in question (as, for instance, a right of way) is ascribed, by a fiction, one of these *prædia*; and, by a similiar fiction, an obligation or duty to bear the exercise of the servitude is imputed to the other. The first is styled *dominans*; the latter

Or (as we should say in English Law-language) the *jus servitutis* or easement is appurtenant to lands or messuages. In truth, the right resides in every physical person who successively owns or occupies the *prædium* styled *dominans*. And the right avails against every physical person who successively owns or occupies the *prædium* styled *serviens*. But by imputing these rights and obligations to the *prædia* themselves, and by talking of them as if they were persons, we express the rights and duties of the persons who are really concerned, with greater conciseness.

To take another instance. *Hæreditas jacens* was a term employed in the Roman Law to denote the whole of the rights and obligations which, at any instant of time during the period which intervenes between the death of the testator or intestate, and the heir's acceptance of the inheritance, would have devolved upon an heir at that instant entering upon the inheritance. This mass of rights and obligations was by a fiction styled a person, although clearly not a person in the popular sense of the word, nor even consisting of any determinate thing, but being a mere collection of rights and obligations. It was so termed by way of expressing that any benefit accruing to the inheritance during the above period, would enure to the benefit of the heir.

FRAGMENTS.

*Law is imperative or permissive.*³⁵

Law, considered as a rule of conduct, prescribed by the Legislator or Judge, is necessarily imperative, since it imposes an obligation to act or to refrain from acting in a given manner.³⁶

As conferring a right, it is permissive. Considered as an expression of the will of the Legislator or Judge, it is imperative or permissive. For it may consist in the removal of restraint.

Penal Laws are seldom directly imperative.

Sanction is not of the essence of permissible law. For, by such

³⁵ Bentham, 'Principles,' etc. pp. 221, 328-9, Blackstone, 86. Thibaut, System.

³⁶ 'Insofern wir unter Gesetzen, die von der Staatsgewalt den Unterthanen vorgeschriebenen Regeln verstehen, ist es einleuchtend, dass es in diesem Sinne nur gebietende und verbotende Gesetze, aber keineswegs erlaubende Gesetze geben kann. Denn in Beziehung auf die erlaubten Handlungen bedarf es keiner besondern Bestimmung, da aus dem

Inhalte der Gebote oder Verbote unmittelbar gefolgt werden kann, was erlaubt ist,' etc. etc.—*Falck, Jurist. Encyc.* p. 31.

If by Laws be meant *obligatory* or *sanctioned* Rules, Laws are either *imperative* (commanding something which shall be done), or *prohibitive* (commanding something which shall not be done), but cannot be *permissive*.—*Marginal Note.*

Lect. XII a law, an obligation, instead of being imposed, may be simply removed. (*Sed quære.*)

It has hitherto been assumed that every law imposes an Obligation. Apparent exception in the case of Permissive Laws. The exception *only* apparent. Taking off an Obligation, it confers a Right, and so imposes an Obligation corresponding to that right.

With reference to such parts of conduct as the positive law of the community does not touch, the members of a political society are in a state of nature. (*Sed quære*: For they are protected in that liberty by the State. Such liberty would seem to consist of rights conferred in the way of permission.)

Law is absolute or conditional;—is to take effect at all events, or only in default of dispositions by the interested parties.

Liberty.

Freedom, Liberty, are negative names, denoting the absence of Restraint.

Civil, Political, or Legal Liberty, 'is the absence of Legal Restraint, whether such restraint has never been imposed, or having been imposed, has been withdrawn.

It is general or particular: i.e. it extends to all; or it is granted to one or some, by an exemption or *privilegium* (see *post*, 'Privilege').

Liberty and Right are synonymous; since the liberty of acting according to one's will would be altogether illusory if it were not protected from obstruction. There is however this difference between the terms. In Liberty, the prominent or leading idea is, the absence of legal restraint: whilst the security or protection for the enjoyment of that liberty is the secondary idea. Right, on the other hand, denotes the protection and connotes the absence of Restraint.³⁷

If the protection afforded by the law be considered as afforded against private persons, the word Right is commonly employed. If against the Government, or rather against some member of the Government, Liberty is more frequently used; e.g. the Liberties of Englishmen.³⁸ Liberty and Right are not however always coexten-

³⁷ 'Par rapport aux actions sur lesquelles le législateur ne prononce ni défense ni injonction, il ne crée aucun délit, aucune obligation, aucun service; cependant il vous confère un certain droit, celui de faire ou de ne pas faire, selon votre propre volonté.'—*Traité de Lég.* vol. i. p. 156.

The right of doing that which is not prohibited, supposes an obligation on others not to obstruct. See 'Principles,' etc. p. 222.—*Marginal Note.*

'On peut imposer des obligations sans qu'il en résulte des droits; mais on ne

fondés sur des obligations. Comment me confère-t-on un droit de propriété sur un terrain? C'est en imposant à tous les autres l'obligation de ne pas toucher à ses produits. Comment ai-je le droit d'aller et venir dans toutes les rues d'une ville? C'est qu'il n'existe point d'obligation qui m'en empêche.'—*Traité, etc.*

And there *does* exist an obligation on others to refrain from obstructing me.—*Marginal Note.*

³⁸ For Liberty, as meaning share in Sovereignty, see Kant, 'Zum ewiger Frieden.' See also *ante*, p. 281 *et seq.*

sive, since the security for the enjoyment of the former may in part be left to the moral and religious sanctions. LECT. XII

(*Sed quære.*) Whether Liberty can ever mean anything but the right to dispose of one's person at pleasure? Liberty or Freedom to deal with an external subject seems, however, to be equivalent to 'Right to deal with it.'

On the whole, Right and Liberty seem to be synonymous:—either of them meaning, 1st, permission on the part of the Sovereign to dispose of one's person or of any external subject (subject to restrictions, of course); 2ndly, security against others for the exercise of such right and liberty.

Wherever there is protection afforded, *Right* is the proper word. As against the sovereign, there can be no right.

Physical freedom is the absence of external obstacles; *i.e.* the absence of causes which operate independently of the will. Moral freedom is the absence of motives of the painful sort.

LECTURE XIII.

PERSON AND THING.

In my last Lecture, I distinguished Obligations or Duties into *positive* and *negative*; and indicated generally and briefly the nature of that important distinction. LECT. XIII
Recapitulation.

I also distinguished Obligations into *relative* and *absolute*: that is to say, obligations which correlate with, or correspond or answer to *rights*; and obligations which neither imply, nor are implied by, *rights*. And, for the reason which I then assigned, I began with the analysis of rights (and of the obligations implied by rights); and deferred all further remark upon the nature of absolute obligations, till that analysis should be completed.

But, since rights reside in persons, and since *persons*, *things*, *acts*, and *forbearances* are the subjects or objects of rights, it was necessary that I should advert to the significations of those several related expressions, before I could address myself to rights and to the obligations with which they correlate.

Accordingly, I distinguished persons into physical or natural, and legal or fictitious: that is to say, into *persons*, properly and simply so called; and persons which are such by a fiction, and for the sake of brevity in discourse.

LECT. XIII

I then stated the meaning which I attach to the term 'person,' as signifying a *physical or individual person*. I endeavoured to demonstrate, that the extensive meaning which I attach to the term, coincides with the meaning which was annexed to it by the Roman Lawyers. And I distinguished that meaning from another and a very different meaning in which they frequently employ it: namely, *not* as signifying physical or individual persons, but as signifying the conditions or *status* which are borne or sustained by the former.

In conclusion, I enumerated the kinds of persons which are persons by virtue of fictions; and I also pointed at the design which those fictions are intended to answer. But inasmuch as fictitious persons are of widely differing natures, and inasmuch as the ideas which they denote are for the most part extremely complex, I deferred all further consideration of them till I should descend to the detail of the science.

Having considered the import of *person*, I proceed to the significations of *Thing*, *Act* and *Forbearance*.

Things are such *permanent* objects, *not being persons*, as are sensible or perceptible through the senses. Or (changing the expression) things are such *permanent* external objects as are *not persons*. Such (for example) is a field, a house, a horse, a garment, a piece of coined gold. Such is a quantity of coined or uncoined gold, determined or ascertained by number or weight. Such is a *quantity* of cloth, corn, or wine, determined or ascertained by measure.

Things are opposed, on the one hand, to *persons* themselves; and are contradistinguished, on the other, from the *acts* of the persons, and from the rest of the *transient* objects which are denominated *facts* or *events*.

Things resemble persons in this: That they are permanent external objects; or objects which are permanent, and sensible or perceptible through the senses. They differ from persons in this: That *Persons* are invested with rights and subject to obligations, or, at least, are capable of both: *Things* are essentially incapable of rights or obligations; although (by a fiction) they are sometimes considered as persons, and rights or obligations are ascribed or imputed to them accordingly.

They resemble facts or events in this: That they are incapable of rights or obligations. They differ from facts or events in this: That things are *permanent* external objects; whilst facts or events are *transient* objects, and consist of

determinations of the will, with other affections of the mind ; Lect. XIII
as well as of objects perceptible through the senses.

In drawing the line, by which Persons and Things are separated from Events, I content myself with vague expressions, and am far from aspiring to metaphysical precision. If I attempted to describe the boundary with metaphysical precision, I should run into enquiries which my limits imperiously forbid, and which were scarcely consistent with the purpose of these discourses. If I endeavoured to define exactly the meaning of 'permanent object,' I should enter upon the perplexing question of sameness or identity. If I endeavoured to define exactly the meaning of 'sensible object,' I should enter upon the interminable question about the difference between mind and matter, or percipient and perceived. And, in either case, I should thrust a treatise upon Intellectual Philosophy into a series of discourses upon Jurisprudence.

Accordingly, now that I have indicated rather than determined the boundary, I must leave my hearers to settle it for themselves, according to their own fashion. I must leave them to distinguish, after their own fashion, between objects which are perceptible through the senses, and objects which are not ; between sensible objects which are permanent, and are *things* (strictly so called), and sensible objects which are transient, and are ranked with *facts* or *events*. The discretion which prompts my reserve will be understood by those who have turned a portion of their attention to the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and will meet with approbation rather than censure. Those who are ignorant of what is styled Metaphysic frequently run, without knowing it, into ill-timed metaphysical speculation. Those who are versed in Metaphysic, know the occasions for abstaining from it, as well as the occasions on which it can be applied to advantage.

But, in order that we may keep clear of a very perplexing ambiguity, I will remark for a moment upon two distinct significations of 'permanent' and 'transient.' And this remark I am compelled to interpose, inasmuch as it regards a distinction which strictly belongs to *Jurisprudence*, whether it be metaphysical or not.

Sensible objects, or objects perceptible through the senses, are permanent or transient. The former are persons or things : the latter rank with the objects which are denominated facts or events.

Now when it denotes a *thing*, as contradistinguished from

an *event*, the import of the expression '*permanent* sensible object,' is (I think) this: It denotes an object which is perceptible *repeatedly*, and which is considered by those who repeatedly perceive it, as being (on those several occasions) one and the same object. Thus, the horse or the house of to-day is the horse or house of yesterday; in spite of the intervening changes which its appearance may have undergone.

The *transient* sensible objects which rank with facts or events, are *not* perceptible repeatedly. They exist for a moment: disappear: and never recur to the sense, although they may be recalled by the memory. Such (I think) is the distinction (indicated in very general expressions) between the term '*permanent*,' as applied to *things*, and the term '*transient*' as applied to sensible *events*. And, taking the terms in these significations, all *things* are *permanent*, and no *things* are *transient*.

But, taking the terms in other significations, things may be distinguished into *permanent* and *transient*, or into such as are more permanent and such as are less permanent. For some are more enduring; others are less enduring. In other words, some retain the forms which give them their actual names for a longer period: some retain those forms for a shorter period, or corrupt, decay, and perish *speedily*.

The purpose of this distinction will appear clearly, when I consider the kinds and sorts into which things are divisible: especially the *kind* of things which have been styled *fungible*, and the *sort* of fungible things *quæ usu consumuntur*.

Resuming the definition of a thing, I mean by a *thing* (as contradistinguished from an *event*) any permanent external object *not* a person. Or (changing the expression) I mean by a thing (as contradistinguished from an *event*) any sensible object, not being a person, which is capable of being perceived *repeatedly*, or is capable of *recurring* to the sense.

Distinc-
tions
between
Things.

The distinctions between Things, or the various *genera* and *species* under which they are distributed, will be considered hereafter. For, though these distinctions are derived (in part) from the physical differences between things, they are also derived (in part) from the differences between rights and obligations; and are just as factitious, or as completely the work of Law, as the rights and obligations of which things are the subjects. Consequently, a statement of the distinctions between Things (as subjects of the science of Jurisprudence) must be preceded by a general statement of the distinctions between rights and duties.

From the import of the term *thing* (as opposed to *person* and *event*) I proceed to certain ambiguities by which it is perplexed and obscured.

And, first, '*res*' or thing (as used by the Roman Lawyers) is frequently extended from *things* (strictly so called) to *acts* and *forbearances* considered from a particular aspect: namely, considered as the objects of obligations, and of the rights corresponding to obligations. For example, If you are bound by virtue of a contract to *do* certain acts (as to perform work and labour in repairing a house); or if you are bound by virtue of a contract to *forbear* from certain acts (as to forbear from exercising a trade within certain limits), the acts or forbearances to which *you* are *obliged*, and to which the opposite party has a correlating or corresponding *right*, are *res* or *things* (in the sense which I am now considering). Strictly speaking, the act or forbearance is not a *thing*. It is not a permanent external object. Strictly speaking, it is the object or end of the right, and of the obligation which corresponds to the right; or it is the purpose for the accomplishment of which the right and the obligation exist.

Things as signifying acts and forbearances.

A more remarkable and a more perplexing ambiguity is the following.

Things are divided by the Roman Lawyers into corporeal and incorporeal.

Corporeal and Incorporeal Things.

Under *corporeal* things are included,

1st, *Things* (strictly so called): that is to say, permanent external objects *not* persons. 2ndly, *Persons*, as considered from an aspect to which I shall advert immediately: that is to say, not as having rights, or as being bound by obligations, but as the subjects or objects of rights and obligations residing in, or incumbent upon others. 3dly, *Acts* and *Forbearances*, considered from the aspect to which I have alluded already: that is to say, as the object of rights and obligations.

By '*incorporeal things*,' they understood not the subjects of rights and obligations, but rights and obligations themselves: '*Ea quæ in jure consistunt:*' velut '*jus hereditatis*,' '*jus utendi fruendi*,' '*jus servitutis*,' '*obligationes*, quoquo modo contractæ.'

By '*corporeal*' they meant sensible or perceptible through the senses: Or (in that philosophical jargon which they borrowed from the Greeks) they meant by '*corporeal*,' *tangible*. For, in the language of the Stoics, and also of the Epicureans, all the various senses were considered as organs of

LECT. XIII touch ; or all sensations, as modifications of the sensation of touch.³⁹

And taking 'corporeal' and 'tangible' in that sense, *res corporales* or *res quæ tangi possunt*, will not only comprise *things* (in the strict signification of the term), but also *acts* (as the objects of rights and obligations). For every act which can be the object of a right or obligation, is an act *external* or *perceptible by sense*. To forbearances, indeed, the term *res corporales* will not apply strictly. For all forbearances are mere determinations of the will. But it was probably extended to forbearances which are the objects of rights and obligations, partly for the sake of convenience, and partly because the acts to be forborne are tangible or sensible.

In the language, then, of the Roman Lawyers, the term *res* has two significations which are widely different. 1st, It denotes Things, Acts, and Forbearances, as the subjects or objects of rights and obligations, and it sometimes denotes persons considered from that same aspect. 2ndly, It denotes Rights and Obligations themselves.

In the English Law, we have this same jargon about 'incorporeal things'⁴⁰ (derived from the Stoical Philosophy through the Roman Law), applied less extensively. With us, *all* rights and obligations are not *incorporeal things*; but certain rights are styled *incorporeal hereditaments*, and are opposed by that name to *hereditaments corporeal*. That is to say, *rights* of a certain species, or rather of numerous and very different species, are absurdly opposed to the *things* (strictly so called) which are the *subjects* or *matter* of rights of another species.

The word *hereditaments* is evidently taken in two senses, in the two phrases which stand to denote the species of hereditaments. A corporeal hereditament is the thing itself

³⁹ 'Pondus uti saxis, calor ignibus, liquor aquai
Tactus corporibus cunctis, intactus
Inani.'

'Tactus enim, Tactus, proh Divum
numina sancta!

Corporis est sensus, vel cum res
extera sese

Insinuat, vel cum lædit, quæ in
corpore nata est.'

Lucretius, Lib. I. & II.

⁴⁰ Blackstone, Vol. ii. c. 3.

The 'Incorporeal Hereditaments' of the English Law are not exactly equivalent to the 'Res Incorporales' of the

Roman. The difference is occasioned by the difference in the English law between the descent or devolution of moveables and immoveables; including in the first *jura ad rem*, or most of them. *Hæreditas* or *obligatio* = an incorporeal, not hereditament,—for they devolve not upon *heirs*,—but thing, going to executors or administrators, or to those who are entitled to that office.—*Marginal note in the page referred to.*

And lower down (same page): Like 'property' (the more extensive right) it is a collective name; and, by consequence, has no *one* thing or incident corresponding to it.—*Marginal note.*

which is the subject of the right; an incorporeal hereditament is not the subject of the right, but the right itself.

I observed, in my last Lecture, that the slave is styled by the Roman Lawyers a 'person.' And considered as bearing a condition, and as bound by obligations, he is a person. But considered as the subject of the *dominion* which resides in the master (a right which the master can assert against the rest of the world), he is sometimes styled a *thing*. For example, In case he be unjustly detained by a third party, the master may recover him by that peculiar action which is styled *rei vindicatio*: an action which was confined to the recovery of *things*; and which could not be brought by the father for the purpose of recovering his son, although the *patria potestas* (or right of the father in the son) was closely analogous to the dominion of the master.

This is utterly capricious. For, if the slave is a thing (as the subject of the master's right), so should every person be considered as a thing, where he is the subject of a right residing in another. In this sense, almost every person is a thing. For there is scarcely a person who is not the subject of a right, which resides in another person, and avails against the world at large. For instance: A servant, in our own country, is the subject of rights residing in his master; not only of the rights which the master enjoys by contract over the servant himself, but of rights in him availing against the world. If a third party were to seduce the servant from his master's service, or to maltreat him, so as to disable him from performing his service, this would be an offence against the right of the master in the servant. Such, again, is the case of a husband and a wife. There are in all such cases two distinct rights, that of the one person against the other, and that of the one person in the other as against third parties. Such cases are very numerous, as will be shown hereafter. Rights may be had in persons, just as they may be had in things; and there is no difference between the cases, except that in one case the subject is a person, in the other the subject is a thing. In the same sense, therefore, in which the slave is sometimes called a thing, all persons whatever might be so styled. There are, however, very few cases in which the slave is styled a thing (even when he is considered as the *subject* of the master's dominion). Generally speaking, he is styled *homo*, or *servilis persona* (even when considered under that aspect): For instance, when he is considered as the subject of the ancient and formal conveyance called *mancipatio* (Gaius, I. § 120)

XIII
 Distinction
 between
jura rerum
jura
onarum
 by
 introduced.

I shall take this occasion of recalling your attention to the double meaning of *persona* in the Roman law as signifying, sometimes a physical or real person, and sometimes a *status* or condition: for the purpose of observing that the last acceptation of *persona*, combined with that of *res* as denoting in certain cases rights and obligations, throws considerable light on the celebrated distinction between *jus rerum* and *jus personarum*; phrases which have been translated so absurdly by Blackstone and others—*rights of persons* and *rights of things*. *Jus personarum* did not mean law of persons or rights of persons, but law of *status* or condition. A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the *status* or condition with which he is invested. It is a remarkable confirmation of this that Gaius, in the margin, purporting to give the title or heading of this part of the law, has entitled it thus, *De conditione hominum*: and Theophilus, in translating the Institutes of Justinian from Latin into Greek has translated *jus personarum*—ἡ

διαίρεσις—*Divisio personarum*: understanding evidently by *persona* or *πρόσωπον* not an individual or physical person, but the *status*, condition, or character borne by physical persons. This distinctly shows the meaning of the phrase *jus personarum*, which has been involved in impenetrable obscurity by Blackstone and Hale. The *law of persons* is the law of *status* or condition; the *law of things* is the law of rights and obligations, considered in a general manner or as distinguished from those peculiar collections of rights and obligations which are styled conditions, and considered apart.

From the same ambiguity arose the mistake of supposing that *jura in rem* must have something to do with things; whereas the phrase really denotes rights which avail *generally* as distinguished from those which avail only against some determinate individual.

LECTURE XIV.

ACT AND FORBEARANCE: JUS IN REM—IN PERSONAM.

LECT. XIV

In the last Lecture, I entered upon the analysis of the term 'Right.'

But, since rights reside in *persons*, and since *persons*, *things*, *acts* and *forbearances* are the subjects or objects of rights, It was necessary that I should advert to the meaning

of those several related expressions, before I could address myself *immediately* to rights and their corresponding duties. LECT. XIV

Accordingly, in the last Lecture, I considered the term ‘Person,’ and the term ‘Thing.’

In the present Lecture I shall point at the respective significations of ‘Act’ and ‘Forbearance,’ and shall consider briefly an important distinction which obtains between rights themselves:—A distinction of which we must seize the general scope or import, before we can understand, and can express adequately and correctly, that nature or essence which is common to *all* rights.

Persons and Things are objects *external* and *permanent*. Or persons and things may be distinguished from other objects, in the following manner: Persons and Things.

1st. A person or thing is a sensible object, or an object perceptible by sense. •

2ndly. A person or thing is perceptible *repeatedly*, or is capable of *recurring* to the sense.

3rdly. A person or thing recurring to the sense is considered by him who repeatedly perceives it as being, on those several occasions, *one* and the *same* object.

Things are such permanent external objects as are *not* Persons; that is to say, as are not physical or individual persons; as are not men (in the largest signification of the term); or (using the term ‘men’ in its narrower import) as are not men, women, or children. Persons and Things distinguished

Facts, Events, or Incidents, may be distinguished from Persons and Things in the following manner. Events. 1st. Every person or thing is a *sensible* object. Of events, *some* are perceptible by sense; but *some* are determinations of the will, or other affections of the mind.

2ndly. Every person or thing is a *permanent* sensible object. But an event perceptible by sense (like every other event) is *transient*. That is to say, an event perceptible by sense, is not perceptible *repeatedly*. It exists for a moment: Then, ceases to exist: And *never recurs* to the sense, although the memory may recal it.

Events are simple, single, or individual; or they are complex. A simple event is incapable of analysis; or is considered incapable of analysis. A complex event is a number of simple events, marked (for the sake of brevity) by a collective name. The importance of this distinction will appear clearly, when I consider events more in detail: Events a simple or complex.

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especially, when I consider them as *causes* of rights and duties, and of the *termination* of rights and duties.

Import of
'fact' and
'incident.'

Before I proceed to the terms 'Act' and 'Forbearance,' I will offer a brief remark upon the terms which are now in question.

The terms 'fact' and 'incident' are sometimes synonymous with the term 'event.' But, not unfrequently, 'fact' is restricted to human acts and forbearances, and 'incident' employed in a sense to which I shall advert hereafter. Consequently, the objects which I am endeavouring to distinguish from persons and things, are best denoted by the term 'events.' 'Event' is adequate and unambiguous: It will always apply to *any* of the objects in question. 'Fact' and 'incident' are ambiguous. Taken in one signification, each of them will apply to *any* of the objects in question. Taken in another signification, it applies exclusively to events of a class.

Acts and
Forbear-
ances.
Act.

The only class of events to which I advert at present, are *human acts and forbearances*.

Now human acts or actions are internal or external.⁴¹ In other words, they are *not* perceptible by sense, or they *are* perceptible by sense. Internal acts are determinations of the will. External acts are such motions of the body as are *consequent upon determinations of the will*. Determinations of the will, and such motions of the body as are consequent upon determinations of the will, are (I conceive) the only objects to which the term 'act' can be applied with propriety. It is scarcely applicable to those motions of the body which are *involuntary*: that is to say, which are involuntary (in the large acceptation of the term), or are *not* consequent upon determinations of the will. If (for example) you plunged into the water *purposely*, the motions of your body *consequent upon the act of your will* would be considered an *act*, or a series of acts. But if you fell into the water without design, the descent of your body into the water would hardly be styled an *act*, although it would be called an *event*.

Nor is the term 'act' applicable to those affections of the mind which are frequently styled passive: that is to say, which are *not* determinations of the will. Whether it will

⁴¹ But observe the correction (p. 433, *post*) of the terminology used here. It will there be seen that the author on further reflection adopts the phrase 'determinations of the will' as to denote what are here termed 'internal acts,' and restricts the meaning of the term 'acts' to denote what are here termed 'external acts.'—R. C.

apply to *these*, without a solecism, seems to be doubtful. But we certainly read and hear of '*acts of the will*;' and I think that the term may be extended to determinations of the will, consistently with general usage. At all events, I shall take leave to consider them as belonging to the class of *acts*: styling them, by way of distinction, '*acts of the will*,' or '*acts internal*.'

A Forbearance is a determination of the will, *not* to do some given external act. Or (taking the notions which the term includes in a different order) a forbearance is the *not* doing some given external act, and the *not* doing it in consequence of a determination of the will. The import of the term is, therefore, double. As denoting the determination of the will, its import is *positive*. As denoting the inaction which is consequent upon that determination, its import is *negative*.

Forbearance.

This double import should be marked and remembered. For mere inaction imports much less than *forbearance* or abstinence from action.

In popular and loose language, a *culpable* forbearance (or a forbearance which is a violation of some law or rule) is not styled a '*forbearance*,' but is ranked with omissions. But an omission (properly so called) is widely different from a culpable forbearance. A culpable forbearance is an act of the will, or supposes an act of the will. An omission is not the consequence of an act of the will, but of that state of the mind which is styled '*negligence*,' and implies the *absence* of will and intention. Accordingly, I apply the term '*forbearance*' to all *voluntary* inaction, or to all inaction which is consequent upon volition. Those forbearances which are violations of laws or rules, may be styled, by way of distinction, *unlawful*, *unjust*, or *culpable*.

And here I dismiss for the present the terms '*Act*' and '*Forbearance*.' Before we can settle the import of these expressions, we must settle the import of the term '*Will*,' and of the inseparably connected term '*Intention*.' But these I shall consider (in conjunction with '*Negligence*' and '*Rashness*') when I endeavour to determine the nature of '*Injuries*' and '*Sanctions*;' and to distinguish the compulsion and restraint which are styled '*Obligation*,' from the compulsion and restraint which operate not upon the will, and may be styled '*merely physical*.'

From Persons, Things, Acts and Forbearances, I proceed to analyse, in a general and concise manner, an important distinction which obtains between Rights, and between the

Introduction to the Distinction between jus

LECT. XIV
in rem and
jus in per-
sonam.

duties or obligations which are implied by rights. But in order that you may follow this analysis with greater ease, I introduce it with the following assumptions, and with the following explanatory remarks. The truth of the assumptions will be proved hereafter. I introduce them here for the purpose of facilitating apprehension.

1st. External Acts and Forbearances (or, briefly, Acts and Forbearances) are the *objects* of duties. Changing the expression, the ends or purposes for which duties are imposed are these; that the parties obliged may do or perform *acts*, or may forbear or abstain from *acts*. The acts or forbearances then to which the obliged are bound, I style the *objects* of duties.

2ndly. The objects of *relative duties*, or of duties which answer to rights, may also be styled the *objects* of the *rights* in which those duties are implied. In other words, all rights reside in persons, and are rights to acts or forbearances on the part of *other* persons. Considered as corresponding to duties, or as being rights to *acts* or *forbearances*, rights may be said to avail *against* persons. Or, changing the expression, they are capable of being enforced judicially *against* the persons who are bound to those acts or forbearances. The acts or forbearances, then, to which these persons are bound, may be called the objects, not only of the duties themselves, but of the rights corresponding to these duties.

3rdly. Of rights, *some* are rights *over* things or persons, or *in* or *to* things or persons. *Others* are *not* rights over things or persons, or *in* or *to* things or persons. All rights over things or persons are of that class of rights which avail against persons generally, or (in other words) which avail against the world at large.

Of rights which are *not* rights over things or persons, *some* are of the class of rights which avail against persons generally. *Others* avail exclusively against persons certain or determinate, or against persons who are determined individually.

Where a right is a right over a thing, or (changing the shape of the expression) *in* or *to* a thing, I style the thing over which it exists the *subject* or matter of the right. I thus distinguish it from acts and forbearances, considered as the *objects* of rights.

Where a right is a right over a person, I also style the person over whom it exists the *subject* of the right. For a

person, considered from this aspect, is placed in a position resembling the position of a *thing* which is the subject or matter of a right. Considered from this aspect, he is not considered as invested with rights, nor is he considered as lying under duties or obligations. He is considered as the subject of a right which resides in *another* person, and which answers to duties or obligations incumbent upon *third* persons.

For example, the relation of master and servant implies *two* rights which are utterly distinct and disparate. The master has a right, which avails against the servant specially, to acts and forbearances on the part of the servant himself. The master has also a right *over* or *in* the servant, which avails against other persons generally, or against the world at large. With respect to the first of these rights, the servant lies under obligations answering to the right of the master. But with respect to the second of these rights, he is placed in a position resembling the position of a *thing* which is the subject or matter of a right. With respect to *that* right, he lies under no obligations. He is merely the subject of a right which resides in his master, and which avails (*not* against *himself*) but against *third* persons.

To resume :

All rights reside in persons, and are rights to acts or forbearances on the part of other persons. And acts and forbearances, considered from this aspect, I would style the *objects* of rights, and of the corresponding duties or obligations. But *some* rights are rights over persons or things: Or (changing the shape of the expression) they are rights *in* or *to* persons or things. And persons and things, considered from this aspect, I would style the *subjects* of those rights, and of the duties which answer to those rights.

And here I will briefly remark, that the term 'subject,' as applied to a *person*, is somewhat ambiguous. A person is subject *to* a duty, when he is bound by the duty, or the duty is incumbent upon him. He is *the* subject of a duty, when the duty is not incumbent upon himself, but he is merely *that* about which the duty is conversant. To recur to the example which I have just cited: As between himself and his master, the servant is *subject* to a duty: that is to say, a duty is incumbent upon him. But he is *the* subject of the duty which is incumbent upon *third* persons towards his master.

The distinction between Rights which I shall presently

LECT. XIV — endeavour to explain, is that all-pervading and important distinction which has been assumed by the Roman Institutional Writers as the main groundwork of their arrangement: namely, the distinction between rights *in rem* and rights *in personam*; or rights which avail against persons generally or universally, and rights which avail exclusively against certain or determinate persons.

The terms '*jus in rem*' and '*jus in personam*' were devised by the Civilians of the Middle Ages, or arose in times still more recent. I adopt them without hesitation, though at the risk of offending your ears. For of all the numerous terms by which the distinction is expressed, they denote it the most adequately and the least ambiguously. The terms which were employed by the Roman Lawyers themselves, with various other names for the classes of rights in question, I shall explain briefly hereafter.

At present, I will merely point at an ambiguity which perplexes and obscures the import of *jus in rem*.

The phrase *in rem* denotes the *compass*, and not the *subject* of the right. It denotes that the right in question avails against persons generally; and *not* that the right in question is a right over a *thing*. For, as I shall show hereafter, many of the rights, which are *jura* or rights *in rem*, are either rights over, or to, *persons*, or have no subject (person or thing).

The phrase *in personam* is an elliptical or abridged expression for '*in personam certam sive determinatum*.' Like the phrase *in rem*, it denotes the *compass* of the right. It denotes that the right avails *exclusively* against a *determinate* person, or against *determinate* persons.

Before I proceed to the distinction between the two classes of rights, I must yet interpose a remark relating to terms.

In the language of the Roman Law, and of all the modern systems which are offsets from the Roman Law, the term '*Obligation*' is restricted to the duties which answer to rights *in personam*. For the duties which answer to rights availing against persons generally, the Roman Lawyers had no distinctive name. They opposed them to *Obligations* (in the strict or proper sense) by the name of *Offices* or *Duties*: Though office or duty is a generic expression; and comprises *Obligations* (in the strict or proper sense) as well as the duties which answer to rights *in rem*.

This limitation of the term '*Obligatio*' by the Roman

Lawyers must be carefully noted. Unless it be clearly understood, their writings, as well as those of most Continental Jurists, will appear an inexplicable riddle. Three-fourths of those who in our own country profess to read and talk about the French Code, cannot possibly understand a word of it, by reason of the sense in which this word is employed therein.

Having premised these remarks, I proceed to state and to illustrate the important distinction in question, with all the brevity which is consistent with clearness.⁴²

Distinction between *jus in rem* and *jus in personam*.

Rights *in rem* may be defined in the following manner :—
‘Rights residing in persons, and availing against other persons *generally*.’ Or they may be defined thus:—‘Rights residing in persons, and answering to duties incumbent upon other persons generally. By a crowd of modern Civilians, *jus in rem* has been defined as follows:—‘*facultas homini competens sine respectu ad certam personam*,’ a definition I believe invented by Grotius.

The following definitions will apply to personal rights :—
‘Rights residing in persons, and availing *exclusively* against persons specifically determinate’ :—Or, ‘Rights residing in persons, and answering to duties which are incumbent *exclusively* on persons specifically determinate.’⁴³ By modern Civilians, a personal right is commonly defined in the following manner:—‘*facultas homini competens in certam personam*.’ This definition also, like the former, was, I believe, devised by Grotius: in neither of them is there any great merit.

According to these definitions, a right of the first class and a right of the second class are distinguishable thus: The duty which correlates with the latter is restricted to a person or persons specifically determinate. The duty which correlates with the former attaches upon persons *generally*.

But though this be the essence of the distinction, these two classes of rights are further distinguishable thus. The

⁴² For the distinction generally, see Hugo, Jurist. Encyc. pp. 75, 208, 325, 335.—Haubold, Jus. Rom. Priv. pp. 7-8.—Savigny, Vom Beruf, etc. pp. 66, 99.—Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 246.—Thibaut, Versuche über einzelne Theile der Theorie des Rechts, ii. p. 28; and note at the end of this lecture.

⁴³ An obligation attaches *exclusively* upon a *determinate* person or persons. Where it is capable of attaching upon

indeterminate persons (as *e.g.* the representative of the obligor in cases of contracts, some obligations *ex delicto*, etc.), it is only capable of attaching upon them as *representing* the original obligors. It never extends beyond the successor, singular or universal, of the original obligor.

A right *in personam* avails exclusively against the obligor, though the obligor may be prevented from performance by a third party.

LECT. XIV duties which correlate with rights *in rem*, are always *negative*: that is to say, they are duties to forbear or abstain. Of the obligations which correlate with rights *in personam*, some are negative, but some (and most) are *positive*, that is to say, obligations to do or perform.

Illustrations of the distinction between *jus in rem* and *jus in personam*.

As every imaginable right belongs to one of these classes, or else is compounded of rights belonging to each of these classes, it is manifest that a full exposition of this all-pervading distinction were nearly equivalent to a full exposition of the entire science of Law. Leaving the fuller exposition of it for future Lectures, I shall merely endeavour, at present, to give the clue to its import, by adducing as briefly as possible a few apt examples.

Property.

1st. *Ownership* or *Property* (equivalent to *Dominion*, in its strict or proper signification) is a term of such complex and various meaning that I must defer the full and accurate explanation of it to a future opportunity. But, in order to the illustration of the distinction which I am endeavouring to exemplify and explain, Ownership or Property may be described accurately enough, in the following manner: 'the right to *use* or *deal with* some given subject, in a manner, or to an extent, which, though it is not unlimited, is indefinite.'

Now in this description it is necessarily implied, that the law will protect or relieve the owner against every disturbance of his right on the part of any other person. Changing the expression, *all* other persons are bound to *forbear* from acts which would prevent or hinder the enjoyment or exercise of the right.

But, here, the duties which correspond to the right of property terminate. Every *positive* duty which may happen to concern or regard it, is nevertheless foreign or extraneous to it, and flows from some incident *specially* binding the party upon whom the duty is incumbent: for instance, from a contract or covenant into which he enters with the owner, or from a delict which he commits against his right of ownership. In other words, every such *positive* duty is restricted to a *determinate* person, and is, therefore, an *Obligation* (in the sense of the Roman Lawyers). And even a duty which is *negative* and regards the right of ownership, is not an obligation corresponding to that *very* right, in case the *vinculum* be *special*: that is to say, not attaching indefinitely upon mankind at large, but binding some *certain* person, or some *certain* persons, and arising from some incident which *exclusively* regards the obliged. An obligation, however, in the

sense of the Roman Lawyers, or a duty binding a determinate LECT.
person, may, whether positive or negative, co-exist with the
duties which correspond to the right of property, by reason of
some incident which superadds to the ownership a right *in*
personam. Thus if in selling you an estate I enter into a
covenant not to molest you in the possession of it, or into a
covenant for further assurance, you enjoy, besides your right
of ownership, which avails and can be enforced against the
world at large, another right arising out of the covenant,
and which avails solely against me. Or if I trespass on land
of which you are the owner, I become amenable to an obli-
gation *ex delicto*, which is superadded to the duties incumbent
upon me and all other persons in respect of your ownership.

Ownership or Property, is, therefore, a *species of Jus in rem*.
For ownership is a right residing in a person, *over or to* a
person or thing, and *availing against other persons univer-*
sally or generally. It is a right implying and exclusively
resting upon obligations which are at once *universal* and
negative.

Where the subject of a right *in rem* happens to be a per-
son, the position of the party who is invested with the right
wears a double aspect. He has a right (or rights) *over or to*
the subject as against other persons generally. He has also
rights (*in personam*) against the *subject*, or lies under *obliga-*
tions (in the sense of the Roman Lawyers) towards the sub-
ject. But this is a matter to which I shall revert presently.

2ndly. The *Servitudes* of the Roman Law, and of the Servitus.
various modern systems which are modifications of the Ro-
man Law, may also be adduced as examples of rights *in rem*.

Servitus (for which the English 'Easement' is hardly an
adequate expression) is a right to *use or deal with*, in a given
and definite manner, a subject *owned* by another. Take, for
instance, a Right of Way over another's land. Now accord-
ing to this definition, the capital difference between *Owner-*
ship and *Servitus* is the following:—The right of dealing
with the subject which resides in the owner or proprietor, is
larger, and, indeed, *indefinite*: That which resides in the
party who is invested with a right of servitude, is narrower
and *determinate*.

But in respect of that great distinction which I am now
endeavouring to illustrate, the Right of Ownership or Pro-
perty, and a Right of Servitude, are perfectly equivalent
rights. *Servitus* (like Ownership) is a right *in rem*. For it
avails against *all mankind* (including the owner of the

LECT. XIV ject). Or (changing the expression) it implies an obligation upon *all* (the owner again included) to *forbear* from every act inconsistent with the exercise of the right.

But this *negative* and *universal* duty, is the only obligation which *correlates* with the *jus servitutis*, or which corresponds to that very right. Every *special* obligation which happens to regard or concern it, is nevertheless foreign or extraneous to it, and answers to some right of the opposite or antagonist class.

Suppose, for example, that the servitude has been *constituted* (or granted) by the actual owner of the subject. And suppose that the owner has also *contracted* with the grantee *not* to molest him in the enjoyment or exercise of the right. Now, here, the granter of the servitude lies under *two* duties which are completely distinct and disparate:—One of them arising from the *grant*, and answering to the right which it creates;—the other arising from the *contract* by which he is *specially* bound, and answering to the right *in personam* which the contract vests in the grantee. In case he molest the grantee in the exercise of the servitude, the *injury* is double, though the *act* is single. By one and the same act, he violates an *Officium* which he shares with the rest of mankind, and he also breaks an *Obligation* (in the sense of the Roman Lawyers) which arises from his peculiar position.

Examples
of rights in
personam.

Having given an example or two of real rights (or of rights which correspond to duties *general* and *negative*), I will now adduce examples of personal rights: that is to say, rights which avail *exclusively* against persons *certain* or *determinate*, or which correlate with obligations, incumbent upon *determinate* persons, to do or perform, or to forbear or abstain.

1st. A right
arising out
of a con-
tract.

All Rights arising from *Contracts* belong to this last-mentioned class: although there are certain cases (to which I shall presently advert) wherein the right of ownership, and others, of the same kind, are said (by a solecism) to arise from Contracts, or are even talked of (with flagrant absurdity) as if they arose from *Obligations* (in the sense of the Roman Lawyers).

Rights, which, properly speaking, arise from *Contracts*, avail against the parties who bind themselves by contract, and also against the parties who are said to *represent* their persons: that is to say, who succeed on certain events to the aggregate or bulk of their rights; and, therefore, to their *faculties* or means of fulfilling or liquidating their obligations. But as against parties who neither oblige themselves

by contract, nor represent the *persons* of parties who oblige themselves by contract, the rights, which, properly speaking, arise from contracts, have no force or effect. LECT. XIV

Suppose (for example) that *you* contract with *me* to deliver me some moveable; ⁴⁴ but, instead of delivering it to *me* in pursuance of the contract, that you sell and deliver it to *another*.

Now, here, the rights which I acquire by virtue of the contract, are the following.

I have a right to the moveable in question as against *you specially*. So long as the ownership and the possession continue to reside in *you*, I can force you to deliver me the thing in specific performance of contract; or, at least, to make me satisfaction, in case you detain it. After the delivery to the *buyer*, I can compel you to make me satisfaction for your breach of the contract with *me*.

But *here* my rights terminate. As against strangers to that contract, I have no right whatever to the moveable in question. And, by consequence, I can neither compel the buyer to yield it to *me*, nor force him to make me satisfaction as detaining a thing of *mine*. For ‘*obligationum substantia non in eo consistit ut aliquod nostrum faciat, sed ut alium nobis obstringat ad dandum aliquid, vel faciendum, vel præstandum.*’ [Or rather, ‘*ad faciendum*’ (including ‘*dandum*’) vel ‘*non faciendum.*’ ‘*Præstandum*’ seems to include both.]

But if you deliver the moveable, in pursuance of your contract with *me*, my position *towards other persons generally* assumes a different aspect. In consequence of the delivery by *you* and the concurring apprehension by *me*, the thing becomes *mine*. I have *jus in rem*: I have a right *over* the thing, or a right *in* the thing, as against all mankind: A right which answers to obligations *universal* and *negative*. And, by consequence, I can compel the restitution of the thing from *any* who may take it or detain it, or can force him to make me satisfaction as for an injury to my right of

⁴⁴ If the contract to deliver, however, be *causâ renditionis*, the transaction is one which in English law depends for its effect as to third parties, on a variety of circumstances. This arises from the peculiar theory of English law that the *property* in moveables is transferred by a sale *in specie* without reference to the fact of delivery. The confusion introduced by this doctrine, and the various expedients resorted to for the purpose of

avoiding most of its practical consequences, (*e.g.* the Bills of Sales Act; the equitable doctrines of vendor's lien, the equitable rules as to notice, &c.) are examples of the inconvenience which arises from the pretension of our Courts to ignore the principles of the Roman law, while compelled by the exigencies of commerce to adopt the results of those principles.—R. C.

LECT. XIV ownership. In the language of Heineccius (a celebrated Civilian of the last century), ‘Ubi rem *meam* invenio, ibi eam *vindico*: sive cum *ea* personâ *negotium mihi fuerit*, sive non fuerit. Contra, si a bibliopolâ librum emi, isque eum *nondum mihi traditum* vendiderit iterum Sempronio, ego sane contra Sempronium agere nequeo: quia cum Sempronio nulum mihi unquam intercessit negotium. Sed agere debeo adversus bibliopolam a quo emi: quia ego ex contractu, i.e. ex jure *ad rem*.’

All rights which arise from contracts and (speaking generally) all rights *in personam*, are rights to *acts* or *forbearances* on the part of determinate persons, and to nothing more. At first sight, that species of *jus in personam* which is styled *jus ad rem* may appear to form an exception. It may seem that the party who is invested with the right, has a right to a thing, or a right *in* a thing, as against the party who lies under the corresponding obligation. But, in every case of the kind, the right of the party entitled amounts, in strictness, to this: He has a right to *acquire* the thing from the opposite party, or to compel the party to make the thing *his* by an *act* of conveyance or transfer. It is only by an ellipsis, or for the sake of brevity in the expression, that the party invested with the right is said to have a right to a thing.⁴⁵

Take the following examples.

1st, If you contract with me to deliver me a *specific* thing, I am said to have *jus ad rem*: that is to say, a right to the thing which is the subject of the contract, as against *you specially*. But, in strictness, I have merely a right to the *acquisition* of the thing: a right of compelling you to give me *jus in rem*, *in* or *over* the thing; to do some *act*, in the way of grant or conveyance, which shall make the thing *mine*.

2dly, If you owe me money determined in point of *quantity*, or if you have done me an injury and are bound to pay me damages, I have also a right to the *acquisition* of a thing; but, strictly and properly speaking, I have not a right to a *thing*. I have a right of compelling *you* to deliver or pay me moneys, which are not determined in *specie*, and as yet are not *mine*: though they *will* be determined in *specie*, and will become *mine* by the act of delivery or payment.

In this case, the nature of the right is obvious. For as

⁴⁵ In the language devised by the Civilians, he has *jus ad rem*: that is to Canonists, and adopted by the modern say, *jus ad rem acquirendam*.

there is no determinate thing upon which it can possibly LECT. XIV attach, it cannot be a right to a *thing*.

3dly, Suppose that you enjoy a monopoly by virtue of a patent; and that you enter into a contract with *me*, to transfer your exclusive right in my favour. Now here, also, I have *jus ad rem*, but it is utterly impossible to affirm that I have a right to a *thing*. The subject of the contract is not a determined thing, nor a thing that can be determined. My right is this: a right of compelling *you* to transfer a right *in rem*, as *I* shall direct or appoint. If I may refine upon the expression which custom has established, I have not so properly *jus ad rem*, as *jus AD JUS in rem*.

And this, indeed, is the accurate expression for *every* case of that species of *jus in personam* which is styled *jus ad rem*. In every case of the kind, the party entitled has *jus in personam AD jus in rem acquirendam*. That is to say, he has a right, availing against a determinate person, to the acquisition of a right availing against the world at large. And, by consequence, his right is a right to an *act* of conveyance or transfer on the part of the person obliged.

With regard to the other species of *jus in personam*, there can be no doubt. If you contract with me to do work and labour, or if you contract with me to forbear from some given act, it is manifest that my right is a right to acts or forbearances, and to nothing more.

I will now advert to the class of cases above alluded to (p. 384) which obscure the otherwise broad and distinct line of demarcation whereby these two great classes of rights are separated. Rights *in rem* sometimes arise from an instrument which is called a contract, and are therefore said to arise from a contract: the instrument in these cases wears a double aspect, or has a twofold effect; to one purpose it gives *jus in personam* and is a contract, to another purpose it gives *jus in rem* and is a conveyance. When a so-called contract passes an estate, or, in the language of the modern Civilians, a right *in rem*, to the obligor, it is to that extent not a contract but a *conveyance*; although it may be a contract to some other extent, and considered from some other aspect. A contract is not distinguished from a conveyance by the mere consent of parties, for that consent is evidently necessary in a conveyance as well as in a contract.

For example, a contract for the sale of an immoveable in the French law, is of itself a conveyance; there is no other;

LECT. XIV the contract, or agreement to sell, is registered, and the ownership of the immoveable at once passes to the buyer.

By the provisions of that part of the English law which is called equity, a contract to sell at once vests *jus in rem* or ownership in the buyer, and the seller has only *jus in re alienâ*. But according to the conflicting provisions of that part of the English system called peculiarly *law*, a sale and purchase without certain formalities merely gives *jus ad rem*, or a right to receive the ownership, not ownership itself: and for this reason a contract to sell, though in equity it confers ownership, is yet an imperfect conveyance, in consequence of the conflicting pretensions of law.⁴⁶ To complete the transaction the legal interest of the seller must be passed to the buyer, in legal form. To this purpose, the buyer has only *jus in personam*: a right to compel the seller to pass his legal interest; but, speaking generally, he has *dominium* or *jus in rem*, and the instrument is a conveyance. To this one intent only he has *jus in personam*; the seller remains obliged, and equity will enforce this obligation *in specie* against the seller, or will compel him to fulfil it by transferring his legal interest in legal form.

Considered with relation to this obligation, which correlates to a right *in personam*, the so-called contract is a contract; but if there were only one system of law in England, and that law were the law administered by the Court of Chancery, it would not be a contract, but a mere conveyance.

Briefly, no right to a thing, properly speaking, is ever given by a contract. Where a thing is the subject of the contract, the right is not a right over, in, or to the thing, but a right to an act of transfer, or assignment of the thing on the part of the obligor.

2dly, A
right
founded on
an injury.

All rights founded upon injuries, or rights of action in the largest sense of the word, are rights *in personam*, equally with those which arise from contracts: and, like all rights *in personam*, are rights to acts or forbearances on the part of determinate persons, and to nothing more. Some confusion has arisen upon this point from the *actio in rem* of the Roman lawyers. *Actio in rem* was a name given by the Roman lawyers to the form of action appointed for the vindication of rights founded on injuries. The name does not imply that the right vindicated is a right *in rem*, but is an

* This of course cannot happen in which requires no particular formality in the case of a sale of moveable chattels, law any more than in equity.—R. C.

abridged expression to denote an action founded on an injury against *jus in rem*.

All rights of action must, it is evident, be founded on rights *in personam*, that is, on rights which avail exclusively against the determinate person or persons against whom the action will lie; although those persons may have been brought under that designation by committing an offence against a right *in rem*. Actions *in rem* are rights of action founded on an offence against a right *in rem*, and seeking the restitution of the party to the enjoyment of that very right, and not merely satisfaction for being deprived of it. Thus, an action of ejectment in English law would be said by the Roman lawyers to be an action *in rem*: because it is founded upon an act of dispossession infringing upon my right of ownership in the land, and because it seeks the restoration to me of that specific right. So likewise an action of *detinue* would be called an action *in rem*: but an action of *trover* would not; because, though founded upon the supposition of a wrongful conversion of the subject claimed to the defendant's use, it does not seek specific restitution, but merely satisfaction or damages.

The following are some of the passages referred to in note ⁴² p. 381, *ante*, together with the marginal notes attached to them.

Those from Hugo's 'Juristische Encyclopädie' are as follows:—

‘Die Forderungen sind überhaupt Rechtsverhältnisse, bei welchen nothwendig auf einen bestimmten Verpflichteten Rücksicht genommen werden muss. In der römischen Sprache sind sie theils obligationes, theils actiones, je nachdem sie für sich bestehende Verhältnisse zwischen den creditor und debtor (Sanctioned), oder Verhältnisse zur Verfolgung irgend eines andern Rechtsverhältnisses sind (Sanctioning). Bei den Alten unterscheiden sie sich auch dadurch, dass die obligatio an sich nie der Rechtsfähigkeit des Verpflichteten ein Ende machen kann, wie dies bei der actio oft der Fall ist.’—Hugo, *Jurist. Enc.* vol. i. p. 75. ¹

Rights of Actions are classed with Obligations; whilst obligations to suffer punishment (which are not more sanctionative than the former), are referred (together with Crimes and Criminal Procedure) to Public Law. Civil Procedure is completely separated from the Rights of Action, and the Matters for Exception, upon which it is built. Civil Injuries are not considered directly. Sanctionative Civil Rights which are exercised extrajudicially are forgotten.—Marginal Note.

LECT. XIV Page 298.—‘*Arten von Rechten an einer Sache.*’

Hugo enumerates three, viz. Eigenthum, Servitut, and Pfandrecht.* ‘Doch,’ he continues, ‘muss bemerkt werden, warum das Erbrecht und der Besitz nicht hierher gehören. Ersteres, weil es eine Art des Eigenthums, oder eine Art es zu erwerben: † und Letzterer, weil es etwas mehr auf dem gegenwärtigen natürlichen Zustande (Factum) als auf einem Rechte beruhendes ist; wodurch freilich auch ein strenges Recht gegen den unschuldigen dritten Besitzer entstehen kann, wenn der Anfang des Besitzes (*causa* oder *initium possessionis*, späterhin *titulus*) es erlaubt; oft entsteht aber daraus nur eine Obligatio.’ ‡

Page 325.—‘*Von Forderungen.*’

‘Der Gegenstand einer Forderung ist entweder ein Geben, oder ein Thun, oder ein Gestat-
 . . .

* Mortgage, etc., is *Jus in Re* given by way of security for the performance of some obligation, though it may lead in the event to the enjoyment of the subject. The Right of the Obligor may be Property or Servitus.—*Marginal Note.*

† And setting aside this ambiguity—assuming that it denotes *Jus*, and not *also* a mode of acquisition—it cannot be classed with *Jura in Re*, because it also includes *Jus ad Rem*. Possession must be considered under three aspects. 1° As *titulus*, as the fact (the fact of enjoyment or occupancy) which gives a right as against *all* except the *proprietor*. 2° As the name of this right. 3° As a *titulus*, which combined with other *tituli* gives a right even as against the *proprietor*.—*Marginal Note.*

‡ *i.e.* *Jus ad Rem* against the alienor by virtue of the warranty for Title.—*Marginal Note.*

Every obligation is positive or negative: is an obligation to give or to perform (in one word, to perform); or to permit, *i.e.* not to hinder.—*Marginal Note.*

Subjects of Private Law.

‘*Juris in artem redacti, seu systematis juris, quantum ad jus privatum, tres constituuntur partes primariæ maxime ab institutorum ejusdem juris varietate ductæ: a.a. Jus Personarum, quod de personarum conditione, et in primis de statu familiæ præcipit: b.b. Jus Rerum, quo de rerum divisionibus et jure circa res, tam proprias quam alienas, etiam defunctorum, disseritur: denique: c. c. Jus Obligationum et Actionum, quod doctrinam, tum de jure adversus certos debitores per obligationem competente, tum de variis modis jus, quod supra traditum est, in judicio persequendi tractat. Quibus partibus tamquam corollarium, sed sine quo ipsa juris privati ratio*

LECT. XIV

is the following table :

Res.

1

Incorporales.

Obligaciones (s. 1.)

Acciones.

Scotland.

IT may not be out of place here to observe that the terms *real* and *personal*, when applied by writers on the law of Scotland to distinguish rights, are invariably applied in a sense conformable to that of the Civilians.

The word *real* has in the law of Scotland several shades of meaning, but all of them importing a distinction of a similar nature to that insisted on by Mr. Austin. Thus, a *real burden* affecting lands means an obligation, similar in character to that imposed by what is called in English law a covenant *running with the land*, and is, therefore, a right availing not *in certam personam*, but against persons of a generic description, namely, owners, or possessors of the land. Thus, also, a right to *teinds* is classed amongst *real* rights, being available not against *certam personam*, but against all persons intromitting with (i.e. reducing into possession) the produce or rents.

But the application of the terms *real* and *personal* which has most precision and distinctness is the following:—A *real* right in land, or other subjects capable of feudal investiture, is a right *completed by investment* (that according to modern forms, duly registered in the Register of Sasines). *personal* right to land, &c., is a right *not completed by investment*.

To understand the distinction, the English reader must be informed that the complete title to land in Scotland is of a double nature. There is the *title* proper (or *personal* title), consisting of a series or *progress* of documents connecting (or presumed to connect) the proprietor with the Crown,

LECT. XIV as the ultimate author of all feudal rights. There is also the *sasine*, formerly a public act of taking possession, now effected by registering the appropriate instrument or deed in the Register of Sasines: which being done, in pursuance of lawful warrants, the proprietor is said to be infeft, or feudally invested with the property. The word *infeftment*, or *investiture*, properly applies to the personal title completed by the *sasine*: but is sometimes applied to the *sasine* as distinct from the personal title, where, as it sometimes happens, they conflict.

Now the essential and, I believe, only practical difference in *present effect* made by the *sasine* (omitting the notice effected by registration and the operation of prescription to cure defects in the personal title) is the following:—

If A. (the owner, or *dominus*) be unlawfully kept out of possession by a tenant or other person, possessing on a colourable title not derived by way of contract from A., or from one whose person A. represents, A. cannot *remove* or *eject* the possessor until he is himself *infeft* in the lands. That is to say, A. *infeft* can enforce his right against persons in general; A. *uninfeft*, only against *certas personas*, namely, 1st, against those who possess under contract with him; and 2ndly, against those whose acts may be necessary to procure his personal right to be clothed with the feudal investiture.

No doubt the heir who has entered on the inheritance, although not *infeft*, has many of the real rights of the *dominus* (e.g. against trespassers); but I believe that in the above distinction lies the reason why the terms *real* and *personal* were applied by our lawyers of the last century (the best of whom were well versed in the learning of the Civilians), to distinguish rights completed by *infeftment*, and rights not so completed.

The rights descendible to *heirs*, as distinguished from those descendible to *executors* or *administrators*, are in the law of Scotland denoted by the appropriate term *heritable*, and never by the term *real*.—R. C.

LECTURE XV.

JUS IN REM—IN PERSONAM (*continued*).

XV IN my last Lecture, I attempted to explain that leading and important distinction, which has been assumed by the Roman Institutional Writers, as the principal basis (or one of the principal bases) of their System or Arrangement: Namely, the distinction between rights *in rem* and rights *in personam*; or between rights which avail against persons *universally* or *generally*, and rights which avail *exclusively* against *certain* or *determinate* persons.

Having first endeavoured to state it in general or abstract expressions, I tried to illustrate the distinction between the two classes of rights by adducing examples of each.

As examples of *jura in rem*, I referred to the right of ownership, property or dominion; and also to those rights over subjects owned by others, which are styled by the

Roman Lawyers *servitutes* or *jura servitutis*, and which may be styled in our own language (though not with perfect propriety) *easements* or *rights to easements*.

As examples of rights *in personam*, I referred to rights *ex contractu*, or to rights which arise directly from contracts properly so called. And I also adverted to the rights which arise from injuries or wrongs, and which (taking the term *action* in its largest import) may be styled *rights of action*. I say, in its largest import, because the term *action* is ambiguous; it has a wider and a narrower signification. Taken in its widest sense, it denotes any judicial remedy whatever; taken in its narrower sense, it expresses only a particular *species* of *judicial* remedy. There are many cases in which judicial remedies are not technically styled rights of action. Such, for instance, is, in the Roman law, the edict *unde vi*, which answers almost exactly to our action of ejectment, being founded on a wrongful dispossession by the party against whom it is brought, and seeking specific restitution of the particular right of which the other party has been deprived. Again, a right to an injunction, and a right to a writ of *habeas corpus*, being founded on an injury, and seeking in the one case the stoppage of the injury, before it is completed, in the other case, the specific restoration of the party to the right of which he has been deprived by the injury, are to all intents and purposes rights of action, as much as those which are in technical jargon called by the name. The whole theory of actions is in truth perfectly easy and simple, were it not for the absurd technical distinctions by which it is perplexed and incumbered.

In order that I may further illustrate the import of the leading distinction in question, I shall direct your attention to those rights *in rem* which are rights over *persons*, and to certain rights *in rem*, or availing against the world at large, which have no determinate subjects (persons or things).

Looking at the obvious signification of the epithet *real*, (and of the phrase *in rem*, from which the epithet is derived,) we should naturally conclude that a *real* right must be a right in a *thing*. And, accordingly, by many of the modern expositors of the Roman Law, the term *real right* or *jus in rem*, (which terms I shall hereafter use as equivalent expressions unless the contrary is indicated,) is restricted to *such* of the rights availing against the world at large, as are rights over *things* properly so called, that is to say, over permanent external objects which are not persons, as distin-

Further illustrations of the distinction between *jus in rem* and *jus in personam*.

Jus in rem restricted by certain writers to *jus in rem* over or in things.

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guished both from persons, and from those transient objects which are called acts and forbearances.

When I say that they restrict the term in the manner which I have now mentioned, I mean that they so restrict it when they state its meaning in *generals*, or when they attempt to *define* it. For, when they are occupied with the *detail* of the Roman Law, they unconsciously deviate from their own insufficient notion, and extend the term to numerous rights which are *not* rights over *things*. For example, it is admitted or assumed by every Civilian, that the right of the Roman heir over or in the *heritage* is a *real* right.

I say the right of the heir over or in the *heritage*. For, independently of the *several* rights which devolve to him from the testator or intestate, he has a right in the *aggregate* which is formed by those several rights; and which aggregate, coupled with the obligations of the deceased, constitute the complex whole which is styled the *hereditas* or heritage. In this heritage, so far as it consisted of rights, the heir had, by the Roman Law, a right which availed against the world at large, and which he could maintain against any one who might gainsay or dispute it, by a peculiar judicial proceeding called *petitio hereditatis*, which proceeding was an action *in rem*, that is, an action grounded on an injury to a *real* right, and seeking the restoration of the injured party to the unmolested exercise of the right in which he has been disturbed.

But though this right of the heir is indisputably *jus in rem*, it is not a right *over* or *in* a *thing*, or *over* or *in* *things*. It is properly a right in an *aggregate* of rights; partly, perhaps, consisting of rights over *things*, but partly consisting of rights which are of a widely different character: namely, of *debts* due to the testator or intestate; or of such *rights of action*, vested in the testator or intestate, as devolved to his heir or general representative. Here then was a case, and a most important one, in which the writers to whom I have referred departed from their own definition, and approached to that adequate notion of *jus in rem*, which I have endeavoured to impress upon my hearers; that which considers it to denote only the compass or range of the right: namely, that it avails against the world at large, in contradistinction to *jus in personam*, which avails only against certain or determinate individuals.

By *jus in rem* and *jus in personam*, the authors of those terms intended to indicate this broad and simple distinction;

which the Roman lawyers also marked by the words *dominium* and *obligatio*, terms, the distinction between which was the groundwork of all their attempts to arrange rights and duties in an accurate or scientific manner. This is not a hasty surmise, but the result of a careful and ample induction, founded on a most diligent study of the Institutes of Gaius and of Justinian, and an attentive perusal of the Pandects or Digest of the latter. Nor is this opinion confined to myself; otherwise I should, of course, feel much less confidence in its correctness. But I share it with such men as Thibaut and Feuerbach, men of indefatigable perseverance and of a sagacity never surpassed. The importance of the distinction will appear in glaring colours, when I pass from the *generalia* into the detail of the science. I must, for the present, content myself with illustrating it in a general and passing manner; and shall shew its applications hereafter.

Besides the right of the heir over or in the *heritage* (which is deemed by every Civilian a *real* right), there are numerous *real* rights which are *not* rights over *things*: being rights over *persons*; or being rights to *forbearances* merely, and having *no* subjects (persons or things).

Of rights existing over persons, and availing against other persons generally, I may cite the following as examples:—The right of the father to the custody and education of the child:—the right of the guardian to the custody and education of the ward:—the right of the master to the services of the slave or servant. Rights in

Against the child or ward, and against the slave or servant, these rights are rights *in personam*: that is to say, they are rights answering to *obligations* (in the sense of the Roman Lawyers) which are incumbent *exclusively* upon those *determinate* individuals. In case the child or ward desert the father or guardian, or refuse the lessons of the teachers whom the father or guardian has appointed, the father or guardian may compel him to return, and may punish him with due moderation for his laziness or perverseness. If the slave run from his work, the master may force him back, and drive him to his work by chastisement. If the servant abandon his service before its due expiration, the master may sue him as for a breach of the *contract* of hiring, or as for breach of an obligation (*QUASI ex contractu*) implied in the *status* of servant.

But considered from another aspect, these rights are of another character, and belong to another class. Considered

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from that aspect, they avail against persons *generally*, or against the world at large; and the duties to which they correspond, are invariably *negative*. As against other persons generally, they are not so much rights to the custody and education of the child, to the custody and education of the ward, and to the services of the slave or servant, as rights to the *exercise* of such rights *without molestation by strangers*. As against strangers, their substance consists of duties, incumbent upon strangers, to *forbear* or *abstain* from acts inconsistent with their scope or purpose.

In case the child (or ward) be detained from the father (or guardian), the latter can *recover* him from the stranger. In case the child be beaten, or otherwise harmed injuriously, the father has an action against the wrong-doer for the wrong against his *interest* in the child. In case the slave be detained from his master's service, the master can recover him *in specie* (or his value in the shape of damages) from the stranger who wrongfully detains him. In case the slave be harmed and rendered unfit for his work, the master is entitled to satisfaction for the injury to his right of ownership. If the servant be seduced from his service, the master can sue the servant for the breach of the contract of hiring; and *also* the instigator of the desertion, for the wrong to his *interest* in the servant. In case the servant be harmed, and disabled from rendering his service, the harm is an injury to the master's *interest* in the servant, as well as to the person of the latter.

The correlating conditions or *status* of husband and wife, will also illustrate the nature of the capital distinction, which I am endeavouring to explain and exemplify.

Between themselves, each has *personal* rights availing against the other, and each is subject to corresponding *obligations* (in the sense of the Roman Lawyers). Moreover, each has a right in the other, availing against the rest of the world, or answering to duties attaching upon persons generally. Adultery *by* the wife violates a right of the former class, and entitles the husband (against the *wife*) to an absolute or qualified divorce. Adultery *with* the wife violates a right of the latter class, and gives him an action for damages against the adulterer.

A person
who is the
subject of
ius in rem
is placed in
a position

And here I may remark conveniently, that where a *real* right is *over* a person, or where a *personal* right is a right *to* a person, the person is neither invested with the right, nor is he bound by the duty to which the right corresponds: the

right *residing* in a person or persons distinct from himself, and *availing* against a person or persons also distinct from himself. He therefore is merely the *subject* of the real or personal right, and occupies a position *analogous* to that of a *thing* which is the subject of a similar right. Consequently, whatever be the kind or sort of the real or personal right, he might be styled *analogically*, (when considered as its subject,) *a thing*.

LECT.
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thing.

For example, Independently of his rights against the child, and independently of his obligations towards the child, the parent has a right *in* the child availing against the world at large. And, considered as the subject of this last-mentioned right, the child is placed in a position analogous to that of a *thing*, and might be styled (in respect of that analogy) *a thing*.

Independently of his rights against the parent, and independently of his obligations towards the parent, the child has a right *in* the parent availing against the world at large. The murder of the parent by a third person might not only be treated as a *crime*, or *public wrong*, but might also be treated as a *civil* injury against that right in the parent which belongs to the child. By the laws of modern Europe, the civil injury merges in the crime; but in other ages the case was different; the offender lay under a twofold obligation: to suffer punishment on the part of the society or community, and to satisfy the parties whose interest in the deceased he had destroyed. Before the abolition of Appeals in criminal cases,⁴⁷ this was nearly the case in the law of England. The murderer was obnoxious to *punishment* to be inflicted on the part of the State; and the wife and the heir of the slain were entitled to vindictive *satisfaction*, which they exacted or remitted at their pleasure. And this is the distinction, and the only one, which exists between a civil injury and a crime.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ By the 59 Geo. III. c. 46.

⁴⁸ By the law of Scotland the wife and family of the slain have still the right to bring a civil action for *assythment* (the ground of action being not only indemnification for damage, but also *solatium* for the bereavement), notwithstanding a criminal prosecution instituted by the Public Prosecutor, unless capital punishment be suffered. It may be here observed, that in Scotland and in other countries where there is a Public Prosecutor charged with the investigation and prosecution of crimes and offences, the

distinction between crimes and offences on the one hand, and civil injuries on the other, is much more intelligible than in the English system. For the distinction, such as it is, in English Law, does not arise until commitment for trial (*vide* Stephen's *Criminal Law*, p. 155). In Scotland the duty of investigation and prosecution, as well as the power of abandoning proceedings, from the time of the commission of the crime until sentence, lies with Her Majesty's Advocate, and his subordinates for whom he is responsible; and there is further this

Now, considered as the subject of the real right which resides in the child, the parent is placed in a position *analogous* to that of a *thing*, and might be styled (in respect of that analogy) a *thing*. In short, whoever is the subject of a right which resides in *another* person, and which *avails* or *obtains* against a *third* person or persons, is placed in a position *analogous* to that of a *thing*, and might be styled (in respect of that analogy) a *thing*.

But though *any* person, as the *subject* of any right, might be styled (by analogy) a *thing*, this analogical application of the term *thing* has (in fact) been partial and capricious. So far as I can remember, there are two instances, and only two, in which the term *thing* has been applied to *persons*, considered as the *subjects* of rights.

Considered as the *subject* of the *real* right which resides in the master, the *slave* is occasionally ranked by the Roman Lawyers with *things*. And considered as the *subject* of the *real* right which resides in the *paterfamilias*, the *filiusfamilias* has been classed with *things* by certain modern Civilians. *Respectu patris filiusfamilias est res, respectu aliorum persona*. These are the words of Heineccius and others.

According to a current opinion, which I mentioned in a preceding Lecture, the slave was not considered by the Roman Lawyers as belonging to the class of *persons*. But this is one of those opinions, utterly destitute of foundation, which have been successively received by successive generations, though the means of detection are open and obvious to all. Considered as bound by duties towards his master and others, the slave is ranked by the Roman Lawyers with physical *persons*; and is spoken of as bearing, or sustaining, a person, *status*, or condition. Considered as the subject of the right residing in his master, and availing (*not* against himself, but against third persons), he is occasionally styled *res*. But, even as considered from this aspect, he is usually deemed a person rather than a thing, and is styled usually *servilis persona*. The right of the master to the services of the slave is distinguished by a different name from that which expresses the analogous right in a thing. It is called *potestas*, or *potestas domini in servum*, not *dominium*. This last is the name most commonly applied to the analogous right to a thing; it is, however, though less frequently, called, *proprietas*;

distinction, that all criminal proceedings are either taken in, or are subject to review by, the Court of Justiciary; a court with a jurisdiction quite distinct from that of the Court of Session, which is the proper tribunal in civil actions.—R. C.

or, still more rarely, *in re potestas*. Gaius, in describing *mancipation*, which is a particular form of conveyance, and enumerating the subjects which may be conveyed by it, says, *Eo modo et serviles et liberæ personæ mancipantur*. Here the slave is spoken of as the subject of a right in the master, and is yet styled *servilis persona*. In all the passages in which he is spoken of as *res*; e.g. in the passage at the beginning of the 2nd Book of Gaius, where he distributes things considered as subjects of rights; in treating of usufruct, where he speaks of *ususfructus hominum et ceterarum animalium*; and in the most decisive passage of all, that in the Digest, where the action called *rei vindicatio*, corresponding to our real action for the recovery of land, and our action of detinue for a chattel, is said to be applicable to the recovery of a slave; in all these passages, the slave is spoken of as the subject of rights in the master, availing against third persons, and not as being himself subject to obligations. As for the *filiusfamilias*, I am not aware of any passage in the classical jurists where he is styled a thing. In the passage of the Digest, to which I have just referred, it is denied by implication that he can be ranked with things. *Per hanc autem actionem, libræ personæ quæ sunt juris nostri, ut puta liberi qui sunt in potestate, non petuntur*. The right of the father over his son is never styled *dominium* or *proprietas*, but *patria potestas*, or *potestas patris in liberos*.

Many have been shocked and scandalised by the Roman Jurists, because these hard-hearted and cold-blooded lawyers degraded the slave to a level with *things*.

Upon which gross misconception, I remark as follows:

It is *not true* that the Roman Lawyers ranked slaves with things. Or if it be true, it is only true in that limited sense which I have just explained. And, admitting that the Roman Lawyers ranked slaves with things, it follows not that they were cold-blooded men, and intended to degrade and vilify the miserable slave. In styling the slave a *thing*, they considered him from a certain aspect: namely, as being the *subject* of a right residing in *another* person, and availing against *third* persons. And (as I have proved to satiety) the *analogy* which led these lawyers to rank the slave with things, would justify the extension of the term *thing* to *any* person who is the *subject* of *any* right. I am far enough from wishing to palliate slavery, which I regard with the utmost abhorrence, but I wish that its opponents would place their reprobation of it on the right foundation.

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Much eloquent indignation has also been vented superfluously on the application of the term *chattel* to the slaves in the English colonies: seeing that the term *chattel*, as applied to the slave, does not import that the slave is deemed a *moveable thing*, but that the rights of the master over his slaves, like his analogous rights over his moveable things, devolve, on the master's intestacy, to a certain class of his representatives.

*Jus realiter
personale.
Rights in
rem, with-
out deter-
minate sub-
jects*

Having cited examples of *real* rights which are rights over persons, I will cite an example or two of *real* rights, which are *not* rights over things or persons, but are rights to *forbearances* merely.

1. A man's right or interest in his *good-name* is a right which avails against persons, as considered generally and indeterminately: they are bound to *forbear* from such imputations against him as would amount to *injuries* towards his right in his reputation. But, though the right is a *real* right, there is no subject, thing or person, over which it can be said to exist. If the right has any subject, its subject consists of the contingent advantages which he may possibly derive from the approbation of others.

2. A monopoly, or the right of selling exclusively commodities of a given class, (a patent right for instance,) is also a *real* right: All persons, other than the party in whom the right resides, are bound to *forbear* from selling commodities of the given class or description. But, though the right is a *real* right, there is no subject, person or thing, over which it can be said to exist. If the right has any subject, its subject consists of the future profits, above the average rate, which he may possibly derive from his exclusive right to sell.

3. Many more examples of this class of rights might be selected from among *franchises*; a law term embracing an immense variety of rights, having no common property whatever except their supposed origin, being all of them considered to have been originally granted by the Crown. Such, for example, is a right of exclusive jurisdiction in a given territory, or a right of levying a toll at a certain bridge or ferry. The law in these cases empowers a party to do certain acts, and enjoins all other persons to *forbear* from every act which would defeat the purpose of the right. But these rights are not exercised over any determinate subject, and are yet available against the world at large. The rights *in personam* which concur with the rights in question are

perfectly distinct from those rights themselves. Those who reside within the territory, or who traverse the bridge, are bound by obligations arising out of the franchise; but these obligations, which result from their peculiar position, and which answer to rights *in personam*, are distinct from the obligation incumbent upon third parties, and answering to the right *in rem*: namely, the obligation not to impede the exercise of the jurisdiction, the levying of the toll, or the passage over the bridge; nor to carry passengers across within the limits of the ferry, to the detriment of the exclusive right of the person entitled.

4. Lastly, a right in a *Status* or Condition (considered as an aggregate of rights and capacities) is also a real right. I am not able at present to explain the nature of Conditions. To determine precisely what a *Status* is, is in my opinion the most difficult problem in the whole science of jurisprudence. For the purpose immediately before me, the following remarks will suffice.

A *Status* or Condition may be purely *onerous*, or may consist of duties only. Such was the condition of the slave, according to the older Roman Law. He was the *subject* of rights residing in his master, and availing against third persons. He also was bound by duties towards his master and others. But he had not a particle of right as against his master or even against strangers. Considered as the subject of rights residing in his master, he was susceptible of *damage*: But he was not susceptible of *injury*.

Now a right in a condition which is purely burthensome, is hardly conceivable. But, so far as a condition consists of rights, and of capacities to take rights, we may imagine a right in the *condition* considered as a complex whole.

According to the Roman Law, as the heir has a right in the *heritage* (abstracted from its several parts), so has the party invested with a *condition*, a right or interest in the condition itself (abstracted from the rights and capacities of which it is compounded). His right in the condition, considered as an aggregate or whole, is *analogous* to the right of ownership in a single or individual *thing*.

Consequently, wrongs against this right are *analogous* to wrongs against ownership; and, according to the practice of the Roman Law, wrongs of both classes are redressed by *analogous* remedies. Where the individual thing is unlawfully detained from the owner, he may *vindicate* or recover the thing. And where the right in the condition is wrong-

LECT. XV fully disputed, the party may assert his right by an appropriate action, which is deemed and styled a *vindication*.⁴⁹

The reason why *status* or condition make so little figure in the English law as compared with the Roman, though the idea must of course exist in all systems of law, seems to be this: that the right in a *status* may by the Roman law be asserted directly and explicitly by an action expressly for its recovery; while in English law no such action can be brought, and the right to a *status*, though of course it often becomes the subject of a judicial decision, almost always comes in as an episode, incidental to an action of which the direct purpose is something else.⁵⁰ Thus a question of legitimacy, which is precisely a question of *status*, is usually brought in and decided upon incidentally, in an action of ejectment. The question whether or not a particular person is a *slave*, would generally come before the judge upon a prosecution by the slave of the person claiming to be his master for doing some act which would be illegal unless the claim could be established. The only case in which a question of *status* is decided directly in English law, is when a jury is summoned to try that precise question as an *issue* incidental to a suit in another court.

NOTES FOUND AT THE END OF LECTURE XV.

The definition of *jus in rem*, that 'it begets a vindicatory action against every unlawful disturber,' is not universally true. It may beget a mere right to satisfaction (*e.g.* *Trover*). If true, it is a mere consequence or property of the right, and is not of its essence.

Besides it merely amounts to this: that the disturbance begets a right of action against the disturber or violator; which is true of every disturbance of a right *in personam*.

N.B. Any prevention of the completion of an Obligation (*stricto sensu*) caused by a third party would be no violation of a Right in

* See Bentham's 'Principles,' etc., 'payment,' p. 246. Hugo, Jur. Enc. p. 335.

* In the English Probate Court—formerly the Ecclesiastical Court—the right to the executorship or administration, a species of *universitas juris*, is obtained by what is substantially a judicial proceeding. It is somewhat remarkable that in the English system the rights of the *heir* vest in him without any public formality, such as the *aditio* in the Ro-

man, the *servitio* in the Scotch law. The *aditio* in Roman law was clearly a formal proceeding, possibly a matter of judicial cognizance, and appears to have been requisite in the case of a stranger heir (*i.e.* one who was not *suius heres* or *necessarius heres*) in order to obtain an *active* title to the *res singule* comprised in the inheritance. A *passive* title (*i.e.* liability to the obligations of an heir) might be inferred by *gestio pro herede* without *aditio*.—R. O.

the *Obligee*; or, if it would, would be a violation of a distinct Right. LECT. XV
 A stranger who engages a builder to undertake an extensive work, or wounds or maims him (thereby, in either case, preventing him from completing a previous contract with myself) violates no Right in me; and my remedy is against the *builder* for the breach of contract with myself. A stranger who inveigles my servant, violates, not my *jus ad rem* under the contract, but my *jus in re*. The servant himself, indeed, does; and for this breach of his Obligation (*stricto sensu*), I may sue him on the contract.

Obligation to pay taxes; Obligation to military service, etc.

The obligations to military service, etc., seem to be merely *absolute* obligations. (See Lecture XLIX.) The state, to which it is due, and which alone can have the Right, has not properly *Rights*. Besides, there is no Person or Thing to which the State has a right, as against all. It has merely a right to the services of the *determinate* individual. It has not a right to the money in specie, to the services, etc., as against others; but a right to the *payment* of the tax and the performance of the service, against the determinate person upon whom the obligation rests. So soon as the tax is paid, the Government indeed has *jus in re* in the money which is rendered; and as against other persons, it has a right (analogous to the *jus in re* of an ordinary master) to the services of the determinate person. e.g. A conscript is punishable for desertion by virtue of the Obligation (*stricto sensu*)—a person seducing him to desert, by virtue of the obligation, which answers to the *jus in re*.

The right which the Government has to the services of its subjects generally, is in truth not a Right to a person or thing against all; but Rights against a number; rights that they shall perform a particular *obligation* on the happening of such an incident.

(The passage in Hugo referred to in the note at the bottom of the last page, is as follows, together with Mr. Austin's marginal notes.)

‘Unter den vermischten Fällen gibt es einige, die mit einem *Vertrage Aehnlichkeit haben* * (die Forderung entsteht *quasi ex contractu*; z. B. *negotia gesta*, in diesem Sinne, Verwaltung einer Vormundschaft, Verwaltung von etwas Gemeinschaftlichem, Antretung einer Erbschaft in Beziehung auf die Vermächtnisse, Entrichtung von etwas, was man nicht schuldig ist): andere grenzen an Vergebungen † (*quasi ex*

* Quasi-Contract: An incident from which the *Obligor* derives a benefit: a benefit which he ought to requite, or which he ought to surrender to the party at whose cost he has obtained it. In the last case, there seems to be no obligation without demand and refusal; for till then, the intention to retain cannot be known.

† Quasi-Delict: *Damage* done to the *Obligee*, but without in-

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maleficio, z. B. das *Einstehen-müssen für Andere* bei gewissen Gelegenheiten): aber auch noch auf andere Art entsteht eine Forderung; z. B. aus dem Auswerfen * (*lex Rhodia de jactu*); auf Unterhalt, *Dos* und Beerdigung, † auf die Abgaben, ‡ und auf das *Einstehen* § für die physischen und juristischen Fehler einer Sache (*ædilitium, edictum und evictio*).¹
—Hugo, *Jurist. Encyc.* p. 335.

tention or negligence on the part of the obligor.

* Quasi-Delict.

† Quasi-Contract; there being benefit to the Obligor.

‡ Neither; unless by a fiction we suppose the governed, in consideration of protection, *quasi-contraxisse* with the Government. The distinction is useless. In the case of the *quasi-contract*, there has been no *contract*. In the case of the *quasi-delict* there has been *damage*, but no *injury*; at least, no *injury* on the part of the obligor, though there may have been on the part of his representatives. The *injury* on his part does not arise till he refuses satisfaction. The obligation however is like an obligation *ex contractu*.

§ Implied warranty: i.e. An obligation to satisfy, annexed to the original contract: and therefore a *Contract*, though by virtue of a dispositive Law.

LECTURE XVI.⁵¹

RIGHTS CONSIDERED GENERALLY.

LECT. XVI

IN the preceding Lectures, I have entered upon the analysis or explanation of the term 'Right.'

Now (as I shall endeavour to demonstrate in this evening's discourse) all that can be affirmed of Rights *considered universally*, amounts to a brief and barren generality, and may be compressed into a single proposition, or into a few short propositions.

But, before I could shew the little which can be affirmed of rights *in general*--or (rather) before I could shew *how* little can be affirmed of rights *in general*, it was necessary

⁵¹ The notes of the oral lectures corresponding to the printed Lectures XVI to XXIII inclusive, are unfortunately

missing. These lectures are therefore reprinted without alteration from the former edition.—R. C.

that I should advert to *persons*, considered as invested with rights; to *things* and *persons*, considered as the *subjects* of rights; to *acts* and *forbearances*, considered as the *objects* of rights; and to a leading or capital *distinction* which obtains between rights themselves.

Accordingly, I called your attention to the following objects:

1st, To *persons* as invested with rights, and as lying under duties or obligations. 2ndly, To *things* as *subjects* of rights, and of the duties corresponding to rights. 3rdly, To *persons* as placed in a position *analogous* to the position of *things*: that is to say, *not* as invested with rights, or as lying under duties or obligations, but as *subjects* of rights residing in *other persons*, and availing against *strangers* or *third persons*. 4thly, To *acts* and *forbearances* as *objects* of rights, and of duties or obligations correlating with rights. 5thly, and lastly, To the distinction between *jus in rem* and *jus in personam*; or between rights which avail against persons *universally* or *generally*, and rights which avail against persons *certain* or *determinate*.

In the present Lecture, I shall endeavour to explain the nature or essence which is common to *all* rights. Or (changing the expression) I shall endeavour to indicate the point at which they meet or coincide; or to shew the properties wherein they resemble or agree; or to state *that* which may be affirmed of rights *universally*, or without respect to the generic and specific differences by which their kinds and sorts are separated and distinguished.

Purpose
and order
of the

In trying to accomplish this purpose I shall proceed in the following order:

1st, I shall endeavour to state, in general expressions, the nature, essence, or properties, common to *all* rights. 2ndly, I shall advert briefly to certain *classes* of rights; and I shall endeavour to shew, that they agree in nothing, excepting those common properties. 3rdly, I shall examine certain *definitions* of the term '*right*;' and I shall endeavour to elucidate the common nature of rights, by shewing the vices or defects of those definitions.

Every right is a right *in rem*, or a right *in personam*.

The essentials of a right *in rem* are these:

Common
nature of
rights.

It resides in a determinate person, or in determinate persons, and avails against *other persons* *universally* or *generally*. Further, the duty with which it correlates, or to which it

LECT. XVI corresponds, is *negative*: that is to say, a duty to forbear or abstain. Consequently, all rights *in rem* reside in determinate persons, and are rights to *forbearances* on the part of persons *generally*.

The essentials of a right *in personam* are these:

It resides in a determinate person, or in determinate persons, and avails against a person or persons certain or determinate. Further, the obligation with which it correlates, or to which it corresponds, is *negative or positive*: that is to say, an obligation to forbear or abstain, or an obligation to do or perform. Consequently, all rights *in personam* reside in determinate persons, and are rights to *forbearances or acts* on the part of determinate persons.

It follows from this analysis, first, That all rights reside in *determinate* persons. Secondly, That all rights correspond to duties or obligations incumbent upon *other* persons: that is to say, upon persons distinct from those in whom the rights reside. Thirdly, That all rights are rights to *forbearances or acts* on the part of the persons who are bound.

These (I believe) are the only properties wherein *all* rights resemble or agree.

Consequently, right *considered in abstract* (or *apart* from the *kinds* and *sorts* into which rights are divisible) may be conceived and described generally in the following manner.

Every legal duty arises from a *Command*, signified, expressly or tacitly, by the *Sovereign* of a given Society.

Every legal duty binds the party obliged, by virtue of a legal sanction. In other words, in case the party obliged violate the duty imposed upon him, he will be obnoxious or liable to evil or inconvenience, to be inflicted by sovereign authority.

[Now the person who is subject to a duty, or upon whom a duty is incumbent, is bound to do, or to forbear from, some given act or acts. And further, he is bound to do, or to forbear from, the given act or acts absolutely or relatively; That is to say, *without respect* to a determinate person or persons, or *towards* a determinate person or determinate persons.]

The *objects* of duties are Acts and Forbearances. Or (changing the expression) every party upon whom a duty is incumbent, is bound to do or to forbear. Or (changing the expression again) the party violates the duty which is incumbent upon him, by *not* doing some act which he is

commanded to do, or by doing some act from which he is commanded to abstain.

Duty is the basis of Right. That is to say, parties who *have* rights, or parties who are invested with rights, have rights to acts or forbearances enjoined by the sovereign upon *other* parties.

Or (in other words) parties invested with rights *are* invested with rights, because other parties are bound by the command of the sovereign, to do or perform acts, or to forbear or abstain from acts.

In short, the term 'right' and the term '*relative* duty' signify the same notion considered from different aspects. Every right supposes distinct parties: A party commanded by the sovereign to do or to forbear, and a party *towards* whom he is commanded to do or to forbear. The party to whom the sovereign expresses or intimates the command, is said to lie under a *duty*: that is to say a *relative* duty. The party *towards* whom he is commanded to do or to forbear, is said to have a *right* to the acts or forbearances in question.

Or the meaning which I am labouring to convey may be put thus.

Wherever a right is conferred, a relative duty is also imposed: the right being conferred upon a certain or determinate party, *other* than the party obliged. Or (changing the expression) a party is commanded by the sovereign to do or to forbear from acts, and is commanded to do or forbear from those given acts *towards*, or *with regard to*, a party *determinate* and *distinct from himself*.

For (as I shall shew hereafter) duties towards oneself and duties towards persons indefinitely, can scarcely be said with propriety to correlate with rights. As against *others*, I have a right to my life. For others are bound or obliged to forbear from acts which would destroy or endanger my life. But it can scarcely be said, with propriety, 'that I have a right to my own life *as against myself*:' Although I am legally bound to abstain from *suicide*, by virtue of certain sanctions whose nature I shall explain hereafter. And the same may be affirmed of duties towards persons indefinitely: that is to say, towards the community at large, or towards mankind generally.

A law which prohibits the importation of certain foreign commodities, to the end of encouraging the production of the corresponding domestic commodities, imposes a *duty* to

ECT. XVI *forbear* from importing the commodities which it is said to prohibit. But it can hardly be said, with propriety, that the law confers a *right*. For there is no *determinate* party who would be injured by a breach of the duty, or towards or with regard to whom the prohibited act is to be forborne. In the technical language of certain systems, breaches of such duties are offences against the sovereign, and the sovereign is invested with *rights* answering to those duties.

But to impute *rights* to the sovereign is to talk absurdly. For rights are conferred by commands issuing *from* the sovereign.

As violating commands issuing from the sovereign, breaches of the duties in question are offences against the sovereign. But so is a breach of every imaginable duty. For all duties are the creatures of sovereign will, or are imposed by Laws or Commands emanating from the Sovereign or State. The truth is, that duties towards oneself, and towards persons indefinitely, are *absolute* duties. That is to say, there is no *determinate* party whom a breach of the duty would injure, or towards or in respect of whom the duty is to be observed.

It is difficult to indicate the import of the term 'Right' (considered as an abstract expression embracing *all* rights). For right (as thus considered) is so extremely abstract—is so extremely remote from the particulars which are comprised in its extension—that its meaning or import is, as it were, a shadow, and closely verges upon the confines of *no-meaning*.

All the ideas or notions which are comprehended by that slender meaning may, I think, be compressed into the following propositions.

Right, like Duty, is the creature of Law, or arises from the command of the Sovereign in a given independent society.

Every right is created or conferred in the following manner.

A person or persons are commanded to do or to forbear *towards*, or with regard to, *another* and a *determinate* party.

The person or persons to whom the command is directed, are said to be *obliged*, or to lie under a *duty*.

The party *towards* whom the duty is to be observed, is said to have a *right*, or to be invested with a right.

In order that we may conceive distinctly the nature of rights, we must descend from Right in abstract to the species

or sorts of rights. We must take a right of a given species or sort, and must look at its scope or purpose. That is to say, we must look at the end of the lawgiver in conferring the right in question, and in imposing the duty or obligation which the right in question implies.

Now the ends or purposes of different rights are extremely various. The end of the rights *in rem* which are conferred over things, is this: that the entitled party may deal with, or dispose of, the thing in question in such or such a manner and to such or such an extent. In order to that end, other persons generally are laid under duties to forbear or abstain from acts which would defeat or thwart it.

But from this general notion of rights over things, we must descend to the species into which they are divisible. For the ends of the various rights which are conferred over things, differ from one another. And what I have said of rights *in rem* over things, will apply to such rights over persons as avail against other persons generally; and also to such rights availing against other persons generally as have no determinate subjects.

The ends or purposes of rights *in personam* are widely different from those of rights *in rem*.

The ends or purposes of the various rights *in personam* are again extremely different from each other.

A right has been defined by certain writers, as that security for the enjoyment of a good or advantage which one man derives from a duty imposed upon another or others.

Certain definitions of a right, examined.

It has also been said that rights are powers:⁵² powers over, or powers to deal with, things or persons.

Objections: 1st, *all* rights are not powers over things or persons. All (or most) of the rights which I style rights *in personam* are merely rights to acts or forbearances. And many of the rights which I style *jura in rem* have no subjects (persons or things).

2ndly. What is meant by saying that a right is a power? The party invested with a right, is invested with that right by virtue of the corresponding duty imposed upon another or others. And this duty is enforced, not by the power of the party invested with the right, but by the power of the state. The power resides in the state; and by virtue of the

⁵² In a note, Mr. Austin proposes to read from Bentham's "Principles of Morals and Legislation," such passages as relate to the difficulty of defining

Right in the abstract, and to the little which such a definition can comprise. These passages are to be found at p. 221-223.—S. A.

LECT. XVI power residing in the state, the party invested with the right is enabled to exercise or enjoy it.⁵³

It may, indeed, be said, that a man has a power over a thing or person, when he can deal with it according to his pleasure, free from obstacles opposed by others. Now in consequence of the duties imposed upon others, he is thus able. And, in that sense, a right may be styled a power. But, even in this sense, the definition will only apply to certain rights to *forbearances*. In the case of a right to an *act*, the party entitled has not always (or often) a power.

3rdly. *Facultas faciendi (aut non faciendi)*. This definition is open to the same objections as the last definition. 'Facultas,' what?

4thly. 'A person has a right, when the law authorizes him to exact from another an act or forbearance.' The test of a right:—that (independently of positive provision) the acts or forbearances enjoined are not incapable of being enforced civilly or in the way of civil action: *i.e.* at the discretion or pleasure of the party towards whom they are to be done or observed. This would distinguish them from absolute duties. For to talk of a man enforcing a duty against himself is absurd. And where there is no determinate person towards whom it is observed, it is incapable of being enforced civilly.

Right;—the capacity or power of exacting from another or others acts or forbearances;—is nearest to a true definition.

For all these reasons, I say that a party has a right, when another or others are bound or obliged by the law, to do or to forbear, *towards or in regard of* him.

But, as I stated at the outset of the analysis, the full import of the term 'right' cannot be made to appear till all the related expressions are examined.

NOTES AT THE END OF LECTURE XVI.

Blackstone's absolute right, vol. i. 123. His confusion of Right as meaning conformity with a rule, and of Right as correlating with duty. (*Ibid.*)

⁵³ 'La loi me défend-elle de vous tuer? Elle m'impose l'*obligation* de ne pas vous tuer. Elle vous accorde le *droit* de ne pas être tué par moi; elle exige de moi de vous rendre le service négatif qui consiste à m'abstenir de vous tuer.'

—*Bentham, Traité*s, etc. vol. i. p. 154.

A service cannot be negative; though an obligation (*not* to obstruct the enjoyment of a subject from which uses or services are derivable) may.—*Marginal Notes.* †

There is no general definition of a Right by the Classical Jurists. LECT. XVI

The following passage from Ulpian is in the Digests :

‘Totum autem jus consistit aut in acquirendo, aut in conservando, aut in minuendo. Aut enim hoc agitur, quemadmodum quid cuiusque fiat ; aut quemadmodum quis jus suum conservet, aut quomodo amittat.’ But this passage relates, not to the definition of a right, but to the modes wherein rights are required, preserved, or lost.

The definition of a Right is not given in any one part of the *Corpus Juris*, but extends through three: Primary Rights; Violations; and Sanctions. The first adumbrates in generals; the second limits and enlarges, so as to correct the generality of the first; the third describes the Sanction.—*Marginal Note in Falck's Jurist. Encyc. p. 31.*

Recht und Gerechtigkeit.

‘Das deutsche Hauptwort Recht hat, wie das lateinische, *jus*, eine zweifache Bedeutung. 1° Im objectiven Sinne versteht man darunter diejenigen *Regeln* und *Vorschriften*, welche die Menschen als vernünftig sinnliche Wesen in ihren gegenseitigen Verhältnissen zu einander, als die Norm ihrer freien Handlungen zu beobachten haben. Dasjenige, was mit diesen *Vorschriften* übereinstimmt bezeichnen wir mit dem Beiworte *recht* (*justum sive rectum*)⁵⁴ und die auf dem innern eignen Antriebe des Menschen und auf seiner Neigung zum Guten beruhende Uebereinstimmung der Handlungen desselben, mit den *Vorschriften* des Rechts heisst Gerechtigkeit (*justitia*). 2° Im subjectiven Sinne hingegen, bedeutet Recht so viel als Befugniss zu handeln, oder die moralische Möglichkeit entweder etwas selbst thun zu dürfen, oder zu verlangen dass ein Anderer zu unserm Vortheil etwas thue oder unterlasse.⁵⁵ Hier zeigt es also das günstige Verhältniss eines Menschen zu einem Andern an, und ist gleichbedeutend mit demjenigen, was wir auch wohl Gerechtsame oder Gerechtigkeit in diesem Sinne zu nennen pflegen.’—*Mackeldey, Lehrbuch des heutigen römischen Rechts, p. 1.*

‘Jus vocamus conditionem facultatemque faciendi aut non faciendi. Ex quo nascitur ut juri semper respondeat aliorum officium ; ⁵⁶ idque aut commune est omnium, quod eo solo cernitur, ut ne quis alterum lædat aut certorum hominum proprium, scilicet ex eo jure oriundum, quo singuli singulis obstringuntur.

‘Atque juris quidem vis omnis in cogendi potestate posita est, eaque aut perfectâ, quæ actionibus maxime continetur, aut imperfectâ quæ

⁵⁴ Right as opposed to Wrong.—*Marginal Note.* *Necessitas officium.*—*Marginal Note.*

⁵⁵ Right as opposed to obligation. ⁵⁶ Potestas et officium: jus in personam et obligatio.—*Marginal*

LECT. XVI defensionibus tantum. Omnino autem hæc sunt sine quibus esse nequit jus, et persona in quam cadere potest jus et materia juris legitima, et causa juri constituendo idonea.'—Mühlenbruch, *Doctrina Pandectarum*, vol. i. p. 144.

‘Jedes Recht führt als solches die Möglichkeit des Zwanges mit sich; entweder um den Verpflichteten zu positiven Handlungen zu nöthigen, oder ihn davon abzuhalten.’—Thibaut, *System des Pandecten-Rechts*, vol. i. p. 44.

LECTURE XVII.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE DUTIES.

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IN my last Lecture, I attempted to settle the import of the term ‘right,’ considered as an expression embracing *all* rights, or considered as an expression for rights *in abstract*, or without regard to their generic and specific differences.

Import of
‘Right’ in

The import of the term ‘Right,’ as thus considered, may (I think) be expressed briefly in the following manner.

A monarch or sovereign body expressly or tacitly *commands*, ‘that one or more of its subjects shall do or forbear from acts, towards, or in respect of, a distinct and *determinate* party.’⁵⁷ The person or persons who are to do or forbear from these acts, are said to be subject to a *duty*, or to lie under a *duty*. The party *towards* whom those acts are to be done or forborne, is said to have a *right*, or to be invested with a *right*.

Consequently, the term ‘right’ and the term ‘*relative duty*’ are correlating expressions. They signify the same notions, considered from different aspects, or taken in different series. The acts or forbearances which are expressly or tacitly enjoined, are the objects of the right as well as of the corresponding duty. But with reference to the person or persons commanded to do or forbear, a duty is imposed. With reference to the opposite party, a right is conferred.

⁵⁷ In the case of the negative duties corresponding to *jus in rem*, it is not necessary to *take into consideration* any determinate or assigned party. The parties on whom the duty is incumbent are restricted to persons within the jurisdiction of the sovereign; consequently, to persons determined *cally*. In every case of a right, and of an *obligation (sensu Romano)* the party having the right, or the party bound by the obligation, is assignable individually or generically, or both: And *must be considered as assigned individually*.

As I intimated at the outset of the analysis through which I am now journeying, duties may be distinguished into *relative* and *absolute*.⁵⁸

A relative duty is incumbent upon one party, and correlates with a right residing in another party. In other words, a relative duty answers to a right; or implies, and is implied by, a right.

Duties are
relative or
absolute.

Where a duty is absolute, there is no right with which it correlates. There is no right to which it answers. It neither implies, nor is it implied by, a right.

Now the term 'absolute' is a negative expression. It signifies the *absence* of some object to which the speaker or writer expressly or tacitly refers. As applied to a duty, it denotes that the duty in question has *no* corresponding right.

But, in order to the complete explanation of a negative expression we must first explain the object of which it signifies the absence. Accordingly, I have attempted to explain 'Right' (and 'duty' as correlating with 'right'), and now proceed to the duties which have *no* corresponding rights, or which (in a word) are *absolute*.

Every legal duty (like every legal right) emanates from sovereign will. It flows from the command (express or tacit) of a monarch or sovereign body. And the party upon whom it is imposed is said to be legally obliged, because he is obnoxious or liable to those means of compulsion or restraint which are wielded by that superior.

Absolute
duties de-
fined by
exhaustive
enumeration.

Every duty is a duty to do or forbear. A duty is relative, or answers to a right, where the sovereign commands that the acts shall be done or forborne towards a *determinate* party, *other* than the obliged. All other duties are absolute.

Consequently, a duty is absolute in any of the following cases: 1st, where it is commanded that the acts shall be done or forborne towards or in respect of the party to whom the command is directed. 2ndly, Where it is commanded that the acts shall be done or forborne towards or in respect of parties *other* than the obliged, but who are not *determinate*

⁵⁸ For 'absolute duties,' see *Bentham*, 'Traité de Législation,' i. 154, 305, 247. Blackstone's 'absolute duties' are moral or religious duties. Vol. iv. ch. 'Principles of Morals and Legislation,' 41. pp. 222, 289, 308.

persons, physical or fictitious. For example, towards the members generally of the given independent society; or towards mankind at large. 3rdly, Where the duty imposed is not a duty towards *man*; or where the acts and forbearances commanded by the sovereign, are not to be done or observed towards a *person* or *persons*. 4thly, Where the duty is merely to be observed towards the sovereign imposing it: *i.e.* the monarch, or the sovereign number in its collegiate and sovereign capacity.

Order in which I shall consider absolute duties in the present Lecture.

I think that this enumeration completely exhausts the cases wherein duties or obligations can be considered absolute. Accordingly, for the purpose of explaining and exemplifying the general nature of those duties, I shall consider them in the order which I have now announced. Though I should probably arrange them in another order, if I attempted to expound them in detail.

Self-regarding duties, and duties not regarding man, regard persons generally in respect of their remote purpose.

But before I endeavour to explain and exemplify the classes of absolute duties, I will briefly advert to a topic upon which I may insist hereafter.

I have said that some of these duties are self-regarding: that is to say, that the acts or forbearances which the Law enjoins are to be done or observed by the party obliged towards or in respect of himself.

I have said that others of these duties are not duties towards *man*: that is to say, that the acts or forbearances, enjoined by the Law, are not to be done or observed towards *persons*, or towards human creatures.

But in styling some of these duties self-regarding, and in affirming of others of these duties 'that they are not duties towards man,' I look exclusively at their immediate or proximate scope.

Considered with reference to their more remote purposes, they are absolute duties regarding persons generally. For, assuming that they are imposed at the suggestions of general Utility, they regard the members generally of the given political society, or they regard mankind at large: so far, that is, as Laws, established in a given community, can promote or contemplate an end so vague and uncertain as the weal of human kind.

For example, the duty incumbent upon you to forbear from suicide, is a self-regarding duty, in respect of its proximate purpose. It is imposed directly, to the end of deterring you from destroying your own life. But, remotely or indirectly, it is an absolute duty regarding persons generally. For it is

partly imposed for the purposes of preserving a member to the community, and of deterring its members generally from the act of suicide by the consequences annexed to the act in the single or particular instance.

Again: A duty to forbear from cruelty towards the lower animals, is not a duty towards *man* in respect of its proximate scope. Its proximate or direct scope, is to save the lower animals from needless suffering: from suffering which has no tendency to promote the good of man, or decidedly outweighs the good which man can derive from it. But, in respect of its remote purposes, the duty is an absolute duty regarding *persons* indefinitely. For, tending to preserve and cherish the sentiment of benevolence or sympathy, it tends to the good of the community, and to the good of mankind at large.

Nor does this apply exclusively to those *absolute* duties, which I have styled (for the sake of distinction) self-regarding, or of which I have affirmed (for the same purpose) 'that they are not duties towards man.'

It also applies to relative duties, or to duties which correlate with rights.

In numerous instances, rights are conferred (and their correlating duties imposed) with the direct or immediate purpose of promoting the general good: (as, for example, the rights of judges and other political subordinates): And rights are conferred indirectly to the same extensive purpose, although their proximate end be the advantage of the parties entitled, or of other determinate parties for whom they are conferred in trust.

For example, The immediate purpose of a right of property, is either the advantage of the proprietor himself, or of some determinate party for whom he is a Trustee. But the ulterior or remote end for which such rights are conferred, is the advantage of the community at large. Consequently, absolute duties, and duties correlating with rights, are not distinguishable when viewed from a certain aspect. Considered in respect of their ultimate or remote scope, all duties regard persons generally.

And as duties which regard *directly* determinate or assigned persons, regard *indirectly* persons generally and indefinitely, so is the converse of the proposition equally true. That is to say, duties which regard *directly* persons considered generally regard *indirectly* determinate persons. For as the general or public interest is an aggregate of individual interests, duties which tend to promote the good of the gene

Relative duties regard persons generally, in respect of their remote purpose.

Duties towards persons generally are, indirectly, duties towards determinate persons.

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ral or whole, tend to promote the good of its several or single members.

In order that we may conceive correctly many important distinctions, it is necessary that we should conceive precisely the truths which I have now stated.

Jus Pub-
licum et
Privatum.

For example, the Roman Lawyers, and most writers upon Jurisprudence, divide Law into Public and Private. According to the Roman Lawyers, Public Law is that, '*quod ad publice utilia spectat.*' Private Law is that department of the whole, '*quod ad singulorum utilitatem—ad privatim utilia—spectat.*'

But this, it is manifest, is *not* the *ground* of the intended distinction. For since the general interest is an aggregate of individual interest, Law regarding the former, and Law regarding the latter, regard the same subject. In other words, the terms 'public' and 'private' may be applied indifferently to *all* Law. Which is as much as to say, that the distinction in question is a distinction without a difference.

It is manifestly impossible to distinguish the two departments by a property common to both. I shall endeavour, hereafter, to analyse the distinction.

Briefly stated, the distinction between Public and Private Law is this. The former regards persons as bearing political characters. The latter regards persons who have no political characters, and persons also who have them as bearing different characters. In a word, Public Law is the law of political *Status*; and, instead of standing opposed to the body of the law, is a branch of one of its departments: namely, of the Law of Persons. In which light it was justly considered by Hale; and, after Hale, by Blackstone.

Civil Inju-
ries and
Crimes.

Again: Civil Injuries and Crimes are distinguished by Blackstone and others in the following manner. Civil Injuries are *private* wrongs, and concern individuals only. Crimes are *public* wrongs, and affect the whole community.

If Blackstone had but reflected on his own catalogue of crimes, he must (I think) have seen that this is not the basis of the capital distinction in question. For the greater half of them are offences against rights. In other words, they are violations of duties regarding determinate persons, and therefore affect individuals in a direct or proximate manner. Such, for instance, are offences against life and body; murder, mayhem, battery, and the like. Such, too, are theft and other offences against property. •

But, independently of this, Blackstone's statement of the distinction is utterly untenable.

All offences affect the community, and *all* offences affect individuals. But though all affect individuals, some are not offences against *rights*, and are therefore pursued, of necessity, criminally. That is to say, they are pursued directly by the Sovereign, or by some subordinate representing the Sovereign.

Where the offence is an offence against a right, it *might* be pursued (in all cases) either by the injured party, or by those who represent him. But, for reasons which I shall explain at large when I arrive at the distinction in question, it is often thought expedient to convert the offence into a crime. That is to say, the pursuit of it is not left to the discretion of the injured party or his representatives, but is assumed by the Sovereign or by the subordinates of the Sovereign. The difference between Crimes and Civil Injuries, is not to be sought for in a supposed difference between their tendencies, but in the difference between the modes wherein they are respectively pursued, or wherein the sanction is applied in the two cases. An offence which is pursued at the discretion of the injured party or his representative is a Civil Injury. An offence which is pursued by the Sovereign or by the subordinates of the Sovereign, is a Crime.⁵⁹

In many cases (as in cases of Libels and Assaults), the same offence belongs to both classes. That is to say, the injured has a remedy which he applies or not as he likes, and the Sovereign reserves the power of visiting the offender with punishment.

That the distinction should have been referred to supposed differences of tendencies, is wonderful. For, in different countries, the line between civil and criminal is utterly different. In almost all rude societies, the domain of Criminal Law is extremely narrow:⁶⁰ and, for reasons which I shall shew hereafter, it generally enlarges as society advances.

The distinction does not consist in this: that the mischief of crimes (as a class) is more extensive than that of civil

⁵⁹ See *post*, Lecture XXVIII. p. 517.

⁶⁰ Instances: Rome ('*furtum*,' etc.); England (Anglo-Saxon) ('*Weregild*'); Old Germany. In the latter country, there was hardly any criminal law. Merely so much as to give effect to civil

proceedings: *e.g.* In cases of offences against the Government and the Minister of Justice. This was necessarily the case: because the Sanction of Sanctions is always Punishment.

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Difference
between
relative
and abso-
lute duties,
etc.

injuries (as a class). But in this: the different tendencies of Civil or Criminal Procedure as applied in certain cases.

It follows from what has been premised, that in distinguishing relative from absolute duties, and in distinguishing the kinds of the latter, we must not look to the ultimate scope or purpose with which duties are imposed. For, as that is the same in all cases, it can never enable us to draw the distinctions in question.

A relative duty corresponds, as I have said, to a right: *i.e.* it is a duty to be fulfilled towards a *determinate person* or *determinate persons*, other than the obliged, and other than the Sovereign imposing the duty. All other duties are absolute.

[All duties are duties towards the Sovereign, and, as towards the Sovereign, are relative. By 'relative,' therefore, as applied to duty, I mean a duty correlating with a right. By 'absolute,' as applied to a duty, I mean not a duty without relations, but without relation to a right.]

All absolute obligations are sanctioned criminally: they do not correspond with rights in the Sovereign, the Public, etc.⁶¹ They do not correspond with rights at all. But rights to enforce, exist in persons delegated by the Sovereign.

e.g. In England, offences against absolute duties, like all other crimes, are said to be offences against the King, because it is part of his office to pursue those offences as well as other crimes.⁶²

Distinc-
tions be-
tween abso-
lute duties.

Absolute duties are distinguishable by their proximate or immediate purposes.

The proximate purpose of some is the advantage of the party obliged. And these I style self-regarding.

The proximate purpose of others is the advantage of persons indefinitely: for instance, of the community at large, or of mankind in general.⁶³

The proximate purpose of others is not the advantage of *any* person or persons.

⁶¹ For examples of breaches of absolute obligations, see Blackstone, vol. iv. c. 8-13, Libel, p. 150; Smuggling, p. 154; Usury, p. 156; Forestalling, p. 158; Breach of prison, escape, etc. p. 129; Champerty, etc. p. 134; Quarantine, p. 161; Polygamy, p. 163. Other examples, pp. 115-127.

Most of the offences styled *præmunire* are breaches of obligations towards society at large.

⁶² Blackstone, i. 268; iii. 40; iv. 88.

⁶³ 'Il y a bien des cas où la partie favorisée (the party on whom a right is conferred) n'est que le public entier, et non pas un individu.'—*Traité de Législ.* vol. i. p. 305.

'In this case, the only persons invested with corresponding rights are, persons clothed with powers in Trust for the Government.'—*Marginal Note.*

I shall adduce examples of them in that order.

Duties towards self.

Violations of these duties: Drunkenness.⁶⁴ Suicide.⁶⁵ Fornication, or simple breach of chastity, not accompanied by violation of a right residing in another, as by adultery, rape, seduction. (Rape includes injury to the party ravished, and to others who have an interest, etc.)

There can be no *right* as against self. The end of a right is, that a party may be obliged by a sanction to do or to forbear, towards a determinate person or persons. But the act or forbearance, in this instance, depends upon the pleasure of the party. To give him a right to an act or forbearance to which he himself is bound, were absurd.

Duties towards persons indefinitely, or towards the Sovereign imposing the duty.

Treason⁶⁶ is properly an offence against the Sovereign. But an offence against a member of a sovereign body is often so considered.⁶⁷

Duties not regarding persons.

Towards God: (Ascetic observances.) (Blackstone, vol. iv. p. 43.)

Towards the lower animals.

The Deity, an infant, or one of the lower animals, *as being the party towards whom a duty is to be performed*, might be said to have a right. But so, in the same case, might an inanimate thing. To call the Deity a person, is absurd.

LECTURE XVIII.

WILL AND MOTIVE.

IN a former Lecture I entered upon the analysis and explanation of the term 'Rights:' Meaning by 'rights,' *legal* rights, or rights which owe their being to the express or tacit commands of Monarchs or Sovereign bodies.

Now all that can be affirmed of rights *considered in abstract*—or all that can be affirmed of rights *apart from their kinds and sorts*—amounts to a brief and barren gene-

⁶⁴ Blackstone, iv. 64.

⁶⁵ Ibid. iv. 189.

⁶⁶ Ibid. iv. 81.

⁶⁷ Offences against rights residing in members of sovereign powers, may be considered breaches of relative duties.

reality, and may be thrust into a single proposition, or into a few short propositions.

But before I could shew the little which can be affirmed of rights in abstract—or before I could shew *how* little can be affirmed of rights in abstract—it was necessary that I should advert to *persons*, as *bearing* rights and duties; to *things* and *persons*, as *subjects* of rights and duties; to *acts* and *forbearances*, as *objects* of rights and duties; and to a certain capital *distinction* which obtains between rights themselves.

Accordingly, In the last four Lectures I called your attention to the following *leading* topics; and to numerous *subordinate* topics, with which they are inseparably connected, or which they naturally suggest:

1st, *Persons*, as invested with rights, and as lying under duties.

2ndly, *Things*, as subjects of rights, and of duties answering to rights.

3rdly, *Persons*, as placed in a position *analogous* to the position of *things*: That is to say, *not* as invested with rights, or as lying under duties, but as the subjects or matter of rights residing in *other* persons, and availing against strangers or *third* persons.

4thly, *Acts* and *forbearances*, as objects of rights and of duties corresponding to rights.

5thly, and lastly, The *distinction* between the rights which avail against persons *generally*, and the rights which avail against persons *certain* or *determinate*:—A distinction which the Classical Jurists denoted by the opposed expressions, '*Dominium et Obligatio*;' but which numerous modern Civilians (and writers upon general jurisprudence) have marked with the more adequate and less ambiguous expressions, '*Jus in rem et Jus in personam*.'

In reviewing these various topics (and, especially, the principal *kinds* into which rights are divisible), I endeavoured to prepare the way for such a definition of '*Right*' as might rest upon a *sufficient induction*: as might apply indifferently to *every* right; or might apply to *any* right, without regard to its class. Accordingly, I proceeded to examine the import of the term '*Right*,' considered as an expression for *all* rights, or for rights abstracted from the generic and specific differences by which their kinds and sorts are separated or distinguished. And, in attempting to settle the import of the term '*Right*,' I considered im-

explicitly the general nature of the duties which I style 'relative:' that is to say, which correlate with *rights*, or answer to corresponding *rights*.

But, besides the Duties which I style 'relative,' there are numerous duties which have *no* corresponding rights, or *no* rights wherewith they correlate: And, as the Analysis through which I am journeying embraces *Duties* as well as *Rights*, it was necessary that I should advert to duties *without* corresponding rights, as well as to duties which are *relative*.

Accordingly, the class of duties in question (which I distinguish from *relative* duties by the negative epithet 'absolute') were also considered in the last Lecture.

Every legal duty—whether it be relative or absolute, or whether it be *obligatio* or *officium* is a duty to do (or forbear from) an outward act or acts, and flows from the Command, (signified expressly or tacitly) of the person or body which is *sovereign* in some given society.

To fulfil the duty which the command imposes, is *just* or *right*. That is to say, the party does the act, or the party observes the forbearance, which is *jussum* or *directum* by the author of the command.⁶⁸

To omit (or forbear from) the act which the command enjoins, or to do the act which the command prohibits, is a wrong or *injury*:—A term denoting (when taken in its largest signification) every act, forbearance, or omission, which

⁶⁸ *Just* is that which is *jussum*; the past participle of *jubeo*.

Right is derived from *directum*; the past participle of *dirigo*; or, rather, *right* is probably derived from some Anglo-Saxon Verb, which comes with *dirigo* from a common root. The German *recht*, *gerecht*, *richtig*, *rechters* (*just*) is from the obsolete *richten* or *rechten* (*dirigo*). Hence *Richter*, a judge. Latin; *Rego*, *Rex*, *Regula*, *Rectum*. (Wrong = *Wrung*; the opposite of *rectum*.)

And as *just* and *right* signify that which is commanded, so do the Latin *Æquum* and the Greek *Dikaion* denote that which conforms to a law or rule. Manifestly, a metaphor borrowed from measures of length. Something equal to, or even with, a something to which it is compared. *Æquum* = *jus gentium*.

The abstracts, *justice*,—*justum*, *di-*

kaion, equity, etc., denote conformity to Command; as their corresponding concretes denote a something which is commanded, or equal.

Distinction between *rights* as denoting something commanded, and as denoting the position of the party *towards* whom it is commanded. To *do* right, is to obey a command. 'To *have* a right,' is to be placed in such a position that another is commanded to do or forbear towards or in respect of oneself.

In consequence of the intimate connection between the terms, right and obligation are often used indifferently. *E.g.* In old German Law language, *recht* denotes either. So in vulgar English. So the Latin *jus* and *obligatio*. The French *droit*, and the Italian *diritto*, are not free from this ambiguity. The Greek *exousia* is equivalent to *potestas*.

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amounts to disobedience of a Law (or to disobedience of any other command) emanating directly or circuitously from a Monarch or Sovereign Number—‘Generaliter injuria dicitur, omne quod non jure fit.’

A party lying under a duty, or upon whom a duty is incumbent, is liable to evil or inconvenience (to be inflicted by sovereign authority), in case he disobey the Command by which the duty is imposed. This conditional evil is the *Sanction* which enforces the duty, or the duty is *sanctioned* by this conditional evil: And the party bound or obliged, is bound or obliged, *because* he is obnoxious to this evil, in case he disobey the command.—That bond, *vinculum*, or *ligamen*, which is of the essence of *duty*, is, simply or merely, liability or *obnoxiousness* to a *Sanction*.

Now it follows from these considerations, that, before I can complete the analysis of legal *right* and *duty*, I must advert to the nature or essentials of legal Injuries or Wrongs, and of legal or political Sanctions.—As Person, Thing, Act and Forbearance, are inseparably connected with the terms ‘Right’ and ‘Duty,’ so are Injury and Sanction imported by the same expressions.

Obligation,

Motive,
Will, In-
tention,
Negligence,
and Rash-
ness.

But before we can determine the import of ‘Injury’ and ‘Sanction’ (or can distinguish the compulsion or restraint, which is implied in Duty or Obligation, from that compulsion or restraint which is merely physical), we must try to settle the meaning of the following perplexing terms: namely, Will, Motive, Intention, and Negligence:—Including, in the term ‘Negligence,’ those *modes* of the corresponding complex notion, which are styled ‘Temerity’ or ‘Rashness, Imprudence or Heedlessness.’

Accordingly, I shall now endeavour to state or suggest the significations of ‘Motive’ and ‘Will.’ In other words, I shall attempt to distinguish desires, as *determining* to acts or forbearances, from those remarkable desires which are named *volitions*, and by which we are not *determined* to acts or forbearances, although they are the immediate antecedents of such bodily movements as are styled (strictly and properly) human *acts or actions*.

Nor is this incidental excursion into the Philosophy of Mind a wanton digression from the path which is marked out by my subject.

‘Will,’ etc.

obliged by a *sanction*. This conditional evil determines or inclines his *will* to the act or forbearance enjoined. In other language, he wishes to avoid the evil impending from the Law, although he may be averse from the fulfilment of the duty which the Law imposes upon him.

Consequently, if we would know precisely the import of 'Duty,' we must endeavour to clear the expressions 'Motive' and 'Will' from the obscurity with which they have been covered by philosophical and popular jargon.

2ndly, The *objects* of duties are acts and forbearances. But every act, and every forbearance from an act, is the consequence of a volition, or of a determination of the will. Consequently, if we would know precisely the meaning of act and forbearance, and, therefore, the meaning of duty or obligation, we must try to know the meaning of the term 'Will.'

3rdly, Some injuries are *intentional*. Others are consequences of *negligence* (in the large signification of the term). Consequently, if we would know the nature of injuries or wrongs, and of various important differences by which they are distinguished, we must try to determine the meanings of 'Intention' and 'Negligence.'

It is absolutely necessary that the import of the last-mentioned expressions should be settled with an approach to precision. For *both* of them run, in a continued vein, through the doctrine of injuries or wrongs; and of the rights and obligations which are begotten by injuries or wrongs. And *one* of them (namely, 'Intention'), meets us at *every* step, in *every* department of Jurisprudence.

But, in order that we may settle the import of the term 'Intention,' we must settle the import of the term 'Will.' For, although an intention is not a volition, the facts are inseparably connected. And, since 'Negligence' implies the *absence* of a *due* volition and intention, it is manifest that the explanation of that expression supposes the explanation of these.

Accordingly, I will now attempt to analyse the expressions 'Will' and 'Motive.'

Certain parts of the human body obey the *will*. Changing the expression, certain parts of our bodies move in certain ways so soon as we *will* that they should. Or, changing the expression again, we have the *power* of moving, in certain

The Will.

Now these expressions, and others of the same import, merely signify this:

Certain movements of our bodies follow invariably and *immediately* our wishes or desires for those *same* movements: Provided, that is, that the bodily organ be sane, and the desired movement be not prevented by an outward obstacle or hindrance. If my arm be free from disease, and from chains or other hindrances, my arm rises, so soon as I wish that it should. But if my arm be palsied, or fastened down to my side, my arm will not move, although I desire to move it.

These antecedent wishes and these consequent movements, are human *volitions* and *acts* (strictly and properly so called). They are the only objects to which those terms will strictly and properly apply.

But, besides the antecedent desire (which I style a *volition*), and the consequent movement (which I style an *act*), it is commonly supposed that there is a certain '*Will*' which is the cause or author of both. The desire is commonly called an act of the *will*; or is supposed to be an effect of a *power* or *faculty of willing*, supposed to reside in the man.

That this same '*will*' is just nothing at all, has been proved (in my opinion) beyond controversy by the late Dr. Brown: Who has also expelled from the region of entities, those fancied beings called '*powers*,' of which this imaginary '*will*' is one. Many preceding writers had stated or suggested generally, the true nature of the relation between cause and effect. They had shown that a *cause* is nothing but a given event invariably or usually *preceding* another given event; that an *effect* is nothing but a given event invariably or usually *following* another given event; and that the *power* of *producing* the effect which is ascribed to the cause, is merely an abridged (and, therefore, an obscure) expression for the customary antecedence and sequence of the two events. But the author in question, in his analysis of that relation, considered the subject from numerous aspects equally new and important. And he was (I believe) the first who understood what we would be at, when we talk about the *Will*, and the *power* or *faculty of willing*.

All that I am able to discover when I *will* a movement of my body, amounts to this: I *wish* the movement. The movement *immediately* follows my wish of the movement. And when I conceive the *wish*, I *expect* that the movement

wished *will* immediately follow it. Any one may convince himself that this is the whole of the case, by carefully observing what passes in himself, when he *wills* to move any of the bodily organs, which are said to obey the *will*, or the *power* or *faculty* of willing.

For further proof I must refer you to Brown's 'Analysis of Cause and Effect.'⁶⁹ A detailed exposition of the subject, were utterly inconsistent with the limits by which I am confined, and with the direct or appropriate purpose of these Lectures.

The wishes which are immediately followed by the bodily movements wished, are the only wishes *immediately followed by their objects*. Or (changing the expression), they are the only wishes which *consummate themselves*:—The only wishes which attain their *ends* without the intervention of *means*.

Dominion
of the will
limited to
bodily
organs.

In every other instance of wish or desire, the object of the wish is attained (in case it be attained) through a *mean*; and (generally speaking) through a *series* of means:—Each of the means being (in its turn) the object of a distinct wish; and each of them being wished (in its turn) as a step to that object which is the end at which we aim.

For example, If I wish that my arm should rise, the desired movement of my arm immediately follows my wish. There is nothing to which I resort, nothing which I wish, as a mean or instrument wherewith to attain my purpose. But if I wish to lift the book which is now lying before me, I wish certain movements of my bodily organs, and I employ these as a mean or instrument for the accomplishment of my ultimate end.

Again: If I wish to look at a book lying beyond my reach, I resort to certain movements of my bodily organs, coupled with an additional something which I employ as a *further* instrument. For instance, I grasp and raise the book now lying before me; and *with* the book which I grasp and raise, I get the book which I wish to look at, but which lies on a part of the table beyond the reach of my arm.

It will be admitted by all (on the bare statement) that the dominion of the will is limited or restricted to *some* of our bodily organs: that is to say, that there are only *certain*

Dominion
of the will
limited to
some bodily
organs.

⁶⁹ Brown's Enquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect. (For the Will in particular, Part 1, Section 3). • Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, cap. 24, 25.

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parts of our bodily frames, which change their actual states for different states, *as* (and so soon as) we wish or desire that they should. Numberless movements of my arms and legs immediately follow my desires of those same movements. But the motion of my heart would not be immediately affected, by a wish I might happen to conceive that it should stop or quicken.

Dominion
of the will
extends not
to the mind.

That the dominion of the will extends not to the mind, may appear (at first sight) somewhat disputable. It has, however, been *proved* by the writers to whom I have referred. Nor, indeed, was the proof difficult, so soon as a definite meaning had been attached to the term *will*. Here (as in most cases) the confusion arose from the indefiniteness of the language by which the *subjects* of the inquiry were denoted.

If volitions be nothing but wishes immediately followed by their objects, it is manifest that the mind is not obedient to the will. In other words, it will not change its *actual*, for *different* states or conditions, *as* (and so soon as) it is wished or desired that it should. Try to recall an absent thought, or to banish a present thought, and you will find that your desire is not immediately followed by the attainment of its object. It is, indeed, manifest that the attempt would imply an absurdity. Unless the thought desired be present to the mind *already*, there is no determinate object at which the desire aims, and which it can attain *immediately*, or without the intervention of a mean. And to desire the absence of a thought actually present to the mind, is to *conceive* the thought of which the absence is desired, and (by consequence) to perpetuate its presence.

Changes in the state of the mind, or in the state of the ideas and desires, are not to be attained immediately by desiring those changes, but through long and complex series of intervening means, beginning with desires which *really* are *volitions*.⁷⁰

Volitions,
what.

Our desires of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are therefore the only objects which can be styled *volitions*; or (if you like the expression better) which can be styled acts of the will.—For that is merely to affirm, ‘that they are the only desires which are followed by their objects *immediately*, or without the intervention of means.’ They are distinguished from other desires

⁷⁰ Examples: Taking up a book to look into a book to recover an absent thought. Look- thought.

by the name of *volitions*, on account of *this*, their essential or characteristic property.

And as these are the only *volitions*; so are the bodily movements, by which they are immediately followed, the only *acts* or *actions* (properly so called).⁷¹ It will be admitted on the mere statement, that the only objects which can be called acts, are consequences of Volitions. A voluntary movement of my body, or a movement which follows a volition, is an *act*. The *involuntary* movements which are the consequences of certain diseases, are *not* acts. But as the bodily movements which immediately follow volitions, are the only *ends* of volition, it follows that those bodily movements are the only objects to which the term 'acts' can be applied with perfect precision and propriety.

The only difficulty with which the subject is beset, arises from the concise or abridged manner in which (generally speaking) we express the objects of our discourse.

Names of acts comprise certain of their consequences.

Most of the names which seem to be names of acts, are names of acts, *coupled with certain of their consequences*. For example, If I kill you with a gun or pistol, I *shoot* you: And the long train of incidents which are denoted by that brief expression, are considered (or spoken of) as if they constituted an *act*, perpetrated by me. In truth, the only parts of the train which are my act or acts, are the muscular motions by which I raise the weapon; point it at your head or body, and pull the trigger. These I *will*. The contact of the flint and steel; the ignition of the powder, the flight of the ball towards your body, the wound and subsequent death, with

⁷¹ It is not clear whether the author here intends to exclude from the category of acts all processes that do not *immediately* result in a *palpable* bodily movement. If so, he is inconsistent.

The author elsewhere (p. 469) implicitly recognises *meditation* as an act: Further (p. 470), while he regards the conviction produced by evidence as a case of physical compulsion, he recognises that non-belief may be blamable, if the result of insufficient examination, refusal to examine, &c. The process of examination is therefore the object of a duty, and hence, according to his own analysis, it is an act (p. 350, 378, 406).

And it is difficult to see why *cogito* should not be classed with acts, just as much as *curro* or *haurio*. There seems no generic difference between the act of taking up a book to banish

an importunate thought and the process of entering (without external aid) upon some mental exercise (*e.g.* a problem in geometry) for the same purpose. It is no doubt true that a *given specific* change in the state of the mind cannot generally be the object of a volition. But the same is true of any *given* bodily movement, unless it happen to be one of those movements, very limited in direction and extent, which are immediately in our power to effect.

No doubt the mental processes in question are too impalpable and obscure to enter the domain of positive law, unless evidenced by acts of a more observable kind, which last are sometimes distinguished by the name of *overt acts*, a term devised not without insight. (See p. 455, *post.*)—R. C.

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Confusion
of will and
intention.

the numberless incidents included in these, are *consequences* of the act which I *will*. I *will* not those consequences, although I may *intend* them.

Nor is this ambiguity confined to the names by which our *actions* are denoted. It extends to the term 'will;' to the term 'volitions;' and to the term 'acts of the will.' In the case which I have just stated, I should be said to *will* the whole train of incidents; although I should only *will* certain muscular motions, and should *intend* those consequences which constitute the rest of the train. But the further explanation of these and other ambiguities, must be reserved for the explanation of the term 'intention.'

Motive and
Will.

The desires of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are imputed (as I have said) to an imaginary being, which is styled the *Will*. They are called *acts of the will*. And this imaginary being is said to be *determined* to action, by *Motives*.

All which (translated into intelligible language) merely means this: I wish a certain object. That object is not attainable *immediately*, by the wish or desire itself. But it is attainable by means of bodily movements which will immediately follow my desire of them. For the purpose of attaining that which I cannot attain by a wish, I wish the movements which will immediately follow my wish, and *through* which I expect to attain the object which is the end of my desires, (as in the foregoing instance of the book).

Motives to
volitions.

A motive, then, is a wish causing or preceding a volition:—A wish for a something not to be attained by wishing it, but which the party believes he shall probably or certainly attain, by *means* of those wishes which are styled acts of the will.

Motives to
motives.

In a certain sense, motives may precede motives as well as acts of the will. For the desired object which is said to determine the will may itself be desired as a mean to an ulterior purpose. In which case, the desire of the object which is the ultimate end, prompts the desire which immediately precedes the volition.

[Give instance.]

Why the
as
acted
much
tion:
seen
thought
mysterious.

That the will should have attracted great attention, is not wonderful. For by means of the bodily movements which are the objects of volitions, the business of our lives is carried on. That the will should have been thought to contain something extremely mysterious, is equally natural. For volitions (as we have seen) are the only desires which

consummate themselves: the only desires which attain their objects without the intervention of means.

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NOTES AND FRAGMENTS.

See Mr. Locke; Chapter on Power and Will.

His mistake was this. He perceived (though obscurely) that we mean by the 'will' or by 'volitions,' desires which consummate themselves, or which are followed immediately by their objects. And if he had asked himself '*what* desires are attained by merely desiring them?' he would have arrived at the solution reserved for Dr. Brown.

[The following passage in Hobbes is referred to by Mr. Austin]:—

'In Deliberation the last Appetite or Aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is what we call the Will; the Act (not the faculty) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will commonly given by the Schools, that it is a rational Appetite, is not good. For, if it were, then there could be no voluntary Act against Reason. For a voluntary Act is that which proceedeth from the Will and no other. But if instead of a rational Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. *Will therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating.* And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing that nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination or Appetite.'—*Leviathan*, p. 28, edit. 1651.

The objects of wishes or desires are desired simply or absolutely, or they are desired for their effects or consequences. Changing the expression, the objects of wishes or desires are desired as *ends*, or they are desired as *means* to ends.

For example, I may desire money for the sake of the advantages which it would procure; or (by virtue of that process of association which I think it needless to explain) I may wish for money without adverting to those advantages, or to any of the consequences which would follow the attainment of my desire.

And the remark which I have applied to *positive* desires, will also apply to those *negative* desires which are styled *aversions*. I may wish to avoid a given pain in prospect, without carrying my attention beyond that given object. Or I may wish that an event in prospect may not happen, on account of some consequence which would certainly or probably follow it, and from which I am averse.

If we steadily keep in view this simple and obvious truth, I think that we may approach to the true distinctions between Motive, Will, and Intention.

LECT.
XXXXX*Voluntary.*—Double meaning of the word *voluntary*.

First, a voluntary act is any act done in pursuance of a volition; i.e. an act (s.s.) with such of its intentional consequences as are included in its import; e.g. submission to punishment, in consequence of a knowledge that resistance would be fruitless.

Secondly, a voluntary act is an act done in consequence of an act of the will, as determined by certain motives. This last sense includes several related yet different senses; e.g. a voluntary act, as opposed to an act done for a valuable consideration: a voluntary act, as opposed to an act done in apprehension of pain.

Spontaneous. Mr. Bentham says,⁷²

‘I purposely abstain from the use of the words *voluntary* and *involuntary*, on account of the extreme ambiguity of their signification. By a voluntary act is meant sometimes, any act in the performance of which the will has had any concern at all; in this sense it is synonymous to “intentional;” sometimes such acts only, in the production of which the will has been determined by motives not of a painful nature: in this sense it is synonymous with unconstrained or *uncoerced*; sometimes such acts only, in the production of which the will has been determined by motives which, whether of the pleasurable or painful kind, occurred to a man himself, without being suggested by anybody else;⁷³ in this sense it is synonymous with *spontaneous*.

‘The sense of the word “involuntary” does not correspond completely to that of the word “voluntary.” Involuntary is used in opposition to intentional and to unconstrained, but not to spontaneous.’

LECTURE XIX.

INTENTION.

LECT. XIX

IN the preceding Lectures I have endeavoured to analyse the expressions ‘*legal Right and Duty*,’ or to determine generally the nature and essence of *legal Rights and Duties*.

Before I can complete the analysis of ‘*Right*’ and ‘*Duty*,’ or before I can determine completely the import of those complex terms, I must advert in a general manner to legal Injuries or Wrongs, and to legal or political Sanctions.

But before I could proceed to the consideration of Injuries and Sanctions, or could distinguish Duty or Obligation from physical compulsion or restraint, it was necessary that I should examine the meaning of ‘*Will*’ and ‘*Motive*,’ ‘*In-*

⁷² ‘*Principles of Morals and Legislation*,’ pp. 22, 79, 81.

⁷³ Or rather, by motives other than those which are in question. Good offices

proceeding from the Moral Sanction, are, with reference to legal obligation, *spontaneous*.—See ‘*Principles*,’ etc. p.

tention' and 'Negligence:' Including, in the term 'Negligence,' negligence strictly so called; with the closely allied, though somewhat different notions, which are styled 'Rashness' or 'Temerity,' and 'Heedlessness.'

Accordingly, I examined, in the last Lecture, the meaning of 'Will' and 'Motive;' and I now proceed to the import of 'Intention' and 'Negligence.'

As I stated in my last Lecture, some of our wishes or desires are followed *immediately* by their objects. In other words, some of our wishes or desires consummate themselves, or attain their appropriate *ends* without the intervention of *means*.

Volitions
and Mo-

The only wishes or desires which consummate themselves, are wishes or desires for certain movements of our own bodily organs. All our other desires attain their appropriate ends, by means, or series of means: by means of the bodily movements which immediately follow our desires for them, or by means of those bodily movements coupled with additional means.

[The bodily movements which we will, or which immediately follow our desires of them, are not desired for themselves, but for their consequences. They are not desired as *ends* but as *means* to ends.]

This (I believe) will hold universally. The movements in themselves are perfectly indifferent objects, and derive all their interest from the purposes which they subserve.]

The desires for those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires for them, are sometimes styled '*volitions*:'—more frequently, 'determinations of the will,' or of 'the power or faculty of willing.' For here (as in other cases of cause and effect) the customary sequence of the bodily movement upon the desire immediately preceding, has been ascribed to a fancied something styled a '*power*:' A '*power of willing*' which resides in the man, and by *virtue* whereof he *produces* the movement which is the instant consequence of his wish for it. The fancied something which comes between the wish and the movement, is commonly styled (with more brevity) 'the Will.' And whenever I find occasion to mention this mysterious being, I will (if you please) call it so.

For the structure of established speech forces me to talk of '*willing*;' and to impute the bodily movements, which immediately follow our desires for them, to '*the Will*.'

LECT. XIX

To discard established terms is seldom possible ; and where it is possible, is seldom expedient. A familiar expression, however obscure, is commonly less obscure, as well as more welcome to the taste, than a new and strange one. Instead of rejecting conventional terms because they are ambiguous and obscure, we shall commonly find it better to explain their meanings, or (in the language of Old Hobbes) 'to *snuff* them with distinctions and definitions.'

Accordingly, I shall talk of 'willing ;' of 'determinations of the will ;' and of 'motives determining the will.' But all that I mean by those expressions is this. 'To *will*,' is to *wish* or *desire* certain of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them. A '*determination of the will*,' or a '*volition*,' is a wish or desire of the sort. A '*motive determining the will*,' is a wish *not* a volition, but suggesting a wish which is. The wish styled a '*motive*,' is not immediately followed by its appropriate object : But the bodily movement which is the appropriate object of the *volition*, seems to the party a certain or probable *mean* for attaining the something which is the appropriate object of the *motive*. In case that something be wished as a *mean* to an ulterior object, the wish of the ulterior object is a motive to a *motive* ; as the wish of the *intervening* mean is a motive to the *volition*.

Acts.

The bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are the only human *acts*, strictly and properly so called. For events which are not *willed* are not *acts* ; and the bodily movements in question are the only events which we *will*. They are the only objects which follow our desires, without the intervention of means.

But, as I observed in my last Lecture, most of the names which seem to be names of acts are names of *acts* strictly and properly so called, *coupled with more or fewer of their consequences*.

And as the names of *acts* comprise certain of their *consequences*, so it is said that those consequences are *willed*, although they are only *intended*. In the case which I have just supposed, it would be said that I *willed* the consequences of my voluntary muscular movements, as well as the movements themselves.

Nor is it in our power to discard these forms of speech, although they involve the nature of will and intention in thick obscurity. They are inseparably interwoven with the rest of established language ; and if we attempted to change

them for new and precise expressions, we should either resort to terms which others would not understand, or to tedious circumlocutions which others would not endure. To analyse, mark, and remember their complex import, is all that we can accomplish.

Accordingly, I must often speak of '*acts*,' when I mean '*acts and their consequences*;' and must often speak of those consequences as if they were *willed*, though, in truth, they are *intended*.

And here I must pause a moment for the purpose of correcting a mistake which I made in a former Lecture.

Internal
Acts.

In that Lecture, I distinguished acts into acts *internal*, and acts *external*:⁷⁴ Meaning by acts *internal*, volitions or determinations of the will: and meaning by acts *external*, the bodily movements which are the appropriate *objects* of volitions.

I am convinced, on reflection, that the terms are needless, and tend to darken their subjects. The term '*volitions*,' or the term '*determinations of the will*,' sufficiently denotes the objects to which I applied the term '*internal acts*:' And it is utterly absurd (unless we are talking in metaphor) to apply such terms as '*act*' and '*movement*' to *mental* phenomena. I, therefore, repudiate the term '*internal acts*;' and, with that term, the superfluous distinction in question. I hastily borrowed the distinction from the works of Mr. Bentham:⁷⁵ A writer, whom I much revere, and whom I am prone to follow, though I will not receive his dogmas with blind and servile submission. Impostors exact from their disciples '*prostration of the understanding*,' because their doctrines will not endure examination. A man of Mr. Bentham's genius may provoke inquiry; and may rest satisfied with the ample and genuine admiration which his writings will infallibly extort from scrutinising and impartial judges.

The bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are *acts* (properly so called).

But every act is followed by *consequences*; and is also attended by *concomitants*, which are styled its *circumstances*.

To desire the *act* is to *will* it. To *expect* any of its *consequences*, is to *intend* those consequences.

Intention
as regard-
ing present
acts, or
the conse-
quences of
present
acts.

⁷⁴ Lect. XIV. p. 376, *supra*.

⁷⁵ 'In the second place, acts may be distinguished into *external* and *internal*. By *external* are meant corporal acts; acts of the body; by *internal*, mental

acts; acts of the mind: Thus, to strike is an external or exterior act: to intend to strike, an internal or interior one.'—*Bentham, Principles, etc.* p. 70.

The act itself is *intended* as well as *willed*. For every volition is accompanied by an expectation or belief, that the bodily movement wished will immediately follow the wish.

A consequence of the act is never *willed*. For none but acts themselves are the appropriate objects of volitions. Nor is it always *intended*. For the party who wills the act, may not expect the consequence. If a consequence of the act be *desired*, it is probably *intended*. But (as I shall shew immediately) an *intended* consequence is not always *desired*. Intentions, therefore, regard *acts*: or they regard the *consequence of acts*.

When I will an act, I expect or intend the *act* which is the appropriate object of the volition. And when I will an act, I may expect, contemplate, or intend some given event, as a certain or contingent *consequence* of the act which I will.

Confusion
of Will and
Intention.

Hence (no doubt) the frequent confusion of Will and Intention. Feeling *that will implies intention* (or that the appropriate objects of volitions are intended as well as willed) numerous writers upon Jurisprudence (and Mr. Bentham amongst the number) employ 'will' and 'intention' as synonymous or equivalent terms. They forget *that intention does not imply will*; or that the appropriate objects of certain intentions are not the appropriate objects of volitions. The agent may not intend a consequence of his act. In other words, when the agent wills the act, he may not contemplate that given event as a certain or contingent consequence of the act which he wills.

A conse-
quence of
an act may
not be in-
tended.

For example:

My yard or garden is divided from a road by a high paling. I am shooting with a pistol at a mark chalked upon this paling. A passenger then on the road, but whom the fence intercepts from my sight, is wounded by one of the shots. For the shot pierces the paling; passes to the road; and hits the passenger.

Now, when I aim at the mark, and pull the trigger, I may not *intend* to hurt the passenger. I may not contemplate the hurt of a passenger as a contingent consequence of the act. For though the hurt of a passenger *be* a probable consequence, I may not think of it, or advert to it, *as* a consequence. Or, though I may advert to it as a possible consequence, I may think that the fence will intercept the shot, and prevent it from passing to the road. Or the road

may be one which is seldom travelled, and I may think the presence of a stranger at that place and time extremely improbable. LECT. XIX

On any of these suppositions, I am clear of *intending* the harm: Though (as I shall shew hereafter) I may be guilty of *heedlessness* or *rashness*. Before *intention* can be defined exactly, the import of those terms must be taken into consideration.

Where the agent *intends* a consequence of the act, he may *wish* the consequence, or he may *not* wish it.

An intended consequence of an act may be wished or not.

And, if he *wish* the consequence, he may wish it as an *end*, or he may wish it as a *mean* to an end.

And if wished, it may be wished as an end, or as a mean.

I will illustrate these three suppositions by adducing examples. But before I exemplify these three suppositions, I will endeavour to explain what I mean, when I say 'that a consequence of an act may be wished as an *end*.'

Consequence of an act wished as an end.

Strictly speaking, no external consequence of any act is desired as an *end*.

The end or ultimate purpose of every volition and act is a feeling or sentiment:—is pleasure, direct or positive; or is the pleasure which arises *indirectly* from the removal or prevention of pain. But where the pleasure, which (in strictness) is the end of the act, can only be attained through a *given* external consequence, that external consequence is inseparable from the end; and is styled (with sufficient precision) the end of the act and the volition. For example, If you shoot me to death because you hate me mortally, my death is a necessary condition to the attainment of your end. The end of the act, is to allay the deadly antipathy. But the end can only be attained through my death. And my death (which is an intended consequence of the act) may, therefore, be styled the *end* of the act and the volition.

I stated in my last Lecture, that the bodily movements, which are the appropriate objects of volitions, are not desired as *ends*.

But that is true of every outward object which is the object of a desire. This, therefore, will not distinguish volitions from other desires.

Nor can it be said, that the appropriate objects of volitions are desired as means to ends external, or to remote ends. In most cases they are. But in some they are not. Namely, dancing, etc., for nothing but the present pleasure.

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The true test is, that they are the only desires immediately followed by their appropriate or direct objects.

Concurrence of Motive and Intention.

Where an intended consequence is wished as an *end* or a *mean*, motive and intention concur. In other words, The consequence intended is also wished; and the wish of that consequence suggests the volition.

Exemplifications of the three foregoing suppositions.

I will now exemplify those three varieties of intention at which I have pointed already.

The varieties are the following :

1st. The agent may *intend* a consequence; and that consequence may be the *end* of his act.

2ndly. He may *intend* a consequence; but he may desire that consequence as a *mean* to an end.

3rdly. He may *intend* the consequence, without desiring it.

As examples of these three varieties, I will adduce three cases of intentional killing.

Of the first supposition.

You hate me mortally: And, in order that you may appease that painful and importunate feeling, you shoot me dead.

Now here you *intend* my death: And (taking the word '*end*' in the meaning which I have just explained) my death is the *end* of the act, and of the volition which precedes the act. Nothing but that consequence would accomplish the purpose, which (speaking with metaphysical precision) is the end of the act and the volition. Nothing but that consequence would allay the painful sentiment of which you purpose ridding yourself when you shoot me. Nothing but that consequence would appease your hate, or satisfy your malice.

Of the second supposition.

Again:

You shoot me, that you may take my purse. I refuse to deliver my purse, when you demand it. I defend my purse to the best of my ability. And, in order that you may remove the obstacle which my resistance opposes to your purpose, you pull out a pistol and shoot me dead.

Now here you *intend* my death, and you also *desire* my death. But you desire it as a *mean*, and not as an *end*. Your desire of my death is not the ultimate *motive* suggesting the volition and the act. Your ultimate motive is your desire of my purse. And if I would deliver my purse, you would not shoot me.

Lastly:

Of the third supposition.

You shoot at Sempronius or Styles, at Titius or Nokes, desiring and intending to kill him. * The death of Styles is

the *end* of your volition and act. Your desire of his death, LECT. XIX
is the *ultimate motive* to the volition. You contemplate his death, as the probable consequence of the act.

But when you shoot at Styles, *I* am talking with him, and am standing close by him. And, from the position in which I stand with regard to the person you aim at, you think it not unlikely that you may kill *me* in your attempt to kill *him*. You fire, and kill me accordingly. Now here you *intend* my death, without *desiring* it. The *end* of the volition and act, is the death of Styles. *My* death is neither desired as an *end*, nor is it desired as a *mean*: *My* death *sub-serves* not your end: you are not a bit the nearer to the death of Styles, by killing *me*. But, since you contemplate my death as a probable consequence of your act, you *intend* my death although you *desire* it not.

It follows from the nature of Volitions, that *forbearances* Forbear-
from acts are not *willed*, but *intended*.

To *will*, is to wish or desire one of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them. These movements are the only *acts*, properly so called. Consequently, 'To will a forbearance' (or 'to will the absence or negation of an act'), is a flat contradiction in terms. but
willed.

When I forbear from an act, I *will*. But I will an act *other* than that from which I forbear or abstain: And, knowing that the act which I will, excludes the act forborne, I *intend* the forbearance. In other words, I contemplate the forbearance as a *consequence* of the act which I will; or, rather, as a necessary *condition* to the act which I will. For if I willed the act from which I forbear, I should not will (at this time) the act which I presently will.

For example, It is my duty to come hither at seven o'clock. But, instead of coming hither at seven o'clock, I go to the Playhouse at that hour, conscious that I ought to come hither.

Now, in this case, my absence from the room is *intentional*. I know that my coming hither is inconsistent with my going thither: that, if my legs brought me to the University, they would not carry me to the Playhouse.

If I *forgot* that I ought to come hither, my absence would not be *intentional*, but the effect of *negligence*.

LECTURE XX.

NEGLIGENCE, HEEDLESSNESS, AND RASHNESS.

LECT. XX.

Acts are
willed *and*
intended :
Conse-
quences are
intended.

Forbear-
ances are
intended.

Motives to
Forbear-
ances.

IN my last Lecture, I endeavoured to distinguish *acts* (properly so called) from the events which are *consequences* of acts; to shew that *acts* are *intended* as well as *willed*; but that their *consequences* are never *willed*, although they are often *intended*. In short, every forbearance is *intended*, but no forbearance is *willed*: the party wills a something inconsistent with the act forborne, *conscious* that the something which he presently wills, excludes (for the time being) *that* from which he forbears.

The motives to *forbearances* (or, rather, to the *acts* which exclude the acts forborne,) are different in different cases.

Disliking the consequences of the act from which I forbear, I forbear from the act *because* I dislike those consequences. Or without disliking (or positively liking) those consequences, I *prefer* the consequences of the act which I presently will, and which I could not perform unless I forbore from the other.

In the first of these cases, my motive to the act which I presently will, is styled *aversion*: aversion from the act forborne, or (rather) from its probable consequences. But whether the act which I *will* be promoted by preference or aversion, the act which I will, and *not* the forbearance, is the object of the volition itself. 'To will nothing,' is a flat contradiction in terms.⁷⁶

Forbear-
ances dis-
tinguished
from Omis-
sions.

Forbearances must be distinguished from Omissions.

A *forbearance* (taking the word in its large signification) is the *not* doing a given act with an *intention* of not doing it. The party *wills* something else, knowing that that which he wills excludes the given act.

An omission (taking the word in its large signification) is the *not* doing a given act, without adverting (at the time) to the act which is not done.

Ambigu-
ities of the
terms 'For-
bearance
and Omis-
sion ;'
'Commit
and Omit.'

The term 'forbearance' (as it is often used) is restricted to *lawful* forbearances:—to such as are exacted by duties, or are not inconsistent with duties.

The term 'omission' (as it is often used) is restricted to *unlawful* or culpable omissions:—to such as are breaches of duties.

⁷⁶ It is not perhaps rigidly true that every forbearance is preceded or accompanied by an *act*.

And, taking the terms in those restricted senses, we have no names for unlawful or culpable forbearances, or for lawful omissions. Not unfrequently, the term 'omission' is extended to *all* omissions, and also to *all* forbearances. Or the term 'omission' denotes such omissions and forbearances as are unlawful or culpable. And, in either of those cases, the *not* doing, which is unintentional, is confounded with the *not* doing, which is intentional.

'Omit' (as opposed to 'commit') is also defective or ambiguous. To 'commit,' is to *do* an act inconsistent with a duty. 'To omit,' is to omit *unlawfully*; or to omit (or *forbear*) *unlawfully*. In the first case, *culpable forbearance* is *dropped*. In the last case, culpable forbearance is confounded with *culpable omission*.

I think that the usage of numerous and good writers authorises the large significations which I attach to the terms in question. At all events, those significations are so clear, precise, and commodious, that I should venture to annex them to the terms, in the teeth of established usage.

Those significations I will repeat.

'To forbear' is *not* to do, with an *intention* of not doing.

'A forbearance,' is a *not* doing, with a like intention.

'To omit,' is *not* to do, but without thought of the act which is not done.

'An omission,' is a *not* doing, with a similar absence of consciousness.

If we would denote 'that a forbearance or omission is a breach of duty,' we can easily accomplish the purpose by express restriction. We can style it 'injurious' or 'unlawful,' or we can call it 'culpable.' Injurious or culpable omissions are frequently styled 'negligent.' The party who omits is said to 'neglect' his duty. The omission is ascribed to his '*negligence*.' The state of his mind at the time of the omission, is styled '*negligence*.' Negligence.

These (I think) are the meanings usually attached to these terms; although the Roman Lawyers (as I shall shew immediately) have given them a larger signification.

Taking them in the meanings which (I believe) are usual, the term '*negligent*' applies exclusively to injurious omissions:—to breaches by omission of positive duties. The party omits an act to which he is *obliged* (in the sense of the Roman Lawyers). He performs not an act to which he is obliged, because the act and the obligation are absent from his mind.

LECT. XX.

Heedless-
ness.

'Heedlessness' differs from negligence, although they are closely allied.⁷⁷

The party who is negligent *omits* an act, and breaks a *positive* duty :

The party who is heedless *does* an act, and breaks a *negative* duty.

Acts (properly so called) are not injuries or wrongs, independently of their consequences. Where an act is forbidden, the duty and the sanction are pointed at consequences which constantly or usually follow it. And (as I shall shew hereafter) the guilt or innocence of a given actor, depends upon the state of his consciousness, with regard to those consequences, in the given instance or case.

If he intend or expect them, he is guilty of the wrong at which the sanction is aimed. And, though he expect them not, they are rationally imputed to him, provided he *would* have expected them, if he had thought of *them* and of his duty. Where he does the act without adverting to those consequences, he is clear of *intending* those consequences, but he produces them by his *heedlessness*.

I endeavoured in my last Lecture to illustrate my meaning, by an example to which I now refer you.⁷⁸ In the case supposed, I did not advert to the probable consequence of my act. And, since it was my duty to advert to it, I am guilty of *heedlessness*, although I am clear of *intentional* injury.

Negligence
and Heed-
lessness
compared.

The states of mind which are styled 'Negligence' and 'Heedlessness' are precisely alike. In either case the party is inadvertent. In the first case, he does *not* an act which he was bound to do, because he adverts not to it. In the second case he *does* an act from which he was bound to forbear, because he adverts not to certain of its probable consequences. Absence of a thought which one's duty would naturally suggest, is the main ingredient in each of the complex notions which are styled 'negligence' and 'heedlessness.'

Rashness.

The party who is guilty of Temerity or Rashness, like the party who is guilty of heedlessness, does an act, and breaks a positive duty. But the party who is guilty of heedlessness, thinks not of the probable mischief. The party who is guilty of rashness *thinks* of the probable mischief; but, in consequence of a missupposition begotten by insufficient advertence,

⁷⁷ Bentham, 'Principles,' etc. pp 86, 161.⁷⁸ See p. 434, *ante*.

he assumes that the mischief will not ensue in the given instance or case. Such (I think) is the meaning invariably attached to the expressions, 'Rashness,' 'Temerity,' 'Foolhardiness,' and the like. The radical idea denoted is always this. The party runs a risk of which he is conscious; but he thinks (for a reason which he examines insufficiently) that the mischief will probably be averted in the given instance.

I will again illustrate my meaning, by recurring to the example to which I have just alluded.

When I fire at the mark chalked upon the fence, it occurs to my mind that a shot may pierce the fence, and may chance to hit a passenger. But without examining carefully the ground of my conclusion, I conclude that the fence is sufficiently thick to prevent a shot from passing to the road. Or, without giving myself the trouble to look into the road, I assume that a passenger is not there, because the road is seldom passed. In either cases, my confidence is *rash*; and, through my *rashness* or *temerity*, I am the author of the mischief. My assumption is founded upon evidence which the event shews to be worthless, and of which I should discover the worthlessness if I scrutinised it as I ought.

By the Roman Lawyers, Rashness, Heedlessness, or Negligence is, in certain cases, considered equivalent to 'Dolus:' that is to say, to intention. 'Dolo comparatur.' 'Vix est ut a certo nocendi *proposito* discerni possit.' Changing the expression, they suppose that rashness, heedlessness or negligence can hardly be distinguished, in certain cases, from intention.

Now this (it appears to me) is a mistake. Intention (it seems to me) is a *precise* state of the mind, and cannot coalesce or commingle with a different state of the mind. 'To intend,' is to believe that a given act will follow a given volition, or that a given consequence will follow a given act. The chance of the sequence may be rated higher or lower; but the party *conceives* the future event, and believes that there is a chance of its following his volition or act. Intention, therefore, is a state of consciousness.

But negligence and heedlessness suppose *unconsciousness*.

the first case, the party does *not* think of a given act. In the second case, the party does *not* think of a given consequence.

Now a state of mind between consciousness and unconsciousness—between intention on the one side and negligence or heedlessness on the other—seems to be impossible. The

LECT. XX. party thinks, or the party does *not* think, of the act or consequence. If he think of it, he *intends*. If he do not think of it, he is *negligent* or *heedless*. To say that a negligence or heedlessness may run into intention, is to say that a thought may be *absent* from the mind, and yet (after a fashion) *present* to the mind.

Nor is it possible to conceive that supposed mongrel or monster, which is *neither* temerity *nor* intention, but partakes of both:— A state of mind lying on the confines of each, without belonging precisely to the territory of either.

The party who is guilty of Rashness *thinks* of a given consequence: but, by reason of a missupposition arising from insufficient advertence, he concludes that the given consequence will *not* follow the act in the given instance. Now if he surmise (though never so hastily and faintly), that his missupposition is unfounded, he *intends* the consequence. For he *thinks* of that consequence, he believes that his missupposition *may* be a missupposition; and he, therefore, believes that the consequence *may* follow his act.

I will again revert to the example which I have already cited repeatedly.

When I fire at the mark chalked upon the fence, it occurs to my mind that the shot may pierce the fence, and may chance to hit a passenger. But I assume that the fence is sufficiently thick to intercept a pistol-shot. Or, without going to the road in order that I may be sure of the fact, I assume that a passenger cannot be there *because* the road is seldom passed.

Now if my missupposition be absolutely confident and sincere, I am guilty of rashness only.

But, instead of assuming confidently that the fence will intercept the ball, or that no passenger is then on the road, I may surmise that the assumption upon which I act is not altogether just. I think that a passenger may chance to be there, though I think the presence of a passenger somewhat improbable. Or, though I judge the fence a stout and thick *paling*, I tacitly admit that a brick wall would intercept a pistol-shot more certainly. Consequently, I *intend* the hurt of the passenger who is actually hit and wounded. I think of the mischief, when I will the act; I believe that my missupposition *may* be a missupposition; and I, therefore, believe there is a *chance* that the mischief to which I advert may follow my volition.

The proposition of the Roman Lawyers is, therefore, false.

The mistake (I have no doubt) arose from a confusion of ideas which is not unfrequent:—from the confusion of *probandum* and *probans*:—of the *subject* of an inquiry into a matter of fact, with the *evidence*.

The state of a man's mind can only be known by others through his acts: through his own declarations, or through other conduct of his own. Consequently, it must often be difficult to determine whether a party *intended*, or whether he was merely negligent, heedless, or rash. The acts to which we must resort as evidence of the state of his mind, may be *ambiguous*: insomuch that they lead us to one conclusion as naturally as to the other. Judging from his conduct, the man may have *intended*, or he may have been negligent, heedless, or rash. Either hypothesis would fit the appearances which are open to our observation.

But the difficulty which belongs to the *evidence* is transferred to the *subject of the inquiry*. Because we are unable to determine *what* was the state of his mind, we fancy that the state of his mind was itself *indeterminate*: that it lay between the confines of consciousness and unconsciousness, without belonging exactly to either. We forget that these are antagonist notions, incapable of blending.

When it was said by the Roman Lawyers, 'that Negligence, Heedlessness, or Rashness, is equivalent, in certain cases, to *Dolus* or Intention,' their meaning (I believe) was this:—

Judging from the conduct of the party, it is impossible to determine whether he *intended*, or whether he was negligent, heedless, or rash. And, such being the case, it shall be *presumed* that he *intended*, and his liability shall be adjusted accordingly, *provided that the question arise in a civil action*. If the question had arisen in the course of a criminal proceeding, then the presumption would have gone in favour of the party, and not against him.

Such (I think) is the meaning which floated before their minds: Although we must infer (if we take their expressions literally) that they believed in the possibility of a state of mind lying between consciousness and unconsciousness.

If I attempted to explain the matter fully, I should enter upon certain distinctions between civil and criminal liability, and upon the nature of *præsumptiones juris* or legal presumptions.

It is, therefore, clear to me, that Intention is always separated from Negligence, Heedlessness, or Rashness, by a

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precise line of demarcation. The state of the party's mind is always *determined*, although it may be difficult (judging from his conduct) to ascertain the state of his mind.

Before I quit this subject, I may observe that *hasty* intention is frequently styled *rashness*. For instance, an intentional manslaughter is often styled *rash*, because the act is not premeditated, or has not been preceded by deliberate intention. Before we can distinguish hasty from deliberate intention, we must determine the nature of intention *as it regards future acts*. But it is easy to see that sudden or hasty intention is utterly different from rashness. When the act is done, the party contemplates the consequence, although he has not *premeditated* the consequence or the act.

To resume :

Negligence,
Heedless-
ness, and
Rashness,
likened and
disting-
guished.

It is manifest that Negligence, Heedlessness, and Rashness, are closely allied. *Want* of the *advertence* which one's duty would naturally suggest, is the fundamental or radical idea in each of the complex notions. But though they are closely allied, or are modes of the same notion, they are broadly distinguished by differences.

In cases of Negligence, the party performs not an act to which he is obliged. He breaks a positive duty.

In cases of Heedlessness or Rashness, the party does an act from which he is bound to forbear. He breaks a negative duty.

In cases of Negligence, he adverts not to the act, which it is his duty to do.

In cases of Heedlessness, he adverts not to *consequences* of the act which he does.

In cases of Rashness, he adverts to those consequences of the act ; but, by reason of some assumption *which he examines insufficiently*, he concludes that those consequences will not follow the act in the instance before him.

And, since the notions are so closely allied, they are (as might be expected) often confounded. Heedlessness is frequently denoted by the term 'negligence' ; and the same term has even been extended to rashness or temerity. But the three states of mind are nevertheless distinct ; and, in respect of differences between their consequences, should be distinguished.

Having tried to analyse intention (where it is coupled with will), and to settle the notions of negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, I will now trouble you with a few remarks upon certain established terms.

Dolus denotes, strictly, *fraud*⁷⁹:—‘*Calliditas, fallacia, machinatio, ad circumveniens, decipiendum, fallendum alterum, adhibita.*’

LECT.
Dolus.

By a transference of its meaning which is not very explicable, it also signifies *intention*,⁸⁰ or *intentional wrong*:—‘*Injuria qualiscunque scienter admissa:*’—‘*Injuria quam quis sciens volensque commisit.*’

The use of the term *dolus* for the purpose of signifying *intention*, may, perhaps, be explained thus:

Fraud imports *intention*: For he who contrives or machinates *ad decipiendum alterum*, pursues a given purpose. For want, therefore, of a name which would denote *Intention* generally, the Roman Lawyers expressed it (as well as they could) by the name of a something which necessarily implied it.

It is an instance of those generalizations which are so common in language: of the extension of a term denoting a species, to the genus which includes that species. [*e.g.* *Virtue.*]

Culpa (when opposed to *Dolus*) imports negligence, heedlessness, or temerity; or any injury consequent upon any of these: ‘*Omnis protervitas, temeritas, inconsiderantia, desidia, negligentia, imperitia, quibus citra dolum, cui nocitum est.*’ But (used in a larger sense), *Culpa* is equivalent to the English ‘*Guilt.*’ It denotes that the party has broken a duty, intentionally, negligently, heedlessly, or rashly. ‘*Generatim, culpa dicitur quævis injuria ita admissa, ut jure imputari possit ejus auctori.*’ In order that a given mischief may be *imputed* to another, ‘*necesse est, ut culpâ ejus id acciderit.*’ That is to say, through his *intention*; or through his negligence, heedlessness or temerity (as I have explained them above).

Culpa.

Culpa, therefore, is sometimes opposed to *Dolus*; and it sometimes comprises *Dolus*.

Again: the term *Culpa* is sometimes opposed to *Negligentia*. In which case, these words have a very peculiar meaning.

Culpa is restricted to *delicts* (*stricto sensu*). *Negligence* denotes breaches of obligations (*s. s.*).

The injuries done through *Culpa* (in this sense) ‘*faciendo semper admittantur.*’

The injuries done ‘*Negligentiâ*’ (in this sense) are committed ‘*faciendo aut non faciendo.*’

Obligations (*stricto sensu*) are positive or negative.

⁷⁹ Bentham, Pr. 91. ⁸⁰ But for a modification of this statement see p. 480,

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Here then *Negligentia* includes, Intention, Negligence (properly so called), Heedlessness, and Temerity.

Origin of this application. *Negligentia* opposed to *Diligentia*: i.e. that care which (ex obligatione) the obliged party⁸¹ is often obliged to employ about the interests of another.

Malice.

I have already remarked upon the extension of *Dolus* to Intention generally. In the English law (in certain cases) we have employed the word 'Malice' for a similar purpose. As malice (*stricto sensu*) implies intention, it has been extended to cases in which there is no malice. As I have already shewn, it does not in this extended sense denote the motive. And it is manifest that the motive to a criminal action may be laudable.⁸² The intention of an action suggested by a blamable motive, lawful.

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Dolus and
Culpa.
Roman law.

A few words for the purpose of applying what has been said to the Roman Law. Unintentionality, and innocence of intention, seem both to be included in the case of *infortunium*, where there is neither *dolus* nor *culpa*. Unadvisedness coupled with heedlessness, and misadvisedness coupled with rashness, correspond to the *culpa sine dolo*. Direct intentionality corresponds to *dolus*. Oblique intentionality seems hardly to have been distinguished from direct; were it to occur, it would probably be deemed also to correspond to *dolus*.⁸³

Meanings of *Dolus*, etc.

Dolus bonus et malus.—Mühlenbruch, vol. i. pp. 191, 332.

Dolus = *Voluntas nocendi*. Consequently it neither includes indirect, nor sudden intention.—Mühl. 190, 330 *et seq.* Feuerbach,⁸⁴ 51–2, 58. Rosshirt, 37–9, 43. Bentham's Princ.

Dolus indeterminatus.—Feuerb. 56. Rossh. 39.

Culpa = *Crimen*, *Delictum*, *Injuria*.—Rosshirt, 42.

Culpa = Guilt: *Dolus et Negligentia* (in any of its modifications).—Feuerb. 78–9. Rossh. 35, 42. Mühl. 326, 330 *et seq.*

Culpa as opposed to *Dolus*. Includes indirect and hasty intention,

⁸¹ Trustees, Bailees, etc.

⁸² Bentham, 'Principles,' etc. pp. 89, 115, 132, 142.

⁸³ It is included in *culpa*. [*Scientia*, but without the *voluntas nocendi*. *Prope dolum*, but not *dolus*.] Nothing can be more accurate.

⁸⁴ *Imputation. Immutability. and Guilt.*

Conditions of imputation:

1. Knowledge, actual or possible, on the part of the accused, of the criminality of his act or omission:
2. Dependence on his own wishes, of the forbearance or performance due.—
marginal Note.

with negligence in all its modifications.—Feuerb. 51-3, 54-5; 80. LECT. XX.
Rossh. 42-3-4. Mühl. 330 *et seq.*

Culpa dolo determinata.—Feuerb. 47. Rossh. 39.

Negligentia ob obligationis vinculum, præstanda.—Mühl. 333.
Mackeldey, ii. 160. •


Injuria, Delictum, Crimen.—Mühl. 325-6, 185. Feuerb. 24.
Rossh. 2.

Injuria (generaliter) = ‘*Omne quod non jure fit.*’—Justinian.

The obvious division is into 1°, Wrongful Intention with its various modifications, 2°, Wrongful inadvertence with, etc.

Inconsistencies consequent upon putting indirect and sudden intention into *culpa*, and excluding them from *dolus*.—Feuerb. 80.
Rossh. 86.

Table applicable to Lecture XX.



LECTURE XXI.

INTENTION FURTHER CONSIDERED.

THE intentions which I considered in my last Lecture, are coupled with present volitions, and with present acts. LECT. XXI

The party wishes or wills certain of the bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them: He expects or believes, at the moment of the volition, that the bodily movements which he wills will certainly and immediately follow it: and he also expects or believes, at the moment of the volition, that some given event or events will certainly or probably follow those bodily movements. Intentions coupled with volitions and acts.

In other words, he presently *wills* some given act; intending the act (as the consequence of the volition), and intending some further event (as the consequence of the volition and the act).

But a *present* intention to do a *future* act, is neither coupled with the performance of the act, nor with a present will to do it. The present intention is not coupled with the present performance of the act. For the intention, though present, regards the future. Nor is it coupled with the present *will* to do the act intended. For to *will* an act is to *do* the act, provided that the bodily organ, which is the instrument of the volition and the act, be in a sound or healthy state. Present intention to do a future act, distinguished from an act w^{ill} se^{tion} and intention.

Consequently, to do an act with a present intention, is widely different from a present intention to do a future act. In the first case, the act is willed and done. In the second case, it is neither willed nor done, although it is intended.

A present intention to do a future act, may (I think) be resolved into the following elements. Present intention to do a future act, what,

First, The party *desires* a given object, either as an end, or as a mean to an end.

Secondly, He *believes* that the object is attainable through acts of his own: Or (speaking more properly) he believes that acts of his own would give him a chance of attaining it.

Thirdly, He *presently* believes that he shall do acts *in future*, for the purpose of attaining the object.

A *belief* 'that the desired object is attainable through acts of our own,' and 'that we shall do acts thereafter for the purpose of attaining it,' are necessary constituents of the Distinguished from a simple desire of the object.

LECT. XXI. complex notion which is styled 'a present intention to do a future act.'

If these be absent, we simply desire the object.

Unless I believe that the object be attainable through acts of my own, I cannot presently believe that I shall do acts hereafter for the purpose of attaining the object. I cannot believe that I shall try to attain an object, knowing that my efforts to attain it are utterly ineffectual.⁸⁵

Intention supposes that the object is attainable through conduct of our own. Or (as it is commonly said) that the attainment of the object depends upon our will. And though I believe that the object be attainable through acts of my own, I *simply desire* or *barely wish* the object, unless I *presently* believe that I shall do acts *hereafter* for the purpose of attaining it.

For example, if I wish for a watch hanging in a watchmaker's window, but without believing that I shall try to take it from the owner, I am perfectly clear of *intending* to steal the watch, although I am guilty of *coveting* my neighbour's goods (provided that the wish recur frequently).

Present intention to do a future act, restated.

The belief 'that the desired object is attainable through acts of our own,' is necessarily implied in the belief 'that we shall do acts hereafter for the purpose of attaining it.'

Consequently, a present intention to do a future act may be defined to be: 'A present *desire* of an object (either as an end or a mean), coupled with a present *belief* that we shall do acts hereafter for the purpose of attaining the object.'

It may also be distinguished briefly from a present volition and intention, in the following manner:

In the latter case, we presently will, and presently act, *expecting* a given consequence. In the former case, we neither presently will nor presently act, but we *presently* expect or believe that we *shall* will *hereafter*.

Confusion of Will and Intention.

When we *will* a present act, intending a given consequence, it is frequently said 'that we *will* the consequence as well as the act.' And when we intend a future act, it is frequently said 'that we *will* the act *now*, although we postpone the execution to a future time.' In either case, will is confounded with intention.

When we intend a future act, it is also commonly said

⁸⁵ *E.g.* Desire to be King. But no man in a private station (unless he be a madman) can intend to aim at the Kingly Office: i.e. to pursue a course of conduct leading him to the throne.

‘that we resolve or determine to do it;’ or ‘that we make up our minds to do it.’ Frequently, too, a verbal distinction is taken between a strong and a weak intention; that is to say, between a strong or a weak belief that we shall do the act in future. Where the belief is strong, we are more apt to say ‘that we *intend* the act.’ Where the belief is weak, we are more apt to say ‘that we *believe* we shall do it.’

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Such being the forms of language, it is somewhat difficult to admit, at first hearing, ‘that a present *intention* to do a future act is nothing but a present *belief* that we shall do an act in future.’ But that nothing but this really passes in the mind any man may convince himself by examining the state of his mind when he intends a future act.

When we speak of *willing* a future act, we are not speaking of our intention to do the future act, but of our wish for the object which we believe may be attained through the act. Or, rather, our wish for the object, and our intention of resorting to the mean, are blended and confounded. And as every volition is a desire, and is also coupled with an intention, the compound of desire and intention is naturally styled a volition, although it is impossible (from the nature of the case) that we *can* will an act of which we defer the execution.

When we say ‘that we have resolved or determined on an act,’ or ‘that we have made up our minds to do an act,’ we merely mean this: ‘that we have examined the object of the desire, and have considered the means of attaining it, and that, since we think the object worthy of pursuit, we believe we shall resort to the means which will give us a chance of getting it.’

Here also, the desire of the object is confounded with the *belief* which properly constitutes the intention. Every genuine volition being a desire, and every genuine volition being coupled with an intention, we naturally extend the terms which are proper to *volitions* to every desire which is combined with an intention.

It is clear that such expressions as ‘determining,’ ‘resolving,’ ‘making up one’s mind,’ can only apply in strictness to ‘volitions’: that is to say, to those desires which are instantly followed by their objects, and by which it may be said that we are *concluded*, from the moment at which we conceive them. He who wills necessarily acts as he wills, and cannot will (with effect) that he will retract or recall

LECT. XXI the volition. He has '*determined*:' he has '*resolved*:' He has '*made up his mind*.' He is *concluded* by his own volition. He cannot *un-will* that which he has willed.

But when such expressions as '*resolving*' and '*determining*' are applied to a present intention to do a future act, they simply denote that we desire the object *intensely*, and that we believe (with corresponding confidence) we shall resort to means of attaining it.

And this perfectly accords with common apprehension, although it may sound (at first hearing) as if it were a paradox. For, every *intention*, (or every so-styled *will*) which regards the future, is *ambulatory* or *revocable*. That is to say, the present *desire* of the object may cease hereafter; and the present *belief* that we shall resort to the means of attaining it, will, of course, cease with the wish for it. We cannot *believe* that we shall try to get that, for which we *know* that we care not.

Intending a
future for-
bearance.

It is clear that we may presently intend a future forbearance as well as a future *act*.

We may either desire an object inconsistent with the act to be forborne, or we may positively dislike the probable consequences of the act. In the first case, we may presently believe that we shall forbear from the act hereafter, in order that we may attain the object which we wish or desire. In the latter case, we may presently believe that we shall forbear from the act hereafter, in order that we may avoid the consequences from which we are averse.

[*Every present forbearance* from a given act, is not preceded or accompanied by a present *volition* to do another act.

It may be preceded or accompanied by mere inaction; *e.g.* I may lie perfectly still, *intending* not to rise.

But, still, it is generally true, that every present forbearance *is* preceded or accompanied by a volition. In our waking hours, our lives are a series (nearly unbroken) of volitions and acts. And, when we forbear, we commonly do a something inconsistent with the act forborne, and which we are conscious is inconsistent with it.]

Where a forbearance is preceded or accompanied by inaction, the desire leading to the forbearance is not to be compared to a volition. The forbearance is not like the act, the direct and appropriate object of the wish.

All that can be said (in generals) of intentions to *act* in future, may be applied (with slight modifications) to inten-

tions to *forbear* in future. I confine myself to intentions to *act* in future, in order that my expressions may be less complex, and, by consequence, more intelligible. LECT. XXI

When we intend a future act, we also intend certain of its consequences. In other words, we believe that certain consequences will follow that future act, which we presently believe we shall hereafter will. This is necessarily implied in every intention of the sort. For our present wish or desire of some probable consequence of the act, is our reason for believing *presently* that we shall do the act *in future*. An intended consequence of an intended future act, is not always desired.

But we may also intend or expect that the act may be followed by consequences, which we do not desire, or from which we are averse. For example; I may intend to shoot at and kill you, so soon as I can find an opportunity. But knowing that you are always accompanied by friends or other companions, I believe that I may kill or wound one of these in my intended attempt to kill you.

Here, the object which I wish or desire is your death. I *intend* the act, or I believe that I *shall* will it, because I desire your death. But I also believe that the act will be followed by a consequence from which I am averse:—by a consequence which is not the *ground* of my present intention, although I intend *in spite of it*. I intend a future act. I intend a consequence which I desire. And I also intend a consequence from which I am averse.

The execution of every intention to do a future act, is necessarily postponed to a future time. Intentions to do future acts are certain or uncertain;

Every intention to do a future act, is also revocable or ambulatory. That is to say, Before the intention be carried into execution, the desire which is the ground of the intention may cease or be extinguished, or, although it continue, may be outweighed by inconsistent desires.

But though the execution of the intention be always contingent, the intention itself may be certain or uncertain. I may regard the intended act as one which I shall certainly will; or I may regard it as one which I shall will, on the happening of a given contingency. In either case, I may either intend a precise and definite act, or I may merely intend some act for the purpose of attaining my object. Are matured or undigested.

For example; I may intend to kill you by *shooting*, at a given *place* and *time*. Or (though I intend to kill you) I may neither have determined the *mode* by which I shall attain my object, nor the *time* or *place* for executing the murderous design. In cases of the first class, the intention,

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design, or purpose, is settled, determinate, or matured. In cases of the latter class, it is unsettled, indeterminate, or undigested.

A *consilium*, or compassing.

It not unfrequently happens, that a long and complex series of acts and means is a necessary condition to the attainment of the desired object (supposing it can be attained). To determine these means, or to deliberate on the choice of them, is commonly styled 'a compassing of the desired object.' Or, when the intended means are thus complicated, the intention is frequently styled *consilium*. Either of the terms denotes the deliberation or pondering, which necessarily attends the intention before it becomes precise.

Such (I think) are the proper meanings of *compassing* and *consilium*. Where the intended means are few and simple, there is no necessity for that long and laborious deliberation, which seems to give to the intention (in the cases in question) the names of 'compassing' or *consilium*.

It must, however, be confessed, that the terms are frequently applied loosely. In the language of the English Law, you would *compass* and imagine the death of the *King*, although you intended to slay him by the shortest and simplest means. For instance, by shooting him with a rifle in a theatre. And, in various books, I have seen the word 'consilium' used for 'propositum' or intention.

It is only by the *complexity* of the means, that a compassing or *consilium* is distinguished from another intention. In all other respects, the two states of mind are exactly alike. There is a present desire of a given object, with a belief that we shall resort to means (precise or indeterminate) for the accomplishment of the desire.

Attempts.⁸⁶

It frequently happens that the desired object is not accomplished by the intended act. For example, I point a gun, and pull the trigger, intending to shoot you. But the gun misses fire, or the shot misses its mark. In this case, the act is styled an *attempt*: an attempt to accomplish the desired object. It also frequently happens, that several acts must be done in succession before the desired object can be accomplished. And the doing any of the acts which precede the last, is also an *attempt* to accomplish the desired object, or

⁸⁶ 'Delictum consummatum. Conatus delinquendi.' Consummate Crimes and Criminal Attempts.—*Feuerbach*, p. 41. bringung eines Verbrechens zum Zwecke hat, ohne den bezweckten verbrecherischen Thatbestand wirklich zu machen, 'Eine Handlung, welche die Hervor- ist ein Versuch.—*Rosshirt*, p. 85.

is rather an endeavour *towards* the accomplishment of the object. For example; to buy poison for the purpose of killing another, or to provide arms for the purpose of attacking the king, are attempts or endeavours towards murder or treason. Attempts are evidence of the party's intention; and, considered in that light, are styled in the English Law, '*overt acts*.'

Where a criminal intention is evidenced by an attempt, the party is punished in respect of the criminal intention.⁸⁷ Sometimes he is punished as severely as if he had accomplished the object. But more commonly, with less severity.

Why the party should be punished in respect of a mere intention, I will try to explain hereafter.

The reason for requiring an attempt, is probably the danger of admitting a mere confession.⁸⁸ When coupled with an overt act, the confession is illustrated and supported by the latter. When not, it may proceed from insanity, or may be invented by the witness to it.

I have considered the import of the term '*Intention*,' in order that I might elucidate the general nature of Injuries and Political Sanctions.

But the word '*intention*' is often employed, without reference to wrongs. We speak of the intention of the legislator, in passing a law; of the intention of testators; of the intention of parties to contracts, and so on. In each of these cases, the notion signified by the term '*Intention*' may be reduced to one of the notions which I have already endeavoured to explain: namely, a present volition and act, with the expectation of a consequence; or a present belief, on the part of the person in question, that he will do an act in future.

Intention
of Legis-
lator, etc.

When we speak of the intention of the legislator, we either advert to the purpose with which he made the law; or we advert to the sense which he annexed to his own expressions, and in which he wished and expected that others would understand them.

If we advert to the purpose with which he made the law, we mean that he willed and performed a given act, *expecting* a given consequence. In order that he might attain the purpose, he made and published the law. And when he made and promulged it, he *intended* the purpose: that is to

⁸⁷ I venture to think, in accordance with my remarks in the note on p. 427 *ante*, that the ratio of this punishment is more simple, and that the *consilium* or *cogitatio* for which the party is punished is an act evidenced by the *overt act*.—R. C.

⁸⁸ Example of man punished for confessed intention (without overt act) to kill Henry III. of France.

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say, he *expected* or *believed* that the 'purpose which moved him to make and promulge it, would follow the making and promulgation *as a consequence*.

If we advert to the sense which he attached to his own expressions, we also mean that he willed and performed an act, *expecting* a consequence. We mean that he used expressions with a certain sense, *expecting* that those to whom he addressed them would receive them in the same sense.

The intention of the testator regards the purpose of the provision, or the sense which he attached to his words. In either case, we mean by 'his intention,' that he did a certain act expecting a certain consequence: That he made the provision, expecting the purpose would follow it; or that he used his words with a certain sense, *expecting* that others would understand them in the same sense. When we say, that 'the will or intention of the testator is ambulatory,' we mean that 'he may will and intend anew.'

When we speak of the *intention* of contracting parties, we mean the intention of the promisor, or the intention of the promisee.⁸⁹ If we mean the intention of the promisor,

⁸⁹ Or rather, the sense in which it is to be inferred from the words used, or from the transaction, or from both, that the one party gave and the other received it. Paley's rule would lead to this: that a mistaken apprehension of the apprehension in which the promisee received, would exonerate the promisor. This would be to disappoint the promisee. If the apprehension of the promisee did not extend to so much as the promisor apprehends that it did, it is true that the promisor is not surprised by a more onerous obligation than he expected; but then there is no reason for giving the promisee an advantage which he did not expect: pain of loss being greater than the mere pleasure of gain; which this advantage would be: there being, by the supposition, no expectation and therefore no engagement in consequence.

If, on the other hand, the promisor underestimates the expectation of the promisee he disappoints an expectation.

The true rule is the understanding of both parties. The very use of Paley's rule shows that it embraces both. In the example, Paley seems to confound the sense which the promisor, in common with all, must have put on his promise, with his secret intention of breaking it.

(See 'Intention,' regarding future.)

The *sense* of the promise, i.e. the meaning which each party apprehends that the words or transaction must denote, is a totally different thing from the *intention* with which it is made. The one uses, and he knows he uses, words of such an import; the other hears words which he knows to be of the same import; from these words ensue an obligation, the extent of which each knows, and the compulsory performance of which *in terminis* would not disappoint the expectations of the parties, whatever might be their intentions.

'Where the terms of a promise admit of more senses than one, the promise is to be performed "in that sense which the promisor apprehended, at the time that the promisee received it."

'It is not the sense in which the promisor actually intended it, that always governs the interpretation of an equivocal

promise; because, at that rate, you might excite expectations which you never meant, nor would be obliged, to satisfy. Much less is it the sense in which the promisee actually received the promise; for, according to that rule, you might be drawn into engagements you never designed to undertake. It must

we mean his intention* as it regards the *performance* of his promise, or we mean his intention as it regards the nature or extent of it. In the first case, we mean that he intends (when he makes the promise) to do or forbear in future. In the second case, we mean that he makes* a certain promise, *expecting* that the promisee will understand it in a certain sense. In the first case, we mean that he believes he shall do or forbear in future. In the second case, we mean that he does a present act, expecting a given consequence.

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If we mean the intention of the promisee, we mean that he accepts the promise, understanding it in a certain sense, and expecting a future consequence: namely, that the promisor will perform it.

He does a present act, expecting a given consequence.

LECTURE XXII.

DUTY, INJURY, AND SANCTION.

I HAVE endeavoured to analyse and to fix the meanings of the following related expressions:—‘Motive,’ ‘Will,’ ‘Intention,’ ‘Negligence,’ ‘Heedlessness,’ ‘Rashness.’

LECT. XXII.

I now proceed to the essentials of Injury and Sanction, and of that Compulsion or Restraint which is imported by Duty or Obligation.

Every legal duty (whether it be relative or absolute, or whether it be *officium* or *obligatio*) is a duty to do, or forbear from, an act or acts, and is imposed by a Command (express or tacit) of the person or body which is *sovereign* in a given society.

Duty.

As every injury or wrong is a breach or violation of duty, it supposes that an act enjoined is *not* done, or that an act forbidden is done.

Injury.

A party lying under a duty, or upon whom a duty is incumbent, is liable to evil or inconvenience (to be inflicted by sovereign authority), in case he violate the duty, or disobey the command which imposes it. The evil to be incurred by

Sanction.

therefore be the sense (for there is no other remaining) in which the promisor believed that the promisee accepted his promise.’—*Paley, Moral and Polit. Philosophy*, vol. i. chap. v.

the party in case he disobey the command, enforces compliance with the command, or secures the fulfilment of the duty. In other words, it inclines the party to obey the command, or to fulfil the duty or obligation which the command imposes upon him. By reason of his liability or obnoxiousness to the eventual or conditional evil, there is a *chance* that he will *not* disobey: A chance which is greater or less (foreign considerations apart), as the evil itself, and the chance of incurring it by disobedience, are greater or less. The eventual or conditional evil to which the party is obnoxious, is styled a '*Sanction*;' or the Law or other Command is said to be *sanctioned* by the evil.

Obligation is obnoxiousness to a Sanction.

'To be obliged to do or forbear,' or 'to lie under a *duty* or *obligation* to do or forbear,' is to be liable or obnoxious to a sanction, in the event of disobeying a command. In other words, 'to lie under an obligation to do or forbear,' is to be liable to an evil from the author of the command, in the event of disobedience.

The party is *bound* or *obliged* to do or forbear, because he is obnoxious to the evil, and because he fears the evil. To borrow the current, though not very accurate expressions, he is *compelled* by his fear of the evil to do the act which is enjoined, or is *restrained* by his fear of the evil from doing the act which is forbidden.

Sanction and Obligation distinguished.

The difference between Sanction and Obligation is simply this:

Sanction is evil, incurred or to be incurred, by disobedience to command.

Obligation is liability to that evil, in the event of disobedience.

Obligation regards the future.

Obligation regards the future. An obligation to a past act, or an obligation to a past forbearance, is a contradiction in terms.

If the party has acted or forborne agreeably to the command, he has fulfilled the obligation wholly or in part, and the obligation has wholly or in part ended or ceased in respect of that act or forbearance.

And here there is a certain difference between positive and negative duties. The end or scope of positive duties, and of the *jura in personam* which correspond to them, is the performance of that to which the party obliged by the duty is bound. But the scope or purpose of negative duties, and of the rights with which they correlate, is not the observance of the office or obligation; although that observance is a

necessary condition to the enjoyment or exercise of the right. A positive obligation, therefore, is determined by fulfilment: but an office or negative obligation is not determined by fulfilment, but by an event extraneous to the duty, namely, the extinguishment of the right with which it correlates, or of a right which it regards or concerns. The performance of a positive duty extinguishes both the duty and the corresponding right: a negative duty is never extinguished by fulfilment, though if the right be extinguished by another cause, the duty ceases. This difference between positive and negative duties, has been erroneously supposed to be a difference between offices and obligations; a confusion of ideas pregnant with important misconceptions, and which obscures the difference between offices and obligations, between *jura in rem* and *jura in personam*.

If, on the other hand, the party has disobeyed the command by action, forbearance or omission, he has actually incurred the sanction, or is actually liable to the application of the sanction. And, in respect of the forbearance which he has *not* observed, or in respect of the act which he has forborne or omitted, the duty or obligation to which the sanction was annexed, has (as before), wholly or in part, ended or ceased. The sanction which has attached upon him may consist of a new obligation, but that obligation to which the sanction was appended, has (wholly or in part) determined.

It is not unfrequently said 'that Sanctions operate upon the *Will*,' and 'that men are obliged to do or forbear through their *wills*.'

Sanctions
operate
upon the
desires.

It were more correct to say 'that Sanctions operate upon the *desires*,' and 'that men are obliged to do or forbear through their *desires*.'

Stated plainly and precisely, the fact is this: The party obliged is averse from the conditional evil, which he may chance to incur in case he break the obligation: In other words, he wishes or desires to avoid it. But, in order that he may avoid the evil, or may avoid the chance of incurring it, he must fulfil the obligation: He must do *that* which the Law enjoins, or must forbear from *that* which the Law prohibits.

That every sanction operates upon the *desires* of the obliged, is true. For he is necessarily averse from the evil with which he is threatened by the Law, as he is necessarily averse from every evil whatsoever.

That every sanction operates upon the *will* of the obliged,

is not true. If the duty be *positive*, and if he fulfil the duty out of regard to the sanction, it may be said with propriety that the sanction operates upon his *will*. For his desire of avoiding the evil which impends from the Law, makes him *do*, and, therefore, *will*, the act which is the object of the command and the duty. But if the duty be *negative*, and if he fulfil the duty out of regard to the sanction, it can scarcely be said with propriety that the sanction operates upon his *will*. His desire of avoiding the evil which impends from the Law, makes him forbear from the act which the Law prohibits. But, though he *intends* the forbearance, he does not *will* the forbearance. He either wills an act which is inconsistent with the act forborne, or he remains in a state of inaction which equally excludes it. In the former case, he does *not* will the *forbearance*. In the latter case, he wills *nothing*.

If, then, the party fulfil his duty, and if he fulfil his duty out of regard to the sanction, the fact, precisely stated, is this: He is obnoxious to evil from the Law, in case he violate his duty. This conditional evil, like every possible evil, he necessarily wishes to avoid. And, in order that he may avoid the evil with which he is threatened by the Law, he wills the act, or *intends* the forbearance, which the Author of the Law commands.

Again: Every sanction operates upon the *desires* of the obliged, *although he violate the duty*.

If he *do* an act which the Law forbids, or if he *forbear* from an act which the Law enjoins, he desires to avoid the evil with which he is threatened by the Law, although that desire be mastered and suppressed by a conflicting and stronger desire. And, if he *omit* an act which the Law enjoins, he *habitually* desires to avoid the conditional evil, although, at the moment of the omission, he forgets the sanction and the duty.

But, *when the obliged party violates his duty*, it is manifest that the sanction does not operate upon his *will*, although it affects his *desires*. If he do an act which the Law forbids, he wills an act in spite of the sanction. If he violate his duty by forbearance or omission, he does *not* will an act which the Law enjoins, and which it is the scope and purpose of the sanction to *make* him *will*.

It is, therefore, not true, or is not true universally, that 'Sanction operates upon the *will* of the obliged;' or 'that the party is obliged through his *will*.' But it is true, and is

true universally, 'that Sanction operates upon the *desires* of the obliged,' or 'that the party is obliged through his *desires*.'

For to affirm *that* is merely to affirm *this*:—'That the party is necessarily averse from every evil; and necessarily wishes to avoid the evil by which the command is sanctioned.'

I said, in a former Lecture, that an obligation to *will* is impossible.⁹⁰ Why I said so, I am somewhat at a loss to see. For it is quite certain, that the proposition is grossly false, and is not consistent with my own deliberate opinion.

An obligation to *will* not impossible.

We *are* obliged to will, whenever our duties are *positive*: that is to say, whenever we are obliged to act. The Law threatens us with the sanction, in order that we may *act*; and in order that we may act, we must *will*. This, it is manifest, is the meaning of the proposition 'that we are bound to act *through our wills*.' The force of the obligation lies in our *desire* of avoiding the threatened evil. But, in order that we may avoid that evil by performing the obligation, we *will* the act which is commanded.

And this is true. For *acts and their consequences* are the objects of positive duties; and every volition is followed by the act which is willed, if the appropriate bodily organ be sound or healthy. Perhaps, I confounded *desires* (as contradistinguished from volitions) with those peculiar desires which are styled 'volitions.' Or, perhaps, I intended to affirm that we cannot be obliged to *desire*, in the sense wherein *desire* is opposed to *will*. And this is also true.

And here I may remark that we cannot be obliged to desire or not to desire; *i.e.* to desire *that* which the Law enjoins, or *not* to desire that which the Law forbids: For although we *desire* to avoid the sanction, we are not *therefore* averse from that which the Law forbids, nor do we therefore incline to that which the Law enjoins.

An obligation to desire not possible.

In spite of our aversion from the evil with which we are menaced by the Law, we may still desire that which the Law forbids, or may desire to evade that which the Law exacts: Although our necessary desire of avoiding the sanction, may be stronger than the opposite desire which urges us to a breach of our duty. The desire of avoiding the sanction may *control* the opposite desire, but cannot supplant or destroy it.

⁹⁰ The passage referred to, not being contained in the lectures as formerly published, I have not restored in its place. But I find that in J. S. M.'s notes it follows the sentence ending on the 11th line of p. 378 *ante*, and runs thus:—

'We cannot, speaking correctly, be obliged to will, though we are obliged through our will. Neither can we, strictly speaking, be obliged to suffer.' —R. C.

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Or, if it can destroy it, it can only destroy it in the oblique or indirect manner to which I shall advert immediately.

It is equally manifest, that we are not *obliged* to our desire of avoiding the sanction. We are not *bound* or obliged to entertain the desire; but we are bound or obliged, *because* we are threatened with the evil, and *because* we inevitably desire to *avoid* the evil. We are not obliged to entertain the desire, but we are obliged *because* we entertain it.

Supposed
conflict of
desire and
will.

When we desire that which the Law forbids, or when we are averse from that which the Law enjoins, we observe our duty (supposing we do observe it) *because* our aversion from the sanction tops the conflicting wish.

In these, and in similar cases, it is not unusual to suppose a *conflict* between desire and will. Because we *will* a something from which we are *averse*, it is imagined that we will *against* our desires. The truth, however, is, that there is no conflict *between desire and will*, although there is a conflict between inconsistent desires.

I wish to forbear from that which the Law enjoins, or I wish to do that which the Law prohibits. But I also wish to avoid the evil with which I am threatened by the Law. And as my wish of avoiding this evil is stronger than the opposite wish, I will that which the Law enjoins, or I forbear from that which the Law forbids. I do not will or forbear *against my desires*, but I will or forbear in compliance with a stronger desire, instead of forbearing or willing in compliance with a weaker desire.

It is truly astonishing that this obvious solution of the difficulty escaped the penetration of Mr. Locke. It is of no small importance that the difficulty should be clearly conceived, and the solution distinctly apprehended. For I believe that the mysterious jargon about the nature of the will has arisen entirely from this purely verbal puzzle.

If we suppose that the Will can control the Desires, or that man can will *against* his desires, we must suppose that will and desire are utterly distinct and disparate; we cannot, consistently with such a supposition, admit that volitions are a class of desires, and are merely distinguished from other desires by a certain specific difference: namely, that they are followed immediately or without the intervention of means, by their direct or appropriate objects.

Effect of
obligation
in extin-
guishing
desires

I have said that we cannot be obliged *not* to desire; that the desire of avoiding the sanction may *master* or *control*, but cannot *extinguish* a desire which urges to a breach of duty.

But this, though true in the main, must be taken with an important qualification.

The desire of avoiding the sanction cannot destroy *directly* the conflicting and sinister desire. But the desire of avoiding the sanction may destroy the antagonist desire, *gradually* or *in the way of association*. The thought of the act or forbearance which would amount to a breach of duty, is habitually coupled with the thought of the evil which the Law annexes to the wrong. If our desire of avoiding the evil, which the Law annexes to the wrong, be stronger than our desire of the consequences which might follow the act or forbearance, we regard the latter as a cause of probable evil, and we gradually transfer to the cause our aversion from the effect. Our stronger desire of avoiding the Sanction, gradually extinguishes the weaker desire. Our wish for the agreeable consequences which might follow the wrong, is absorbed by our wish of avoiding the evil which the wrong would probably induce. We regard the wrong as a cause of evil, and we dislike it accordingly.

which urge
to a breach
of duty.

This is merely a case of a familiar and indisputable fact. Objects originally agreeable become disagreeable on account of their disagreeable consequences. And objects originally pleasing become displeasing by reason of painful consequences with which they are pregnant.

This gradual effect of sanctions in extinguishing sinister desires, is a matter of familiar remark, and is expressed in various ways. Owing to the prevalent misconceptions regarding the nature of the will, the effect which is really wrought upon the state of the desires is frequently ascribed to the *will*. It is forgotten that the will is merely an *instrument* of the desires; and that every change in disposition and conduct is a change in the dominant desires, and not in the subject will.

We are told, for instance, by Hobbes, in his 'Essay on Liberty and Necessity,' 'that the habitual fear of punishment maketh men just:,' 'that it frames and moulds their *wills* to justice.' The plain and simple truth is this: that it tends to quench wishes which urge to breach of duty, or are adverse to *that* which is *jussum* or ordained.

Where the fear of the evils which impend from the Law has extinguished the desires which urge to breach of duty, the man is *just*. He is not compelled or restrained by fear of the sanction, but he fulfils his duty spontaneously. He is moved to right, and is held from wrong, by that habitual

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aversion from wrong or injury, which the habitual fear of the sanction has gradually begotten.

The man who fulfils his duty *because* he fears the sanction, is an *unjust* man, although his conduct be just. If he could violate his duty without incurring the evil, his conduct would accord with the desires which urge him to break it.

In short, the fear of the evils by which our duties are sanctioned, cannot extinguish *instantly* or *directly* the desires and aversions which urge us to violate our duties. But the fear of those evils may extinguish these desires and aversions *gradually* or *in the way of association*. Our necessary aversion from the evils with which we are threatened by the Law is often transferred by insensible degrees to the injuries or wrongs which might bring those evils upon us. Our fear of the sanction is changed into hate of the offence. Instead of fulfilling our duty through fear of the sanction, we fulfil our duty through that aversion from wrong which the habitual fear of the sanction has slowly engendered. We come to love justice with disinterested love, and to hate injustice with disinterested hate. So far as we fulfil our duties through these disinterested affections, we are just. 'Justitia est perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi.' So far as we are moved to fulfil them by the evils with which they are sanctioned, we are *unjust men*, although our *conduct* be just. For if we were freed from the fear which compels or restrains us, our conduct would accord with the sinister desires and aversions, which solicit or urge us to violate our duties.

When I affirm that our fear of the evils by which our duties are sanctioned is frequently transmuted into a disinterested hate of injustice, I am far from intimating that *that* fear is the *only* source of *this* beneficent disposition. The love of justice, or the hate of injustice, is partly generated (no doubt) by a perception of the *utility* of justice; and by that love of general utility which is felt by all or most men more or less strongly. But it is also generated, in part, by the habitual fear of sanctions. And to this consideration my attention is particularly directed. For my purpose is not to analyse the sources of the beneficent disposition, but to distinguish the *remote* effect of obligations and sanctions from the *immediate* or *direct*:—to shew that sanctions may inspire us with a disinterested love of justice, although they *compel* us to right, or *restrain* us from wrong, in case that useful sentiment be absent or defective.

When the desires of the man habitually accord with his duty, we say that the man is disposed to justice, or we style the state of his mind a disposition to justice. And this disposition to justice is a ground for mitigation in measuring out punishment or in measuring out censure.

Every legal crime should be visited with legal punishment, and every offence against morals should be visited with reprobation. But when the circumstances of the offence indicate a disposition to justice, or indicate any disposition which is generally useful or beneficent, utility requires that the punishment should *diminish*, or that the censure should *soften* accordingly. The general consequences which would ensue if the offender passed with impunity, render it expedient that it should be visited with punishment or censure. But since there would be few offences if good dispositions were general, it is also expedient to mitigate the punishment or censure, with a view to the good disposition manifested by the criminal.

And this, accordingly, is the usual habit of the world. The occasional aberrations of a man who is habitually just or humane, are treated with less severity than the offences of the dishonest and the cruel. The amount of punishment is frequently determined by this consideration ; or (although the nature of the offence exclude mitigation of punishment) public reprobation falls with comparative lenity. The necessity of inflicting the punishment is generally perceived and admitted, but the offender is regarded with a feeling which approaches to compassion and regret, rather than to antipathy and exultation.

Where the desires of the man are habitually adverse to his duty, we say that the man is disposed to injustice, or style the state of his mind a disposition to injustice.

Owing to the prevalent misconceptions about the nature of will, we frequently style the predominance of pernicious desires, a depraved or wicked will. Sometimes, indeed, we mean by a depraved or wicked will, a deliberate intention to do a criminal act. Although it is perfectly manifest, that badness or goodness cannot be affirmed of the will, and that a criminal intention may accord with a good disposition.

(See Leibnitz. Schelling and Kant in Ritter and Krug. Coleridge.)⁹¹

What they meant by freedom of the Will was not that we desire without a determining cause, or that we will against our desires, but that, in the cases in question, our desires or wills go with our duties, i.e. we desire to perform our duty more than anything else.

The term 'Sanction' denotes the conditional evil, which is annexed by the Sovereign to the Command. The term 'Obligation' imports the same object considered from a certain aspect. It denotes present liability to that contingent evil, in case the duty be broken, or the command be disobeyed.

The Latin *Obligatio* denotes the operation of the sanction upon the will of the obliged.

It is manifest that the Latin *obligatio* is equivalent to *ligamen* or *vinculum*. The position of a party obnoxious to a contingent evil, is likened to that of a party who is tied to a given place.

⁹¹ These names, especially the first and last of them, suggest an observation upon the ethical views maintained by the author in these lectures.

The author recognises an absolute standard of what is good and true, not (with Kant) as a necessary form of thought, but as consisting in the Divine law which is set to man by a superior, namely the Divine intelligence. The indices to that law he states to be Revelation and Utility, and the position on which he insists at length in the introductory lectures is this: that, apart from Revelation, Utility is the only index, measure, or test of the Divine law—conformity to the law ascertained by Utility, the only aim which ought to control the desires. But the *sphere* of Revelation he passes in silence; a reserve which obliges him to leave untouched the question, how far it is possible for human intelligence and desire to reach forward beyond experience, in the direction of conforming themselves to the Divine intelligence and the Divine will.

The position thus taken up by the author, is a very strong one; and admirably adapted to the purpose of an entry into the field of jurisprudence. But I cannot help noting that, in regard to the entire field of *ethical science*, this position is comparatively narrow, and that its bounds have been left by the author undefined. And they are neces-

sarily indefinite. For I conceive that, as a *measure* or *test*, utility may well be extended far within the sphere of Revelation; and is the only *test* of Revelation which the intelligence common to all mankind seems capable of applying. But that the theory of utility has availed, except to a very limited extent, in *advancing* the practical science of ethics, I take to be contrary to the teaching of history. For I confess myself a learner with those who have read history as shewing, that Revelation has been the guide and pioneer, in places which utility has now fenced and secured as a possession to mankind for all time coming.

Provided only there be conceded to human nature *divinus aliquis afflatus*, which can rise above experience to the recognition and partial realisation of the good existing in God and the Divine Law, and provided *all* the results of such a faculty be embraced in the term Revelation, I readily accede to the author's rejection of a *tertium quid* under the name of moral sense, &c., standing between Revelation and Utility as an index to moral truth. An inquiry into the nature and province of Revelation and the corresponding receptive faculty would clearly have been beyond the scope of these lectures. And as it has not been entered on, neither is it prejudged.—R. C.

The English *duty* (looking at its derivation) rather denotes *that* to which a man is obliged, than the obligation itself. It is derived, through the French *devoir* (past part.) and the Italian *dovere*, from the Latin *debere*. It is, therefore, equivalent to *id quod debitum est*, rather than to *obligatio*.

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Same remark as to the German '*Forderung*' (equivalent to the *obligatio* of the Roman Jurists), '*Pflicht*,' '*Verbindlichkeit*.'

By '*duty*' may be meant any duty; but it commonly meant religious duty, or test of duties.

LECTURE XXIII.

PHYSICAL COMPULSION DISTINGUISHED FROM SANCTION.

I now proceed to distinguish physical compulsion or restraint from the restraint which is imposed by duty or obligation.

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A sanction is a conditional evil:—an evil which the party obliged may chance to incur, in case he violate the obligation, or disobey the command which imposes it. The party obliged is obliged, because he is obnoxious to this evil in the event of disobedience, and because he is necessarily averse from it, or *desires* to avoid it.

The *object* of every duty is an act or forbearance: Or (changing the expression) every duty is a duty to act or forbear. But every act is the consequence of a volition, and every volition is the consequence of a desire: meaning by a *desire*, a desire which is *not* a volition, or a desire strictly so called. Consequently, every act is the consequence of a desire.

And, further, every *forbearance* is *intended*; and is either the effect of an aversion from the consequences of the act forborne, or is the effect of a preference for some object which is inconsistent with the performance of that act. Consequently, every forbearance, like every act, is the consequence of a desire.

Unless we are determined to obedience by disinterested hate of wrong, we fulfil an obligation because we are averse from the sanction. Our desire of avoiding the evil which we might chance to incur by disobedience, makes us will the act which the command enjoins, makes us forbear from the

act which the command forbids. In other words, our desire of avoiding the evil, which we might chance to incur by disobedience, makes us desire the act, or makes us desire the forbearance.

Consequently, we cannot be obliged to *that* which depends not upon our desires, or which we cannot fulfil by desiring or wishing to fulfil it. A stupid and cruel Legislator may affect to command *that*, which the party cannot perform, although he desire to perform it. But though he inspire the party with a wish of fulfilling the command, he cannot attain his end by inspiring those wishes. Nor will the infliction of the pain operate in the way of *example*, or tend to confirm others in their desires of fulfilling their duties. Consequently, the compulsion or restraint which is implied in Duty or Obligation, is hate and fear of an evil which we may avoid by *desiring*: by desiring to fulfil a something, which we *can* fulfil if we wish.

Physical
compulsion
or restraint

guished
from that

by duty or
obligation.

Other compulsion or restraint may be styled merely *physical*. For the term 'physical' or 'natural' (as it is commonly used) is simply a negative expression: denoting that the object to which it is applied, is *not* some other object which is expressly or tacitly referred to. As applied to compulsion or restraint, it denotes that the compulsion or restraint to which it is applied, is *not* the compulsion or restraint which is imported by Obligation or Duty.

Physical compulsion or restraint, as thus understood, may affect the body, or may affect the mind.

For example: If I am imprisoned in a cell of which the door is locked, physical restraint is applied to my body. I cannot move from my cell, although I desire to move from it. Whether I shall quit, or whether I shall stay in my cell, depends not upon my desires.

Again: I am imprisoned in a cell from which I am able to escape, but, knowing that I may be punished, in case I attempt to escape, the fear of the probable punishment determines or inclines me to stay there. •

Now, in this instance, the restraint which is applied to me is not *physical* restraint, but I am *obliged* to stay in my cell. My desire to escape, is not controlled or prevented by outward obstacles. It is controlled or prevented by my opposite or conflicting desire of avoiding the probable punishment. Whether I shall quit, or whether I shall stay in my prison, depends upon my desires.

Further: If the judge sentence me to imprisonment, he

may command that I shall be dragged to prison in case I refuse to go, or he may command me to go to prison under peril of an additional punishment. If I refuse to go to prison, and am dragged thither by the officers without a movement of my own, *physical compulsion* is applied to my body. My body moves to the prison in obedience to an outward impulse, and not in compliance with volitions of my own, prompted by a desire of my own. Whether I shall move to prison, or shall not move to prison, depends not upon my desires.

But if I go to prison, knowing that I shall be whipped in case I refuse to go, *physical compulsion* is not applied to my body, but I move to prison *willingly* in consequence of my *obligation* to go. Much as I hate imprisonment, I hate imprisonment coupled with whipping more. My aversion from the heavier punishment, being stronger than my aversion from the lighter punishment; it may be said, that I desire to go to my prison, *i.e.* I desire it as a mean: a mean of avoiding the greater evil, and that that desire makes me will the movements which carry my body to my prison.

As I observed in a former Lecture, the dominion of the will extends not to the mind.⁹² That is to say, no change in the state of the mind is accomplished by a mere desire. But, though no change in the mind immediately follows a desire for it, changes in the mind may be wrought through *means* to which we resort in consequence of such desires.

For example, I cannot know a science by simply wishing to know it. But by resorting to means suggested by the wish, I may come to know it. By reading, writing, and meditation, I shall acquire the knowledge which I desire. And so, virtues may be acquired by indirect consequence. Numerous changes in the mind are, therefore, wrought by desires: though none of the desires which wchanges in the mind, can be likened to the peculiar desires which are styled volitions.

But a change in the mind may be wrought or prevented, whether we desire the change or whether we do not desire it. And, in all such cases, it may be said that the mind is affected by physical compulsion or restraint.

The conviction produced by evidence, is a case of physical

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compulsion. If I perceive that premisses are true, and that the inference is justly drawn, I admit the conclusion, though I do not *wish* to admit it, or though the truth be unwelcome, and I would reject the truth if I could. Accordingly, if I love darkness, and hate the light, I naturally eschew the evidence which might expel the grateful error. I refuse to examine the proofs which might render the truth resistless, and I dwell with complacency upon every shadow of proof which tends to confirm my prepossession.⁹³

Obligations
to suffer
and not to
suffer.⁹⁴

I observe, that certain writers talk of obligations to suffer, and of obligations not to suffer. And, as an instance of an obligation to suffer, they cite the supposed obligation to suffer punishment, which is incumbent upon a criminal.

But it is clear that we cannot be *obliged* to suffer, or not to suffer. For whether we shall suffer, or shall not suffer, does not depend upon our desires. By acts or forbearances which *do* depend upon our desires, we may induce suffering upon ourselves, or we may avert suffering from ourselves; but the sufferance or passion itself is not immediately dependent upon our wishes to suffer or not.

The Criminal who is condemned to punishment is never *obliged to suffer*, although he may be obliged to acts which facilitate the infliction of the suffering, or may be obliged to forbear from acts which would prevent or hinder the infliction.

For example: If I am condemned to imprisonment, I am not obliged to suffer the imprisonment, although I may be obliged to walk to prison, or to forbear from breaking prison. Whether I shall walk to prison, or shall *not* walk to prison, or whether I shall forbear or not from attempting to break my prison, depends upon my desires. And I can, therefore, be bound or obliged by fear of additional punishment, to do the act, or to observe the forbearance. But whether I shall suffer the imprisonment, or shall not suffer the imprisonment, does not depend upon my desires in the last result. If, in spite of the additional punishment with which I am threatened, I refuse to go to prison, or attempt to break prison, I may not only be visited with the additional punishment, but physical compulsion or restraint may be applied to my body. I may be dragged to prison by the officers of justice; or, when

⁹³ For this reason, non-belief may be examine, partiality or antipathy indilamable. Where (*e.g.*) it is the result rectly removable, etc.

of insufficient examination, refusal to ⁹⁴ *Trinités*, etc. vol. i. pp. 239, 245.

I am there, I may be secured by walls and chains which defy my attempts to escape.

To talk of *obligation* to suffer, is to confound obligation with the ultimate basis of obligation: In the last result, every obligation is sanctioned by suffering: that is to say, by some pain which may be inflicted upon the wrong-doer whether he consent or not: *i.e.* by some pain which may be inflicted upon the wrong-doer independently of an act or forbearance of his own. If this were not the case, and if every obligation were sanctioned by a further obligation, no obligation could be effectual. One obligation might be broken after another; and as no obligation could be enforced without the consent of the wrong-doer, he would not be obliged at all.

Passion or suffering, what. Is the *ultimate* sanction of every obligation.

For example: I am condemned to restore a house which I detain from the owner; to make satisfaction for a breach of contract; to pay damages for an assault, to the injured party; or to pay a fine for the same offence.

The sanction which attaches upon me, in this the first stage, is an obligation: An obligation to deliver the house, or to pay the damages or fine.

If I refuse to perform this obligation, I may incur a further obligation: for instance, an obligation to pay a fine or to suffer imprisonment.

But if this were again sanctioned by a further obligation, and that by another, and so on, it is manifest that I should be exempt (in effect) from all obligation.

Either in the first instance, or at some subsequent point, I must be visited with a sanction which can be inflicted without my consent. Suffering, therefore, is the ultimate sanction. Or (changing the expression) every obligation is ultimately sanctioned by suffering, although (in innumerable cases to which I shall advert hereafter) the immediate sanction of the obligation is another obligation.

But though suffering is the ultimate sanction, we cannot be obliged to suffer. For that supposes that we can be obliged to a something which depends not upon our desires. The only possible objects of duties or obligations are *acts* and *forbearances*.

Before I conclude I beg leave to observe, that suffering must not be confounded with physical compulsion and restraint. To suffer, is to incur an evil independently of our own consent: a pain which is inflicted upon us, independently of an act or forbearance of our own.

Suffering may be inflicted without physical compulsion or restraint.

Now, though physical compulsion or restraint, is com-

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monly the mean or instrument by which suffering is inflicted, suffering may be inflicted without it. For instance, certain obligations are sanctioned by nullities; others again are sanctioned by penalties which are purely infamising: by a declaration, pronounced by competent authority, that the party shall be held infamous or merits infamy.

In these and in other cases, the sanction is applied without the consent of the party, and without physical compulsion or restraint (or, at least, without such compulsion or restraint applied to the body).

In other cases, the suffering is inflicted by physical compulsion or restraint: Or at least physical compulsion or restraint may be necessary (*e.g.* Punishments which affect the body).

In most of the cases, in which it may be necessary to inflict suffering by physical compulsion or restraint, the physical compulsion or restraint is, in fact, needless: because the party, knowing it may be applied, submits voluntarily.

LECTURE XXIV.

INJURY OR WRONG, GUILT, IMPUTABILITY.

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I NOW proceed to consider the import of '*guilt*' or '*imputability*:' which it is necessary to determine in order that we may fully apprehend the nature of injury or wrong.

Immediate
and remote
objects of
duties.

Every act and every forbearance derives its importance or interest from its positive or negative consequences: that is to say, from certain events by which it is followed; or from its preventing events which would or might have happened, if the act done had *not* been done, or if the act forborne *had* been done.

Consequently, Although acts and forbearances are the *immediate* objects of duties, the positive and negative consequences of the acts and forbearances enjoined, are the objects which they regard *remotely*.

That an act or acts may be done, is the *immediate* purpose of a positive duty. But the production of events by which the act may be followed, or the prevention of events which may happen if the act be *not* done, is the more remote purpose for which the duty is imposed.

That an act or acts may be foreborne, is the *immediate* purpose of a *negative* duty. But the prevention of events which may happen in case the act be done, or the production of events which the act might prevent, is the more *remote* purpose for which the duty is imposed.

If the act enjoined be forborne or omitted, or if the act forbidden be done, the positive or negative consequences, which it is the purpose of the duty to produce, are certainly or probably *not* produced: Whilst the opposite or contrary consequences, which it is the purpose of the duty to avert, certainly or probably follow the forbearance, omission, or act.

Forbearances, Omissions, or Acts, which are inconsistent with the remote purposes of duties.

Certain of such forbearances, omissions, and acts, are *injuries* or wrongs.

The persons who have forborne, omitted, or acted, are *guilty*. Or the persons who have forborne, omitted, or acted, are in that plight or predicament which is styled '*guilt*.'

Import of the cognate expressions, Wrong, Guilt, Imputability = Breach of Duty.

The forbearances, omissions, or acts, together with such of their consequences as it was the purpose of the duties to avert, are *imputable* to the persons who have forborne, omitted, or acted. Or the plight or predicament of the persons who have forborne, omitted, or acted, is styled '*imputability*.' ⁹⁵

All these expressions, it appears to me, are equivalent. They all of them denote this, and nothing but this: 'that the persons, who have forborne, omitted, or acted, have *thereby* violated or broken duties or obligations.'

A *wrong*, or *injury*, is an act, forbearance, or omission, of such a character, that the party is *guilty*:

And, To be *guilty*, is to have acted, forborne, or omitted, in such wise, that the act, forbearance, or omission, is an *injury* or *wrong*.

If the act, forbearance, or omission, be an *injury* or *wrong*, and if the party be therefore *guilty*, the act, forbearance, or omission, together with such of its consequences, as it was the purpose of the duty to avert, are *imputable* to the party. And if the act, forbearance, or omission, together with such of its consequences as it was the purpose of the duty to avert, be *imputable* to the party, the party has broken or violated a duty or obligation.

⁹⁵ ('Imputability' is properly applicable to the culpable act, forbearance, or omission. It is, however, applied to the plight or predicament of the party to whom such act, forbearance, or omission, is imputable.)

LECT.
XXIV

Intention,
negligence,
heedless-
ness, or
rashness, is
of the es-
sence of
injury,
guilt, im-
putability,
or breach
of duty.

But is not
of itself
injury,
guilt, etc.

As I shall shew hereafter, intention, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness, is *an essentially component part* of injury or wrong; of guilt or imputability; of breach or violation of duty or obligation.

Whether the act, forbearance, or omission, constitute an injury or wrong; or whether the party be placed by it in the predicament of guilt or imputability; or whether it constitute a breach of duty or obligation; *partly* depends upon his *consciousness*, with regard to *it*, or its consequences, at and before the time of the act, forbearance, or omission. Unless the party intended, or was negligent, heedless, or rash, the act, forbearance, or omission, is *not* an injury or wrong; the party is *not* placed by it in the predicament of guilt or imputability; nor is it a breach or violation of duty or obligation.

But a necessary ingredient is *not* the compound into which that ingredient must enter before the compound can exist. An essential part is *not* the complex whole of which it is an essential part.

Intention, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness, is *of the essence* of injury or wrong; is *of the essence* of breach of duty; is a *necessary condition precedent* to the existence of that plight or predicament which is styled guilt or imputability.

But intention, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness, is *not of itself* injury or wrong; is *not of itself* breach of duty; will *not of itself* place the party in the plight or predicament of guilt or imputability. Intention, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness, will not place the party in the plight of guilt or imputability, unless it be followed or accompanied by an act, forbearance, or omission: by an act, forbearance, or omission which amounts to an injury or wrong, provided it be preceded and accompanied by that state of the mind. Action, forbearance, or omission, is as necessary an ingredient in the notion of injury, guilt, or imputability, as the intention, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness, by which the action, forbearance, or omission, is preceded or accompanied. The notion of injury, guilt, or imputability, does not consist of either considered alone, but is compounded of both taken in conjunction.

This may be made manifest by a short analysis.

Brief an-
alysis of
negligence
and its
nature.

If I am *negligent*, I advert not to a given act: And, by reason of that inadvertence, I omit the act.

If I am *heedless*, I will and do an act. not adverting to its

probable consequences: And, by reason of that inadvertence, I will and do the act.

If I am *rash*, I will and do an act, adverting to its probable consequences; but, by reason of a missupposition which I examine *inadvertently*, I think that those probable consequences will not ensue. And, by reason of my insufficient advertence to the ground of the missupposition, I will and do the act.

Intention regarding the present, and Intention regarding the future.

Consequently, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness, supposes an omission or act, which is the result of inadvertence. To that inadvertence, *as taken or considered in conjunction with the omission or act*, we give the name of negligence, heedlessness, or rashness. But none of those names has the shadow of a meaning, unless the inadvertence, to which it is applied, be considered in conjunction with the omission or act of which the inadvertence is the cause.

If I *intend*, my intention regards the present, or my intention regards the future. If my intention regards the present, I presently do an act, expecting consequences: Or I presently do an act, or am presently inactive, knowing that the act which I do, or the inaction wherein I am, excludes for the present the performance of another act. In the former case, I presently do an act, intending consequences. In the latter case, I presently forbear from an act.

In either case, my intention is necessarily coupled with a present act of forbearance: And the word 'intention' has no meaning, unless the consciousness or belief to which it is applied be considered in conjunction with that act or forbearance.

If my intention regard the future, I *presently* expect or believe that I shall act or forbear *hereafter*.

And, in this single case, it is (I think) *possible* to imagine, that mere consciousness might be treated as a *wrong*: might be *imputed* to the party: or might place the party in the plight or predicament which is styled *imputability* or *guilt*.

Whether an intention, neither consummate nor followed by an attempt, could be made the object of a negative obligation? (see p. 455, *ante*.)

We *might* (I incline to think) be *obliged* to forbear from *intentions*, which regard future acts, or future forbearances from action: Or, at least, to forbear from *such* of those intentions, as are settled, deliberate, or frequently recurring to the mind. The fear of punishment might prevent the frequent recurrence; and might, therefore, prevent the pernicious acts or forbearances, to which intentions (when they recur frequently) certainly or probably lead.

Be this as it may, I am not aware of a *positive* system of

Law, wherein an intention, without an act or forbearance, places the party in the predicament which is styled imputability. In every positive system of which I have any knowledge, a mere intention to forbear in future is innocent. And an intention to act in future is not *imputed* to the party, unless it be followed by an act;⁹⁶ unless it be followed by an act which accomplishes his ultimate purpose, or by an act which is an *attempt* or endeavour to accomplish that ultimate purpose. In either case, the party is *guilty*, because the intention is coupled with an *act*: and with an act from which he is *obliged* to forbear or abstain. For, though he is not obliged to forbear from the *intention*, he is obliged to forbear from *endeavours* to accomplish that intention, as well as from such acts as might accomplish his intention directly.

Restriction
of [‘Guilt’
or] ‘Culpa’
to Inten-
tion, Negli-
gence,
Heedless-
ness, or
Rashness,
as the *cause*
of Action,
Forbear-
ance, or
Omission.

Without, then, staying to inquire, whether we *might* be obliged to forbear from naked intentions, I assume, for the present, the following conclusion: a conclusion which accords with general or universal practice.

Intention, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness, is not of *itself* wrong, or breach of duty or obligation; nor does it of *itself* place the party in the predicament of guilt or imputability. In order that the party may be placed in that predicament, his intention, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness, must be referred to an act, forbearance, or omission, of which it was the *cause*.

Accordingly, the term ‘Injury’ (or ‘Wrong’) and the term ‘Breach of Duty,’ is invariably applied to a *compound* of action, forbearance, or omission, and of intention, negligence, heedlessness, or rashness. The term ‘imputability’ is also applied invariably in a similar sense. It denotes that the party has broken a duty, by some act, forbearance, or omission which was the *effect* of an intention he had conceived, or of his negligence, heedlessness, or rashness.

But, in the language of lawyers, and especially of criminal lawyers, ‘guilt’ or ‘culpa’ is frequently restricted to the state of the party’s mind. It denotes the intention of the party, or his negligence, heedlessness, or rashness; although it necessarily connotes (or signifies indirectly) the act or forbearance which was the *effect* of his intention, or the omission

⁹⁶ See Feuerbach, ‘Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gültigen peinlichen Rechts,’ p. 73. Rosshirt, ‘Lehrbuch des Criminal-Rechts,’ p. 73.

or act which was the effect of his negligence, or of his heedlessness or temerity.

In order that I may shew the meaning which is commonly annexed to 'guilt,' I will read a few passages from two treatises on German Criminal Law.

One of them is the work of Feuerbach; the most celebrated Criminal Lawyer now living:⁹⁷ formerly professor of Roman and German Jurisprudence, and now president of a Court of Appeal in the Kingdom of Bavaria.

The other is by Dr. Rosshirt, professor of Law at Heidelberg.

Feuerbach's book is entitled, 'Institutes of the Penal Law which obtains generally in Germany.'

The title of Dr. Rosshirt's book may be translated as follows: 'Institutes of the Criminal Law which obtains generally in Germany: Including a particular Exposition of Roman Criminal Law, in so far as the German is derived from it.'

'The application (says Feuerbach) of a penal Law, supposes that the will of the party was determined positively or negatively: that this determination of the will was contrary or adverse to the duty imposed by the Law: and that this determination of the will was the cause of the criminal fact.' 'The reference of the fact as effect to the determination of the will as cause, constitutes that which is styled *imputation*. And a party who is placed in such a predicament, that a criminal fact may be imputed to a determination of his will, is said to be in a state or condition of *imputability*.'

'The reference of the fact as effect to the determination of the will as cause, settles or fixes the legal character of the latter.

'In consequence of that reference (or by reason of the imputation of the fact) the determination of the will is held or adjudged to be *guilt*: Which *guilt* is the ground of the punishment applied to the party.'

He adds, in a note, 'that the "*culpa*" of the Roman Lawyers (as taken in its largest signification), and also the "*reatus*" of more recent writers upon jurisprudence, answers to the "*Schuld*" or "*das Verschulden*" of the German Law.'

'*Culpa*' (as taken in its largest signification), *reatus*, and '*Schuld*' (or '*das Verschulden*') may (I apprehend) be translated by the English '*Guilt*.'

⁹⁷ He died in 1833. The passage quoted is at pages 78, 79 of his work.

The language of Dr. Rosshirt accords with that of Feuerbach.⁹⁸ 'In order (says he) to the existence of a *Crime*, the *will of the party* must have been in such a predicament, that the criminal fact may be *imputed*: that is to say, that the criminal fact may be imputed *as effect* to the state of his will *as cause*.'

'The term "*Culpa*" as used by the Roman Lawyers, is frequently synonymous with *Crime* or *Delict*, or with *Injury* generally. But, when they employ it in a stricter sense, it is equivalent to the *reatus* of modern philosophical jurisprudence, to the *Verschulden* of the German Law. It denotes the *state of the party's will*, considered as the *cause* of the criminal fact. It denotes the *dolus*, or the *negligentia*, of which the criminal fact is the ascertained consequence or effect.'

In translating these passages I have thrown overboard certain terms borrowed from the Kantian Philosophy. For the modern German Jurists (like the Classical Jurists of old) are prone to shew off their knowledge of Philosophy, though actually occupied with the exposition of municipal and positive Law.

These impertinent terms being duly ejected, the meaning of the passages is clear and simple.

It merely amounts to this. '*Culpa*' denotes the state of the party's mind: although it *connotes* (or embraces by implication) the positive or negative consequence of the state of his mind.

But I think that the term '*Guilt*,' as used by English lawyers, not only denotes the state of the party's mind, but also the act, forbearance, or omission, which was the consequence. It imports generally 'that the party has broken a duty.' It embraces *all* the ingredients which enter into the composition of the wrong; and is not restricted to *one* of those necessary ingredients. We say that a man is *guilty* of an injury, or is *guilty* of a breach of duty: expressions which would not be applicable, unless the term '*guilt*' imported the whole offence, instead of being limited (like the term '*culpa*') 'to an essentially component part.

And this extended meaning of the word '*guilt*' is likewise (I think) the meaning which convenience prescribes. A *general* expression for culpable *intention*, and for the various modifications of *negligence*, tends to confusion and obscurity

⁹⁸ Pages 35-42.

rather than to order and clearness. I am not aware of a single instance, in which it can be necessary to talk of them *collectively*. But it is necessary to *distinguish* them in numberless instances.

Before I conclude this subject, I will remark that the term 'Injury,' and also the term 'Guilt,' is merely the contradictory of the term 'Duty' or 'Obligation.'

It
is
contradictory
of duty.

If I am bound or obliged to *do*, I am bound or obliged *not* to prætermit the act *intentionally or negligently*.

If I am bound or obliged to *forbear*, I am bound or obliged *not* to do the act *intending* certain consequences, or *not* to do the act *heedlessly or rashly*.

I am not absolutely obliged to do or forbear, but to do or forbear *with those various modifications*.

If I prætermit an act intentionally or negligently, I break a positive duty.

If I do an act *intending* certain consequences, or if I do an act *heedlessly or rashly*, I break a negative duty.

An injury, or breach of duty, is therefore the *contradictory* of *that* which the Law imposing the duty enjoins or forbids: — 'Omne id quod *non jure* fit.'

Accordingly, that may be an injury to one purpose which is not an injury to another purpose. Or (changing the expression) that may be a breach of one duty, which is not a breach of another duty.

I am bound not to kill with a *deliberate* intention of killing.

I am bound not to kill with a *sudden* intention of killing.

Each of these is a *distinct* duty; and the compound whole, which constitutes the corresponding injury, consists, in each case, of a distinct set of ingredients.

If I kill with a deliberate intention of killing, I am guilty of Murder.

But if I kill on a sudden provocation, I am guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter. With reference to the Law which forbids murder, I am not guilty, or have not committed a wrong. To adopt the current phrase, there is not the *corpus delicti* which will sustain a charge of Murder. There is not deliberate intention or gross heedlessness.

For *corpus delicti* (a phrase introduced by certain modern civilians) is a collective name for the sum or aggregate of the various ingredients which make a given fact a breach of a given Law.⁹⁹ *Corpus* is used by the Roman lawyers (like

Corpus
Delicti.

⁹⁹ For *Corpus Delicti*, see Feuerbach, 75, 76; Rosshirt, 79.

universitas) to express every whole composed of parts, as in the phrase *corpus juris*, which with the Roman lawyers stood for the aggregate of the laws, though by the moderns it is applied to the particular volumes which contain Justinian's collections.

Further remarks on the import of the word Dolus.

Before I conclude I must correct certain mistakes which I committed in stating the import of *dolus* and *culpa*. I said, that *dolus* is exactly equivalent to intention, except when *dolus* is used in its original and narrow sense, to signify fraud.¹ But this is not precisely the case. *Dolus* comprises in its meaning, *intention*, but it must be *direct* intention: the mischief done must not only be intended but desired; it must be the very end for which the party does the act. *Dolus* does not include what has been called, by some modern civilians *dolus indirectus*, and by Mr. Bentham *indirect intentionality*; i.e. intention to do an act which is not desired; as, for example, when I shoot at one person while another is standing so near that I think it probable I shall kill *him* in endeavouring to kill the other. Nor does *dolus* include hasty or sudden intention, as contradistinguished from deliberate intention. This is included in *culpa* as opposed to *dolus*: it would probably be included in *temerity*, in consequence of a confusion of ideas to which I formerly adverted. *Dolus*, therefore, denotes all intention, except indirect and sudden intention. These are comprised in *culpa* as opposed to *dolus*. *Culpa*, therefore, includes negligence, heedlessness, rashness, and indirect and sudden intention. This, at least, is the meaning of *culpa* as opposed to *dolus*. As used in another sense, to which I adverted in a former part of this lecture, it denotes intention of any kind, or negligence, heedlessness, or rashness; in short, the mental state which is the cause of any effect that can be *imputed* to the party. *Negligentia*, in the case of *obligatio* in the strict sense, includes intention of all species, together with negligence, heedlessness, and temerity, particularly in the position of parties who are bound to *diligentia*, by reason of fiduciary situations; of some trust or other with which they are invested. These are generally the cases in which intention or negligence are brought in question. In most other cases they are necessarily implied in the breach of the *obligatio*.

The word *malus* is often coupled with *dolus* by the Roman lawyers. The reason is that there is a *dolus bonus*, a *machi-*

¹ See p. 445, *ante*

natio which is innocent or laudable; artifice, for example, which is made use of to prevent an impending crime. All other *dolus* is *dolus malus*: and this is the only meaning of the word *malus* when attached to *dolus*.

An example occurs to me which shews the importance of this classification of the various states of consciousness. It is laid down that there cannot be a *culpose attempt*. Now this would be true if *culpa* only included negligence, heedlessness, or rashness; because an attempt is of course intentional; but if *dolus indirectus*, or sudden intention, be included in *culpa*, it is clear that there may be a *culpose attempt*.

Further instances:

Damage *corpore* to things belonging to another: amounts to a breach of *Lex Aquilia*.²

Damage *non corpore* amounts to a breach not of *Lex Aquilia*, but of a duty imposed by the Prætorian Edict, and for which an *actio utilis* lay.

Trespass *vi et armis* and Case is a somewhat similar distinction.

Attempts as distinguished from consummation.³

For want of the *consequence* there is not the *Corpus* of the principal delict. But the *intention* coupled with an act *tending to the consequence* constitutes the *corpus* of the secondary delict styled an 'attempt.'

Ambiguity of Schuldner, Reus, etc.

I remarked in a former Lecture that '*jus*,' '*recht*,' or '*right*,' frequently denotes the duty incumbent upon the party obliged, as well as the right residing in the opposite party; and that the '*Obligatio*' of the Roman Lawyers denotes the *jus in personam* residing in the party entitled, as well as the *obligation* incumbent upon the party obliged.

² 'Et placuit ita demum ex ista lege actionem esse, si quis corpore suo damnum dederit atqui alio modo damno dato, utiles actiones dantur,' etc.—Gaius, iii. § 219.

Damage done by the bodily might of the offender was the proper subject of the Aquilian Law; which was however extended *per utiles actiones* to other damage within its Equity.—*Marg. Note*.

³ 'Delictum consummatum. Conatus delinquendi.' Consummate Crimes and Criminal Attempts. Feuerbach, pp. 41, 42, 43.

'Eine Handlung, welche die Hervorbringung eines Verbrechens *zum Zwecke hat*, ohne den bezweckten verbrecherischen Thatbestand wirklich zu machen, ist ein Versuch.' Rosshirt, p. 58.

The German '*Schuld*' (or '*das Verschalden*') reminds me of a similar ambiguity. '*Schuld*' signifies properly '*liability*.' To impute to a person '*Schuld*,' is to say that he has broken a duty, and is now *liable* to the sanction.

Accordingly, '*Schuldner*' is synonymous with the Roman '*Debitor*;' which applies to any person lying under any *obligation*: that is to say, an *obligation* (*stricto sensu*), or in the sense of the Roman Lawyers.

'*Creditor*,' is the correlative of '*Debitor*,' and applies to any person who has *jus in personam*. The French '*Débiteur*' and '*Créancier*' have precisely the same meanings. The English '*Obligor*' and '*Obligee*' ought to bear the same significations. But, in the technical language of our Law, the term '*obligation*' or '*bond*' has been miserably mutilated. Instead of denoting *obligatio* (as correlating with *jus in personam*), it is applied exclusively to certain *unilateral* contracts *evidenced by writing under seal*. Or, rather, it is applied to the writing under seal by which the unilateral contract is evidenced. That is to say, it is not the name of an *obligation*, but of an *instrument* evidencing a *contract* from which an obligation arises. And, in consequence of this absurd application of the term *Obligation* or *bond*, the well-constructed expressions *Obligor* and *Obligee* are also completely spoiled. If it were used properly, the term '*Obligee*' would apply to any person invested with *jus in personam*: And the term '*Obligor*' (as the correlative of '*Obligee*') would apply to the party lying under the corresponding duty. But in consequence of the narrow application of '*bond*' or '*obligation*,' the term '*obligee*,' with its correlative '*obligor*,' exclusively applies to persons who are parties to certain contracts: namely, such *unilateral* contracts *as are evidenced by writing under seal*, and are couched in a peculiar form: That peculiar form being not less absurd than the absurd application of '*bond*' or '*obligation*' to which I have pointed your attention.

In the strict technical import which it bears in the English Law, the meaning of '*debt*' is not less narrow and inconvenient than the meaning of '*bond*' or '*obligation*.'

In the Roman Law, the term '*debitum*' is exactly co-extensive with the related or paronymous expression '*debitor*.' As '*debitor*' signifies generally a person lying under an *obligation*, '*debitum*' denotes (with the same generality) *every* act or forbearance to which a person is *obliged*. It denotes universally the positive or negative something which is *due* by virtue of an *obligation*: '*id quod ex obligatione præstandum est*.'

But in the strict technical import which it bears in the English Law, '*debt*' is restricted to a *definite sum of money*, due or owing from one party to another party. And, accordingly, the action of debt does not in strictness lie, unless the object of the action be the recovery of a *sum certain*.

In later times, indeed, this strictness has been relaxed: Insomuch

that *debt upon simple contract* is not substantially different from an action of *assumpsit*: whilst *debt upon bond* differs from an action of *covenant* in form rather than in effect.

As is usual in English legislation (whether it be direct or judicial) a mischievous absurdity of the old Law has been cured by a mischievous remedy. Instead of *extirping* pernicious rules and distinctions, English Legislators are content to palliate the mischief by the introduction of *exceptions*: exceptions, which aggravate the bulk of the *Corpus Juris*, and (what is an evil of still greater magnitude) which reduce the body of the Law to a chaos of incoherent details.⁴

I will venture to affirm, that no other body of Law, obtaining in a civilized community, has so little of consistency and symmetry as our own. Hence its enormous bulk; and (what is infinitely worse than its mere bulk) the utter impossibility of conceiving it with distinctness and precision. If you would know the English Law, you must know all the details which make up the mess. For it has none of those large *coherent* principles which are a sure *index* to details. And, since details are infinite, it is manifest that no man (let his industry be what it may) can compass the whole system.

Consequently, the knowledge of an English Lawyer, is nothing but a beggarly account of scraps and fragments. His memory may be stored with numerous particulars, but of the Law as a whole, and of the mutual relations of its parts, he has not a conception.

Compare the best of our English treatises with the writings of the Classical Jurists and of the Modern Civilians, and you will instantly admit that there is no exaggeration in what I have ventured to state.

Returning to the subject from which I have digressed, it is remarkable that '*Schuldner*' (in the older German Law) applied to the *Creditor*, as well as to the *Debitor*: Just as *jus* sometimes signifies duty, as well as right; and just as *obligatio* denotes *jus in personam*, as well as the duty to which the right corresponds.

The *Reus* of the Roman Lawyers is in the same predicament. As opposed to '*Actor*' it signifies the *defendant* in a civil proceeding, or the party who is the object of accusation in a criminal proceeding. And, taken in this sense, it is not ambiguous.

But *reus* also signifies a party to a *stipulation*: that is to say, a unilateral contract accompanied by peculiar solemnities. And, taken in this sense, it applies to the promisee or obligee, as well as to the promisor or obligor. Both are *rei*. The party who makes the promise, is styled *reus promittendi*: The party to whom it is made, and by whom it is accepted, is styled *reus stipulandi*. *Correi promittendi* are joint promissors: *Correi stipulandi*, joint promisees.

⁴ It may be scarcely necessary to observe that the terms in which the author speaks of English actions at law, are directly applicable to the forms in use before the C.L.P. Acts, 1852 and 1854. The anomalies here deprecated were somewhat mitigated, though by no means removed, by those Acts.—R. C.

LECTURE XXV.

ANALYSIS OF INJURY OR WRONG CONTINUED.

LECT.
XXVIntention
or inadvertence
is of
the essence
of injury.

I ASSUMED, in my last Lecture, that Intention or Inadvertence is a necessary ingredient in injury or wrong.

A short analysis will shew the truth of the assumption.

In case the duty be positive, the prætermision of the act which the duty requires, is the result of forbearance, or the result of omission.

If the prætermision of the act be the result of forbearance, the party, at the time of the forbearance, is conscious of his duty, and knows that the duty of which he is presently conscious, requires the performance of the act from which he forbears.

If the prætermision of the act be the result of omission, the party is conscious *generally* of the duty incumbent upon him, but adverts not to his duty, or to the act which his duty requires, at the moment of the omission.

In either case, he is guilty of injury or wrong, unless some special reason exempt him from liability.

In case the duty be negative, the party does an act from which he is bound to forbear, expecting consequences which it is the object of the duty to prevent. Or the party does the act without adverting to those consequences, or assuming *inadvertently* that those consequences will not ensue. And, on any of these suppositions, he is guilty of Injury or Wrong, unless some special reason exempt him from liability.

Now, in all these various cases of forbearance, omission, and action, the party expects consequences inconsistent with the objects of his duty, or, in case he adverted or attended in the manner which his duty requires, he *might* perceive that such consequences would certainly or probably ensue. In other words, he forbears or acts with an *intention* adverse to his duty, or else he omits or acts negligently, heedlessly, or rashly.

Unless he expected consequences inconsistent with the objects of his duty, or *might* expect such consequences if he adverted or attended as he ought, he *would* not and *could* not know, that the forbearance, omission, or act would conflict with his duty. And, by consequence, the sanction *would* not and *could* not operate as a motive to the fulfilment of the duty. In short, men are held to their duties by the sanc-

tions annexed to those duties. But sanctions operate upon the obliged in a twofold manner: that is to say, They counteract the motives or desires which prompt to a breach of duty, and they tend to excite the attention which the fulfilment of duty requires. Consequently, injury or wrong supposes unlawful *intention*, or one of those modes of unlawful *inadvertence* which are styled negligence, heedlessness, and rashness. For unless the party knew that he was violating his duty, or unless he *might* have known that he was violating his duty, the sanction could not operate, at the moment of the wrong, to the end of impelling him to the act which the Law enjoins, or of deterring him from the act which the Law forbids.

The only instance wherein intention or inadvertence is not an ingredient in breach of duty, is furnished by the Law of England. By that law, in cases of Obligation arising directly from contract, it frequently happens that the performance of the obligation is due from the very instant at which the obligation arises. Or (speaking more accurately) the time for performance is not determined by the contract, and performance is due so soon as the obligee shall desire it.

An absurdity in English Law from inattention to this principle.

For example:

If a moveable be deposited with me in order that I may keep it in safety, I am bound, *from the moment of the deposit*, to restore it to the bailor.

If I buy goods, and no time be fixed for the payment of the price, I am bound, *from the moment of the delivery*, to pay the price to the seller.

Now, in these, and in similar cases, it is impossible that the obligation should be broken, *through intention or inadvertence*, until the obligee desire performance, and until the obligor be informed of the desire. For, strictly speaking, he is bound to perform the given act, so soon as the obligee shall wish the performance, and so soon as he himself shall be duly apprised of the wish. But, according to the rule which obtains in the Courts of Common Law, the creditor may sue the debtor, as for a breach of the obligation, without a previous demand: The debtor being liable in the action for damages and costs, just as he would be liable if performance had been required, and the obligation had then been broken through his own intention or negligence.

Now as every right of action is founded on an injury, here is a case of injury without intention or inadvertence. For, without a previous demand, or without some notice or inti-

mation that the creditor desires performance, the debtor cannot know that he is breaking his obligation, by not performing the act to which he is obliged.

This monstrous rule of the Common Law Courts, is justified by a reason which is not less monstrous. For it is said that a previous demand were superfluous and needless, inasmuch as the action is itself a demand.

The reason forgets, that a right of action is founded on an injury; that unlawful intention or inadvertence is of the essence of injury; and that, in all the cases which I am now considering, there is no room for unlawful intention or inadvertence, until the creditor desire performance, and until the debtor be apprised of the desire.

Where an *injury has been actually committed*, it is not necessary (although it may be expedient) that the action founded on the injury should be preceded by a demand. For, here, the right of action has already accrued, and the use of the previous demand would merely amount to this: that it would give the debtor an opportunity of redressing the wrong, and might therefore save the parties from the evils which accompany a suit.

But in cases of the class which I am now considering, there is no injury (intentional or by negligence), until the creditor demand performance, and until the debtor (intentionally or by negligence) comply not with the demand.

Strictly speaking, the case stands thus. Looking at the essentials of injury, the party obliged is not guilty of injury. But he is considered by the Courts as if he had broken his obligation, and is accordingly liable in an action for damages and costs.

In *certain cases* of the class which I am now considering, it is, indeed, expedient that the creditor should be permitted to sue, although no demand has been made upon the debtor. But why? Because the debtor has actually broken the obligation; or because the debtor *intends* to break the obligation, and the delay occasioned by a formal demand might facilitate the execution of his unlawful design.

For example:

If the debtor withdraw himself from his home or from his usual places of resort, *in order that he may evade a demand*, he is placed in the position in which he would have been placed if the demand had actually been made. Or, speaking more strictly, a demand is made on the part of the creditor: and it may fairly be *presumed* from the conduct of

the debtor, that he has notice of the demand. He is fairly liable to an action, and to the costs occasioned by the action. For he is conscious that the obligee requires performance; he withholds performance notwithstanding; and he is therefore guilty of an actual injury. •

Again: If there be reason to suppose that he means to withdraw himself from the jurisdiction, or to place his goods beyond the reach of process, it is reasonable that the creditor should be permitted to sue, without a previous demand. For, here, the debtor presently *intends* to commit an injury; and the delay occasioned by a previous demand, might enable him to defeat the action by withdrawing his person or property.

In this case, the action is instituted for the purpose of *prevention*; and it operates like an injunction, or a *ne exeat regno*.

But where there is nothing in the conduct of the debtor, indicating an intention to frustrate the creditor of his right, it is clear that a demand of performance, with subsequent non-performance, ought to precede the action: And that if an action be brought without this important preliminary, the creditor should be liable for the costs of the needless proceeding, and bound to make satisfaction for the gratuitous vexation which he occasions.

On looking over Evans's Digest of the Statutes for another purpose, I have had great pleasure in observing that so judicious a writer takes the same view of this question which I have just stated. He says (vol. iii. p. 289): 'There is another Rule in Courts of Equity which may deserve a different consideration, as applied to legal demands, viz. that length of time is no bar in case of a trust. Where a man deposits money in the hands of another, to be kept for his use, the possession of the custodee ought to be deemed the possession of the owner, until an application and refusal, or other denial of the right; for, until then, there is nothing adverse; and I conceive that upon principle, no action should be allowed in these cases, without a previous demand; consequently, that no limitation should be computed further back than such demand. And I think it probable that, under these circumstances, the limitation would not be allowed to attach, though the other part of the observation would be as probably disallowed.'⁵ For a

⁵ So far as regards the operation of the statutes of limitations, the principle here contended for seems now to consist with judicial decision (*Philpott v. Kelly*, 3 Ad. & Ell. 106; *Edwards v. Clay*, 28 Beav. 145).—R. C.

sweeping rule has been by some means introduced into practice, that an action is a demand; whereas *every action in its nature supposes a preceding default*; where money is improperly received, or goods are bought without any specific credit, or even where money is borrowed generally, there is held to be an immediate duty, and it is a perfectly legitimate conclusion that no demand can be necessary, in addition to the duty itself. But wherever there is a loan in the nature of a deposit, or any other confidential duty is contracted, the mere creation of that duty, unaccompanied with the absolute breach of it, by denial or inconsistent conduct, ought not to be considered as a ground of action.'

I perfectly agree with this reasoning as applied to the case of the deposit. It is only on breach of the obligation, that a right of action should accrue to the bailor. And it is only by refusal or neglect to return the subject on demand, that the obligation is broken.

But similar reasoning is also applicable to the case of goods sold without specific credit; of money lent generally; and of money paid and received by mistake.

In the case of money paid and received by mistake, it is necessary to distinguish.

If the money was received *bonâ fide*, it surely is expedient that a demand should precede the action. For until the debtor is apprised of the mistake, it is impossible to say that he has broken *intentionally or by negligence* his obligation to return the money.

If the money was received *malâ fide*, the act of receiving the money was in itself an *injury*: an injury *analogous* to unlawful taking. The only difference between the cases lies in the means. In the one case, I take the goods of another without the consent of the owner. In the other case, I take the goods *with* his consent, but by reason of an error in which he is, and of which I avail myself by suppressing the truth. Here, therefore, the debtor is guilty of an injury from the very outset; and no demand is necessary as a basis for the action.

I shall here remark generally, a distinction which exists between obligations arising from the possession of *res alieneæ*, or things which are the property of another person. The party entitled has always a right to the restitution of the goods or to satisfaction for their loss, and the party in possession is always bound to restore or satisfy.

But the nature of the obligation depends upon the con-

sciousness of the party in possession: If he possess the subject *malá fide*, his possession is itself a wrong. His obligation to restore or satisfy, arises from an *injury*; and, inasmuch as the right which is violated is *jus in rem*, the obligation is *ex delicto* (in the strict signification of the term).

If he possess the subject *boná fide*, his possession is not a wrong. His obligation to restore or satisfy is *quasi ex contractu*: That is to say, It arises from a fact which is neither an injury nor a convention. But so soon as he is apprised of the right which resides in the party entitled, the obligation alters its nature. It may either be considered as arising from a breach of the quasi-contract; or from a violation of the *jus in rem* which resides in the party entitled. And, on either supposition, it arises from an injury. The only difference is, that it arises, on the former, from a breach of quasi-contract; whilst it arises, on the latter, from a *delict* (strictly so called).

[Remark on the indistinctness of the boundary, by which obligations *ex delicto* are distinguished from obligations *quasi ex contractu*.

The receipt of money paid by mistake ought not to be considered as begetting an obligation *quasi ex contractu*, if the party receiving be in *malá fide*. The action should be Case, and not Assumpsit (assuming, that is, that the forms of action should be kept up).

The Roman Law not free from this uncertainty.

The confusion of quasi-contracts with contracts, peculiar to English Lawyers.]

The allegation in bills, ‘that the plaintiff has requested the defendant to perform the object of the suit, but that the defendant has refused or neglected to comply with that request,’ is (I should suppose) merely formal: i.e. it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove it. At least, a demand is not necessary, where the defendant has actually committed an injury. But where notice must be given, before the defendant can commit an injury, there (I apprehend) a demand on the part of the plaintiff, with subsequent refusal or neglect on the part of the defendant, is a necessary preliminary to the institution of the suit. *E.g.*: If you are seized in fee in trust for me, you are bound to convey the legal estate as I shall direct. But if I filed a bill for the purpose of compelling a conveyance without previous demand and consequent refusal or neglect, I think that *Equity* (who, let men traduce her as they may, is far more rational

than her sister and rival *Law*) would compel me to pay the costs of the wanton and vexatious suit.

The Roman Law, in regard to the matter in question, is perfectly rational and consistent. In all cases, the institution of an action must be preceded by a notice to the debtor, provided the debtor can be found. In case the debtor has not broken the obligation, the notice is necessary as a *basis* to the action. In case the debtor has actually broken the obligation, the notice gives him an opportunity of redressing the injury, and of saving himself and the creditor from the evils of a suit.

Whether or not a demand must precede an *action*, is, therefore, a question which can never arise. As a demand must precede an action in every case whatever, the only question which can arise is this: namely, whether a demand of performance must be made by the creditor, in order that the debtor may be *in morá*, and may incur the liabilities which are incident to that predicament. This I will endeavour to explain with all possible brevity.

Morá.

The non-performance of an obligation is in the Roman Law styled *morá*:⁶ for the debtor *delays* performance; or, in consequence of the non-performance, the creditor is *delayed*. Not unfrequently, it is styled *frustratio*, or *dilatio*.

But the predicament in which the debtor is placed in consequence of his non-performance, is also styled *morá*. *Debitor qui moram fecit in morá dicitur*. Being *in morá*, he incurs liabilities from which he were exempt if he were not *in morá*.

For example: If a moveable has been deposited with the debtor in order that he might keep it safely, he is not liable for accidental damage, unless he be *in morá*. But if he refuse to return it on demand made by the creditor, he is *in morá*: and he is thenceforth liable for accidental damage, as well as for damage occasioned by his intention or negligence.

If he owe money payable on demand, and after demand decline or neglect payment, he is *in morá*. And being *in morá*, he is bound to pay interest on the money which he detains, though no interest was previously payable.

Now, if no time be fixed for the performance of the obligation, the debtor is not *in morá*, and does not incur the liabilities incident to that predicament, unless a demand of performance be made by the creditor, and unless the debtor

⁶ Mühlenbruch, i. 325, 339. Mackelvey, ii. 156, 165.

comply not with the demand. The rule is '*Interpellandus est debitor loco et tempore opportuno*'. The authors of the rule justly considered, that intention or inadvertence is of the essence of wrong; and that the obligation could not be broken, either through intention or inadvertence, until the creditor required performance.

If a specific *terminus* or time be fixed for the performance, the debtor is *in morá*, unless he perform at that time, although no demand be made by the creditor. '*Dies interpellat pro homine*.' (N.B. *Interpellatio* signifies making a demand.) For, here, the debtor breaks the obligation, intentionally or by negligence, whether a demand be made or not by the opposite party. He knows *generally* that he ought to perform at the time; and a demand of performance on the part of the creditor were, therefore, superfluous.

Whether a demand of performance ought to precede an action, and whether a demand should be made in order that the debtor may be *in morá*, are distinct questions. But it is manifest that the solution of either question must be sought for in the same source: namely, in the state of the debtor's consciousness. If he know that the performance is due, and yet do not perform, it is reasonable to presume that the non-performance is the consequence of intention or negligence. He is actually guilty of injury. Consequently, a demand of performance is not an *essential* preliminary to the institution of an action. And, further, it is not unreasonable that he should be subjected to certain liabilities, which he would not have incurred, if he had been clear of unlawful intention or unlawful inadvertence. On this, as on almost all other subjects relating to contracts, the depth and consistency of the Roman lawyers is truly admirable, and is only equalled by their plain and manly manner of expressing their meaning.

• Before I dismiss this subject, I may make this general remark. In most cases of breach of contract, the intention or negligence of the debtor is so manifest, that the question is not agitated or even adverted to. And from hence we might incline to infer, that intention or negligence is not of the essence of the wrong. If we look into the detail, we immediately perceive that breach of contract as necessarily supposes intention or negligence as any other injury whatever.

For instance: whether a demand be an essential preliminary to an action, or whether the debtor be *in morá* without

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a demand, entirely depends upon the presence or absence of intention or negligence. If *without* demand he could not know that he was breaking his obligation, it is manifestly necessary that a demand should be made, before the action is instituted by the creditor, or before the debtor is placed in the predicament which is styled *morá*. In all cases in which the contract binds him to *diligentia* (as in cases of bailment), the question of 'negligence or not,' also frequently arises. In ordinary cases the question does not arise, because the intention or negligence is manifest and indisputable. I make this remark because, owing to the arrangement adopted by the Roman institutional writers, one is liable to suppose that breaches of contract are not similar to other breaches of obligation, and are not even injuries at all; not being ranked with delicts or injuries, nor bearing the same name. In the arrangement of the Roman law, not only the primary obligations arising from contracts and quasi-contracts, are called *obligations*, but likewise the obligations arising from breaches of these primary obligations are called *obligationes* simply and are said to arise not from delicts, but from the contracts or quasi-contracts. And in our own law we talk of actions *ex contractu*, and distinguish them from actions *ex delicto*. It is, however, undeniable that actions *ex contractu* are just as much founded on injury, as the actions which are said to be *ex delicto*.

Resume the

is of the
essence of
injury.

Unlawful intention or unlawful inadvertence, is, therefore, of the essence of injury, and for this reason, that the sanction could not have operated upon the party as a motive to the fulfilment of the duty, unless at the moment immediately preceding the wrong he had been conscious that he was violating his duty, or unless he *would* have been conscious that he was violating his duty, if he had adverted or attended as he ought.

Grounds of

stated.

If we examine the grounds of the various exemptions from liability, we shall find that most (though not all) of them are reducible to the principles which I have now stated. We shall find (generally speaking) that the party is clear of liability, because he is clear of intention or inadvertence: or (what, in effect, comes to the same thing), because it is *presumed* that he is clear of intention or inadvertence.

1. Casus or
Accident.⁷

Thus: No one is liable for a mischief resulting from *acci-*

⁷ Mühlenbruch, i. 179, 326, 331. iii. 165. Heineccius, Recitationes, 538. Mackelvey, ii. 157. Blackstone, iv. 26; 539.

dent or *chance* (*casus*). That is to say, from some event (other than act of his own), which he was unable to foresee, or, foreseeing, was unable to prevent. Whether the event happen through the intervention of man, or whether it happen without the intervention of man, is not important. The essence of *casus*, *chance*, or *accident*, lies in this: that the event was not an act done by the given party, and could not have been foreseen or prevented by that given party. This (I think) is the meaning of *casus* or *accident* in the Roman, of *chance* or *accident* in our own Law.

‘By the Common Law’ (says Lord Mansfield) ‘a carrier is an insurer. It is laid down, that he is liable for every *accident*, except by the act of God or the king’s enemies.’ Here, the term *accident* includes the *acts of men*: namely, of the king’s enemies. And, in the Digest, it is expressly said, ‘*fortuitis casibus solet etiam adnumerari aggressura latronum.*’

It would seem then, that *casus* or *accident* includes the act of man. But (I think) it is never extended to the act of the party himself. An act of his own is hardly called an *accident*, although the act be not *imputable*, inasmuch as it is not accompanied by unlawful intention or inadvertence, or, is excusable for other reasons.

In the language of the English Law, an event which happens without the intervention of man, is styled ‘the Act of God.’ The language of the Roman Law is nearly the same. Mischiefs arising from such events are styled *damna fatalia*, or *detrimenta fatalia*. They are ascribed to *vis divina*, or to a certain personage styled *fatum*. Or the *casus* or *accident* takes a specific name, and is called *fatalitas*.

The language of either system is absurd. For the act of man is as much the act of God as any event which arises without the intervention of man. And if we choose to suppose a certain *fate* or *destiny*, we must suppose that she or it determines the acts of men, as well as the events which are not acts of men.

In the language of the Roman Law, events which happen without the intervention of man, are sometimes distinguished from the others by the term *natural*. Or (what comes to the same thing) they are ascribed to *vis naturalis*.

Returning to the legal effect of *casus*, *chance*, or *accident*, no man is liable, civilly or criminally, for a purely *accidental* mischief. For, as he could not foresee the event from which the mischief arose, or was utterly unable to obviate the event

LECT. or its consequences, the mischief is, not imputable to his intention or negligence.

For example, If I am in possession of a house, or of a moveable belonging to another, and the subject whilst in my possession is destroyed by an accidental fire, I am not liable to the owner in respect of the damage. ‘*Damnum ex casu sentit dominus.*’

But when I say, ‘that no man is liable in respect of an accidental mischief,’ I mean, ‘that he is not liable *as for an injury or wrong.*’ For, by virtue of an obligation arising *aliunde*, he may be liable.

To revert to the instance which I have just cited:—I am liable to the owner for the damage done by the fire, in case I contracted with him to that effect. I am also liable in case I am a carrier, and the subject has come into my possession in the course of my calling. If the subject was deposited with me in order that I might keep it safely, I am also liable (according to the Roman Law) if I am *in morâ*: that is to say, if the owner has requested me to return the subject, and I have nevertheless kept possession of it.

But in these and similar cases, I am not liable as for an injury, but by virtue of an obligation *ex contractu* or *quasi ex contractu*. The mischief done by the fire, is not the consequence of an injury done by me; although I *shall* be answerable, *as for an injury*, in case I perform not my special obligation to make good the loss arising from the accident.

The carrier is a person on whom the law imposes a particular obligation, and all persons are supposed to deal with the carrier on the terms which the law predetermines, unless they specially provide otherwise. This is the case of what are termed dispositive laws. A particular arrangement is determined by a provision of the law, subject to be altered by a special convention between the parties. Thus, although as a carrier I am liable for all damage suffered by goods under my charge, except from the act of God, or the king’s enemies, I am at liberty to relieve myself from this liability by sticking up in my shop a notice to that effect. In either case, the obligation arises from a contract; in the one case, the parties enter into a contract, tacitly adopting the provisions of the dispositive law; in the other case, they enter into a more special contract, modifying those provisions. In the case of *morâ*, also, the obligation to answer for damage by fire or other accident, does not arise from the

fire, but is consequent, on a previous injury. If this obligation be violated, a new injury is committed and a consequent obligation incurred.⁸

Another ground of exemption is, ignorance or error with regard to matter of fact.

2. Ignorance or Error.

Now, here, although the *proximate* ground is ignorance or error, the *ultimate* ground is the absence of unlawful intention or unlawful inadvertence. For unless the ignorance or error was *inevitable* or *invincible* (or, in other words, unless it could not have been removed by due attention or advertence), the act, forbearance, or omission, which was the consequence of the ignorance or error, is imputable to negligence, heedlessness, or temerity.

I will touch briefly upon a few cases, wherein the party is exempt from civil and criminal liability, by reason of ignorance or error.

‘Si quis’ (says Ulpian) ‘hominem liberum ceciderit, dum putat servum suum, in eâ causâ est, ne injuriarum teneatur.’

Here the party whose conduct is in question beats a freeman. But he is not liable as for an assault and battery, because he believes at the time of the beating that the man is his slave. In consequence of ignorance or error, he thinks that he is exercising his indisputable right of using and abusing his own.

Another case, closely resembling the last, is the following. If the party possess *bonâ fide* a thing belonging to another, and if the thing be damaged by his abuse or carelessness, he is not liable to the owner in respect of the damage; although he *would* have been liable, if he had possessed the thing *malâ fide*. ‘Rem enim quasi suam neglexit.’

The foregoing examples are taken from the Roman: the following, from the English Law.

If I hire your servant, *knowing* that he is your servant, I am guilty of an offence against your right in the servant, and am liable to an action on the Case. But if I hire your servant, *not knowing* that he is your servant, I am not guilty

⁸ As is frequently the case with customs which prevail not in this country only but throughout Europe, the custom and understanding relating to carriers now recognised as the common law of England, has its origin in the positive law obtaining amongst the Romans: in this instance following the law founded on the Prætorian Edict, ‘Nautæ, Caurones, Stabularii, quod cujusque saluum

fore receperint, nisi restituent, in eos judicium dabo’ (D. iv. 9). The *ratio* of the liability in the Roman law was however not implied contract of indemnity, but presumed *culpa*. — R.C.

⁹ Feuerbach, p. 80-4. Mühlenbruch, 193, 331. Rosshirt, 53. Blackstone, iii. 142, 154; iv. 26. Bentham, Pr. 168.

of a wrong, and am not liable to an action, until I receive notice of his previous contract with you.

If I keep a dog given to worry cattle, and if I am apprised of *that* his mischievous inclination, I am liable for damage done by the dog to my neighbour's cow or sheep. But unless I am apprised of his vicious disposition, I am not guilty of an injury, and am not liable to make good the damage.¹⁰ For the damage is not imputable to my intention or inadvertence.

If, intending to kill a burglar who has broken into my house, I strike in the dark and kill my own servant, I am not guilty of murder, nor even of manslaughter. For the mischief is not imputable to intention or inadvertence, but to inevitable error. That is to say, to error which could not have been prevented by any attention or advertence, practicable under the circumstances.

And so much for ignorance or error, with regard to matter of fact.

Before I dismiss the subject, I will briefly advert to ignorance or error, with regard to the state of the law.

In order that an obligation may be effectual (or, in other words, in order that the sanction may operate as a motive to fulfilment), two conditions must concur. 1st. It is necessary that the party should know the law, by which the *Obligation* is imposed, and to which the *Sanction* is annexed. 2ndly. It is necessary that he should actually know (or, by due attention or advertence, *might* actually know), that the given act, or the given forbearance or omission, would *violate* the law, or amount to a *breach* of the obligation. Unless these conditions concur, it is impossible that the sanction should operate upon his desires. Or (changing the expression) the given act, or the given forbearance or omission, cannot be imputed to an unlawful intention, or to any of those modes of unlawful inadvertence which are styled negligence, heedlessness, or rashness.

¹⁰ The presumption which apparently exists in England in favour of the *man-sueti natura* of our dogs has elsewhere not passed without controversy. In a case in Scotland where sheep had been worried by a foxhound, the late Lord Cockburn repudiated the principle that 'every dog is entitled to have at least *one worry*:' and the Scotch Court agreed with him in presuming, that if a dog worry sheep, the owner is to blame.

The House of Lords (Lords Cranworth and Brougham) overruled this decision (2 Macqueen, 14). An Act was subsequently passed (for Scotland), declaring it unnecessary, in an action against the owner of the dog, to prove a previous propensity to injure cattle (26 & 27 Vict. c. 100). An Act to a similar purport was afterwards passed for England (28 & 29 Vict. c. 60).—R. C.

Accordingly, inevitable ignorance or error in respect to matter of fact, is considered, in every system, as a ground of exemption.

With regard to ignorance or error in respect to the state of the law, the provisions of different systems appear to differ considerably; although they all concur in assuming generally, that it shall not be a ground of exemption. '*Regula est, juris ignorantiam cuique nocere,*' is the language of the Pandects. And *per* Manwood, as reported by Plowden, 'It is to be presumed that no subject of this realm is misconusant of the Law whereby he is governed. Ignorance of the Law excuseth none.'

I have no doubt that this rule is expedient, or, rather, is absolutely necessary. But the reasons assigned for the rule, which I have happened to meet with, are not satisfactory.

The reason given in the Pandects is this: '*In omni parte, error in jure non eodem loco quo facti ignorantia haberi debet, quum jus finitum et possit esse et debeat: facti interpretatio plerumque etiam prudentissimos fallat.*'¹¹

Which reasoning may be expressed thus:

'Ignorance or error with regard to matter of fact, is often inevitable: that is to say, no attention or advertence could prevent it. But ignorance or error with regard to the state of the law, is never inevitable. For the law is definite and knowable, or might or ought to be so. Consequently, ignorance or error with regard to the law is no ground for exemption. If the conduct of the party be imputable to ignorance of law, it is not imputable *directly* to unlawful intention or inadvertence. But as the ignorance to which it is imputable is the consequence of unlawful inadvertence, his conduct, in the last result, is caused by his negligence.'

The reasoning involves the small mistake of confounding 'is' with 'might be' and 'ought to be.' That Law *might* be knowable by all who are bound to obey it, or that Law *ought* to be knowable by all who are bound to obey — '*finitum et possit esse et debeat,*' is, I incline to think, true. That any actual system is so knowable, or that any actual system has ever been so knowable, is so notoriously and ridiculously false that I shall not occupy your time with proof of the contrary.

Blackstone produces the same *pretiosa ratio*, flavoured with a spice of that circular argumentation wherein he delights.

¹¹ Digest, xxii. 6, 2.

‘A mistake (says he) in point of Law, which every person of discretion, not only *may*, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases no sort of defence.’

Now to affirm ‘that every person *may* know the law,’ is to affirm the thing which is not. And to say ‘that his ignorance should not excuse him *because* he is *bound* to know,’ is simply to assign the rule as a reason for itself. Being bound to know the law, he cannot effectually allege his ignorance of the law as a ground of exemption from the law. But *why* is he bound to know the law? or *why* is it presumed, *juris et de jure*, that he knew the law?

The only *sufficient* reason for the rule in question, seems to be this: that if ignorance of law were admitted as a ground of exemption, the Courts would be involved in questions which it were scarcely possible to solve, and which would render the administration of justice next to impracticable. If ignorance of law were admitted as a ground of exemption, ignorance of law would always be alleged by the party, and the Court, in every case, would be bound to decide the point.

But, in order that the Court might decide the point, it were incumbent upon the Court to examine the following questions of fact: 1st, Was the party ignorant of the law at the time of the alleged wrong? 2ndly, Assuming that he was ignorant of the law at the time of the wrong alleged, was his ignorance of the law *inevitable* ignorance, or had he been previously placed in such a position that he might have known the law, if he had duly tried?

It is manifest that the latter question is not less material than the former. If he might have known the law in case he had duly tried, the reasoning which I have produced from the Pandects would apply to his case. That is to say; Inasmuch as the conduct in question were *directly* imputable to his ignorance, it were not imputable *directly* to unlawful intention or inadvertence. But, inasmuch as his ignorance of the law were imputable to unlawful inadvertence, the conduct in question were imputable, in the last result, to his *negligence*.

Now either of these questions were next to insoluble. Whether the party was *really* ignorant of the law, and was so ignorant of the law that he had no *surmise* of its provisions, could scarcely be determined by any evidence accessible to others. And for the purpose of determining the of his ignorance (its *reality* being ascertained), it were

incumbent upon the tribunal to unravel his previous history, and to search his whole life for the elements of a just solution.

The reason for the rule in question would, therefore, seem to be this:—It not unfrequently happens that the party is ignorant of the law, and that his ignorance of the law is inevitable. But if ignorance of law were a ground of exemption, the administration of justice would be arrested. For, in almost every case, ignorance of law would be alleged. And, for the purpose of determining the *reality* and ascertaining the *cause* of the ignorance, the Court were compelled to enter upon questions of fact, insoluble and interminable.

That the party shall be presumed *peremptorily* conversant of the law, or (changing the shape of the expression) that his ignorance shall not exempt him, seems to be a rule so necessary, that law would become ineffectual if it were not applied by the Courts generally. And if due pains were taken to promulge the law, and to clear it of needless complexity, the presumption would accord with the truth in the vast majority of instances. The party (generally speaking) *would* actually *know* the law. Or the party, at least, might so *surmise* its provisions, that he could shape his conduct safely. The reasoning in the Pandects would then be just. The law would be in *fact* as '*finitum*' and knowable, as '*possit esse, et debeat.*'

The admission of ignorance of *fact* as a ground of exemption, is not attended with those inconveniences which would seem to be the reason for rejecting ignorance of *law* as a valid excuse. Whether the ignorance really existed, and whether it was imputable or not to the inadvertence of the party, is a question which may be solved by looking at the circumstances of the case. The inquiry is limited to a given incident, and to the circumstances attending that incident, and is, therefore, not interminable.

I have said that the provisions of different systems seem to differ considerably with regard to the principle which I am now considering.

In our own law, '*ignorantia juris non excusat*' seems to obtain without exception. I am not aware of a single instance in which ignorance of law (considered *per se*) exempts or discharges the party, civilly or criminally. In the case of infancy, and in certain other cases to which I shall advert directly, the presumed incapacity of the party to know the law would seem to be *one* of the grounds upon which the exemption rests. But his presumed incapacity to know the

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law is only *one* of those grounds. His exemption rests *generally*, upon his *general* incapacity (real or presumed) to judge sanely of law or fact.

From an opinion thrown out by Lord Eldon, in the case of *Stockley v. Stockley*, I inclined to think (at the first blush) that a party would be relieved, in certain instances, from a contract into which he had entered in ignorance of law.¹² But, admitting the justness of Lord Eldon's conclusion, the agreement (I conceive) would be void, not because the party was ignorant of the law, but because there is no consideration to support the promise.

According to the Roman Law, there are certain classes of persons, '*quibus permissum est jus ignorare.*' They are exempt from liability (at least for certain purposes), not by reason of their general imbecility, but because it is presumed that their capacity is not adequate to a knowledge of the law. Such are women, soldiers, and persons who have not reached the age of twenty-five. Here, ignorance of law (considered *per se*) is a ground of exemption. For women, soldiers, and multitudes of persons under twenty-five are not in that state of general imbecility, which is the ground of exemption in case of insanity, or in case of extreme youth.¹³ But ignorance of law (as a specific ground of exemption) is only admissible in favour of persons who belong to certain classes.

And this (I apprehend) shews distinctly, that the exclusion of *ignorantia juris*, as a ground of exemption, is deducible from the reason which I have already assigned. In ordinary cases, the admission of *ignorantia juris* as a ground of exemption would lead to interminable inquiry. But, in these excepted cases, it is *presumed* from the *sex*, or from the *age*, or from the *profession* of the party, that the party was ignorant of the law, and that the ignorance was inevitable. The inquiry into the matter of fact is limited to a given point: namely, the sex, age, or profession of the party who insists upon the exemption. That obvious fact being ascertained, the legal presumption or inference is drawn by the tribunal without further investigation.

Whether the legal presumption ought to obtain, or whether in most cases it do not conflict with the truth, is a distinct question. What I advance is this: that in ordinary cases, the inquiry were impracticable, because the facts upon which the solution depends are not to be ascertained.

¹² 1 Vesey & B. 31.¹³ Digest, xxii. 6, 9.

In these excepted cases the inquiry is practicable, because it is predetermined by a general rule, that certain facts which *may* be ascertained shall be received by the Courts as evidence of the facts in question. There is a *presumptio juris et de jure*, and evidence is not admissible to rebut it. Nor would the case be materially altered, assuming that the presumption may be rebutted. For the counter evidence must necessarily consist of a specific fact or facts. The large and vague inquiry is shut out by the legal presumption.

[Analogous case of *doli capacitas* in infancy. See p. 507 *post.*]

Before I quit this subject, I will advert to a curious distinction made by the Roman Law.

The persons, *quibus permissum est jus ignorare*, cannot allege with effect their ignorance of the law, in case they have violated those parts of it which are founded upon the '*jus gentium*.'¹⁴ For the persons in question are not generally imbecile, and the *jus gentium* is knowable *naturali ratione*. With regard to the *jus civile*, or to those parts of the Roman Law which are peculiar to the system, they may allege with effect their ignorance of the law.

This coincides with our distinction between *malum prohibitum* and *malum in se*; and the distinction is reasonable. For some laws are so obviously suggested by utility, that any person not insane would naturally surmise or guess their existence; which they could not be expected to do, where the utility of the law is not so obvious. And most men's knowledge of the law is mostly of this kind. They see that a particular act would be mischievous, and they conclude that it must be prohibited. The conduct of nineteen men out of twenty, in nineteen cases out of twenty, is rather guided by a surmise as to the law, than by a knowledge of it. Even lawyers have no other knowledge than this, of any branch of law but that which they have peculiarly studied. A Common Law lawyer, if he were making a will or a settlement of real property, would, if he acted rationally, surmise that there must be provisions of the law of real property which were not known to him, and would accordingly have recourse to a conveyancer, rather than foolishly attempt to draw the instrument for himself.

¹⁴ Nor (per Labeo) can they allege it, or if they had access to good legal advice if the law might have been conjectured, vice. Digest, *ubi supra*.

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The objection to *ex post facto* laws, deducible from the same principle.

Before I conclude, I must observe that the objection to laws *ex post facto*, is deducible from the general principle already explained, namely, that intention or inadvertence is necessary to constitute an injury. The law was not in existence at the time of the given act, forbearance or omission: consequently the party did not, and could not know that he was violating a law. The sanction could not operate as a motive to obedience, inasmuch as there was nothing to obey.

I am provoked to make this remark by a silly and flippant attempt in the 'Edinburgh Review' to justify or palliate *ex post facto* legislation. Speaking of Lord Strafford's attainder, the writer talks to the following effect.

'It is commonly objected to punishment inflicted *ex post facto*, that it operates not as a warning. But this is a fallacy. Punishment inflicted *ex post facto* does operate as a warning. The punishment inflicted upon Lord Strafford operated as a warning to succeeding statesmen.' The writer mistakes the objection (simple and obvious as it is) which is commonly urged against punishment inflicted *ex post facto*. It is not objected to such punishment, that it may not operate as a warning. But it is objected, and is truly objected, to such punishment, that the party *upon whom it is inflicted* was not warned. He confounds the application of a law to cases which precede it, with the application of the same law to cases which follow it. With regard to cases which precede it, the law (if it extend to those cases) is an *ex post facto* law. With regard to cases which follow it, it is not.

That is to say, the writer answers the objection to *ex post facto* legislation, by shewing that the objection does not apply to *other* legislation.

I have treated this nonsense with great indulgence; for I have assumed that the punishment inflicted upon Lord Strafford might at least operate as a warning to succeeding statesmen.

But even this is false. For the law by which he suffered was not only *ex post facto*, but was what is styled in the Roman Law a *privilegium*. It was a law inflicting punishment upon Strafford specifically, and not declaring in general expressions, 'that those who might do thereafter as Strafford had done should be visited with Strafford's fate.'

If the punishment had been inflicted by virtue of a judicial decision, then also it might have operated as a warning. For one judicial decision being commonly the basis of

others, a judicial decision is tantamount to a law conceived in general expressions.

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But from an arbitrary command nothing can be concluded. Although the supreme Legislature punished Strafford, it could not be inferred (looking at the nature of its proceeding) that it would punish future statesmen walking in Strafford's steps.

It must be observed that a judicial decision *primæ impressionis*, or a judgment by which a new point of law is for the first time decided, is always an *ex post facto* law with respect to the particular case on which the point first arose, and on which the decision was given.

• NOTES.

The subjoined Tables are copied from the margins of Mühlenbruch and Mackeldey at the pages referred to in the footnotes, pp. 492, 495 *ante*.—S. A.

Damnum fortuitum.

Damn. ex. homine facto.

Proprio.

Alieno.

Licito (sed
obligatorio) q. ex. c.

Illicito
s. injuriâ in
gen.

• Aquilia culpa (s. Culpa simpliciter) ob damnum *injuriâ* datum, idque faciendo, præstanda.

Dolus.

Culpa.

Lata.

Levis.

Negligentia ob Obligationis vinculum, idque faciendo vel non faciendo, præstanda.

Culpa lata: C. dolo prox.
Dolus.

Culpa levis,
culpa simpliciter.

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Casus.

Factum voluntarium.

Proprium.

Alienum.

Licitum.

Illicitum.

Dolo.

Culpâ.

Morâ.

LECTURE XXVI.

THE SAME SUBJECT

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lation.

HAVING in the Lecture which immediately preceded the last, assumed that intention or unlawful inadvertence is a necessary ingredient in injury or wrong, I endeavoured in my last Lecture to prove this assumption by a brief analysis of the various classes of injuries. Having demonstrated by general reasoning, that unlawful intention or inadvertence is of the essence of injury, I then adverted to certain cases in which an act, forbearance, or omission seems to be an injury, although its author neither was conscious, nor could he be conscious, that he was violating an obligation. A creditor, for example, by English law, may sue without previous demand, although the obligation on the part of the debtor is merely to pay the debt on demand. These cases, I observed, are anomalies, and the rule of the Common Law Courts which admits such suits, conflicts, not only with general principles, but with the practice which prevails in analogous cases in the Courts of Equity, as well as with the rules of the Roman law.

I next observed that if we examined the ground of most of the exemptions from liability, we should find that they ultimately rest on the principle that intention or inadvertence is necessary to constitute wrong. A party is exempt, either because he is clear in fact from unlawful intention or inadvertence, or because, (which generally amounts to the same thing), he is presumed to be clear of both. In order to confirm this remark, I examined at some length two of the principal grounds of exemption from liability, namely, 1st, *casus*, *chance* or *accident*, and 2ndly, *ignorance* or *error*; this last being either with relation to a matter of fact, or with relation to the state of the law.

Having explained the import of *casus* or *accident*, I endeavoured to shew that the exemption on account of *casus* rests on the broad principle already laid down. As the party could not foresee the mischievous event, or, foreseeing, could not prevent it, the mischief was not the consequence of his unlawful intention or inadvertence, and therefore is not imputed to him. Obligations to answer for mischance arise, when they do arise, not from injuries, but from contracts and quasi-contracts.

In the case of ignorance or error also, the ground of the exemption is the absence of unlawful intention and of unlawful inadvertence. For if the ignorance or error be not invincible and inevitable, but might have been cured or prevented by due attention, the mischievous consequence is imputed to the party.

With respect to ignorance or error regarding the state of the law, I put a difficulty which naturally suggests itself; it is this. In order that the obligation may be effectual, or in order that the sanction may determine the party from the wrong, it is necessary, 1st, that the party should know or surmise the law which imposes the obligation, and to which the sanction is annexed; and 2ndly, that he should know, or might know by due attention or advertence, that the specific act, forbearance, or omission would conflict with the ends of the law and of the duty. Unless both these conditions concur, the sanction cannot operate as a motive, and the act, forbearance, or omission, is not imputable to unlawful intention, or to negligence, heedlessness, or rashness. But although to render the sanction efficacious, it is necessary that the party should know the law, it is assumed generally or universally, in every system of law, that ignorance or error as to the state of the law shall not exempt the party from liability. This inflexible or nearly inflexible maxim would seem to conflict with the necessary principle, which I have so often stated, respecting the constituents of injury or wrong. For ignorance of the law is often inevitable, and where the injury or wrong is the consequence of that inevitable ignorance, it is not even remotely the effect of unlawful intention or of unlawful inadvertence.

The solution of this difficulty is to be found in the principles of judicial evidence. The admission of ignorance of law as a specific ground of exemption, would lead to interminable investigation of insoluble questions of fact, and would, in effect, nullify the law by hindering the administration of

justice. This rule, therefore, is one which it is necessary to maintain, although it occasionally wounds the important principle, that unlawful intention or inadvertence is a necessary ingredient of injury.

I then adverted to certain exceptions to this rule permitted by the Roman law, and shewed that those exceptions consist with the reason of the general maxim, and also serve to indicate what that reason is. Lastly, I observed that these exceptions ultimately rest on the principle which it was the main purpose of my Lecture to explain and illustrate:—and shewed that wherever ignorance of law exempts from liability, the ignorance is presumed to be inevitable, and the party, therefore, to be clear from unlawful intention and inadvertence.

Consideration of the exemptions from liability resumed.

If I were to examine *all* the exemptions which ultimately rest upon this principle, the present inquiry would run to unconscionable length. But I shall briefly touch upon a few, to which I did not advert in my last Lecture.

3. Infancy and Insanity.

And, first, an infant or a person insane is exempted from liability, not because he is an infant or because he is insane, but because it is inferred from his infancy or insanity, that at the time of the alleged wrong he was not capable of unlawful intention or inadvertence. It is *inferred* from his infancy or insanity, that, at the time of the alleged wrong, he was ignorant of the law; or (what in effect is the same thing) was unable to remember the law. Or (assuming that he had known, and was unable to remember the law) it is inferred that he was unable to apply the law, and to govern his conduct accordingly: that he did not and could not foresee the consequences of his conduct; and, therefore, did not and could not foresee that his conduct tended to the consequences which it was the end of the law to avert.

For, in order that I may adjust my conduct to the command or prohibition of the law, I must know and remember what the law *is*; I must distinctly apprehend the *nature* of the conduct which I contemplate; and (in the language of lawyers and logicians) I must correctly *subsume* the *specific case as falling within the law*. In other words, I must compare the conduct which I contemplate with the purpose or end of the law, and must be able to perceive that it agrees or conflicts with that purpose or end. Every application of the law to a fact or case, is a syllogism of which the minor premiss and the conclusion are singular propositions. Unless I am competent to this intellectual process, the sanction cannot

operate as a motive to the fulfilment of the obligation, or (changing the expression) the obligation is necessarily ineffectual.

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That the ultimate basis of the exemption of infants and lunatics is the presumed absence of unlawful intention or inadvertence, will appear from the following consideration.

For if the infant was *doli capax* (or was conscious that his conduct conflicted with the law), his infancy does not excuse him. Certain evidence of his capacity of unlawful intention, or even the specific and precise evidence afforded by the fact or its circumstances, rebuts the general and uncertain presumption which arises from his age. And if the alleged wrong was done in a lucid interval, the fact is imputed to the madman. There are, indeed, cases, wherein the *præsumptio juris* founded on infancy is '*juris et de jure*.' That is to say, the inference which the law preappoints, is conclusive as well as preappointed. The tribunal is not only bound to draw the inference, but to reject counter-evidence.

While I am on the subject of legal presumptions, I shall perhaps be excused for digressing from the main subject of the Lecture, for the purpose of giving some explanations for which no other occasion may arise.

Digression on the different kinds of *præsumptiones juris*.

It is absurd to style conclusive inferences, *presumptions*. For a presumption, *ex vi termini*, is an inference or conclusion which *may* be disproved. Till proof to the contrary be got, the inference may hold. On proof to the contrary, it can hold no longer.

But according to the language of the Civilians (language which has been adopted by some of our writers on evidence), *presumptions* are divisible in the following manner.

Presumptions are *præsumptiones juris*, or *præsumptiones hominis*. *Præsumptiones juris* are inferences drawn in pursuance of the preappointment of the law. The law predetermines the *probative* effect of the fact, or instructs the judge to draw a certain inference from a fact of a certain sort. For example, the presumption already stated in favour of infants is *præsumptio juris*. The law predetermines that from the fact of infancy, the incapacity of unlawful intention and of unlawful inadvertence shall be inferred. *Præsumptiones hominis*, or presumptions simply so called, are drawn from facts of which the law has left the probative force to the discretion of the judge. In other words, he is not instructed to draw a given inference from a fact of the sort. *Præsump-*

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tiones juris, are again divisible into *præsumptiones juris* (simply so called) and *præsumptiones juris et de jure*.

There are therefore three classes of presumptions: *præsumptiones hominis*, *præsumptiones juris*, and *præsumptiones juris et de jure*.

Where the presumption is a *præsumptio hominis*, not only is proof to the contrary admissible, but the presumption is not necessarily conclusive, though no proof to the contrary be adduced. For instance: I sue you for goods sold and delivered, and I produce a fact leading to a presumption that the goods *were* delivered. Not only is it competent to the judge to admit counter-evidence, but to reject the presumption as *insufficient*, though no counter-evidence be adduced. For, here, the judge is at liberty to determine without restriction the exact worth of the fact as an article of evidence.

Actions frequently fail; not because the evidence produced by the Actor, is met by counter-evidence, nor because the evidence which he produces is altogether worthless; but because the inference or presumption founded upon the facts produced, is too feeble to sustain the case. The inference drawn from testimony to the truth of the fact attested is also in truth of this kind.

Where the presumption is *præsumptio juris* simply, proof to the contrary is *admissible*, but, till it be produced, the presumption necessarily holds. For, here, the law has predetermined the probative force of the fact, although it permits the judge to receive counter-evidence. The law, or the maker of the law, says to the Courts, 'Receive counter-evidence if it be produced, and weigh the effect of that evidence against the worth of the presumption. But till such counter-evidence be produced, draw from the given fact the inference which I predetermine.' For example: Where an infant has attained a certain age, proof of his *doli capacitas* is admissible. But until such proof be produced, it is inferred from the fact of his infancy, that he is not *doli capax*.

Where the *præsumptio juris* is *juris et de jure*, the law predetermines the probative force of the fact, and also forbids the admission of counter-evidence. The inference (for it is absurd to call it a presumption) is *conclusive*. That is to say, proof to the contrary is not admissible. For, all that is meant by a conclusive proof, is a proof which the law has made so. Independently of predetermination that it *shall* be conclusive, no inference from one fact to another

can be more than probable: Although, in loose language, we style the proof *conclusive*, wherever the probability appears to be great.

As an instance of a presumption *juris et de jure*, I may mention the case of an infant under a certain age; for example, seven years. Here, according to the Roman Law, and (*semble*) according to our own, the infant is presumed *juris et de jure* incapable of unlawful intention or culpable inadvertence. His incapacity is inferred or presumed from the age wherein he is; and proof to the contrary of that preappointed inference is not admissible by the tribunals.

In numerous cases, presumptions *juris et de jure* are purely fictitious. They are resorted to by the Courts as a means of legislating indirectly. For example, a *grant* of an easement is inferred from the fact of its having been enjoyed, or a surrender of a trust term is presumed by the Courts of Law because the trust has been performed. In the first case (which is the simpler and more intelligible of the two) a certain legal consequence is annexed to length of enjoyment by means of a fictitious presumption. It is not believed that there ever was a grant; but the jury are instructed by the judge to infer that there was from the fact of the enjoyment.

In other words, acquisitive prescription is unknown to the English Law in its direct form.¹⁵ Directly and avowedly, length of enjoyment is not a *mode of acquisition*,

¹⁵ No acquisitive prescription in English Law.¹⁶ Difference between acquisitive and restrictive prescription not so

obvious now, on account of the frequent use of possessory actions.

¹⁶ Notwithstanding the change in the law of prescription made by the statute 3 & 4 W. IV. c. 27, the statement in the text that 'acquisitive prescription is unknown to the English law in its direct form,' is (subject to the correction on p. 516, *post*) still perfectly accurate. The whole frame of this statute is *negative*, that is, denying action to persons who have neglected a claim for a certain period of time: although, in the case of many titles, the protection afforded by this act is nearly equivalent to that afforded by an *acquisitive* or *positive* prescription. In Scotland there is an acquisitive or positive prescription where heritable subjects have been possessed conformably to *sasines* (that is, to the instrument evidencing the act of feudally receiving possession) for forty years con-

tinuously and peaceably. Where the *sasine*, founded on the root of title, bears to have been taken by a singular successor (or *purchaser*), the production of the deed of alienation (or purchase) on which the *sasine* is grounded, is further necessary to make an unexceptionable title, but it is not necessary to shew any further documents so as to connect the owner with the crown as the author of all heritable rights. This prescription is said to be *positive* or *acquisitive*, because the owner, although he may have originally purchased a *non domino*, acquires by it what is *expressly* and *avowedly* enacted to be a title against all the world. This prescription is founded on an Act of the Scotch Parliament made in the year 1617.—R.C.

or (in the language of our own law) a *title*. But a *grant* is a *title* directly and avowedly: And, by feigning a grant from length of enjoyment, length of enjoyment becomes a title in effect, or that mode of acquisition which is styled *acquisitive* prescription is introduced *indirectly*.

The number of rights and obligations, which (in our own law and in the Roman also) are created and imposed obliquely by means of these fictitious presumptions, is truly astonishing. Probably one-third of the rights conferred by the Roman Law, and a very great proportion in our own, are conferred in this absurd manner. The various statutes of limitations do not give a *titulus* on which the party can positively insist, but are merely opposed as a bar to a right of action residing in a determinate party. All prescription known to the English Law is, I believe, in theory, merely negative or extinctive.¹⁷

It is evident, that unless these, fictitious presumptions were *juris et de jure*, they could not answer their purpose. But presumptions *juris et de jure* are not always fictitious. Some of them are really founded on probability, and counter-evidence is excluded for a special reason. Such, for instance, is the presumption that the party knows the law. This presumption is really true in the majority of instances; and is made conclusive for the reason which I have before stated, namely, that a judicial inquiry into its truth must otherwise be resorted to in every instance, and the administration of justice be rendered impossible.

Reverting to the subject from which I have digressed,—the presumption *juris et de jure* ‘that the infant under seven is not *doli capax*,’ is probably well founded in almost every instance. It is probably made conclusive in *all* instances, on account of the little advantage which could arise from the punishment of a child in any instance whatever. His punishment would rather revolt, than serve as a useful example, and it is therefore expedient to extinguish inquiry at once by a conclusive presumption of innocence. It cannot, then, be inferred from this case, that the exemption from liability by reason of infancy does not rest upon the broad principle which I am endeavouring to explain.

I observe that Mr. Bentham ascribes this exemption, and also the exemption in case of insanity and drunkenness, to a

¹⁷ See modification of this statement on p. 516,

different principle: namely, 'that the prospect of evils so distant as those which are held forth by the Law, cannot have the effect of influencing the conduct of the party.'

But this (I think) will not hold. In case the party, at the moment of the alleged wrong, were conscious of the law, and could foresee the consequences of his conduct, it is manifest that the sanction would inspire him with some desire of avoiding it. And an inquiry into the strength or steadiness of that desire, would seem to be idle; because it must necessarily be different in every different person, whether he be infant or adult, mad or sane, drunk or sober.

There are indeed cases, to which I shall advert directly, wherein the party is held exempt, because he is moved to the alleged wrong by a desire so strong and imperious that no sanction could get the better of it. Such are the cases in which a party is exempted because he was compelled *metu*: that is, by some apprehension which it is supposed that no will, however strong, can resist.

The reason assigned by Blackstone, and by various other writers, is hardly worth powder and shot.

He tells us that a wrong is the effect of a wicked will. And (says he) infants and madmen are exempted, because the act goes not with their will, or is not imputable to a wicked will.

Now, in case the alleged wrong be wrought by action, it is clear that there must be a will going with the act, although the party may not be conscious of a wrong. In case it be wrought negatively, it is true that the forbearance or omission does not go with volition, or is not *directly* the consequence of a volition. But what would that matter, if the forbearance were accompanied by an unlawful intention, or the omission could be ascribed to culpable negligence?

By dint of much explanation, it is true that this jargon may be made intelligible. By the will of the party, Blackstone means (so far as he means anything) the state of the party's consciousness. By a wicked will, he means unlawful intention or unlawful inadvertence. And he means that the alleged wrong is not imputable to either, when he says that it cannot be ascribed to a wicked will. And when he affirms, that the ground of every exemption is a want or defect of will, he means that the ground of every exemption is inevitable ignorance: inevitable ignorance of the law; or of the certain or probable consequences of the alleged wrong; or of

the relation or connection between that alleged wrong and the law. He cannot mean to affirm that an infant or mad-man has not as much *will* as the adult or the sane.

Nor is his position, thus translated, true. For, in certain cases (as I shall shew immediately), the party is exempt, although he is conscious of the law; of the nature and consequences of his own conduct; and of the relation or connection between his conduct and the law.

I have stated that infancy or insanity is a ground of exemption, partly because the party was ignorant of the law, or is presumed to have been ignorant of the law. This does not contradict what I before said, that ignorance of the law is never in our own system a ground of exemption. For in the case of insanity or infancy, it is not a specific or distinct ground of exemption: infants and lunatics are not exempted distinctly and solely on that account. It may, however, be considered as one ground of the exemption in company with other grounds from which it is impossible to sever it in the particular cases.

4. Drunk-
of
law).

In the English Law, drunkenness is not an exemption. In criminal cases, never: nor in civil cases when the ground of the liability is of the nature of a delict; but a party is at times released from a contract which he entered into when drunk. In the Roman Law, drunkenness was an exemption even in the case of a delict; provided the drunkenness itself was not the consequence of unlawful intention: if, for instance, I resolve to kill you, and drink in order to get pluck, according to the vulgar expression, the mischief, although committed in drunkenness, is ultimately imputable to my intention. In all other cases, drunkenness was a ground of exemption in the Roman Law.

The ultimate ground of this exemption is the same as in the case of insanity or infancy. The party is unable to remember the law if he knew it, or to appreciate distinctly the fact he is about, or to subsume it as falling under the law.

Where unintentional drunkenness, that is, drunkenness which is not itself the consequence of unlawful intention, is not a ground of exemption; the party, it is evident, is liable in respect of heedlessness. There is no unlawful consciousness at the time of the offence, but he might have known before he got drunk, that he was likely when drunk to commit acts inconsistent with the ends of his duties. He has heedlessly

placed himself in a position, of which the probable consequence will be the commission of a wrong.

This remote inadvertence is very often a ground of liability. Remote inadvertence is what I have just explained. The party is guilty of remote inadvertence, where the alleged wrong is not imputable directly to unlawful intention or inadvertence, but is a natural consequence of a position in which he has placed himself from inadvertence, and is therefore a remote effect of inadvertence. When the party commits the wrong in consequence of his ignorance of the law, the ground of liability might be referred to remote inadvertence. Were it not for the legal presumption, that he knows the law, the fact would be imputable to him, if at all, from his having previously neglected to make himself acquainted with the law.

Another ground of exemption is sudden and furious anger. In English law, this is never a ground of exemption: in Roman Law it is, for the same reason as drunkenness and insanity.

5. Sudden and furious anger (in some systems).

Where the party is answerable for an alleged wrong done in furious anger, the reasoning is the same as in the case of drunkenness. He is guilty, not in respect of what he has done in furious anger, but in respect of his having neglected that self-discipline, which would have prevented such furious fits of anger.

There are many cases of liability on similar grounds. *Imperitia*, for instance, or want of skill, is the source of a common case of liability both in our own and in the Roman Law. In this case the ground of the obligation is the same as in the case last specified. Pretending to practise as a physician or as a surgeon, I do harm to some person: in the particular case I attend with all my skill, and the mischief is not imputable to unlawful intention or inadvertence at that time, but to neglect of the previous duty of qualifying myself by study for the profession I affect to exercise.

Liability for injuries done by third parties, is ascribed justly by Mr. Bentham to the same cause. I am liable for injuries done by persons whom I employ, because it is generally in my power not to employ persons of such a character, or to form them by discipline and education so as to be incapable of the commission of wrong. The first reason applies to a man's servants, the last to his children. The obligation is peculiarly strong in the Roman Law, because of the great extent of the *patria potestas*: by reason of which it probably

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An illogical
distinction
in Roman
Law be-
tween de-
licts and
quasi-de-
licts.

was in the power of the father not only to form the character of his child by previous discipline, but in most cases to prevent the specific mischief by specific care.¹⁸

Before I quit the subject, I shall remark on a distinction which is made by the Roman lawyers, and which appears to me illogical and absurd: (a rare and surprising thing in the Roman Law). I mean the distinction between *delicts* and *quasi-delicts*. I cannot discover any ground for this distinction from the capricious way in which they arrange offences under these two heads.

The *imperitia* for instance of a physician is a delict; but the *imprudentia* of a judge, who is liable in certain cases for erroneous decisions, is a quasi-delict. The ground of the liability in these two cases is precisely the same. The guilt of the party in both cases consists in taking upon himself the exercise of a function, without duly qualifying himself by previous preparation. And as the right violated is in both cases a right *in rem*, the offence is properly a delict. This distinction, therefore, appears to me to be groundless; though I draw such a conclusion with diffidence, when it refers to any distinction drawn by the Roman lawyers, whose distinctions I have found in almost every other case to rest on a solid foundation.

All the exemptions, which have now been examined, may be referred to the same principle. The party neither was conscious nor could he be conscious that he was violating his duty, and consequently the sanction could not operate on his desires. And this principle will account for the greater number of exemptions, but not for all.

Grounds of

ing on the
foregoing
principle.
1. Physical

The party is exempted in some cases in which the sanction act on his desires, but in which the fact does not depend on his desires.

Such is the case of physical compulsion. A person is not liable for what he is forced to do by physical constraint; in which he is not an agent, but an instrument or means. In this case, he may be conscious of the obligation, and fear the sanction: but the sanction would not be effectual if applied, because it is impossible for him to perform the obligation.¹⁹

Pothier, 'Traité des Obligations,' Part II. ch. vi. sec. viii. Art. II. § 5. (454). The distinction that obtains in the case where the injured party is also a servant rests upon the contract express or implied between the master and the latter, who is held to undertake the risks

of this exemption, which appears to have been first distinctly laid down by Shaw, C. J. in an American case, the English, Scotch, and American courts are at one, See 4 Metcalf, 40, 3 Macqueen, 300, 316. Law Reports, 1 Q. B. 149, 2 Q. B. 33, and 1 N. of L. Sc. 328.—R. C.

There is still another case which is distinguishable from this ; in which the sanction might operate on the desires of the party, might be present to his mind, and the performance of the duty might not be altogether independent of his desires ; but the party is affected with an opposite desire, of a strength which no sanction can control, and the sanction therefore would be ineffectual. Such for instance is the case in which a party is compelled by menaces of instant death to commit what would otherwise be a crime. For example, if I am compelled by the king's enemies to join their ranks and fight against the king, I am not liable for treason, provided that I take the earliest opportunity of making my escape. The reason is that I am urged to a breach of the duty by a motive more proximate and more imperious than any sanction which the law could hold out : and as the sanction therefore would not be operative, its infliction would be gratuitous cruelty.

2. Extreme terror.

I believe that all these exemptions, except the two last mentioned, may be explained on the principle so often referred to.

In conformity with usage, I have talked of these various circumstances as cases of exemption from liability : but it would be more correct to say, that they are cases in which the parties are not obliged ; cases to which the notion of obligation cannot apply, because the sanction could not be operative. Injury is co-extensive with obligation. Now we are not bound absolutely to do or forbear ; we are bound (strictly speaking) not to omit negligently, or to forbear with unlawful intention or unlawful inadvertence. Therefore, where no unlawful intention or inadvertence exists, the party has not broken any obligation, nor consequently incurred any liability from which he can be exempted. The sanction would be ineffectual, either as not operating on the desires, as in the five first-mentioned cases, or as operating upon them in vain, as in the two cases last mentioned.

The so-called exemptions not properly exemptions, but cases to which the idea of obligation does not apply.

It may be remarked that the first of these cases, namely that of physical compulsion, falls within *casus* or accident, since, as I have already observed, the act of man as *aggressura latronum* falls within the notion of

the act is not the *act of the party* at all. It bears however so strongly the semblance of an act of the party, as to be properly mentioned in an exhaustive category of exemptions.—R. C.

LECTURE XXVII.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF SANCTIONS.

LECT.
XXVIICorrection
of state-
ments in
last Lec-
ture,
Anger,
p. 513, *ante*.

I WISH, before I commence, to correct one or two mistakes into which I fell in my last Lecture.

I said that furious anger is a ground of exemption in the Roman Law. Now anger may be such as to exclude all consciousness of the unlawfulness of the act; or it may not exclude all consciousness of the unlawfulness: although it prompts the party to an act (accompanied by an unlawful intention), from which he would otherwise abstain.

It is only in the first case that it is a ground of exemption in the Roman Law. It exempts, precisely as insanity exempts, and is in truth considered as temporary madness. When the anger does not exclude all consciousness of the unlawfulness of the act, and is yet a cause of mitigation, the ground is not the absence of unlawful intention and of unlawful inadvertence, but the absence of *deliberate* intention. In this, as in various other cases, the disposition of the party is taken into the account, and as less malignity of disposition is evinced by a criminal intention when sudden than when deliberate, the punishment is commonly less. In English Law, for example, if the fact were homicide, the offence would in the one case be murder, in the other only voluntary manslaughter.

On the other hand, where an act which does suspend the use of reason is not a ground of exemption, it is because the act arises remotely from negligence. Thus, where drunkenness is not a ground of exemption, as in our own law, the party is not answerable because at the time of the wrong he was guilty of unlawful intention or unlawful inadvertence; but because he has negligently placed himself in a position from which he might have known that criminal acts were not unlikely to ensue.

Statement
as to

I also stated too roundly that acquisitive præscription in its direct form is unknown in the English Law. A præscription in a *que estate*, as it is called, or a præscription of an easement appurtenant, is recognised directly by the English Law. But I think this is the only instance. Easements in gross are not acquired by præscription in that direct way, but in the oblique mode before explained. Rights amounting to *proprietas* or *dominium* are *never* acquired by direct præscription. The operation of the different statutes of limitation

is purely negative or extinctive; it merely bars the right of a definite person, and does not give^a to the party in possession a right which he can enforce against the world. I may plead the statutes of limitation in bar to an action brought by a party who would otherwise be entitled. But in order to enforce my right of property against third parties, I can only proceed by proving anterior possession. This, against a person who can produce no title at all, establishes my right.

The distinction between acquisitive and negative præscription turns solely, as it appears to me, upon the nature of the evidence which it is requisite to give in order to enable the owner to recover the thing when detained by a stranger. It may be only necessary to show anterior possession, in order to enable him to maintain an action; or to maintain an action it may be necessary for him to shew his title. If it be necessary to shew his title, then unless a title may be acquired by acquisitive præscription, he cannot sustain the action. But the right which he possesses under the statute of limitation certainly would not enable him to maintain an action against a third party.

Having endeavoured to explain the essentials of Injuries and Sanctions, and, therein, to illustrate the nature of obligations or duties, I will now advert to the differences by which sanctions are distinguished. If I attempted a complete examination of all these differences, the present inquiry would run to inordinate length: And those more important differences upon which I shall touch, will sufficiently suggest the others to the memory or reason of my hearers.

And, first; Sanctions may be divided into *civil* and *criminal*, or (changing the expressions) into *private* and *public*.

Sanctions
civil and
criminal.

As I remarked in a former Lecture,²⁰ the distinction between private and public wrongs, or civil injuries and crimes, does not rest upon any difference between the respective tendencies of the two classes of offences: *All* wrongs being in their *remote* consequences *generally* mischievous: and most of the wrongs styled public, being *immediately* detrimental to determinate persons.

Viewed from a certain aspect, all wrongs and all sanctions are public. For all wrongs are violations of laws established directly or indirectly by the Sovereign or State. And all sanctions are enforced by the sovereign, or by sovereign authority.

But in certain cases of wrongs which are offences against

²⁰ Lecture XVII. p. 416, *ante*.

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rights, or (changing the expression) which are breaches of relative duties, the sanction is enforced at the instance or discretion of the injured party. It is competent to the determinate person immediately affected by the wrong, to enforce or remit the liability incurred by the wrong-doer. And, in every case of the kind, the injury and the sanction may be styled *civil*, or (if we like the term better) *private*.

In other cases of wrongs which are breaches of relative duties, and in all cases of wrongs which are breaches of absolute duties, the sanction is enforced at the discretion of the Sovereign or State. It is only by the sovereign or state that the liability incurred by the wrong-doer can be remitted. And in every case of the kind, the injury and the sanction may be styled *criminal* or *public*.

In some countries, the pursuit or prosecution of Crimes does not strictly reside in the sovereign or state, but in some *member* of the sovereign body. For instance, the pursuit of criminals resides in this country in the King; or, in a few instances, in the House of Commons, as when it impeaches an alleged offender before the House of Lords. The definition of a criminal sanction and of a crime must therefore be taken with this qualification.

In short, the distinction between private and public wrongs, or civil injuries and crimes, would seem to consist in this :

Where the wrong is a *civil injury*, the sanction is enforced at the discretion of the party whose right has been violated. Where the wrong is a *crime*, the sanction is enforced at the discretion of the sovereign.²¹ And, accordingly, the same wrong may be private or public, as we take it with reference to one, or to another sanction. Considered as a ground of action on the part of the injured individual, a battery is a civil injury. The same battery, considered as a ground for an indictment, is a crime or public wrong.

The distinction, as I have now stated it, between civil injuries and crimes, must, however, be taken with the following explanations.

1st. In certain cases of civil injury, it is not competent to the injured party, either to pursue the offender before the tribunals, or to remit the liability which the offender has incurred. For example, An infant who has suffered a wrong

²¹ See distinction between Civil Injuries and Crimes, in Lecture XVII., 'On Absolute Duties,' p. 417.

is not capable of instituting a suit, nor of renouncing the right which he has acquired by the injury. The suit is instituted on his behalf by a general or special Guardian: who (as a trustee for the infant) may also be incapable of remitting the offender's liability.

It were, therefore, more accurate to say, that where the wrong is a civil injury, the sanction is enforced at the instance of the injured, or of his representative; and that the liability of the offender (if remissible at all) is remissible by the injured party, and not by the sovereign or state.

2ndly. When I speak of the discretion of the sovereign or state, I mean the discretion of the sovereign or state as exercised according to law. For, by a special and arbitrary command, the sovereign may deprive the injured of the right arising from the injury, or may exempt the wrong-doer from his civil liability. [Herein lies the difference between governments of *law* and governments of *men*.] In one or two of the bad governments still existing in Europe, this foolish and mischievous proceeding is not uncommon. For example, Letters of protection are granted by the government to debtors, and by these the debtors are secured from the pursuit of their creditors. But in cases of this kind the sovereign partially abrogates his own law to answer some special purpose. This is never practised by wise governments, whether monarchical or other. The Great Frederick, in spite of his imperious temper and love of power, always conformed his own conduct to his own laws.

Letters of protection were granted in this country by the King, so late as the reign of William III.²² These must have been illegal. For though the King is empowered by the Constitution to pursue and pardon criminals at his own discretion, he is not Sovereign. It is not competent to him to disregard the law by depriving the injured party of a right of civil action. In an analogous case, this has, however, been done by the Parliament. A person named Wright sued a number of clergymen for non-residence;²³ and though he had been encouraged to bring these actions by the invitation of the existing law, Parliament passed an Act indemnifying the clergymen, and put off poor Wright with the expense of the actions which he had brought.

²² See the case of Lord Cutts, 3 Lev. 332. Taunton, vols. v. and vi. I presume the Act referred to is 57 Geo. III. c.

²³ Some of the cases are reported in —R. C.

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Public and
private
wrongs.

The distinction between private and public wrongs, is placed by some on another ground:

Where, say they, the injury is a crime, the end or scope of the sanction is the *prevention* of future injuries. The evil inflicted on the individual offender, is inflicted as a punishment, or for the sake of warning or example. In other words, the evil is inflicted on the individual offender, in order that others may be deterred from similar offences. Where the injury is civil, the end of the sanction is redress to the injured party.

Now, it is certainly true, that where the injury is treated as a crime, the end of the sanction is the prevention of future wrongs. The sanction is *pœna* or *punishment* (strictly so called): that is to say, an evil inflicted on a given offender in order that others may observe the law. Or (what is the same thing) the evil is inflicted on the given offender, by way of example, warning, or *documentum*: In order that others may be *reminded* of the evils threatened by the law, and may be convinced that its menaces are not idle and vain.

This is manifestly the meaning of the word example, when we speak of punishment being inflicted for the sake of example. We mean that the punishment is inflicted by way of caution or warning; for the sake of recalling to others the threats of the law. The word commonly used by Latin writers, and more especially by Tacitus, is *documentum*. If the evil did not answer this purpose, it would be inflicted to no end.

It is also equally true, that where the injury is considered civil, the proximate end of the sanction is, (generally speaking,) redress to the injured party. But, still, the difference between civil injuries and crimes, can hardly be found in any difference between the ends or purposes of the corresponding sanctions.

For, first; Although the proximate end of a civil sanction, is, generally speaking, redress to the injured party, its remote and paramount end, like that of a criminal sanction, is the prevention of offences generally.

And, secondly; An action is sometimes given to the injured party, in order that the wrong-doer may be visited with *punishment*, and not in order that the injured party may be *redressed*. Actions of this sort (to which I shall advert immediately) are styled *penal*: In the language of the Roman Law, *pœnæ persecutoriæ*.

These propositions I will endeavour to explain.

It is quite clear that the necessity of making redress, and of paying the costs of the proceeding by which redress is compelled, *tends* to prevent the recurrence of similar injuries; The immediate effect of the proceeding is the restitution of the injured party to the enjoyment of the violated right, or the compulsory performance of an obligation incumbent upon the defendant, or satisfaction to the injured party in the way of equivalent or compensation. But the proceeding also operates *in terrorem*. For it is seen that the wrong-doer is stripped of every advantage which he may have happened to derive from the wrong, and is subjected to the expenses and other inconveniences of a suit.

Accordingly, a promise *not* to sue, in case the promisee shall wrong the promisor, is void (generally speaking) by the Roman Law: Although it is competent to a party who has *actually* suffered a wrong, to remit the civil liability incurred by the wrong-doer. And the reason alleged for the prohibition is this: That such a promise removes the salutary fear which is inspired by prospective liability. A right of action is not merely considered as an instrument or means of redress, but as a restraint or determinative from wrong.

In short, the end or purpose for which the action is given is double: redress to the party directly affected by the injury, and the prevention of similar injuries: The accomplishment of the former, which is the proximate purpose, tending to accomplish the latter, which is the remote and paramount.

Assuming, then, that the redress of the injured party is always one object of a civil proceeding, it cannot be said that civil and criminal sanctions are distinguished by their ends or purposes.

• It may, however, be urged, that the prevention of future injuries is the sole end of a criminal proceeding; whilst the end of a proceeding styled civil, is the prevention of future injuries *and* the redress of the injured. But even this will scarcely hold. For in those civil actions which are styled *penal*, the action is given to the party, not for his own advantage, but for the mere purpose of punishing the wrong-doer.

• In the Roman Law, actions of this kind are numerous.

For example; Theft is not a crime, but a private delict: But besides the action for the recovery of the thing stolen,

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the thief was liable to a penalty, to be recovered in a distinct action by the injured party.

So, again, if the heirs of a testator refused to pay a legacy left to a temple or church, they were not only compelled to yield '*ipsam rem vel pecuniam quæ relicta est, sed aliud, pro poenâ.*'

There are (I think) cases of the kind in our own law, though I cannot at this instant recal them. In such cases, the end of the action is not redress, but prevention.

Although by these civil actions a right is conferred upon the party injured, the end for which the actions are given is not to redress the damage which has been suffered by him, but to punish the wrong-doer, and by that means to prevent future wrongs. In the case of theft, for example, the damage sustained by the injured party is redressed by the first action for restitution, and the end of the other action for the penalty is solely the punishment of the offender. Also popular actions, or actions given *cuius ex populo*, which exist both in the Roman and English Law, evidently have the punishment of the offender for their object.

Laws sometimes sanctioned by nullities.

Besides this principal distinction, there are other species of sanctions requiring notice. Laws are sometimes sanctioned by nullities. The legislature annexes rights to certain transactions; for example, to contracts, on condition that these transactions are accompanied by certain circumstances. If the condition be not observed, the transaction is void, that is, no right arises; or the transaction is voidable, that is, a right arises, but the transaction is liable to be rescinded and the right annulled. Whether the transaction is void or voidable, the sanction may be applied either directly or indirectly. The transaction may either be rescinded on an application made to that effect, or the nullity may be opposed to a demand founded on the transaction. An instance of the first kind is an application to the Court of Chancery to set aside the transaction: an instance of the second is afforded by a defendant who opposes a ground of nullity to an action at common law. The distinction in English Law between void and voidable is the same as that in the Roman Law between null *ipso jure* and *ope exceptionis*. The first conferred no right; the second conferred a right which might be rescinded or destroyed by some party interested in setting it aside. *Ope exceptionis* is an inadequate name, for the transaction might be rescinded, not only by *exceptio*, that is, a plea, but by applications analogous to an

application to Chancery to set aside a voidable instrument or an instrument obtained by fraud.

In certain cases, sanctions consist in pains to be endured by others, and are intended to act on us through sympathy. These Mr. Bentham has styled vicarious punishments. They fall on other persons in whom we take an interest, and if they affect us at all, affect us by our sympathy with those persons. Forfeiture, in treason, is an instance. As it falls upon a person who by the supposition is to be hanged, it is evident that it cannot affect *him*, but it affects those in whom he is interested, his children or relations, and may possibly, for that reason, influence his conduct. Annuling a marriage has in part the same effect, since it not only affects the parties themselves whose marriage is annulled, but also bastardises the issue. •

Vicarious

Sanctions, in some other cases, consist of the application of something not itself affecting us as an evil, but affecting us by association as if it were an evil. Posthumous dishonour is of this nature. It is applied as a punishment in the case of suicides who are buried with certain ignominious circumstances. This, of course, can only operate upon the mind of the party by association, since at the time when he is buried he is not conscious of the manner of his burial.

In adverting to the difference between civil and criminal sanctions, I forgot to say that where the sanction is criminal, or where the proceeding is criminal, or rather where the injury is considered as a crime, nothing but the intention of the party, the state of his consciousness, is looked to; where, on the other hand, it is a civil injury, an injury must have been committed; for the immediate end, by the supposition, is the redress of the injury to the given party: which supposes that an injury has been committed. The state of the party's consciousness is the only circumstance which is considered in crimes; and on this principle a party is punished for attempts. Generally, attempts are perfectly innocuous, and the party is punished, not in respect of the attempt, but in respect of what he intended to do.

I now advert to the various meanings of the word sanction

As it is at present used, it has the extensive meaning which I have attached to it, and denotes any conditional evil annexed to a law to produce obedience and conformity to it. According to this acceptation, which I believe is now general among writers on the subject, the liabilities under civil actions may be called sanctions with the same propriety as

Various meanings and etymology of the word Sanction.

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punishments under a criminal proceeding. But the term sanction is frequently limited to punishments strictly so called. This is the sense in which the word is used by Blackstone, though not consistently. With the Roman lawyers, who were the authors of the term, or rather who adopted it from the popular language of their own country, sanction denoted, not the pain annexed to a law to produce obedience, but the clause of a penal law which determines and declares the punishment.

In the Digest the etymology of the word is said to be this: *Sanctum* is defined *quod ab injuria hominum defensum est*, and is said to be derived from *sagmina*, the name of certain herbs which the Roman ambassadors bore as marks of inviolability. The term was transferred, in a manner not uncommon, from the mark of inviolability, to what is frequently a cause of inviolability, namely punishment.

In other cases *sanction* neither denotes the evil nor the clause determining the evil: it signifies confirmation by some legal authority. Thus, we say that a Bill becomes law when *sanctioned* by Parliament, and that it does not become law till it is *sanctioned* by the Royal assent, or till it has received the Royal sanction. And it is often used in this sense by the Roman lawyers.

Sanctio is also used to denote generally a law or legislative provision, or to denote the law or body of law collectively. Thus, in the beginning of the Digest, *totam Romanam Sanctionem* is used for the whole of the Roman Law. *Sancire* means to enact or establish laws. The manner in which it acquired this sense is easily conceivable.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

